Belarusian Yearbook 2009 by Pankovsky, Anatoly & Kostyugova, Valeria
1BELARUSIAN
Minsk, 2010
BELARUSIAN INSTITUTE FOR STRATEGIC STUDIES
WEBSITE OF THE EXPERT COMMUNITY OF BELARUS “OUR OPINION”
A survey and analysis of developments
in the Republic of Belarus in 2009
2009
Y E A R B O O K
2 	



Compiled and edited by:
Anatoly Pankovsky and Valeria Kostyugova
English version translated by Volha Hapeyeva, Vladimir Kuznetsov,
Tatsiana Tulush
English version edited by Max Nuijens
Scientific reviewers and consultants:
Miroslav Kollar, Institute for Public Affairs, Program Director of the Slovak
annual Global Report; Vitali Silitski, Doctor of Philosophy, Director of the
Belarusian Institute for Strategic Studies (BISS, Lithuania); Pavel Daneiko,
Institute for Privatization and Management; Andrei Vardomatski, Doctor
of Sociology, NOVAK laboratory; Petr Martsev, BISS Board member; Ales
Antipenko, PhD in philosophy, head of the Belarusian Collegium; Oleg
Manaev, Doctor of Sociology, the Independent Institute of Socio.Economic
and Political Studies (IISEPS); Vladimir Dunaev, PhD in philosophy, website
Nashe Mneniye (“Our opinion”); Aleksei Pikulik, Doctor of Political
Science, St. Petersburg Humanitarian University.
The yearbook is published with support
of The German Marshall Fund of the United States
ISSN 1822.4091 © Belarusian Institute for Strategic Studies
3CONTENTS

  
	

	



 

!"

 #

$%
$
&"' ()

*%+

"
 ,
	
-!"
+
%
!.

""

/0 1
	

"
2"+
	

". 3(


"+
4$"
 3#
	



		
!4!
+
52'
$ ,3


!4+
"
6 3

	
'4!
+
7!

$2 )3
 		
!
 
8+

'
.

2"
"$9 #(
!

!
 
+
:'
'!
8
'

$9 
"
;
8

5'+
!
<$".

=
"=

"

" 
4 	





#$
"
$



$"
 ((1
%
	

5'
'
"+
5
$
$

"'2 (,

	

>
>+
"%
&6
2
'
&"82!

$ (11
 	
!
>
+
=
!"!=
2

2! (3(
	
!"+
&'=

4
'
!
. (,
 
""+
 %=
 =
2 (
(
2!
$'
<%$

!+

'
$$

'
$"' (),
	'	
7!!+
?!


" ((
)
@'"+
@2'
"'2
2
 "". (
"%
$
!"8

'
<%$
> 

(	
	
!&"
$A
B
2




&. (3
( #*
""
7+



&.
$!&"
$ (
5

	
>"""+
*'
&

!&
" 1(
	
!
82
"

>.
>8
%
 31

+	
&
>8

"
".+
7%
2+
2
$!'

$%

$. ,
#,	
2.
"+

7! ,
%	
>



%6 )
 	
2"!!+
 &
& )3


 " #
5@ 11(
6 	



EDITORIAL FOREWORD
The Belarusian Yearbook has become a traditional annual effort
of Belarusian experts and specialists to compile a conceptualized
chronicle of the country’s modern history. This unique publication
offers an integrated analytical account of events and trends in
different governmental and social spheres.
In 2009 social and political life in Belarus was determined by
the world economic crisis, the country’s negotiations with the
International Monetary Fund about minimization of the impact of
the crisis, a broader dialogue with Europe, and Belarus joining the
EU Eastern partnership program. These international processes
reflected differently on all segments of Belarusian social life. The
contributors to the Yearbook sought to provide an adequate and
politically neutral review of these processes. However, the editors
and the authors gave preference to deep analysis and wide
coverage of events and trends, rather than to the neutrality of the
approach.
Contributing to this yearbook were independent analysts and
experts, as well as specialists representing different research
centers, such as the Belarusian Institute for Strategic Studies
(Lithuania), the Institute for Political Research Palitychnaya sfera
(“Political Sphere”), the Research Center of the Institute for
Privatization and Management, the Agency of Humanitarian
Technologies – Center for Social Innovation, Novak Axiometric
Research Laboratory, the Independent Institute for Social, Political
and Economic Studies, the Centre for Eastern Studies (Warsaw,
Poland), the analytical center Polesye Fund of International and
Regional Studies (Chernigov, Ukraine), and the research center
eBelarus.
The authors of this yearbook hope that, on the one hand, their
work will stimulate public debate about current transformations
in Belarus and development options open to the country and, on
the other hand, it will benefit state functionaries, business leaders,
members of the diplomatic corps, journalists, politicians and
community leaders.
Valeria Kostyugova
Anatoly Pankovsky
Vitali Silitsky
7STATE AUTHORITY
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PRESIDENTIAL ADMINISTRATION –
AN UNCERTAIN NEW LINE
Vital Silitsky
Summary
In 2009 the presidential administration remained the decisionmaking
“epicenter”. The main tendencies of its activity that we had outlined in the
previous analysis1, – the substitution by the administration of the activity of
some state bodies, its transformation into the shadow Ministry of Foreign Affairs
and the shadow Ministry of Economy – showed themselves in new colors in
2009. What also deserves attention is the actual transformation of the
administration into the shadow intelligence service in connection with the
occurrence of the operativeanalytical centre under the president of Belarus
which received large powers concerning investigatory operations and control
over the Internet space. The activity of the presidential administration was
defined by the personnel policy of the head of the state and by the agendas of
the management of the administration who started to combine the status of
state machinery politicians with the status of public politicians. As to the
consequences of the activity of the presidential administration for inner and
foreign policy of the development of the country, they were formed by
uncertainty of the general vector of the development of the state and certain
entropy of “Lukashenka’s transformations” – even despite the external pressure
and the world crisis, the system managed to survive without radical
transformations; therefore the activity of the presidential administration entirely
coincided with “the adaptable scenario” that had been realized by the authorities
since 2007, – carrying out of a minimum of the transformations necessary to
satisfy external donors, the basic geopolitical players.
Tendencies:
• The presidential administration keeps frustrating economic reforms;
• The activity of the presidential administration substitutes the activity of other
state governing bodies;
• Senior executives of the administration get the status of public politicians
Presidential administration as the shadow government
As for economy “the shadow Ministry of Economy” became the
main factor of blocking privatization in 2009. Assistant to the
1 Silitsky V. Presidential Administration // Belarusian Year book 2008. Minsk,
2009. – Pp. 7–18.
9president Siarhey Tkachou confirmed his reputation of anti.
reformer in an article of newspaper “Soviet Belarus” in August,
2009, having said that “nobody has yet proved the advantages of
private property over the state one”. Moreover, Tkachou actually
called for curtailment of those half.reforms in the sphere of
liberalization of conditions of business that had been carried out
during the previous two years. In particular, Tkachou said that in
the real partnership relations with the state private business must
use its profit for social needs, otherwise the state can nationalize
the property2.
The presidential administration successfully struggled with the
government and the Ministries of Economy in order not to ease
the control over transferring of the property to the private
individuals from the head of the state. The bill, prepared by the
government and blocked at the presidential administration,
provided the possibility to sell the shares of companies which had
not been sold at competitive auctions, at the stock exchange,
allowed the sale of unprofitable enterprises for the balance price,
gave the chance to company sales at one participant of auction
when other requests did not come and also provided a new
mechanism of denationalization – transfer of the enterprise to
management. The status quo at which the privatization approval
is necessary, even for transactions with the minimum sum,
remained. At the same time it is not necessary that privatization
will be blocked in general in the future. Probably, transactions with
low sums can keep the considerable “undercover” conditions of
property sale, which is important for control over power and money
in the course of redistribution of actives.
As for the foreign policy the presidential administration
became a conductor of the policy of balancing between the East
and the West which was started by president Lukashenka. Despite
the wealth of foreign policy events in 2009, the visit of the head of
the administration Uladzimir Makey to Georgia for the
celebrations of Independence Day in May with the special message
of the president of Belarus to the president of Georgia Mikhail
Saakashvili can be called a real event. It was the officials of the
presidential administration who took the main burden of
negotiations on the main foreign policy questions in 2009,
2 http://www.sb.by/post/90719/
State Authority
10 	



including the Belarusian.Russian disputed episodes, partial
normalization of Belarusian.American relations (Emanuel Zeltzer’s
release is meant here), and also cooperation with European
organizations in respect of performance of the EU conditions
voiced by the European Commission in 2008, for normalization of
the relations. Negotiations on these questions were conducted, as
a rule, personally by the head of the presidential administration
Uladzimir Makey.
Personnel appointments:
updating or shortage?
Personnel appointments in the presidential administration
corresponded to the logic of the development of the political
system at the present stage – there is a certain rejuvenation which
does not lead to qualitative changes. Technocrats and profes.
sionals that replace veterans of Lukashenka’s system at higher
positions do not burn with desire to carry out reforms, and
diligently work for stabilization of the system, even if they try to
give it a new and more modern shape.
Personnel decisions in the ranks of the presidential admini.
stration in 2009 are Natallia Piatkevich’s appointment at the post
of the first deputy of the president and Mikalai Snapkou’s – as a
deputy head of the presidential administration on January 9, 2009.
On August 4, Valery Mitskievich was appointed another deputy
head of the administration. He was promoted from the National
centre of legislation and legal research of Belarus. The activity of
Piatkevich at the presidential administration will be described
further.
As to Snapkou he managed to hold his post for some months
only and in December he was appointed Minister of Economy. At
the previous post Snapkou had been more in the background, with
the exception of the attempts to get into contact with independent
economists in connection with advice which he could possibly give
to the head of state. Some of the proposals voiced by Snapkou,
followed the general course, for example, about additional material
stimulation of the heads of state enterprises. In general Snapkou
has the reputation of  the person “from a preferred set” who came
to power at quite a young age due to his origin and ties in native
Mahiliou region, and his reshuffle is an example of the increasing
11
“personnel shortage” and a small “bench” in the presidential
vertical.
Valery Mitskevich headed the state legal department, however
unlike the other heads of the administration he did not show
himself as a public politician. He is known for having taken part in
the negotiations with OSCE on the reform of the electoral
legislation, and, judging by the additions accepted at the end of
year and changes in the electoral code, the primary goal – to
liberalize the legislation without posing a threat for the control
over elections by the state – was excellently fulfilled. In a previous
life Mitskevich was the director of the National Center of Law
Drafting Activities. In 2007 he introduced a bill which forbade state
officials to make contact with the independent press without the
consent of their immediate heads, warning that “today there are
situations when a government official speaks about his/her
versions on this or that question, representing this or that state
body but which do not coincide with the point of view of this
body”3.
Piatkevich – the ideologist of an uncertain course
Natallia Piatkevich’s appointment to the post of first deputy head
of the administration of the Belarusian President took place on
January 9, 2009 the week following after the devaluation of the
Belarus ruble – the second expressively anti.populist step of
Lukashenka for the last years after the notorious abolition of social
privileges in 2007. Piatkevich, that time adviser to the president,
was responsible both for information coverage of that campain,
and for decision “advancement” through the National Assembly.
Therefore her promotion was interpreted by some as preparation
for new measures on “tightening the screws”, which looked true,
taking into consideration the approaching economic crisis.
Piatkevich, thus, had to provide grounds to the “new course” of
Lukashenka – the problem was however that the head of the state
still had not decided what this course should be.
Natallia Piatkevich’s reputation is quite contradictory. She is
undoubtedly one of the most loyal associates of Lukashenka, whose
political weight is supported by her alliance with the eldest son of
3 http://www.svaboda.org/content/Article/759334.html
State Authority
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the president. According to some opinions, Piatkevich is one of
those in the environment of the head of the state who understands
the necessity of modernization of the country and certain reforms,
certainly, in the context of self.survival of the system. At the same
time, Piatkevich’s actions characterize her as one of the most
reactionary friends of Lukashenka’s “internal environment”.
As the main ideologist of the country, Piatkevich became a
curator of the state mass media and the whole ideological vertical.
As for the uncertainty with respect to the state ideology of the head
of the country in relation to the “new course”, this led to comic
turns in the workings of the ideological vertical. In 2009 the range
of political orders grew considerably, from the necessity to form a
positive image for the European Union in connection with the
dialogue of Belarus and the EU (a united political day in June was
entirely devoted to the topic of the Eastern Partnership) to the
traditional propaganda exercises of the official media (propaganda
films that discredit the opposition etc.). In this situation Piatkevich
chose for herself the safest way of providing apologetics of the
head of state without regard to what policy he pursues, which
developed into a famous tirade during the exhibition “Mass media
in Belarus” on May 5 in Minsk, that “one must not get used to
peace, one must appreciate “every moment of life, each step made
by the authorities for the sake of the people”4. Her attitude to
freedom of the press is displayed by another statement made in
September 2009: “The interests of a journalist should coincide with
the interests of society. The press should give that information
which the society is ready to accept”. The interests of society and
its ability to accept this or that information are to be defined by
the main ideological management of the presidential admini.
stration.
As for mass media Piatkevich appeared the main negotiator
with representatives of the European structures concerning libera.
lization of the media space. On the one hand in 2009 there was a
certain softening of the climate in relations between the state and
independent mass media, partly at the expense of the political
dialogue between Belarus and the EU and other European organi.
zations (March seminars with OSCE as mediator, creation of
consultative council on mass media with the participation of
4 http://www.nn.by/index.php?c=ar&i=26018
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representatives of non.state press). In 2009 some conflicts between
the presidential administration and some heads of the state mass
media began to brew, who have a especial status in relations with
the head of state and who can take more liberty than an ordinary
editor of a state edition (what is meant is an overt “selfish
opposition” of the head of the Belarusian Broadcasting Company
Aliaksandr Zimouski and the editor.in.chief of “Soviet Belarus”
Pavel Yakubovich). On the other hand as soon as the independent
press started to cross certain borders (when topics unpleasant for
the authorities began to appear on the pages of the non.state press:
the private life of the president, corruption or swine flu) – repres.
sive measures were immediately taken by the authorities. Piatke.
vich herself did not declare a “new course” of the authorities –
her actions concentrated rather on the management of the
ideological apparatus than on its conceptual maintenance.
Saga about the social council
or the parliament which we did not get
As we wrote in the previous issue of the Belarusian year.book,
Uladzimir Makey’s appointment as the head of the presidential
administration would develop into “PR.ization” of the activity of
the presidential administration. Makey’s voyage into public
politics was limited but peculiar and provoked an instant reaction
in the mass media, because the style of Makey’s public relations
actions in some way reminded of the political handwriting of his
employer. Visits to housing and utility services in order to control
how well the presidential instruction about de.bureaucratization
was fulfilled reminded Lukashenka’s PR at least because such
actions were absolutely precisely directed at the achievement of a
media effect. In May Makey repeated his “campaign among the
masses”, this time having chosen drugstores, checking, whether
there were cheap medicines available that had to be accessible to
the majority of the population during the crisis. However, these
two quite successful PR.actions (they helped to fix Makey’s status
as a public person) was not continued, and Makey returned to a
more habitual role of politician of the state apparatus.
Creation of the social.consulting council under the presidential
administration became a political sensation of early 2009, though
the event got the “sensational” status because of the unrealizable
State Authority
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expectations about continuation of political liberalization which
early in the previous year had already significantly dented. The
creation of the council was certainly initiated by the head of the
administration and probably it was intended as a certain moral
compensation for the EU for the open commitments to hold the
parliamentary elections of 2008 more or less in conformity with
European standards. The council structure (20 pro.Lukashenka
people, 10 persons who are more or less representatives of the
opposition and civil community) approximately displayed that
state of affairs that would entirely satisfy the European structures
and would lead to a faster legitimization of the regime in the
European arena. Representatives from “civil society” were the
people whom the head of the state would call “not extreme” –
public persons without expressive aspirations to overthrow the
“bloody regime” and the cooperation with whom would give a
greater respectability to the system (Piotr Martsau, Yury Zisser,
Aliaksandr Patupa, Uladzimir Nistsiuk, Aleh Trusau, Stanislau
Bahdankevich, Aleh Hulak, Zhanna Hryniuk, Leanid Zaika). The
structure of the pro.governmental representatives is motley
enough: from the regime “liberals” (the deputy minister of
economy and the former member of the United Civil Party Andrey
Tur) to absolutely odious persons such as a former senator Mikalay
Charhinets who became famous for his struggle against the
Internet and rock music, or the director of the most mysterious
research centre of the country Ekaom Mikalay Musienak.
The question remains whether Uladzimir Makey intended to
receive competent advice about some decisions which then could
be presented to the head of the state. The head of the council at
the first session tried to deny that the council was a fake body,
“created under the pressure of the EU and the USA, and that the
authorities supposedly have to flirt hypocritically with the
opposition in order to achieve normalization of relations with
Europe”5. However the information effect from the council creation
was more felt more on the western front than in the country where
its creation was regarded as something not serious. Suffice it to
say that the author of this analysis within two weeks after the
council declaration had to answer the questions of foreign media
and diplomats three times more than those of the Belarusian mass
5 http://www.belta.by/ru/news/politics?id=331255
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media about the prospects of the council. The head of state
hastened to “besiege” the exaggerated expectations in the West
from the work of the council and to protect the head of the
administration from transforming an advisory body into his own
PR project, having said that the council is “not the parliamentary
tribune for shouting and pushing through dirty ideas”6.
The format of the work of the council was defined as
amorphous. In fact the agenda and necessity to convene the
council are assigned by the head of the administration in spite of
the fact that the members can represent their opinions and even
proposals about cooptation of new members. The council sessions
were constantly put off sometimes for reasons that reminded a
“diplomatic cold” (being busy or illness of the head of the council),
and in fact the decisions which were to be approved by the council,
had not yet been approved by “the higher authority”. So within a
year only one substantial session of the council was held
concerning the proposals how to help the Belarusian economy out
of the crisis. This session was used by the united democratic forces
as an attempt to present through Stanislau Bahdankevich their anti.
crisis platform, but the platform received a “picket fence” both
from representatives of the state, and some friends from the civil
community because of its extreme ideologization and unrealism.
The second session on the reform of the electoral legislation was
postponed for various reasons and it was not to happen untill the
declaration of suspension of the council activity in connection with
its criticism by mass media in November 2009. Negotiations with
the state structures on liberalization of the election legislation
“missed the mark” at the council, which once again underlined
their real influence and status (it is possible to say that the initial
propaganda effect from its convocation was reached and then the
authorities predictably lost interest to it).
For the council members such invitation created a certain kind
of receiving of the political capital which is impossible to get by
other means under conditions of a noncompetitive political system.
In oppositional circles the creation of the council was interpreted
at once as a step for creation in Belarus of “controllable democracy”
per Russian sample, and the “oppositional” members of the council
were enlisted at once in “assistants to the tsar on revolution”. The
6 http://admin.charter97.org/be/news/2009/2/10/14932/
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civil community part saw in the members of the council as
competitors for “a place under the sun” in a planned forum of the
civil community in the framework of the Eastern Partnership and
initiated a number of actions discrediting the members of the
council and underlining their dependent, puppet status. (Thus the
answers to the invitations of some council members also testified
to that fact that they, first of all, consider themselves “state
people”). It is interesting that on the collective site of the council
members there has been no updating since May 2009, and that
comments on the site are forbidden7. Excitement of representatives
of the civil community appeared to be vain in general. At the same
time, a part of the council members tried to use the council as a
platform for voicing of reformatory ideas, in particular the reform
of the electoral legislation, having carried out the corresponding
consultations with the representatives of the civil community and
the independent factories of thoughts. Regeneration of the council
activity in 2010 if it happens would indicate that the Belarusian
authorities still need fake democratic veneer.
7 http://oksovet.blog.tut.by/about
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REPRESENTATIVE POWER BRANCH
Zmicier Kuhlei
Summary
In 2009 the activities of the Belarusian parliament and local representative bodies
were carried out during the rise of the economic crisis, further development of
BelarusEU relations and pursuit to preserve Russian oil preferences through
signing at the end of 2009 a package of documents to establish the Customs
Union among the Republic of Belarus, Russian Federation and Kazakhstan.
It should be noted that the elections of 2008 did not provide the House of
Representatives with real politicians who are independent and with personal
ambitions. Most MPs of the 4th composition merely represent the presidential
power “vertical”; moreover, they are either at retirement or preretirement age.
These representatives of the executive branch – functionaries of all levels – are
good managers and doers: without intense debate they passed all the bills
elaborated by the National Legislation and Legal Studies Centre with the
Administration of the President of the Republic of Belarus.
Neither the House of Representatives nor the Council of the Republic of the
National Assembly are independent in the county’s political process as they
exercise no influence on internal political issues but perform formal legislative
and representative functions.
Nevertheless, being passive and inert in domestic policy issues the Belarusian
parliament played a more significant role in foreign policy where it promoted
and protected the interests of the Belarusian ruling elite on the international
scene and in relations with other countries or integration associations.
Tendencies:
• the Belarusian parliament showed that it is absolutely manageable and
predictable, once and for all it turned into a kind of boarding house without
outstanding personalities and initiatives;
• the House of Representatives of the National Assembly did not use even the
most favourable geopolitical situation to make a breakthrough to the West
and gain representation in European parliamentary bodies because that would
have signified that Europe recognizes its legitimacy and the legitimacy of
the parliamentary elections in 2008;
• the Belarusian parliament was made a tool to procrastinate decisionmaking
on most urgent international issues.
Parliament’s legislative activity review
The 2009 autumn session of the House of Representatives of the
National Assembly was most memorable for the amendments to
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the Election Code of the Republic of Belarus, the ratified package
of agreements on the Customs Union and a number of other
significant issues.
On November 4, 2009 the House of Representatives ratified
the package of agreements on the Customs Union of Belarus,
Kazakhstan and Russia. The package includes 13 bills on
ratification of international agreements that constitute the
regulatory framework for the Customs Union. The biggest wish of
Belarusian authorities is to prolong the period of being Russia’s
“oil” off shore business, which accounts for the haste with which
the House of Representatives ratified the documents.
For many years the Russian Federation has supplied Belarus
with crude oil for processing without any export duty, which was
very profitable for the Belarusian side. In 2009 it became clear that
the Russian Federation would limit this benefit only to crude
supplies for domestic consumption in Belarus. End of 2009 the
Belarusian side attempted solving this problem by joining the
Customs Union of Belarus, Russia and Kazakhstan. Ratification of
the Union revealed the absolute inability of the House of
Representatives to fulfil one of its main functions, i. e. to represent
the interests of various social groups.
Firstly, the Customs Union of the three post.Soviet countries
significantly hinders Belarusian prospects for European
integration, including the long.term prospects to create a free trade
zone with the EU countries. But, according to IISEPS research in
June 2009, 41.4 % of citizens supported the idea of Belarus joining
the EU, while 38.8 % supported integration with the Russian
Federation. Secondly, the Customs Union disadvantaged
Belarusian car owners who will have to bear extra costs while
supporting Russian car manufacturers. The decision to raise the
duty on imported cars evoked a number of civil initiatives against
the Customs Union or its consequences. Non.parliamentary
opposition represented by BNF made an attempt be in the forefront
of this process and initiate a referendum on imported cars duty
rise and protect Belarusian car owners.
End of 2009 Belarusian MPs contributed to the Belarusian
“house of horrors”: the House of Representatives passed both reads
of the bill on mandatory fingerprinting of all males liable for
conscription aged 18 to 55. The universal fingerprinting was
launched by the Interior Minister Vladimir Naumov after the
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explosion during the Independence Day celebrations on July 3,
2008. Naumov himself addressed the Security Council and the
Council of Ministers to make an amendment to the law on state
fingerprint registration that would enable mandatory
fingerprinting for all males liable for conscription.
When he resigned the new minister Anatoli Kuleshov got on
with it and persuaded the MPs, who actually had no objections to
this new infringement on the rights of their voters. Despite absence
of any legal mechanisms at the moment of amendments enforce.
ment 1.4 million persons, or 61% of those liable to conscription,
had their fingerprints taken. Only 22 thousand people declined
the proposal to voluntarily go under observation of the law
enforcement bodies.
It should be mentioned that the law enforcers quickly grasped
how useful this procedure, launched as part of the July 4, 2008
explosion investigation, is for their institution. This fingerprinting
allowed the police to find 3 thousand matches with fingerprints
from other crime scenes, among them: 1 thousand thefts and 50
serious crimes. Now there is an additional legal provision
stipulating a mechanism to control every citizen liable to
conscription, which also fulfils a preventive function for those
citizens who underwent fingerprinting. It should be noted that up.
to.date information and communication technologies are excellent
tools for the government to control society, but regulations on the
Internet and cellular communication, traditionally perceived as
political issues, were reserved for the presidential ordinance.
In 2009 the House of Representatives on the tip from the
Ministry of Defence adopted additional amendments to the law
on servicemen stipulating prohibition of any party membership
and activity. This law simply enforced the army’s extra function to
cancel out youth opposition activists, most active of which have
been drafted starting 2008, especially on the eve of significant
political events.
It is worth mentioning that MPs introduced extra restrictions
in relation to themselves when on December 9 they adopted the
second read of the bill to amend the law “On the status of the
deputy to the House of Representatives and the member of the
Council of the Republic of the National Assembly of the Republic
of Belarus” stipulating that deputies and senators must not accept
gifts, souvenirs; they must not be members of the board in
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commercial organizations, or have their own business; they and
their close relations are obliged to declare their income and
personal property.
On November 4 the House of Representatives adopted the
bill that strengthened positions of certain law enforcement
bodies and power.holding clans that control them. The bill
stipulated the right for investigation and search operations and
launch of criminal proceedings against some categories of
citizens: those on the presidential civil service register, deputies
of the House of Representatives and local councils, Council of
the Republic members. Power.holding clans and security
officials lobbied this bill. It is obvious because already in early
2010 the senior investigator of important cases of the Attorney
General’s Office Svyatlana Baikova who specialized in
investigating cases of organized crime and corruption in public
authority bodies was arrested. It is revealing that Baikova’s
arrest is connected with her last case. The accused were the
former director general of the Financial Investigations
Department, a retired KGB general, other officials of high rank
and a few dozen customs officials.
On December 11, just before another round of elections, the
MPs adopted amendments to the election legislation of the
Republic of Belarus. After parliamentary elections in 2008 the
OSCE ODIHR provided several recommendations on how to
improve the electoral legislation to meet European standards.
The MPs were working on changes to the electoral legislation
end of 2009 very hastily as the parliament was to approve the
amendments before the local council election campaign for
2010.
The initial intention was to vest observers with much broader
powers and key the latter to the Convention on standards of free
and equitable elections in the CIS countries. But the amendment
concerning the observers’ right to supervise ballot counting was
rejected by the specialists from the National Legislation and Legal
Studies Centre with the Administration of the President of the
Republic of Belarus as “biased”.
The House of Representatives did not take much time to
consider the bill and it passed both reads with no objections or
suggestion from MPs. Actually, the previous version of the
electoral law helped them along to the House of Representatives.
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At the same time the electoral legislation suffered significant
changes. Not less than 1/3 of election commissions, except the
Central Election Commission, should consist of party and public
association members; nomination and registration of candidates
has been simplified; candidates have been allowed to establish
individual election funds of candidates to the House of Repre.
sentatives and for the presidency. The minimum voter turnout for
local council elections has also been abolished. The process of early
voting will be more controlled. There are more possibilities to file
an appeal against forming of election commissions or election
results. But the most important stage of elections, the ballot
counting, was not revised, which further secures elegant victories
for the ruling elite during elections at all levels: presidential,
parliamentary, and local.
International cooperation activities
Although the OSCE ODIHR called the elections 2008
undemocratic, the thaw in relations with the European Union made
Belarusian MPs strongly believe in the breakthrough with the West
and expect to receive not later than in summer 2009 a special guest
status in PACE, on which Belarusian and European authorities
seem to have agreed before. During the summer session PACE
deputies voted for reinstatement of the special guest status to
involve Belarusians into political dialogue, on conditions of
abolition of the death penalty.
Belarusian authorities considered the steps given below to
have met commitments to democratization of the political process
in exchange for reinstatement of PACE status. Among them is
release of several political prisoners and registration of the For
Freedom movement. Also, three independent printed media were
included in the state newspapers distribution network; and NGO
members were included into the established advisory council.
But opposition representatives and independent experts admit
that these steps are insignificant and unsystematic. The abolition
of the death penalty is by no means a critical issue for Belarusian
authorities, but they would like to “sell” it to the West at a higher
price.
Mid.2009 the European Parliament composition that supported
Euronest cooperation exclusively with the opposition, changed
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and new MEPs mitigated their approache to Belarus and offered
that the officials be represented in the interparliamentary body of
the Eastern Partnership initiative. But Belarusian MPs and the
Ministry of Foreign Affairs did not persuade the European
authorities to give all seats to the official representatives while the
latter proposed 5+5 formula: five MPs and five opposition and
NGO representatives. The final decision on Belarusian representa.
tion in Euronest is to be made in 2010.
Despite serious pressure from the Russian Federation
regarding recognition of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, Belarusian
authorities tried to keep the balance between eastern and western
vectors of foreign policy. Already back in 2008 the National
Assembly agenda included the issue of the Caucasian republics.
Nevertheless, even during 2009 it continued to be too overwhel.
ming for Belarusian MPs to decide on. On November 17–20, a
Belarusian delegation of 8 House of Representatives MPs and 4
Council of the Republic senators paid an official visit to Georgia,
Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Its purpose was to study the social,
political and economic situation and norms of life in the region, so
that the Belarusian parliament could carry on debates on
recognition of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. But this “further
debate” dragged on for so long that it was postponed to the spring
session 2010.
In 2009 Belarusian authorities were using the National
Assembly more actively to promote their foreign political efforts
both in the East and in the West. Absolute predictability and
manageability of the MPs elected in 2008 allowed either for
unrestrained and swift adoption or efficient procrastination of
international issues.
Despite the pressure from the Russian Federation regarding
recognition of Abkhazia and South Ossetia during 2009, Belarusian
officials preferred not to worsen relations with western countries
and applied the new mechanism to delay decision making on
problematic international issues. At the same time Belarusian
authorities employed Belarus’ advantageous geopolitical situation
and joining the “Eastern Partnership” initiative. They intensified
pressure on western partners by trying to involve the parliament a
part of the “representative” branch, which in old European
democracies, in contrast to that in Belarus, have more weight and
power in political processes.
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Local councils’ activities
The representative branch at the local level is as rudimentary as it
used to be in the Soviet times. It is still a kind of a department of
the executive branch and its real function is to approve decisions
of local administrations. It should be noted that local councils
mostly consists of directors, functionaries and intelligentsia who
regard their activities in the local councils as an extra social work
load.
In 2009 local council deputies were obliged to carry out
explanatory/propaganda work to lessen negative reaction to
reduction of social benefits. Local councils and deputies are still
regarded a helping hand for executive bodies to implement state
policy and different programs at the local level, first of all in
ideological education of the population.
The crisis year 2009 faced significant reduction of local budgets
regarding expenses (profits as well), including social financing,
especially health care and education. It should be noted that in
2009 the local budgets deficit totalled BYR 1.4 trillion (USD 470
million), while the republican budget showed a 1.4 trillion surplus,
whereas local councils’ profits and expenses made up to 25 and
36% of the consolidated budget respectively.
One of the state policy priorities regarding local authorities is
to promote self.financing. The authorities are more and more
persistent in their appeal to rural councils to count on themselves
in forming the budget and not to wait for help from above. At the
same time, local councils were assigned the right to raise/cut (but
only twice as much) the land tax and the property tax for certain
categories of taxpayers. They were allowed to grant land tax,
property tax, natural person income tax, and unified tax benefits
to natural persons who are not individual entrepreneurs. Local
councils could grant land tax and property tax exemption to
Consumer Societies (Belkoopsoyuz) trade and public catering
facilities in rural areas. But whereas before 2009 local authorities
placed their expectations within budgets of higher levels, in the
crisis year they started looking for partnership in projects financed
by international organizations.
It should be noted that since 2009 the EU/UNPD Local
Development programme has been in operation. 58 Belarusian
administrative units submitted applications for this project, of
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which 35 were accepted. The programme stipulates active
participation of NGOs, which so far have been treated very
unfavourably by Belarusian authorities both at the highest and at
the local levels. But objective circumstances compel officials to
involve NGOs in order to receive help from abroad, including
financial help. Frontier administrative units have possibilities for
and show interest in projects within EU.financed programmes.
But self.government bodies practically have no say in this
process; everything is under executive bodies’ control. Despite the
fact that amendments to the law on local governing and self.
governing bodies were adopted in late 2009, changes in local
authorities are no to be expected: local representative bodies’
powers were not extended, the amendments just established local
practice. The bill specifies and delimits powers of local councils
and executive bodies of different territorial levels; it also defines
the legal status and establishment procedure of territorial self.
government bodies.
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GOVERNMENT: A CRISIS TEST
Vadim Sehovitch
Summary
In 2009 the Government made every effort to solve current problems, arresting
economic liberalization plans. Economic growth was the major objective of the
first six months of 2009, the next task reducing manufacturers’ stockpiles.
Prime Minister Sergey Sidorsky’s policy in 2009 led to reduced stability of the
banking system and an unreasonably optimistic forecast for 2010. However,
the government and the National Bank secured relative financial market stability.
Foreign borrowing became the alternative to serious reductions of export returns
of several gross output manufacturers.
Tendencies
• “waitandsee” attitude and compliance with the former economic GDP
growth oriented policy were adopted as the foundation of anticrisis policy
which added new problems to the country’s economy;
•  the government’s current problem solving efforts led to reshaping of
liberalization plans and in some spheres resulted in backsliding into etatism;
• foreign borrowing became the major instrument of economic sustainability.
The IMF principal role as a consultant strengthened so much that the Fund
received the unofficial status of another Belarusian Ministry.
Helpless Manager, Best Trainee
The financial crisis stimulated thinking about the necessity of
radical global economic reform. At the national level governments
of globally leading economies have taken costly measures to
structurally reshape economic systems and relations.
In theory, for the Belarusian government the crisis could have
become a good starting point for renewing economic policy, which
has hardly ever changed since the end of the 1990s and which is
characterized by high imports, high energy and materials
consumption, low level of long.term savings, technologically
lagging behind, excessive stimulation of domestic demand by
emission of loans. The supremacy of state monopolies in nearly
all sectors of the economy prevents competition.
Although the government planned economic reforms (different
types of liberalization scenarios were devised since the end of
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2008), major efforts in 2009 were concentrated on short term
problem solving. Almost till mid.2009 growth rate sustainability
and implementation of planned activities were the highest
priorities of the government; agricultural output rate temporarily
met expectations and plans, only to undergo downward revision
at the end of August. Due to the unexpected reduction of total
agricultural output Belarusian GDP dropped below the 100% level
for the first time in eight months (January – August) as compared
to the same period last year.
Not earlier than mid.2009, economic growth aspirations were
sacrificed to economic pragmatism: the government made an
attempt to align economic growth plans to real exports capacity
and foreign currency returns as the only ways of economic
sustainability and growth, ensuring that gold and foreign currency
reserves and external debt remain within the state economic
security limits.
The policy of Prime Minister Sergey Sidorsky’s Cabinet in
the first six months of 2009 resulted in overstocking of
warehouses with domestic produce, freezing of manufacturers’
working capital, as well as stricter bank regulations concerning
companies, which was threatening the stability of the banking
sector. It would be wrong to say that the government took no
action to stimulate sales on the domestic and foreign markets, to
reduce the foreign trade deficit, hidden unemployment and other
detrimental processes. But the measures taken were primitive and
generally inefficient. ‘Anti.crisis activities’ like these did no good
and resulted in the notorious and immediately annulled
resolution of the Council of Ministers № 991 as of July 28 “On
certain aspects of goods purchasing on the territory of the
Republic of Belarus.”
The government’s weakness strengthened the position of the
IMF in the country. Beginning with the December 2008 Memoran.
dum, its consultations with the National Bank of Belarus acquired
a bigger impact on long.term economic planning of the country.
The influence of the IMF became so strong that in economic circles
it received an unofficial status of another Belarusian Ministry. Its
influence was even more strengthened by rational division of the
credit line into several tranches, which made Belarusian authorities
seriously consider the recommendations of the international
organization.
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After 2009 Belarus can claim to be “the IMF’s favorite trainee”
since the country efficiently performed tasks of any level of
complexity, which not infrequently were contrary to its political
and social interests. It concerns the devaluation of the national
currency, freezing wages, increase of housing and communal
services, cuts in state programs (including the cherished
presidential rural areas development program), and finally
privatization through an agency specifically created for this
purpose. “The favorite trainee” status allows Belarus to believe
that if in 2010 the country needs new IMF loans, it is more than
likely that the collaboration will be continued.
On the other hand, the IMF is ready to revise its position and
in some points meet the interests of Belarus. For example, this
tendency became apparent in the drafting of a privatization units
list. Earlier the IMF insisted on the privatization of gross output
and leading manufacturers, whereas now it agrees with
privatization of several small enterprises which play hardly any
role in the economy.
Growth Slowdown
As an alternative to working out an anti.crisis strategy, which most
countries did, the Belarusian government chose the simplest way,
i.e. to minimize all efforts on working out and implementing such
a plan and to wait until similar projects are implemented in
neighboring countries. The emphasis was primarily on fast
recovery from the crisis occurring in Russia and the European
Union, which are the major markets of Belarusian goods. The
recovery of these markets was supposed to automatically restore
demand for Belarusian goods. As a result of all.round support for
economic growth (which was the basis of economic policy of
Belarus in early 2009 due to the confidence in fast recovery of
neighboring markets), Belarus turned out to be one of very few
countries with GDP growth at that period.
However, alongside with recession and protectionist actions
on the key markets this tendency led to a disastrous overstocking
of leading exporters’ warehouses. Many major Belarusian
industries (machine building, agricultural machine building,
milk.processing industry) were seriously hit and still incur
financial losses because of restrictions imposed by Russia. As of
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May 1, 2009 over 15 per cent of Belarusian manufacturers’
working capital was stuck in stockpiles. According to estimates
of non.governmental economists as well as experts from the
Presidential Administration, by the end of August 2.3% of GDP
consisted of stockpiles.
Machine building and light industry were most seriously hit.
As of August 1, the ratio of stockpiles to average monthly
household clocks output was 35.3 times, linen fabrics output 9.8,
wool fabrics 5.7, bearings 4.6, metal.cutting lathes 4.5, cargo trucks
3.8, TV sets 3.8 times.
Not until the stockpiles reached a critical level with no demand
from foreign trade partners whatsoever, the government said that
the benchmark of production efficiency of manufacturers is not
output growth, but the rate of stockpiles unloading. This strategy,
however, offered no positive results. Moreover, the 2010 forecast
for the Belarusian economy features too optimistic economic
growth, experts say.
Belief that these problems will evaporate after the formation
of the common Customs Union of Belarus, Russia and Kazakhstan,
the creation of which can be viewed as a reaction to the crisis, have
no serious economic foundation. The formation of a new system
of economic relations is not an easy job to do and it can take years,
which is complicated by the fact that the partners start with a huge
pile of disputes and issues to solve.
Staff Problems and Lack of Unity
The uncommon economic situation has revealed that the
government lacks adequate staff. Staff working for the government
not only failed to suggest effective anti.crisis measures, but failed
to suggest any measures at all, aside from the habitual economic
growth sustainability actions. The gap was filled, firstly, by IMF
experts, of which almost all suggestions were adopted without
reservations. Secondly, in 2009 the government itself underwent
a radical staff reshuffle. During this period heads of 11 out of 23
Belarusian ministries were replaced, notably in the Ministries of
Economics, Industry and Trade.
Besides the staff problems of the current government, the
crisis revealed the lack of agreement among its members. This
especially holds true with respect to disagreements about a whole
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range of issues (for example, housing construction plans) among
Panel Members: on one side Sergey Sidorsky, the Council of
Ministers and Economic Departments, on the other Petr
Prokopovich and the National Bank, who work in close liaison
with the IMF.
Due to its actions at the beginning of 2009 the government
was not only criticized by opposition parties and groups, but by
the Presidential Administration as well. With this criticism
unfolding, the Administration managed to secure success in
several key issues, like for example, the VAT rate increase. Initially
the plan was to increase the VAT from 18 to 22 per cent beginning
in 2010 to compensate for a decrease in receipts due to reduction
and cancellation of a number of taxes. The Administration strongly
objected to this decision, arguing that it would result in an
avalanche of company bankruptcies and negative social
implications, which is beneficial to the IMF alone, since it is
planning mass privatization in Belarus. The dispute was settled in
a compromise of 20 per cent VAT rate.
Set Aside Privatization
Recession on the major foreign markets, worsening of terms and
conditions for oil refining and petrochemical products export, as
well as other problems leave no doubts about the need for further
loans. Obviously the government cannot (even if it wants to) take
the risk of radical cuts in expenditures.
Partially and to the maximum possible extent, housing
construction expenditures and funding of construction materials
manufacturing and light industry development programs, as well
as funding of the rural areas development program were cut last
year. In compliance with the IMF recommendations the go.
vernment restricted the growth of wages in the public sector, state.
owned and most state.controlled companies. The decision was
taken to finance the construction of the planned atomic energy
station by foreign capital alone.
According to estimates of several economists working for the
government, for economic security reasons the 2010 foreign
borrowing limit should not exceed $ 1 billion. Their calculations
show that with the stand.by loan ($ 3.5 billion) and the World
Bank’s free loans for development purposes ($ 200 million), the
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external debt of the county by the end of 2010 will total $ 8.7
billion, with annual debt service about $ 600 million. Provided
that this year foreign borrowing stays within the $ 1 billion limit,
the key indicator of economic security of a country, the external
debt to GDP ratio, will be 17% in Belarus, with the normal quota
being 20%. This is the maximum figure, after which reduction of
the ratio sets in. By 2012 when the markets are expected to be
back on track, Belarus will increase loan repayments to $ 1.3
billion a year, with external debt.GDP ratio coming down to
13.2%.
In a situation like this privatization can become a major source
of additional capital. Last year turned out to be one of the most
uneventful of the last 5 years in this respect, the selling of JSC
“BPS.Bank” to Russian Sberbank for $ 280 million being the only
big transaction. However, state.owned property going public (at
present, for example, “Belaruskali” is in the process), the
involvement of the IMF and a group of investment banks
(Rotschild, “Renaissance Capital”) in privatization, the
toughening of Russia’s requirements concerning oil refining, all
these combined promise turbulent times in the Republic of
Belarus.
Conclusion
The government’s underestimation of the depth of the crisis and
belated reaction to negative changes in the economy added
another problem. Focus on the pre.crisis GDP and industrial output
forecasts resulted in stockpiling of warehouses and freezing of
resources. Lack of clear insight about the tendencies in the
development of the global and national economy in 2010 led to
approval of very optimistic forecasts and plans. The adjustment of
the 2010 forecast to the obligatory fulfillment of the five.year
country’s development plan (2006–2010) looks rudimentary in
the light of global changes.
The government should take more action directed at financial
market sustainability in this difficult period. Foreign borrowing
was viewed as an alternative to the drastic decline of export returns
from several leading manufacturers. Maneuvering between Russia
and the IMF, the government managed to secure diversification
of financial sources, more or less acceptable terms and conditions
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for loans, and low cost of attracted investment. Given all the
difficulties, it was possible not only to attract, but also to stimulate
Russian oil suppliers to start refining in Belarus in the last year of
the preferential terms regime with Russia.
This article made use of information from the
Belarusian National Statistics Committee, various
information agencies, and the newspaper
“Ezhednevnik”.
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JUDICIAL POWER:
RELATIVE AUTONOMY AND ACCENT
ON “FREEDOM”
Andrei Kazakevich
Summary
In 2009 the judicial system developed along lines established earlier and within
legal limits like the expanded meeting of court judges of Belarus1, the Concept
of improvement of the legislation2, the decisions of the congress of judges,
etc. Last year no changes were visible in the sphere of political and social
control. After a reorganization in 2008, the primary activity of the Constitutional
court consisted of performance of auxiliary functions in the legislative process.
Functioning of the judicial power was linked to the rest of judicial activity
including the overwhelming majority of criminal, civil and administrative cases.
In 2009 there were no essential structural and personnel changes, the basic
changes are noted only in judiciary practice. Continuing trends were the
reduction of penitentiary punishment and the growth of judicial autonomy
concerning law enforcement bodies in cases which were not subject to political
and social control. The steady growth of references to the courts for civil
litigation testifies to the growing trust in courts.
Tendencies:
• subordination of court reform to preserving direct dependence of the judicial
system on executive powers prevented structural changes in the judicial
system;
• steady growth of references to the court for civil litigation reflects the growth
of legal culture among the population and trust in courts;
• continuing reduction of penitentiary punishment for crimes that do not
represent considerable public danger.
Status and judicial independence
In modern Belarus the development of the judicial power is an
attempt to increase overall performance within the framework of
an authoritative political system. In practice it means that a cardinal
reform of the court system is possible, but direct dependence on
1 Speech of A. Lukashenko at the meeting of court judges of Belarus.
25.03.2008: http://president.gov.by/press55624.html#doc.
2 Presidential decree of 10 April 2002. No 205 “On the Concept of
improvement of the Legislation of the republic of Belarus”.
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the executive power of national and regional levels still remains.
The state chief executive officers can freely influence verdicts if a
certain case, for whatever reasons, has acquired political, social or
economic importance to the authorities. Through the majority of
other cases the judge can still keep some autonomy. Thus, in 2009
in the sphere of politically and socially motivated control no visible
changes occurred, the development of the judicial system was
connected with the rest of the judicial activity including the
overwhelming majority of criminal, civil and administrative cases.
Wat is the degree of independence of the judicial system as a
branch of power in Belarus? Judicial reform is guided by two
things: how well the “requirements” and “commissions” of
President Lukashenko are performed as well as the items of
directive No 2. The will of the president, as a rule, is emphasized
more than references to international standards, constitutional
principles etc3. In publications judicial system officials also often
refer to presidential speeches.
System of the general courts
Structural changes. Despite the fact that in recent years legislative
conditions for specialized courts were created and the necessity
for such courts repeatedly reaffirmed in documents (see for
example, Concept, 2002: item 53) and in speeches of officials4, this
process is now practically frozen. Specialized boards as an
intermediate stage to creation of courts were not created either.
The same situation applies to appeals that are made for
investigation of civil and criminal cases. The necessity to be able
to make appeals is reflected in various documents and confirmed
in publications of officials (in particular, the chairperson of the
Supreme Court and also the Minister of Justice5), but these rational
expectations have not been realized.
3 The goals set by the Head of State for the courts of common jurisdiction to
get their practical realization (materials of the joined expanded meeting of
the Presidium of the Supreme Court and the board of the Ministry of Justice.
17 February 2009) // Judicial Herald. 2009. № 1. pp. 3–11.
4 Sukalo V.  Access to Justice: some aspects of practical realization // Judicial
Herald. 2009. № 2. pp. 3–5.
5 Summing up the results of work of ordinary courts of 2009 // Justice of
Belarus. 2010. № 2. pp. 3–17.
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The major factors connected with the absence of structural
reform are: insufficient organizational and legal preparation, the
necessity of additional financial expenses and resistance of a part
of the judicial community. The absence of progress in structural
reform of the general courts negatively affects the overall
performance of the judicial system, which (for example, as to
appeals) is admitted by the heads of the judicial power and the
Ministry of Justice.
Personnel changes. In 2009 no considerable changes occurred
in the governing body of the general courts; the majority of the
heads kept their posts. Personnel changes concerned only the head
of the system of military courts: the chairman of military board of
the army Evgeny Tsarenko retired, and his post was occupied by
Alexander Konyuk who used to be chairman of the Belarusian
military court. The post of chairman of the Belarusian military court
was given to Andrey Chizhov. Besides, the chairman of Vitebsk
regional court Tadeush Voronovich (since 1995) became the judge
of the Constitutional court and his former post was taken by
Nikolay Hamichenok.
The basic tendencies in dispensing justice. Among the basic
tendencies which defined the functioning of the judicial power in
Belarus in 2009 were the growth of civil and administrative
proceedings; change of the policy of criminal punishment;
preservation of the tendency to strengthen the autonomy of courts
from other law enforcement bodies (prosecutor’s office, the
Ministry of Internal Affairs).
The growth of references to courts. For Belarus the steady
growth of the number of civil cases which are investigated by the
general courts is remarkable. In 2009 the number of civil cases grew
by 26%, having reached about 330 thousand. The growth of civil
references was a certain call as it creates considerable pressure
upon the judicial system and judicial community, especially in a
situation where an increase in regular number of judges is
impossible (see Figure 1). The way out of this situation lies in
improvement of the investigation procedure and pre.judicial
preparation of cases6.
6 Filipchik R. Single questions of procedural economy in civil trials // Judicial
Herald. 2009. № 4; Voronovich T parsimony of justice is a task of impor.
tance // Judicial Herald. 2009. № 2; On preparation of civil cases  for court
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Figure 1. The number of civil cases investigated by the general courts
(2004–2009)
Source:  “Yustycyja Belarusi” (Justice of Belarus) (2005–2010)
In 2009 the number of administrative cases which were
investigated by the courts also increased. In comparison with 2008
the growth was not so considerable, about 9%, and the total
amount of cases reached 420 thousand, which increased the
workload for the judicial system even more (see Figure 2). The
growth of administrative cases in the courts, recorded since 2007,
is basically connected with the new Code on administrative
offences coming into force, which considerably expanded the
competence of courts for investigating cases of administrative
offences. The changes in administrative legislation coming into
force in 2010 are thought to considerably lower the number of
investigations in this category at the expense of transferring
(returning) a considerable part of administrative cases to non.
judicial bodies.
The growth of references to the court for civil litigations can
be considered as a positive development reflecting the tendency
to decrease the role of informal connections in solving legal
conflicts and a growing legal culture. It also seems to testify to the
reliability of the judicial power as a mechanism of settling legal
disputes. But for the courts such a tendency would demand
proceedings (materials of plenary session of the Supreme Court of Belarus
of 25 June 2009): http://www.supcourt.by/cgi.bin/index.cgi?vm=d&vr=
news&vd=133&at=0.
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considerable improvement of the investigation procedure and also
an increase of work efficiency.
Figure 2. The number of the administrative cases investigated by the
general courts (2004–2009)
Source: “Yustycyja Belarusi” (Justice of Belarus) (2005–2010)
System of punishment. In 2009 work on changing the policy in
the field of criminal punishment proceeded. For the last years,
representatives of the judicial power have characterized imprisonment
as an inefficient measure of punishment7. This question was especially
topical in 2009. The position of the heads of the Supreme Court
appeared to be widely presented in the state mass.media8, and also
in feature stories in departmental editions. The corresponding position
on this question is fixed in the decision of plenum of the Supreme
Court in March, 20099. According to the results of courts work in 2008,
imprisonment ceased to be prevailing among other sanctions, and
this tendency became more pronounced in 200910.
Among the reasons of changes the following is mentioned:
inefficiency of imprisonment as a form of punishment; integration
7 Gureev S. Imprisonment: general overview // Judicial Herald. 2009. № 2.
pp. 30–32.
8 Court and Case (interview with V. Sukalo) // Belarus today. Soviet
Belorussia, 25.03.2009; Execute not pardon (interview with V. Kalikovich,
deputy chief of the Supreme Court of Belarus) // Respublika. 2009,
25 March; Rakitski V. Severe doesn’t mean effective // Zviazda. 2009.
24 March.
9 Decree No.1 of Plenum of the Supreme Court of Belarus of 25 March 2009
“On imposition of sentences by the courts as deprivation of liberty”.
10 Judge is always under a microscope (an interview with V. Sukalo) // Belarus
today. Soviet Belorussia. 2010. 28 January.
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of a considerable number of people into the criminal environment;
infringement of social ties; orientation towards international
experience; and financial costs for the state. The necessity of
further reduction of application of imprisonment is declared as
well as restriction of freedom (“forced labor”) for socially harmless
crimes at the expense of increase of alternative sanctions, also the
development of a procedure for pre.judicial termination of criminal
cases is provided.
As a whole, the mentioned tendencies are positive and
correspond to European practice. But fully implementing a reform
of the judicial system will demand considerable efforts in order to
overcome conservative views and modes of work of a considerable
part of judges and officers of law enforcement bodies.
Autonomy of courts in relation to law enforcement bodies. In
2009 the tendency to increase autonomy of courts from the work
of law enforcement bodies (the Ministry of Internal Affairs, Office
of Public Prosecutor) remained. The judges are less than before
guided in their decisions by the conclusions and opinions of
investigation agency bodies and the public prosecution. In 2009,
there were 187 verdicts of “not guilty”, which is a little bit less
than in 2008, which saw 191 ”not guilty” verdicts.
The Constitutional Court
In 2009 the activity of the Constitutional Court was defined by the
logic set by personnel and functional transformations of 200811.
After reorganization of the Constitutional Court in 1997 on the
basis of a new edition of the Constitution, there appeared a vital
problem of functional maintenance of constitutional justice.
Since 1999 the function of pronouncement of the obligatory
reasons for execution gradually lost its value due to reduced
interest in the Constitutional Court by bodies authorized to initiate
inquiries. Such references became sporadic and since 2008 stopped
altogether. In other words the basic function which was laid in the
1996 edition of the Constitution was lost. For maintaining its own
functionality the court switched to rendering recommendatory
judgments which it passes under its own initiative and on the basis
11 Kazakevich, А. Belarusian Judicial System // Belarusian Yearbook 2008.
Minsk, 2009, pp. 35–44.
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of references of citizens. Such activity becomes commonplace after
1999–2000 (see Table 1).
Table 1. The basic indicators of activity of the Constitutional Court of
Belarus (1997–2009)
Note. When drawing up the table, only the published verdicts were
included. From decisions only those that were delivered as the results of
investigation of statutory acts were considered, other decisions (for
example, messages and changes in regulations of the Constitutional Court)
were not considered. Figures on consideration of statutory acts within the
frameworks of the preliminary control are given according to the
communiquй “On the state of the constitutional legality in the republic of
Belarus” for 2008 and 200912.
In 2008 an attempt was made to reform the Constitutional Court
at the expense of transfer of additional functions that was
unforeseen in the constitution. First of all, it was a question of the
obligatory preliminary control of the bills, the order of which is
fixed in a special decree of the president13. After reorganization of
12 Decision No Р.430/2010 of the Constitutional court of Belarus of 26 January
2010 “On the state of the constitutional legality in Belarus in 2009”; Decision
No. Р.313/2009 of the Constitutional Court of Belarus of  4 February 2009
“On the state of the constitutional legality in Belarus in 2008”.
13 Presidential decree No 14 of 26 June 2008 “On some measures for
improvement of the activity of the Constitutional Court of Belarus”.
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2008 the primary activity of the Constitutional Court consists in
performance of auxiliary functions in the legislative process.
In 2009 considerable efforts of the heads of the Constitutional
Court were directed at justifying reorganization. For this purpose
various mechanisms of improving procedures of obligatory
preliminary control were offered and adopted; also, suggestions
on development of indirect access of citizens to constitutional
justice were put forward14.
The basic problem of the Constitutional Court in the current
political system is its non.functionality which can only be
overcome through modifying the constitution, which is improbable
in the near future. Besides, the transformation of the Constitutional
Court into a body of preliminary control of bills can have negative
consequences. Concerning the indicators of 2008–2009 the court
has investigated more than 100 statutory acts, including codes and
other bulk documents; 5 days are given for the investigation of
each act. Even if to consider that with the optimization of procedure
of pre.judicial preparation of cases to investigation, this term can
take 2–3 months15, and all.round and detailed investigation can
become a significant problem.
The situation that has evolved comprises one more potential
danger. The obligatory investigation of statutory acts can generate
a big file of legislation which does not de facto fall under
constitutional control. It is improbable that in future the
Constitutional Court will start to accept and to recognize as
unconstitutional those norms which were already investigated
within the framework of preliminary control, though such control
(taking into account the work volumes) cannot have a sufficient
depth.
The developed practice of preventive control also contradicts
the logic of constitutional justice organization of other countries
where attention is focused on problems delineated by the
authorized subjects instead of control of a great mass of statutory
acts. Efficiency of the preliminary control procedure can be called
14 Miklashevich, P. Problems of citizens’ access to constitutional justice.
Herald of the constitutional Court of the republic of Belarus  № 3, 2009,
pp. 61–73.
15 Miklashevich P. Improvement of legal procedure of mandatory precheck
of constitutionality of laws // Herald of the Constitutional Court of the
republic of Belarus, № 4, 2009 pp. 164–172.
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into question by the fact that even after looking through 206 acts
for two years, the court never recognized its contradiction to the
Constitution and, thus, has in no way promoted the correction of
a possible error.
Economic courts
In 2009 the development of economic courts were guided by the
general growth in the number of cases flooding the courts. The
growth of references (together with the quality of legal
investigation) represents a problem for work of the courts and in
many respects defines the primary goals and calls for the system
(see Table 2).
Table 2. Legal investigation by the economic courts of Belarus
(2004–2009)
Source: Herald of the Supreme Economic Court of the republic of Belarus16
To prevent negative consequences it is suggested to stimulate
extrajudicial settlement; to warn the judicial disputes about
separate categories of cases; to propagandize and introduce
intermediary procedures; to expand mandatory proceedings. In
2009 special attention was given to intermediation. Within the
framework of the corresponding campaigns the judges
participated in various seminars and meetings and sessions of
executive powers as well.
16 Main results of the economic courts of Belarus for 2008 // Herald of the
Supreme Economic Court of the republic of Belarus. 2009. № 4. pp. 28–37.
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LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES:
NEW PERSONNEL POLICY
Sergej Satsuk
Summary
When in 2009 Vladimir Naumov, the last independent law enforcement figure,
resigned and the president cancelled supervision of security officials by outside
functionaries, the framework of how law enforcement agencies function was
redefined. On the one hand, these steps provided security officials with relative
independence in their work but, on the other hand, they deprived them of the
possibility to engage in business. These factors were positive and helpful for
fighting corruption and had an effect on the process of economic liberalization
in the country, which would have been impossible if security officials were
allowed to keep meddling in economic affairs.
But these improvements in enforcement agencies are balanced by a number of
negative incidents that caused real professionals to resign from enforcement
institutions. Therefore, this relative improvement in working conditions of the
lawenforcement system is accompanied by serious risks that will already in
2010 become apparent.
Tendencies:
• the final removal of “strong” figures supervising enforcement institutions
and mass personnel rotation put an end to interdepartmental rivalry and
raised independence of law enforcers.
• the enforcement institutions received a new management system and were
allotted extra powers to fight corruption, which improved clearance of
corruption crimes;
• new framework conditions for functioning of law enforcement agencies, on
the one hand, promoted economic liberalization, but, on the other hand,
heightened the risks of system failure.
State Control Committee
For the last ten years the functioning of the Belarusian law
enforcement system was determined by “strong” figures. By the
latter we mean department and subdivision heads or even
individual officers capable of making independent decisions. Such
people, especially among enforcement institution representatives,
are a potential menace for the system of power vertical that has
been created, which expects subordination to the executive branch
and no independent activities.
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The removal of strong figures in the so.called “silowiki” group
already started in 2006 when Zenon Lomat was appointed
Chairman of the State Control Committee (SCC). Later on, he
“destroyed” the work of the country’s leading controllers by
diluting the organization’s tasks and functions, reducing the high
profile it had.
In 2009 this work was carried on in the Financial Investigations
Department (the FID) bodies. After the resignation of Sergei
Baranov, Director of the FID of the SCC, the process reached its
final stage. Baranov had closed ranks with the remaining
professionals still working for the financial investigations bodies.
After his resignation Victor Morozov began to play the lead role
in the FID. He brought along his men who did not have enough
experience to carry out financial investigations. Morozov’s
influence on the financial investigation bodies can be compared
to that of Zenon Lomat and his henchman Victor Pisarik on the
whole SCC.
Under former SCC Chairman Anatoli Tozik the main
requirement for reaching key positions was professional expertise,
under Lomat and Pisarik protectionism became a common
practice. In the FID this process was restrained by Baranov. After
his resignation, professional expertise of employees responsible
for financial investigations stopped being of primary importance.
Lomat’s appointment in 2006 was rather an accident than part
of a general strategic plan, which, judging by the president’s
actions, started taking shape only in 2008 and turned into a definite
law enforcer management scheme in 2009. The State Control
Committee was taken as a practical example, whereas the
president’s rotation rule was the tool applied not only to chief
executives but to all enforcement staff as well.
State Security Committee (KGB)
During 2009 most key positions in the central KGB staff were filled
not by Cheka officers, well.trained and educated in the hard school
of life, but border guards and representatives of the Interior
Ministry. In addition, there was general rotation among career
Cheka officers: almost all KGB staff who had been working with
the organization for more than 5 years were shuffled like cards in
a deck, and their tasks were radically changed.
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As a result, the core of KGB activities underwent fundamental
transformation. Although the organization itself retained its
autonomy, the staff officers lost their independence as they were
appointed to new working places and, not having enough
experience, had to take orders of extraneous executives and, thus,
lost the initiative. The general personnel rotation prevented
knowledge transfer between generations: senior officers no longer
are real professionals and cannot pass on their knowledge to
subordinates. They simply give orders and instructions.
Taking orders diligently substituted the aim to achieve good
results. The results of the work of an officer, a section, a department,
or a committee are not important any more. Showing initiative is
not punished yet, but already unwelcome. The professional level
of a single officer counts less than his ability to follow orders.
During 2009 it suddenly became apparent that the KGB evolved
into an organization with clear military features, which in the light
of the coming presidential elections creates the option of using
the intelligence organization for repressive purposes.
Interior Ministry
The first six months of 2009 the Interior Ministry was watching the
general reconstruction of the law enforcement group from the
sidelines, although there was an attempt to replace its key staff
already back in 2008 when the scandal about the police’s cottages
broke. But this scandal did not lead to serious changes in the
personnel policy of the Interior Ministry, because its initiators
discredited themselves in the president’s eyes.
But Vladimir Naumov’s resignation in April 2009 indicated that
the Interior Ministry was also going to witness a surge of personnel
reorganization. The resignation itself was preceded by a number
of successful KGB operational activities against key Interior
Ministry figures. At the same time, we cannot count the so.called
“hunters’ affair” and the plunder of the Central Department for
Operational.Investigative Activity represented by its head Ivan
Shilo as new surges of war between the law.enforcement groups.
They are rather a result of the new personnel policy and the
appointment of Anatoly Kuleshov as Minister of Internal Affairs
attests to that. The essence of this new personnel policy, as said
above, is to exclude strong figures, who play their own game, from
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the law enforcement agencies, and to fill the staff with people who
just take orders.
Currently, in order to eliminate the personnel deficit, the
Interior Ministry is actively recruiting persons with no professional
training besides higher education. At the same time the real
professionals who had to leave the Financial Investigations
Department of the State Control Committee are not employed at
the Interior Ministry. Instead, the Ministry has launched active
campaigns among future school leavers to talk them into entering
the Interior Ministry Academy.
Attorney’s Office
Practically only the Attorney’s Office was saved from the
reorganization of law enforcement agencies during 2009. Despite
some cases in which officers from other departments were
employed, the Office was left untouched by reorganization
processes.
Still, the work of the Attorney’s Office underwent certain
changes. In early 2009 the president ordered drafting a law
conferring more powers to the Interior Ministry, the KGB and the
Financial Investigations Department of the State Control
Committee. The reason behind this was to strengthen their
independence from the scrutiny of the Attorney’s Office, which
was deemed too intense. The Attorney’s Office had an exclusive
right to sanction arrest and operational.investigative activities
(OIA) involving violation of human rights concerning privacy.
Therefore, it restrained the departments involved in OIA from
undertaking unrestricted actions. The draft law was ready after 2
months and presented for discussion to all departments involved.
The Attorney’s General Office drew up a very negative opinion
letter about the draft law; Attorney General Grigory Vasilevich
disagreed with it as well. Nevertheless, he provided his objections
to the president in a strongly abridged form. As a result, the draft
law was introduced to the House of Representatives of the National
Assembly of the Republic of Belarus and adopted in the nearest
time possible. The heads of the Interior Ministry, KGB and the
FID of the State Control Committee received the right to sanction
arrests and OIA, which entail such violation of human rights for
personal privacy as, for example, wiretapping.
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The role of attorney organs was reduced when early in the year
the Interior Ministry, KGB and the FID of the State Control
Committee got the right to investigate all corruption cases
regardless of jurisdiction. The status quo was restored when on
January 27, 2010 the Attorney’s Office received the exclusive right
to send criminal cases with repenting perpetrators to the
commission for presidential pardon.
New management system
According to Interior Ministry, KGB and FID of the State Control
Committee reports, in 2009 all results of their performance
significantly exceeded the plan. The most impressive is
performance in corruption investigations; their exposure rate
increased 20% compared with 2008. But this success is relative
because it is based on operational groundwork done in 2008 and
greater powers that KGB, the Interior Ministry, and the FID of
the State Control Committee received in early 2009. Meanwhile,
if we evaluate the financial indicators of the law enforcement
agencies we can see that their efficiency clearly tends to be
declining.
Thus, according to data from the State Control Committee,
in 2009 the Financial Investigations Department recovered
damages in the amount of BYR 133.5 billion (USD 44 million) in
cash and inventory holdings from offenders, and that was 3.3 %
more than  in 2008. In other words, taking into consideration the
inflation of the Belarusian ruble, the efficiency actually dropped
26.7 %. This statement is most evident in cases under section 88
part 1 of the criminal code of the Republic of Belarus stipulating
extinction of criminal liability if the compensations are made
voluntarily.
And when in 2008 the FID of the State Control Committee
sent more than 200 cases to the commission for presidential
pardon, in 2009 there were only 140 of them. At the same time,
during 12 months in 2009 the defendants who were subjected to
such cases paid compensations of not more than BYR 12.5 billion
(USD 4.1 million). Earlier the FID of the State Control Committee
could receive such a sum from a single case. This is the result of
personnel policy in law enforcement agencies, which in 2009 had
the most serious consequences for the FID of the State Control
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Committee, and in 2010 will have consequences for both the
Interior Ministry and KGB. The main point is that taking orders
diligently is more valuable in security officers than their
professional qualities while personnel rotation becomes the cure.
all for corruption. Setting a problem and punishing those who
have not solved it is a management principle in the system of
enforcement agencies.
The example of Leonid Maltsev, the new secretary of the
Security Council, best shows the effects of such policy. Having no
previous work experience in law enforcement agencies, during the
last report to the president he said that the level of financial
compensations under exposed crimes should be raised by several
times in the nearest period. Despite the fact that in 2010 financial
compensations are expected to fall by 5.10%.
The reason is that as of 27 January the amendments to the
criminal procedure code came into effect, under which the KGB,
the Interior Ministry and the FID of the State Control Committee
have no power to send criminal cases to the committee for
presidential pardon. This tool enabled investigators to close
complicated or judicially dubious criminal cases when they
convinced the person under investigation to make amends to avoid
imprisonment. Now, the cases will exclusively be sent to the
committee by the attorney and only after the investigation is
concluded, and he or she has no stimulus to convince the defendant
to provide financial compensation and does not care whether to
send the case to the commission or to court.
Therefore, the rate of financial compensation at the
investigation stage that now lies at 50 % will drop by several times
and this will cause a drop in the general rate of compensation.
To illustrate the kind of sums involved we refer the reader to the
case of the director of the “Zhdanovichy” market were in October
2009 the financial compensation reached BYR 85 billion (USD
28.8 million). For comparison: all bodies of the Financial
Investigations Department of the State Control Committee
managed to recover only BYR 113.5 billion (USD 37.8 million)
during the whole year.
Thus, despite Leonid Maltsev’s ambitions, it will be impossible
to reach the set target. Earlier, the heads of law enforcers also
showed incompetence in their decisions but their subordinates
made up for that. Now this buffer is all but destroyed.
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Conclusion
The substitution of professional qualities with loyalty, the drop in
work efficiency and additional powers for law enforcers are the
factors that pose a threat to society. Being diligent executors of
orders instead of responsible professionals, law enforcers will have
to find other ways of carrying out the tasks and avoid a drop in
main performance indicators. Thereby, it is highly probable that
2010 will witness a large number of dubious criminal cases initiated
against major businessmen and top managers of state enterprises.
These attacks cancel out positive results of economic liberalization
launched in 2009 and threaten to deter potential investors in
Belarus.
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ARMED FORCES:
SLOWEPACED REARMAMENT
Alexander Alesin
Summary
In the CIS, Belarus still comes third in its military capacity after the Russian
Federation and Ukraine. This is a prestigious position, even in comparison
with the neighboring NATO countries. The Belarusian authorities use the military
factor in their foreignpolicy games most efficiently. But the actual technical
level of the Belarusian armed forces testifies that the imaginary state of affairs
differs from reality and military rearmament process is very slowly.  The level
of hightech arms and materiel provision in the Belarusian army does not allow
for leading positions in the world and European “tables of ranks”.
Tendencies:
• a significant amount of arms and materiel in the Belarusian army is
obsolescent; the deficit of uptodate armaments is getting more acute.
• the State Rearmament Program is being implemented at a flagrantly slow
pace, the Belarusian army is rapidly falling behind modern armament
standards for military equipment.
• this lag is caused both by increasing costs of design and production of new
arms when financing is insufficient and by technological weakness of not
only the Belarusian but also the Russian militaryindustrial complex.
New forms for old contents
Belarus’ geopolitical position and military capacity have always
been its trump card in bargaining with both the East and the West.
Therefore, right from the start of his first term president
Lukashenko started paying significant attention to maintaining
the fighting capacity of the Belarusian army.
These efforts bore fruit. The present structure and recruitment
of the Belarusian armed forces generally meet European standards.
As a result of the army reform, mechanized brigades became
basic tactical units of the Belarusian armed forces. They are
grouped together into corps subordinated to territorial operational
commands.
A crucially new component of the ground troops (mobile
brigades) were formed on the basis of the most efficient Soviet
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airborne formations, with special operations forces being part of
the latter. The main emphasis in military training is put on
operation in conditions of mobile defense.
The joint system of military education, training and retraining
of professional military personnel has been almost completed. In
the foreseeable future, the Ministry of Defense intends to stick to
mixed army recruitment, i.e. combining conscripts and regulars.
There is a plan to further upgrade this process in the course of
time.
Development of air defense, air force, missile arm, electronic
warfare, reconnaissance, and communications has been outlined
as priority areas of the national defense. Regulatory documents
prescribe basic modernization vectors: to enhance performance
capabilities and jamming immunity, to expand functional areas,
to ensure the highest possible automation of the control process,
and to transit to a sophisticated element base.
But unbiased analysis shows that the Belarusian army has not
advanced far in implementing these guidelines. Most available
arms and materiel can hardly be described as up.to.date. And a
whole range of arms is definitely obsolescent. T.72B, the basic
Belarusian tank, was added to the armory in 1985, the armored
vehicles BMP.2 and BTR.80 in 1980 and 1986 respectively. The
152 mm self.propelled 2S3 Akacia howitzer was added in 1971,
the 152.mm self.propelled 2S5 Hyacinth gun in 1976 and the
Sturm.S antitank missile system in 1979. Relatively modern but
scanty 152.mm self.propelled 2S19 MSTA.S howitzers do not
constitute key role machinery.
When the block guides were installed on MAZ.6317 truck
chassis, Grad multiple launch rocket systems (added in 1963)
showed better performance capabilities. But their ammunition
range and precision fall behind the level of leading nations. In the
nearest future this criticism will also apply to the Smerch (Tornado)
heavy multiple rocket launcher (1987), so far the most powerful
one in its class. Soon, the Tochka (Point) tactical operational missile
complex (1976), the most long.range weapon in the Belarusian
army, will require replacement.
The little known Osa (Wasp) anti.aircraft missile system (its
first model was added to the armory in 1975, its modification Osa.
AKM in 1980) and anti.aircraft missile systems SAN S.300
(S.300P in 1979, S.300PS in 1982) do not fully meet the modern
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air defense requirements (first of all against stealth technology
aircraft).
The air force shows similar tendencies. Mi.24 helicopter
gunships were first supplied to combat units in 1971, Su.25 fighter
jets in 1981, Su.24M interdiction fighters in 1972. These aircrafts
are quite obsolescent today, but it is their electronic systems that
fall significantly behind their western counterparts, and this fact
causes anxiety. Only MiG.29 (1983) and Su.27 (1987) jet fighters
were included in relatively advanced upgrade programs.
Quite recently the Belarusian air force received L.39 trainer
aircraft (1974) purchased in Ukraine. But they were developed as
far back as in socialist Czechoslovakia and do not meet
requirements for last generation aircraft pilot training.
Technical stock modernization
Official sources present a problem.free picture of the country’s
military arsenal. On the eve of February 5, the Day of Arms of the
Armed Forces in Belarus, the Ministry of Defense informed about
interim results of the State Armament Program 2006–2015.
The released information shows that during the first stage
of the Program (2006–2010) the Ministry of Defense purchased
modern electronic reconnaissance facilities, electronic warfare
units, secure communication facilities, automatic arms and
troops control systems (ACS), small arms and sighting devices.
Military formations and units, educational establishments are
equipped with the latest training simulators. The special
operations forces were re.equipped with up.to.date small arms,
optical surveillance and sighting device, communication
facilities and personal protective gear. As a result, some military
units are now fully equipped with latest surveillance and
electronic warfare facilities.
As of 2006 more than 90 new models of arms and machinery
were added to the Belarusian armed forces armory. In 2009 alone,
the army was supplied with 8 new models, to implement 5 trainer.
simulation systems, to complete 7 more prototypes and to launch
their operational testing. During the last 2 years the following
equipment was added to the armory: a system of automation
facilities for radar mobile command posts; the upgraded PRV.16M
mobile height finder; the Strela.10 (Arrow.10) autonomous
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simulator for combat crews of missile systems; the upgraded PEK.
1BM mobile shielded system; staff and single.purpose vehicles for
mobile command points protecting state bodies and organizations;
the control, troubleshooting and maintenance system for air
defense machinery electronic modules; KM.S, KM.L, KM.2LR
camouflage systems.
The National Academy of Sciences participated in the work
on topogeodesic and navigational support systems. There was
developed a vehicle prototype to serve as mobile high power
railway maintenance equipment. MAZ facilities are being used to
develop an all.purpose tractor.trailer to transport pontoons for
pontoon railway bridges.
The development of high.precision weapons counteraction
facilities was focused on methods to attack control system
elements. These models showed high efficiency during official
testing. They were exclusively developed by Belarusian
enterprises, which provided lower costs compared to their foreign
counterparts. Some of these prototypes have already been applied
in the armed forces.  In 2010 after operational testing at least 11
new models will be added to the military.
Development of methods to counteract high.precision
weapons is one of the priority tendencies of the national defense.
Recent armed conflicts demonstrate that high.precision weapons
constitute up to 90 per cent of the whole system of fire destruction.
During last year’s exercises “Zapad.2009” (“West.2009”) Sapphire
laser guidance jammer, Naves.U GPS radar jammer, and
prototypes of remotely controlled aircrafts underwent operational
testing.
Research and development not only laid the foundation for
full.scale production of new models. Electronic warfare,
reconnaissance, topogeodesic and navigational support systems,
all kinds of air force and air defense ACSs are being maintained
and upgraded at national enterprises. All this allowed for major
repairs and upgrading of more than 700 higher.priority arms and
equipment, such as planes, antiaircraft guided missile systems, and
electronic reconnaissance stations. This list includes Su.27UBM1
and MiG.29BM fighter jets, Mi.8MTK01 helicopters, P.18BM
radar stations, BM.21А BelGrad multiple launch rocket systems
on facilities of cross.country MAZ vehicle, R.934UM Udar and R.
378UM Ukol jamming stations.
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Slow rearmament
The second stage of the State Armament Program will focus on
step.by.step substitution of obsolescent arms and materiel and
year.by.year rise of up.to.date and upgraded armaments
purchasing. Deputy Minister of Defen for Arms Materiel Ivan
Dyrman wrote in his article in “Belarusian Military Newspaper”
that president Lukashenko made a fundamental decision that the
country’s armed forces be equipped with next.generation
antiaircraft missile systems in the nearest future.
The present stock of armed vehicles has already been assessed
and models that will undergo step.by.step withdrawal were
defined. To substitute them the most up.to.date arms and materiel
will be purchased. Some currently used arms will be fundamentally
upgraded. One of the first high.precision arms developed in
Belarus is a guided glide bomb presented last year by 558 Aircraft
Repair Plant (Baranovichi) at the 5th International Exhibition of
Arms and Military Machinery Milex.2009, Minsk.
But the problem is that the unit weight of up.to.date arms and
materiel in the Belarusian army is still quite small. Even high.
ranking servicemen admit that the pace of rearmament is not high
enough. The armed forces require urgent and accelerated
modernization. Underfinancing is still the restraining factor. And
this situation was worsened by the economic crisis.
Russia has big potential military science and defense industry
and its assistance could facilitate Belarusian military
modernization. But the Russian military.industrial complex lost a
number of technologies and experiences a deficit in manufacturing
capacity, which, along with high arms and materiel costs, hinder
joint rearmament programs.
Despite this, a recent Belarusian Ministry of Defense press
release states that improvements can be expected on this front:
the defense ministries of Belarus and Russia intend to sign
agreements on supply, repair and modernization of arms and
military machinery. At the end of the day though, the financial
realities will determine whether these goals are achievable.
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RUSSIANEBELARUSIAN RELATIONS:
TOGETHER APART
Valeria Kostyugova, Anatoli Pankovski
Summary
Belarus’ engagement in the EU’s Eastern Partnership (EaP) program became
one of the crucial factors shaping BelarusianRussian relations. Although official
EU representatives never mentioned that the involvement of Belarus in the EaP
was contingent upon recognition of the selfproclaimed Georgian republics of
Abkhazia and South Ossetia, the Belarusian authorities chose to refrain from
supporting Moscow in this very sensitive matter. However, Belarus did support
Russia in another essential initiative – the reanimation of the Customs Union,
but even the unprecedented rate of adoption of the package of Customs Union
documents did not result in much expected dividends in oil and gas transport
cooperation and did not resolve the problems concerning supplies of Belarusian
products to the Russian market. In the gas transport sector, mutual relations
developed in the context of the longterm contracts concluded at the turn of
2006 moving toward the standard terms of gas trade that Russia applies to the
rest of the region. Collaboration in the defense sector was the most productive
of all, but even here Belarus failed to obtain union preferences and had to settle
for evasive promises in exchange for participation in Moscow’s defense
integration initiative, the CSTO Rapid Reaction Force.
Tendencies:
• Marked decrease in efficiency of traditional leverage Belarus uses to bargain
with Moscow over sensitive issues;
• Significant improvement in BelarusianEU relations, which is used to influence
the eastern partner, albeit with varied success;
• More pronounced divergence of the eastern and western directions of
Belarusian foreign policy;
• Absence of alternatives in collaboration in the defense sector.
Terms of engagement
There were a few decisive factors shaping Belarusian.Russian
relations in 2009. Firstly, Belarus was included in the European
Union’s Eastern Partnership program. This foreign political
initiative clearly correlated with the issue of recognition of
Georgian breakaway republics of Abkhazia and South Ossetia by
official Minsk (which Moscow insists on). Secondly, the terms of
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the “long” talks over trade in energy resources need to be revised
in the following aspects: (a) the four.year gas contract expires in
2010; (b) the contract for oil deliveries expired in 2009; (c) the
growing uncertainty about the expiration of the long.term energy
contracts (amid the economic crisis, which naturally aggravates
this uncertainty) can be minimized – at least theoretically – by
the “compensatory” prospects of the Customs Union of Russia,
Belarus and Kazakhstan.
For convenience in analysis, we will group the factors in the
following manner:
1. There are certain delays and deviations in the process of
sovereignization of post.Soviet countries (dismantling of the
imperial complex), which is expressed at the institutional level in
the formation of relatively autonomous structures of sovereignty
(ranging from “external” communication systems to state
institutions) and on the emotional.political level, in the search for
the “own way”.
2. The global economic crisis apparently slows this process:
the trivial deficit of finance prevents these countries from reaching
the desired rate of progress. For example, Russia has postponed
the launch of its new infrastructure projects (especially energy
transport initiatives), which indicates the need for a reversal in
mutual relations with transit countries that “lock” or encircle
Russia along the contours of the continent.
3. In a strict sense, this reversal does not presuppose recoil to
the previous phase of relations. In other words, former integration
patterns are not being restored, but transformed. For instance, the
Customs Union is a project designed to partially replace the
Eurasian Economic Community, which served as the foundation
of the Customs Union, and partially substitute for the Union State
of Belarus and Russia, which has been almost completely
dismantled by now, except for its formal components (executive
authorities and regulatory framework) and the ideological facade.
4. The sophisticated recombination of initial integration
intentions and projects results in quite serious collisions: the
Belarusian administration, which used to successfully balance
between the West and East, will have to make a choice not only of
its tiny civilizational niche, but also of benefits and expenses of
integration. This choice is complicated by extremely narrow
forecasting time.frames: the benefits and expenses are utterly
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impossible to assess, because the Customs Union and Eastern
Partnership are not so much programs as frameworks of potential
programs. Minsk completed the year 2009 amid lingering
uncertainty and high investment risks.
Recognition of the unrecognized
vs. Eastern Partnership
The Russian.Georgian military conflict prompted the global
community to revise the role of Russia in the former Soviet Union.
The events of August 2008 made it clear that Russia was unable to
guarantee security in the region, and the ex.Soviet space had run
short of “soft power”. It is to a large extent due to this “discovery”
that the European Union on February 23, 2009 decided to include
Belarus in its Eastern Partnership Initiative alongside Azerbaijan,
Armenia, Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine. These countries
welcomed the possibility to be involved in the Eastern Partnership.
Although EU officials never drew a direct connection between the
engagement of Belarus in the EaP and the issue of recognition of
the self.proclaimed breakaway Georgian republics of Abkhazia
and South Ossetia, the Belarusian authorities refrained from
backing Moscow in this matter1.
Official requests of the South Ossetian and Abkhazian
administrations to recognize them as independent nations were
not neglected by the Belarusian authorities; however, Alexander
Lukashenko handed responsibility for this delicate issue to
parliament. Anyway, neither the spring nor the autumn session
proved to have sufficient time to address the sovereignty of the
breakaway republics. Belarusian delegations visited the self.
proclaimed nations thrice in 2009: on May 12, a high.level
delegation was led by Presidential Administration Chief Vladimir
Makei, and two parliamentary delegations paid visits to South
Ossetia and Abkhazia on May 31 and November 17–20. Those
visits did not facilitate the decision.making regarding the
recognition of the two republics, but Belarus managed to use this
1 For example, Jose Manuel Pinto Teixeira said: “The issue of recognition or
non.recognition of the two Caucasian republics is not part of our dialogue
with Belarus. The Belarusian authorities and society are to resolve this issue
independently,” http://telegraf.by/in_belarus/33235.html.
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issue when bargaining with Moscow over sensitive issues. For
example, following a session of the Union State government on
July 22, which proved quite unsuccessful for the Belarusian side,
the Belarusian Foreign Ministry “strongly recommended”
Belarusians to follow Georgian regulations when planning trips
to Abkhazia and South Ossetia2.
Russian news media responded with a barrage of accusations of
betrayal3. A high.ranking unnamed source in the Russian
Presidential Administration warned that the misbehavior of
Moscow’s ally would bring imminent retaliation (Russia would not
provide loans, would make Belarusians pay for gas and close its
domestic market to Belarusian products, etc.). Some Russian
commentators came up with more serious threats: if Lukashenko
fails to follow Russia, his regime will collapse – he will be dethroned
by internal forces, he will be replaced by a Russian candidate, he
will be sold by European partners and sent to the International
Criminal Court in The Hague. Such threats were frequently masked
by appeals to the Russian administration “not to betray the last ally”
and criticism of Russian policies on Lukashenko’s regime, but their
key objective was to promote a sensation of weakness of
Lukashenko’s position in the new circumstances4.
The Union State partners did not succeed in tackling this
narrow foreign political vector in 2009. The warnings and threats
that diversified the media space failed to create a serious system
of incentives and disincentives amidst Belarus’ collaboration with
the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank, which
helped offset the foreign trade deficit (in other words, losses of
Belarusian companies on the Russian market), and exciting
prospects of exchanges with the European Union. As of late 2009,
Abkhazia and South Ossetia could still be used as bargaining chips,
but their significance was played down as early as the first months
of 2010. It is very hard to reintroduce them in the Belarusian.
Russian negotiations, and it seems Belarus will manage to minimize
its importance to ultimately add it to the list of “discarded chips”,
including the Constitutional Act of the Union State, common
currency, etc.
2 http://naviny.by/rubrics/politic/2009/07/24/ic_news_112_315061/.
3 http://www.izvestia.ru/politic/article3129247/.
4 http://www.regnum.ru/news/1170588.html.
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Customs Union retrospect
The central issue of the Customs Union agenda is the terms of trade
in end products, especially, supplies of Belarusian commodities
to the Russian market. The problem of symmetry in trade relations
is naturally raised quite frequently, but for the Russian side the
conditions of exports to Belarus are just a negotiating point rather
than a matter of strategic importance. For Belarus, the Russian
market is capacious, crucial, and truly irreplaceable.
Talks over the terms of supplies (alongside Belarus’ accession
to the Eastern Partnership and dilemma of recognition of
Abkhazia and South Ossetia) generated major scandals, mutual
complaints and threats throughout 2009. During a session of the
Council of Ministers of the Union State of Belarus and Russia on
January 30, 2009, Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin linked
up the possible preservation of preferences for the Belarusian side
on the Russian market and inclusion of Belarusian commodities
in Russian “government.financed contracts” (budget.financed
procurement, lease programs, etc.) to the establishment of joint
holdings – allegedly suggesting the “no holdings – no
preferences” pattern.
Some more scandals followed. Russian Kommersant daily
reported after a series of summit meetings on March 19 and 21
that President Dmitry Medvedev had demanded in plain language
that a number of Belarusian dairy farms be privatized by Russian
companies5. A joint working group was said to have drawn up a
list of Belarusian milk.processing enterprises to be ceded to Russia.
However, Belarusians tackled the potential privatization projects
with traditional “thoroughness” (that proved efficient enough
during the haggle over Abkhazia and South Ossetia), and Russia
started losing patience as early as late spring and imposed a ban
on imports of Belarusian dairy products. The “milk war” was short,
but dramatic, and looked like the gas conflict of 2004. In some
way, the war gingered up the integration project of the Customs
Union. The convincing demonstration of the grim prospects of the
Belarusian industrial sector in conditions of the isolation from the
Russian market prodded Alexander Lukashenko to qualify the
5 Alexander Lukashenko Depreciates, Kommersant  #49 (4104) of March
20, 2009: http://www.kommersant.ru/doc.aspx?DocsID=1140552.
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decision of CIS foreign ministers on June 9 on the simultaneous
accession of the Customs Union members (Russia, Belarus and
Kazakhstan) to the World Trade Organization (WTO) as a
“breakthrough”.
The logic of the Russian side is not quite transparent, but
understandable. On the one hand, Russia has preserved
preferential terms for many CIS countries, especially Belarus,
which has enjoyed not only relatively cheap energy resources
and loans, but also has an almost unlimited access to the Russian
market. On the other hand, Russia interprets Belarus’ accession
to the Eastern Partnership as a direct proposal: European
businessmen are welcome to use the Russian market as their
own – and this interpretation is not unfounded. The Russian
industrial lobby responded instantly: Belarusian Savushkin
Produkt dairy brand is one thing, whereas Polish or Dutch
products under the same brand is a totally different thing. The
concept of the Customs Union is designed to end the “milk war”
(and a number of disputes over other commodity groups –
mostly food.processing enterprises and agricultural machines).
The key idea of the Customs Union is to introduce equal customs
tariffs and common customs records. The Belarusian side had to
reluctantly welcome this project: a loss of the Russian market
is synonymous to a fiasco of the Belarusian manufacturing
sector.
On September 4, Russian border guards familiarized
themselves with the work of Belarusian counterparts working
on the western border of the Union State. The presidents of
Russia, Belarus and Kazakhstan approved the constitutive
documents of the Customs Union during a EurAsEC summit in
Minsk on November 27. For the first time ever, a bloc was
established in the former Soviet Union with a supranational body
– the Commission of the Customs Union. On December 4, the
13 international agreements that form the legal framework of
the Customs Union within the EurAsEC were ratified in the
lower chamber of parliament, the House of Representatives. The
list includes the agreement on the use of quotas in the Customs
Union and bill on the ratification of the protocol on provision
of tariff preferences. Alexander Lukashenko approved the
package of documents to establish the Customs Union on
January 5, 2010.
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Gas and oil
Amid the tragic events around the “Caucasian knot”, the Eastern
Partnership and terms of trade, the relations in the oil and gas
sector developed relatively peaceful. The gas and oil conflicts were
bound to subside as soon as Belarus and Russia signed long.term
framework contracts regulating oil relations until the end of 2009
and gas relations until the end of 2010. The Belarusian side even
managed to have the price discount rate increased in 2009 (Russia
allowed Belarus to pay 70% of the European gas price minus
transport cost instead of the originally scheduled 80%). It was easy
for Gazprom to meet halfway with Belarus, because the real price
Belarus paid every quarter met Gazprom’s forecast: Belarus paid
U.S. $210 per 1,000 cubic meters of gas in the first quarter, U.S. $158
in the second quarter, U.S. $115 in the third quarter and U.S. $122
in the fourth quarter. Discounts set as part of the European price
are not really relevant in conditions when a monopoly supplier –
Gazprom – simply sets the final price. There is no one to appeal
to. In other words, it is much easier to sell a commodity for U.S. $200
if the old price tag has U.S. $300 on it – who would complain
about the discount?
Another concession that the Belarusian side obtained from
Russia – the one on gas payment procedure – was much harder
to get. Belarus used to pay for gas at actual prices on a quarterly
basis, whereas in 2009, the country used its best lobbying skills to
persuade Russia to accept payments at an average annual price of
U.S. $150 per 1,000 cubic meters, which means Belarus was
underpaying in the first half of the year and overpaying in July.
December. The request of the Belarusian side had been initiated
by shortages of finance early in 2009.
In the oil sector, the Belarusian.Russian relations were even
more peaceful, as the Belarusian side could not influence the
Russian oil trade strategy. Belarus did not seem willing to make
any adjustments in oil import patterns. Some experts had predicted
grave problems in the “oil issue” in early 2010 and advised taking
immediate action. However, Belarus allowed matters to take care
of themselves.
In early 2009, Russia offered Belarus to establish a joint oil
holding incorporating the Belarusian section of the Druzhba oil
pipeline, the two oil refineries, petrochemical enterprises and
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Russian oil producers. The proposal was aired by Russian
Ambassador to Belarus Alexander Surikov and Russian Deputy
Prime Minister Igor Sechin. Surikov promised: “whether we will
speed up or postpone the construction [of BTS.2 pipeline . authors]
will depend on the progress of our talks over joint projects,
including the establishment of a holding of extractive, transport
and processing enterprises ‘at the junction’ of Belarus and
Russia.”6. The Belarusian side was interested in the Russian
proposal: a working group was set up; it worked the entire year,
but without visible results. In short, the attitude of the Belarusian
side, its deliberation and excessive thoroughness were the main
reasons behind the oil knot that Belarus will have to untangle in
20107. Belarus entered the new year without a new oil contract.
Why did the Belarusian “oil generals” fail to tackle the problem
that had been looming for months? It looks like Belarusian hopes
for the Customs Union benefits and automatic dissolution of all
“oil clots” had been too high. Belarus did not bear in mind, though,
that the Customs Union was being formed to cut transit losses and
combat smuggling, and not to keep the Belarusian socioeconomic
model afloat. On the other hand, the “oil issue” was somewhat
overshadowed by the “financial issue”, when the International
Monetary Fund took over from Russia the role of the chief financial
donor of Belarus.
Military cooperation
Negotiations over intensification of military cooperation started
at the very beginning of 2009. Dmitry Medvedev and Alexander
Lukashenko had a telephone conversation on January 27 and
agreed to create a joint military force countervailing to that of
NATO – the Rapid Reaction Force of the Collective Security
Treaty Organization (CSTO). Three days later, the Council of
Ministers of the Union State inked the accord that Belarus and
Russia had been working on for almost a decade – the agreement
6 Quoted from: BTS.2 On Its Mark, Belorusy i rynok (‘Belarusians and the
market’) #№ 21(856) 25 of May, 31 2009: http://www.belmarket.by/ru/
28/65/1971/
7 There were no crude oil supplies under tolling terms to Belarus in the first
quarter of 2010.
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on the creation of the Common Regional Air Defense System. The
presidents approved the agreement on February 38. The Belarusian
air defense system had never been independent, as its efficient
operation had been reliant on coordination with Russian air
defense forces. While ensuring the defensive ability of the
Belarusian army in the air, the Russian side demanded that the
real state of things be legalized in an agreement on the common
air defense system. The most serious problem pertained to the
command of the Belarusian air defense units, as they are supposed
to report to the Supreme Commander.in.Chief, i.e. the president.
A compromise was reached, though9: Belarusian air defense will
be subordinate to the Belarusian military command in time of peace
and to the Russian command in time of war. After consolidating
its success on the western border by the large.scale West.2009
exercise, Russia focused on engaging Belarus in other military
blocs. Belarus was invited to the Shanghai Cooperation
Organization (SCO), and in October, signed a package of
documents to establish the CSTO Rapid Reaction Force. However,
the closer military cooperation in 2009 did not result in a fast
rearmament of the Belarusian army, contrary to Belarusian
expectations.
Conclusion and challenges of 2010
In 2009, Belarus lost some of the traditional levers that it had been
using when negotiating sensitive issues with the Russian
administration, including oil and gas cooperation and trade in end
products. At the same time, Belarus failed to reduce its dependence
on Russia in energy import and export of Belarusian products. The
Russian authorities were making “preemptive strikes” in
strategically important areas, allowing Belarus a few minor tactical
nd media victories as a consolation prize.
Attempts to get back to bygone cooperation schemes used
within the Union State for years, i. e. direct subsidies to the
Belarusian economy as a Russian region in the form of Russian
8 BelTA, February 3, 2009, http://www.belta.by/ru/news/archive?date=
03_02_2009&page=2&id=329307.
9 A. Alesin, Union Cover, Nashe Mneniye (‘Our Opinion’), February 5, 2009,
http://nmnby.eu/news/express/1676.html.
63
domestic energy prices and preferential access for Belarusian
exports to the Russian market are a waste of efforts and
resources.
In 2010, the Belarusian administration will have to redouble
its efforts to seek alternative sources of bolstering its socio.
economic model – primarily through expansion of cooperation
with the countries of the region and liberalization of the business
environment. If Belarus succeeds in its quest, it will have new
valuable bargaining chips to use in future disputes with Russia.
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BELARUSEEU:
PROTRACTED NORMALIZATION
Denis Melyantsov
Summary
The year 2009 became a significant landmark for Belarusian foreign policy and
the relations with the European Union as an important aspect of this policy.
Belarus became a full member of the EU’s Eastern Partnership Initiative, thus
transforming from the “last European dictatorship” into a partner of the European
Union. European politicians visited Belarus to meet with the head of state and
top officials, and some Belarusian officials paid visits to European countries;
negotiations commenced over European financial aid to Belarus; the Delegation
of the European Commission to Belarus eventually was granted an official status.
At the same time, Belarus and EU made little progress in institutionalizing their
relationship. The European Union did not manage to get Belarus to make any
serious steps toward democratization and improvement of the human rights
situation.
Tendencies:
• Belarus managed to break its international isolation and strengthen its position
as an EU partner;
• Belarus and EU did not make much progress in the issue of the ratification of
the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement and involvement of Belarus in
the European Neighbourhood Policy;
• Lack of progress in democratization of Belarus slows down the approximation
with EU and impedes the country’s engagement in the Eastern Partnership
projects.
End of isolation
In 2009, Belarusian foreign policy finally demonstrated its declared
“multi.vector” nature after finding a western counterbalance to
its oversized eastern dimension. The end of the long.standing self.
isolation phase was marked by a resumption of official visits of the
Belarusian state leader to European countries, as well as visits of
distinguished high.ranking guests from the West to Belarus,
participation of official Minsk in the institutions initiated by EU
(Eastern Partnership program) and inflows of western capital,
mostly in the form of loans.
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The signing of the agreement on the establishment of the
Delegation of the European Commission to Belarus (later the
Delegation of the European Union to Belarus) by President
Alexander Lukashenka on January 8 marked the beginning of a
new stage in the history of the Belarusian.European relations, as
Belarus and EU officially established full.scale diplomatic
relations. Prior to that, the delegation used to work in Belarus as
a TACIS office designed to provide Belarus with technical
assistance.
The opening of the EU Delegation to Belarus took place amid
a bitter diplomatic conflict between the Belarusian authorities and
the United States, which resulted in the expulsion of the U.S.
ambassador and significant staff reductions in the U.S. Embassy.
This may not be a coincidence, as Minsk may have been making
clear indications that the EU’s instruments to influence Minsk were
limited, and possible consequences of a too enthusiastic support
for the Belarusian opposition could be devastating.
On February 19, Javier Solana, High Representative for the
Common Foreign and Security Policy, Secretary.General of the
Council of the European Union, paid a visit to Belarus. During the
visit, which had been arranged in half secrecy, the top European
official complied with Minsk’s request to pursue dialogue without
intermediaries and preliminary conditions1, thus indicating the end
of the European policy of conditionality toward Belarus. Solana
made it clear that EU was ready for informal agreements with the
Belarusian government and that geopolitical loyalty was the
cornerstone of mutual relations, rather than democracy and human
rights.
Commissioner for External Relations and European
Neighbourhood Policy Benita Ferrero.Waldner, on the other hand,
kept to the traditional European rhetoric fixed in the non.paper
“What the European Union could bring to Belarus” (2006)2. It could
be for this reason that Lukashenka did not want to meet with her
right after the visit of Javier Solana (Ferrero.Waldner’s visit,
originally slated for March, had been postponed until June).
1 Javier Solana says he came not to make conditions: http://naviny.by/
rubrics/politic/2009/02/19/ic_news_112_306656/
2 See.: What the European Union could bring to Belarus: http://
ec.europa.eu/external_relations/belarus/intro/non_paper_1106.pdf.
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In May, Lukashenka visited the European Union after a more
than 10.year pause. Lukashenka went to Italy to meet with the
Italian leaders and had an audience with the Pope. That European
visit was to show that Belarus had not only broken its international
isolation, but also was eager to consolidate its relations with the
Catholic Church. In fact, the Belarusian leader had a more
ambitious goal in mind – to act as an intermediary in the matter
of reconciliation between the Western and Eastern Churches.
However, the Moscow Patriarch, just like Lukashenka himself,
showed that he preferred pursuing dialogue without any
intermediaries3 by disavowing Lukashenka’s statements.
In autumn, there were a few more international top.level visits
that proved once and for all that Belarus had done away with its
international isolation. In September, Lukashenka paid an official
visit to Lithuania, and in late October, Italian Prime Minister Silvio
Berlusconi arrived in Minsk (he became the first European
politician of this level to visit Belarus in the past 12 years).
In November, Lukashenka paid a visit to Kiev (see “Belarus.
Ukraine: On the Way to Strategic Cooperation?” in this yearbook),
which alongside his stay in Vilnius in September and general
enhancement of economic ties along the North.South axis could
be regarded as a new trend in Belarusian foreign policy. This new
tendency may be dubbed “regionalization” of Belarusian foreign
political efforts aimed at strengthening its positions in talks with
Russia and creating an “airbag” in the event of the failure of the
dialogue with the European Union.
Besides top.level visits, there were plenty of Belarusian.EU
contacts at the level of ministries and expert communities. Foreign
Minister Sergei Martynov in the fourth quarter alone visited Finland,
Romania, Spain, Austria and Brussels (twice). The revision of the
EU’s attitude to Belarus thus brought an end to the period of political
isolation of Belarus, which had lasted for more than a decade.
Eastern Partnership context
There was one more serious bonus for Belarus besides the cessation
of its international isolation – the country got involved in the
3 See.: Bat’ka Crosses Pope’s Path: http://www.kommersant.ru/doc.aspx?
DocsID=1244986
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Eastern Partnership (EaP) Initiative of the European Union,
proposed by Poland and Sweden in the spring of 2008. EaP is an
instrument of deepening the European Neighbourhood Policy
(ENP) and is in essence an alternative to membership of the
European Union, offering all the countries involved a free trade
area and visa.free travel to the European union in the long term.
The decisive factor for the immediate launch of the Eastern
Partnership (compared to other EU programs, which had taken
much longer) was the war in the Caucasus in August 2008. The
primary motivation behind the Eastern Partnership is a purely
geopolitical campaign to withdraw Eastern European post.Soviet
countries from the influence of Russia with a view to forming a
belt of friendly nations on the eastern border of the European
Union4. The European Commission’s declaration dated Decem.
ber 3, 2008 and EU Council documents on the Eastern Partnership
lost the phrases about a threat coming from Russia and added the
context of values, but it did not mean the geopolitical foundation
of the initiative had lost its priority5. High.ranking European
politicians and officials have made it clear many times that Belarus’
involvement in the Eastern Partnership would depend on the non.
recognition of the breakaway Georgian republics by official
Minsk6, which attests to the geopolitical rationality of the new
European program.
During the first three months of 2009, the level of Belarus’
engagement was discussed, and the country was eventually
granted the status of full EaP member. We believe Alexander
Lukashenka’s meeting with Javier Solana contributed a lot to that
decision. Whether or not Lukashenka would take part in the EaP
inaugural summit in Prague on May 7 was a matter of grave
concern to many, but a clever maneuver helped everyone save face:
Lukashenka got an official invitation to come to Prague, but there
4 This task is consistent with the European Security Strategy (ESS) adopted
in 2003, aiming at expanding the security belt around Europe.
5 D. Melyantsou. Eastern Partnership: Incomplete Gestalt. BISS 2009: http://
www.belinstitute.eu/images/stories/documents/bb072009by.pdf
6 Javier Solana: “Belarus should stand fast in its position on non.recognition
of South Ossetia and Abkhazia”: http://belapan.com/archive/2009/03/17/
eu_291314/. “Possible recognition of South Ossetia, Abkhazia by Belarus
will hardly promote Eastern Partnership collaboration, German Foreign
Ministry says”: http://belapan.com/archive/2009/11/05/eu_341048/, etc.
Foreign Policy
68 	



must have been some informal agreement that the Belarusian
leader would not turn up and embarrass some of the re.
presentatives of Old Europe, who still felt skeptical about the
normalization of relations with the dictatorship. The fact that the
Belarusian head of state did not go to Prague proves that Minsk
was willing to keep, among others, even unofficial promises.
Throughout the year, Belarusian officials would emphasize the
importance of Belarus’ involvement in the Eastern Partnership.
First of all, Minsk is interested in attracting additional financing
for the projects that cannot be funded from the state budget amid
the global downturn. Its participation in EaP projects would also
improve the image of Belarus, which until quite recently had been
in political isolation, and which European investors would avoid.
The Belarusian authorities also liked the fact that they were invited
to shape the development of the initiative from the start.
Despite the fact that the Eastern Partnership has a special place
reserved for civil society (Civil Society Forum), one has to
remember that the initiative had been designed as a form of
interaction with neighboring countries at the interstate level, hence
a limited influence of the Forum on decision.making and certain
secrecy in the preparation and submission of suggested projects
by the Belarusian side. Nevertheless, it is known that of the “post.
Soviet “sextet” taking part in the Eastern Partnership, Belarus was
the first one to submit its draft projects to the European
Commission (as of late 2009, the Commission had made no decision
on the Belarusian proposals yet).
It should be noted that the transformation potential of the
Eastern Partnership is very low. The program does not aim at
reforming the economies of the member.states for further
accession to EU or transforming the political systems of the six
members. As for the financing of the initiative, it is quite modest:
the EaP budget amounts to 600 million euros for the six countries,
and Belarus can only hope to get 40 million euros7.
Belarusian and European experts have noted that the Eastern
Partnership program is a sort of alternative to the Russian Common
Economic Area project. It will be impossible for Belarus to be
involved in both, and in the end Minsk will have to decide which
7 J.E Holzapfel. Belarus.EU cooperation amounts to 40 million euros: http://
news.tut.by/135310.html
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of the two integration initiatives is preferable. This naturally
narrows the room for political maneuver, and the Belarusian
administration will keep doing its best to pursue the policy of
avoiding the ultimate choice.
President Lukashenko made an unambiguous statement to this
effect: “We tend to prioritize what we can implement earlier. If the
Customs Union starts working for real in 2010, it will become our
priority. Whether we will have a free trade zone of Belarus, Ukraine
and the European Union or not, we don’t know yet. We have had
nothing but discussions so far. It would be good if we established
the Customs Union, as it will be very profitable to us. But it would
naturally be advantageous if we created a free trade zone with the
European Union”8.
The year 2009 marked the onset of the Eastern Partnership (its
executive agencies are not formed yet). This European initiative
has not resulted in any substantial preferences for Belarus yet,
therefore the Belarusian authorities hurried to sign the Customs
Union accord with Russia and Kazakhstan looking for immediate
benefits, which put into question many potential benefits of the
Eastern Partnership.
Dialogue without intermediaries and conditionality
From the very beginning, the Belarusian.European dialogue not
only served the interests of Belarus, but also corresponded with
the needs of the European Union. The previous policy, based on
sanctions, had failed, and it was time to look for new ways to resolve
the “Belarusian issue”, which appeared to be gaining importance
for the enlarged European Union: an undemocratic transit country
on the eastern border was a challenge for the then immature foreign
policy of United Europe.
Since late 2006, the EU had been trying to force Minsk to fulfill
a package of preliminary conditions stipulated in the non.paper
“What the European Union could bring to Belarus” and some other
documents, claiming that compliance was a precondition for
normalization of relations. However, official Minsk ignored that
8 A Lukashenka. “We would not turn down EU free trade zone, if it were
proposed tomorrow”: http://naviny.by/rubrics/economic/2009/07/06/
ic_media_113_3219/
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conditionality insisting that political relations must be restored
without any preconditions or “double standards”. As a result,
Brussels cut the package of requirements from 12 to five, and then
left only one, namely, the release of political prisoners, showing
the inconsistency of its position and willingness to yield without
having any reciprocal concessions.
After the Russian.Georgian war of August 2008 the significance
of Belarus for the EU increased enormously – the “belt of
neighborliness” would not be an organic whole without Belarus.
Being shocked by the events in the Caucasus, the European Union
turned a blind eye to the undemocratic parliamentary elections in
Belarus and failure to meet preliminary conditions, and opted for
the one.sided recognition of the Belarusian regime, because
geopolitical reasons proved weightier than democratic principles.
That fatal mistake resulted in a whole range of problems, which
the EU will have to tackle later.
The European Union painted itself into a corner when it agreed
to give up conditionality and restored its relations with Belarus
without drawing up a “road map” of normalization. First, it let
Lukashenka see that non.recognition of South Ossetia and
Abkhazia was more important for the EU than democratization and
liberalization of Belarus, and that the EU will be ready to cede its
positions in future. Second, once it started the dialogue with
Belarus, the EU will find it impossible to suspend it even if Minsk
“misbehaves”, as it would mean another failure of an EU policy on
Belarus.
Third, by agreeing to make unilateral concessions, the
European Union limited the range of instruments to impose any
conditions on Belarus in future. Minsk interpreted the situation
perfectly well and played along with EU when the right time came.
It appeared that the European Union “hooked” Belarus using its
programs, whereas Belarus “hooked” Brussels using the
inconsistency of the European approach.
The Belarusian authorities did not make any serious moves
toward democratization of the internal political life in 2009; the
political system remained unreformed; the only change was a slight
alleviation of political practices. At the same time, Belarus became
a full member of the Eastern Partnership Initiative, broke the
international isolation, received stand.by loans from the
International Monetary Fund (IMF) (EU gave its consent), started
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negotiating financial aid and simplified visa procedures with EU.
In other words, the Belarusian administration became the winning
party. Civil society, too, managed to reap the benefits of an
additional vote in the Civil Society Forum of the Eastern
Partnership.
One should admit that the “policy of dragging” toward Belarus
may prove efficient if EU manages to make its programs attractive
enough for Belarus to lose its interest in the integration projects
with Russia. In order not to lose control of the process, EU needs
to pay more attention to tactical issues, such as “road maps” and
interconditionality of concessions. So far official Minsk has been
playing in the framework of the old scheme, based on geopolitical
bargaining and taking political opponents hostage. A new
configuration in the scope of the region would give the Belarusian
authorities more room for maneuver.
The EU’s “soft policies” on Belarus are explained not only by
geopolitical factors, but also by economic interests of some
member.states, corporations and firms, certain opportunities
offered by the participation in the privatization of Belarusian state
property, which will start sooner or later. For that matter, political
reorientation of Belarus toward the West could create an
alternative to one.way capital inflows from Russia.
First disappointments
When evaluating the initial phase of the Belarusian.European
dialogue, one should note that both sides are somewhat
disappointed: EU has not seen any progress in democratization of
Belarusian political life; political opposition, civil society and
independent media are still persecuted, and the political system
has showed no institutional changes. The relation between the EU
and Belarus still lack the institutional framework: the Partnership
and Cooperation Agreement has not been adapted and ratified;
Belarus has not become part of the European Neighbourhood
Policy, which prevents the country from taking part in the bilateral
format of the Eastern Partnership as a full member. On the other
hand, as it was mentioned above, the policy of dragging applied
to Belarus may prove successful only in the long run.
The Belarusian government had expected fast financial
benefits from the dialogue with the EU, especially through
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financing of EaP projects, but unfortunately for the Belarusian
authorities, the program has been taking too long, and not a single
project from the list proposed by the Belarusian side has been
adopted. Additional difficulties will be encountered when the
Eastern Partnership starts forming EaP administrative agencies.
The European Parliament refuses to include Belarusian
representatives of the National Assembly in the Euronest
Parliamentary Assembly and demands seats for the Belarusian
opposition.
The process of normalization did not result in a complete
abolition of sanctions – they were suspended until autumn 2010.
The country’s Generalized System of Preferences (GSP) benefits
have not been reinstated, and Belarus has failed to gain
membership in the European Neighbourhood Policy, which
restricts its access to possible sources of financing.
Being quite disappointed with the immediate results of the
Eastern Partnership, Belarus turned to other options, namely, the
Customs Union with Russia and Kazakhstan, hoping it would
reincarnate the subsidies that it had enjoyed prior to 2007. These
sharp swerves in the foreign policy of official Minsk puzzled
European politicians, who seem to question the seriousness of
Belarusian partners’ intentions. At the same time, this behavior of
the Belarusian administration appears to be a natural result of the
low attractiveness of European programs, which should prompt
European institutions to work out a full.scale strategy for its eastern
partners, especially for Belarus.
Conclusions
A major breakthrough for the Belarusian.EU relations came in
2009, which appeared to be the most productive and favorable year
in the past decade. In a very short time span Belarus made
remarkable progress from “the last dictatorship” in Europe to an
EU partner. However, the rapprochement did not lead to a
transformation of the political system of the country, because
political repression still remains, albeit less severe than before,
whereas European values are still alien to the Belarusian elite
currently in power.
Once the EU failed to work out a “road map” for normalization,
it lost its influence over Belarus, and it does not seem to be in charge
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of the process now. The inconsistency of the European approach
at the early phase of the dialogue does not allow EU to get back to
the policy of conditionality, which is why the dialogue continues
according to the rules imposed by official Minsk.
The policy of dragging employed by the European Union may
prove efficient in the long run, but the delays in the implementation
of Eastern Partnership projects encourages the Belarusian
authorities to look for more beneficial alternative integration
projects, primarily those involving Russia.
The Belarusian.European relations have formed a separate line
in Belarusian foreign policy that is now independent of the
situation in the Belarusian.Russian relations. Nevertheless, Belarus
has not given up its strategy of balancing between the “two
monsters” and has not made its choice in favor of a single center
of gravity.
Foreign Policy
74 	



POLISHEBELARUSIAN RELATIONS:
CONTINUATION OF PRAGMATISM
Kamil Klysinski
Summary
For PolishBelarusian relations the most dynamic were traditionally the
economic ties which both parties managed bring to unprecedented level, and
the scope of cooperation in 2009. As for political relations, Poland for its part
continued to act for the benefit of engaging Belarus by dialogue and participation
in the Eastern Partnership program. However, despite the development of
relations in the political and economic spheres, it was not possible to solve
longterm problems causing tension between Minsk and Warsaw.
Tendencies:
• The transition from a current trading exchange to a wide cooperation at the
highest level has become stronger;
• Economic crisis was reflected on the PolishBelarusian trading exchange –
it decreased by half;
• Polish diplomacy was actively engaged in the dialogue between the EU and
the Belarusian authorities;
• Controversial questions of bilateral relations remained unresolved.
Economic cooperation despite crisis
Partial alleviation of the international isolation of the Belarusian
regime in combination with the Belarusian steps of improving the
investment climate brought about considerable growth of the level
and intensity of economic relations in 2009. The visit of Polish vice.
premier Waldemar Pawlak to Belarus on February 23, during which
the possibilities of joint energy projects and prospect of
participation of Polish investors in the widely announced
privatization of state subjects of management of Belarus were
discussed, proved this.
However, the First Economic Summit Poland – Belarus
organized on June 23–24 and accompanying it the ІІІ National
Exhibition of the Republic of Belarus were the most indicative
episodes in this sphere. During the sessions both parties discussed
cooperation in the energy sector, in finance and insurance, trade
and agriculture, regional cooperation and tourism. The plans of
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action in the energy sector had the most perspective. Among others
the project of the construction of a coal power station in Zelva near
Hrodna (preliminary announced at the London investment forum
in November, 2008) was presented as well as the modernization of
the Polish.Belarusian power bridge Ros.Narew, and the
construction of the product pipeline from Belarus to the Polish
fuel base in Maіaszewicze. The first economic summit became an
unprecedented event in Polish.Belarusian relations both in
quantity and the rank of participants and in the width of the
discussed problems.
The unexpected visit of the head of the Polish Prime minister’s
office Tomasz Arabski to Minsk, who met with the head of
Administration of the Belarusian President Uladzimir Makey, was
the continuation of the intensive economic contacts. The economic
questions, including prospects of the Polish capital in Belarus, were
the main topic of negotiations. The possibility of an admission of
Polkomtel firm in the Belarusian telecommunication sector was one
of the discussed projects. As well as the economic summit,
organized in June, this meeting brought new quality into the
Polish.Belarusian economic cooperation.
The working visit of Premier Syarhei Sidorsky to Poland on
September 1.2 was the next demonstration of revival in this sphere.
Though the participation in the 70th anniversary of the beginning
of World War II was a formal reason for the Prime Minister’s arrival,
the economic topic again dominated. The signed memorandum
of cooperation in the sphere of electrical power industry
concerning cooperation in the field of energy turnover, its transit
and delivery as well as the exchange of experience among the
experts in this area. Besides the negotiations with the
representatives of several Polish firms interested in business in
Belarus, including AJK Investment company, which offered the
consulting support in privatization of Belarusian enterprises were
carried out.
The last event was the session of the Polish.Belarusian working
group on trade and investments in Warsaw on October 14, 2009.
During the negotiations the parties co.coordinated the realization
of the project of the pipeline which transports oil products from
Mozyr oil refinery to the Polish fuel base in Maіaszewicze. The
Polish Liquid Fuels Logistics Operator (OLPP) became the
executor of the project. The institutional contacts also increased.
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In October representatives of the central banks of both countries
signed an agreement promising cooperation and exchange of
experience.
All events mentioned above prove that in Polish.Belarusian
relations the tendency that started in 2008 for transition from a
current trading exchange to wide cooperation at the highest
level which is beneficial for certain investment projects, has
become stronger. However such dynamic development of
relations does not prevent problems and misunderstanding in
this sphere.
In the context of February visit of vice.premier Pawlak the
widely circulated Polish newspaper Rzeczpospolita published an
open letter of Terravita firm which for some years has already tried
to return the capital invested in Belarus that was intercepted by
their dishonest Belarusian partner. In their letter the
representatives of the firm warned the readers from investing into
Belarus, accusing its authorities of disrespecting property rights
and applying arbitrary solutions to separate problems. Thus the
problems which result from the considerable difference of
economic systems of both countries increased.
In its turn in December the news broke that the interest of the
Polish side in the construction of the oil pipeline to Maіaszewicze
had abated. This was caused by the increase in capacity of the
Gdansk oil refinery, now able to satisfy the main demand for oil
products in Poland. The realization of other investment projects
as well as the participation of Polish projects in the privatization
promised by the Belarusian authorities turned out to be
problematic.
In 2009, despite the negotiations and proposals, no serious
transaction was made in which Warsaw participated. It seems that
the reason for this was on the one hand the economic crisis, and
on the other – the subjective fear of the Belarusian authorities of
loosing state ownership, the inability to work with foreign investors
and also the harsh demands for investors. These restrictions had a
general nature and concerned all investors, irrespective of the
country of origin.
The economic crisis affected the Polish.Belarusian trading
exchange. According to Polish data, during the period of January.
November, 2009 a decline of about 50% was registered. The
greatest reduction occurred in imports from Belarus – from USD
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1.26 billion during the period of January.November, 2008 to USD
0.73 billion during the same period in 2009. But Polish exports
during this period were over USD 1.09 billion, while in the previous
year it was USD 1.49 billion. Thereby Poland once again received
a positive balance of trade (in 2008 it had been nearby USD 300
million). It should also be underlined that Belarusian data have
not agreed with Polish statistics for many years, resulting from
different methodologies for calculating trade operations. The result
is that both parties provide data claiming a positive balance in trade
with their neighbor.
Involvement of Belarus through its participation
in the Eastern Partnership
Just as in previous years, in 2009 Polish.Belarusian relations were
essentially determined by the relations in the Brussels.Minsk axis.
Polish diplomacy was very actively engaged in the dialogue of the
EU with the authorities of Belarus, making from this question one
of its priorities. It is important that it was Warsaw that was the main
author and initiator of the program “Eastern Partnership”, partly
aimed at the Belarusian side. Therefore Poland also, despite other
conflicts round the Union of Poles in Belarus headed by Andїelika
Borys and the absence of democratic changes, accepted the EU
offer to invite Alexander Lukashenko to the May summit in Prague
which opened the ”Eastern partnership”. Earlier the Polish
authorities had also supported the decision to continue the
moratorium on visa sanctions against the representatives of the
regime.
Just as in 2008, the policy of dialogue and openness met with
sharp criticism of the Belarusian opposition. In March during their
visit to the European Parliament Alexander Kazulin and Anatoly
Lyabedzka accused Poland of cynical trade of values for local
interests. Despite this criticism Warsaw continued operating for
the benefit of mutual understanding with the official Minsk, and
at the same time continued supporting the democratic forces and
financing such projects as TV BELSAT. The Polish MEPs often
raised the question of violation of civil rights and simultaneously
called for a greater openness of Belarusian society, by the way, by
reducing prices for Shengen visas. In its turn Polish diplomats
consistently asked the attention of other EU.member for the
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problems in Belarus. Thereby Poland more and more acquired the
role of the main advocate of “the Belarusian cause in the EU”.
The official Minsk had a very positive attitude towards the
“Eastern Partnership”, which presented the first chance to
participate in the EU program after a long isolation. Therefore the
Belarusian government was the first (from 6 states participating in
this program) who stated their expectations. Among the offered
projects two were connected with Poland, namely the construction
of electrical power bridge Ros<Narew (due to which it is possible
to export energy from the new power station planned near Hrodna),
and also the construction of gas pipeline Yamal.2 which was at
once estimated as unrealistic and unwise.
But the first project was supported and received backing for
financing from the European Investment Bank. At the same time
it should also be said that the Belarusian side consistently avoided
the issues of human rights and democratization, thereby limiting
its participation in the Partnership to convenient issues, such as
power, transport, industrial infrastructure and logistics. This was
proved by the fiasco of the Polish initiative to include Belarus into
the cooperation program among the representatives of civil rights.
The Belarusian side even deviated from fulfilling the entrance
condition.
Multilateral cooperation was also important, so Poland and
Belarus joined the project of Ukrainian president Victor
Yushchenko to create a trilateral formula of cooperation that from
the first month of the meeting on June 23 was named the “Kiev
initiative”. However it was possible to organize only one more
meeting before the end of the year, which failed to offer any certain
solutions. Lithuania was more successful in this field. At the summit
of the Eastern Partnership on December 8 it submitted together
with Ukraine and Belarus a package of joint projects which
concerned the development and modernization of border
infrastructure.
Conflict areas
Despite the expressive revival in economic contacts and political
relations, still it was not possible to solve a number of long.standing
contradictions, such as, for example, legalization of activity of the
Union of Poles in Belarus headed by Andїelika Borys. This situation
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supported the division performed in 2005 which divided the Union
into one that is supervised by the authorities, and the other,
independent, supported by Warsaw, the members of which were
exposed to repression, such as penalties or arrests. Vandalism and
provocation against some activists and their property were
committed. They were not repression on national grounds but
rather actions against one of the most independent Belarusian
public organizations. However the greatest tension was caused by
the attempts made by regime to confiscate Polish houses remaining
under the control of the UPB headed by Andїelika Borys.
In 2009 the activities of the authorities concentrated on Ivyanets
which is in the Minsk region where the pressure was brought upon
the local chairperson of the independent union Teresa Sobal by
different means. Thanks to the efforts of Polish diplomats and
European MEPs the problem of the Polish minority in Belarus was
constantly escalated to the EU level. However Minsk was not
interested in compromise and rejected the offer to begin
negotiations with Andїelika Borys, at the same time accusing
Warsaw of interfering into the internal affairs of Belarus.
At the same time as during the previous years there were
regular aggressive publications in the official mass media where it
was stated that Poland by means of UPB headed by Andїelika Borys
was going to tear off Hrodna region from Belarus. The businessman
Stanisіaw Siemaszko, the new chairman of the pro.regime Union
elected in September, who by the way does not speak the Polish
language, expressed the same opinion. Besides, the annoyance of
Minsk was caused by such questions as the issuing of so.called
Polish Cards to Belarusian citizens of Polish background and the
activity of TV channel Belsat which broadcasts from Poland. In its
turn the Polish side steadily criticized the absence of civil liberties
in Belarus.
Conclusion
The opening in political relations in autumn 2008 created new
possibilities of cooperation between Poland and Belarus. An
undisputed achievement in the sphere of economic cooperation
between Minsk and Warsaw in 2009 was raising the level of
contacts and the expansion of the questions discussed to an
unprecedented level. Although this development failed to translate
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into concrete results on problematic issues, it cannot be excluded
that with time, benefits will accrue from further engagement, for
example via increased investment of Polish capital in Belarus.
At the same time being occupied with “the Belarusian
question”, Poland became one of the main initiators of EU policy
with respect to Belarus. With that, Polish diplomacy assumed at
least part of the responsibility of the project of democratization
through a policy of openness and dialogue. However, the conflict
around the UPB shows what a difficult partner Alexander
Lukashenko is and how illusive the expectations about
modernization of this system can be. Therefore it also seems that
2010 will be a serious test for the efficiency and durability of
dialogue with the official Minsk, lobbied by the Polish side.
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BELARUS – UKRAINE:
ON THE WAY TO STRATEGIC COOPERATION?
Gennadi Maksak
Summary
Politically, Belarus and Ukraine achieved a major breakthrough in 2009. The
two countries reached an agreement in principle to finally resolve the long
standing problem of ratification of the accord on the UkrainianBelarusian border
by the Belarusian side and address the amount and status of Ukrainian debt –
the issue that Belarus links to the state border agreement. The Belarusian
Ukrainian dialogue continued amid certain liberalization of BelarusianEU
relations (which started in late 2008) on the one hand and strained relations
between Minsk and Moscow on the other. At the top level, Belarus and Ukraine
gained understanding with a view to resolving certain issues and developed a
concerted vision on the strategic lines of the dialogue. In bilateral cooperation,
emphasis was traditionally placed on strengthening trade cooperation, which
appeared to be a sensible decision in conditions of the continuing economic
lag of the region. Amid the general approximation of Ukrainian and Belarusian
positions towards the European vector, considerable progress was reached in
crossborder cooperation and contacts at the level of civil society and expert
communities.
Tendencies:
• a sharp improvement in communication at the level of the presidents,
governments and foreign ministries led to an expansion of the regulatory
framework of bilateral cooperation;
• BelarusianUkrainian trade turnover dropped as a result of the economic
downturn;
• the pace of political contacts and agendas for BelarusianUkrainian meetings
was traditionally defined by the relations between Minsk and Moscow, as
well as the presidential campaign in Ukraine;
• the Eastern Partnership Initiative gave an impetus to the cooperation between
Belarus and Ukraine in outlining the strategic areas of regional cooperation
in transport and energy.
Political thaw in MinskEKiev relations
As was predicted in 2008, the new positive trends in Belarusian.
EU relations resulted in changes in official Kiev’s strategy for
pursuing political dialogue with Minsk.
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Based on European standards and commitments Belarus
assumed previously, the results of the 2008 parliamentary elections
in Belarus did not allow European institutions to report major
positive shifts in the internal political situation, however, the
elections did not provoke a new round of tensions. The willingness
of the Belarusian administration to rectify its errors and inefficiency
of isolationism allowed the EU to exercise good will toward Belarus
and temporarily lift sanctions against Belarusian state officials and
enterprises.
In Kiev, this signal was interpreted as the “green light” to
facilitate the approximation between Belarus and EU. In October
2008, Minsk hosted consultations of representatives of the two
foreign ministries, which addressed the potential of joint projects
with the European Union. The preparatory work conducted by the
foreign ministries in early 2009 helped reconstruct the direct
communication channel at the top level.
During their bilateral meeting on January 20, 2009, the
presidents of Ukraine and Belarus signed a few landmark
documents creating additional regulatory prerequisites for
intensification of the bilateral dialogue in the political and
economic spheres, including:
• a memorandum of cooperation in the energy sector;
• a consular convention between Belarus and Ukraine;
• a memorandum between the governments and national banks
of Belarus and Ukraine aimed at elaborating a system of
measures to intensify bilateral trade and economic cooperation
in conditions of the global financial and economic crisis;
• an intergovernmental agreement on simplified passage of the
Belarusian section of Slavutich.Chernobyl motorway by
personnel, vehicles and freight of the Chernobyl nuclear power
plant operating in the restricted zone, and foreign specialists
involved in international projects contributing to shutting
down the Chernobyl plant, and a protocol to the agreement.
During that meeting in Ukraine, Lukashenko publically
confirmed the role of Kiev as an intermediary between EU and
Belarus and the determination to implement joint energy projects.
As a result, both sides managed to form platforms necessary to
reach foreign political objectives. Amid the energy conflict with
Russia, it was crucial for Kiev to show Moscow that it has allies in
the matter of diversification of energy imports. For Minsk, the
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meeting became a good chance to demonstrate Moscow the entire
range of political fluctuations in the context of energy relations
and display its interest in developing cooperation in the European
direction.
The European platform underlay the agenda for the meeting
between Presidents Lukashenko and Yushchenko in Gomel on
May 6, 2009. Besides discussing joint projects and addressing
pressing issues, the presidents discussed Ukraine’s possible
support for promotion of closer contacts between Minsk and
Brussels, especially in the format of Belarus’ full participation in
the Eastern Partnership Initiative. Symbolically, the meeting took
place on the eve of the Eastern Partnership inaugural summit that
took place in Prague on May 7.
The meeting between the Belarusian and Ukrainian presidents
during a summit of the CIS heads of state in Kishinev on October
9 was another proof that a new format of bilateral relations had
been developed. The attempt to work out a concerted Belarusian.
Ukrainian policy on Russia indicated that the Belarusian side was
ready for deepening its relations with Ukraine in some very
important areas. Lukashenko’s official visit to Ukraine on
November 4–6 proved quite prolific, as the heads of state signed:
• an agreement between the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine and
the government of Belarus on holdings fairs to trade
domestically.made commodities in cross.border regions;
• a memorandum between the two foreign ministries on
cooperation in the implementation of mutually beneficial
projects in the framework of the Eastern Partnership Initiative;
• a protocol on exchange of the instruments of ratification of
the Consular Convention between Ukraine and Belarus.
During the visit, Lukashenko and Yushchenko reached an
agreement on the ratification of the treaty on the demarcation of
the Ukrainian.Belarusian state border, which will enable the two
countries to resolve their dispute over Ukraine’s debt by setting
preferential prices for Ukrainian exports of electricity to Belarus.
At the level of the governments, the dialogue was held both by
the premiers and within the framework of the interdepartmental
Ukrainian.Belarusian mixed commission for trade an economic
cooperation. Despite early 2009 agreements, Prime Minister Yulia
Timoshenko did not pay a visit to Belarus. Her Belarusian
counterpart Sergei Sidorsky visited Kiev on June 12. While in Kiev,
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the governmental delegation of Belarus managed to reach an
agreement on resumption of exports of Ukrainian electrical power
to Belarus.
Finally, 2009 saw a more active dialogue at the parliamentary
level. In March, the National Assembly of Belarus and the Supreme
Rada of Ukraine held a session of the Interparliamentary
Commission. Ukrainian speaker Vladimir Litvin paid an official
visit to Minsk on June 30 – he met with President Lukashenko
and Speaker of the Council of the Republic of the National
Assembly Boris Batura.
The busy schedule of visits and meetings at all levels may also
be explained by the fact that President Viktor Yushchenko, Prime
Minister Yulia Timoshenko and Speaker of the Supreme Rada
Litvin all ran for the Ukrainian presidency in late 2009.early 2010.
The two foreign ministries also showed a significant increase
in the efficiency of bilateral cooperation. First, Petr Poroshenko
was appointed Ukrainian foreign minister after a lengthy
confrontation (the ministerial position had remained vacant for
quite long); second, back in early 2009, Ukraine claimed that the
resolution of the border issue with Belarus was among the key
priorities of Ukrainian foreign political efforts in 2009; and third,
the EU’s Eastern Partnership Initiative called for deeper systemic
consultations at the level of the foreign ministries.
In October, newly appointed Ukrainian Foreign Minister
Poroshenko paid a working visit to Belarus, and on November 22,
Kiev hosted a tripartite meeting of Poroshenko, Belarusian Foreign
Minister Sergei Martynov and Lithuanian Foreign Minister
Vygaudas Usackas. The foreign ministers addressed trilateral
projects in the scope of the Eastern Partnership, especially the use
of the Belarusian transit potential in supplies of Ukrainian power
to Lithuania and cooperation in the implementation of the Viking
container train project and development of transport
infrastructure, including the construction of Minsk.Kiev highway.
An important decision in the context of the Eastern Partnership
was made by the national security councils of Ukraine, Belarus
and Poland regarding the creation of the Kiev Initiative, which
envisages deeper cooperation in the framework of the Eastern
Partnership.
On the whole, irrespective of the real motives of the political
agents involved in the development of bilateral relations, the new
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format of political cooperation resulted in a major expansion of
the regulatory framework. As of late December 2009, there were
over 180 bilateral agreements between Belarus and Ukraine,
including nine interstate ones, one antiparliamentary accord, and
82 intergovernmental agreements (the rest of them are
interdepartmental deals). More than half of all bilateral documents
regulate trade and economic relations, which attests to the
importance of the commercial component of engagement.
Economic cooperation between
Belarus and Ukraine
Ukraine is a leading trade partner of Belarus. In 2009, it ranked
second in the CIS and fourth globally by the overall volume of
trade with Belarus. Among Ukraine’s foreign trade partners,
Belarus was number seven. Trade turnover between Belarus and
Ukraine totaled U.S. $2.98 billion in 2009. Belarus exported U.S.
$1.69 billion worth of commodities and services to Ukraine,
whereas imports were at U.S. $1.29 billion, hence a surplus of about
U.S. $400 million for Belarus.
Trade between Belarus and Ukraine, in millions of U.S. dollars
Source: the Belarusian Embassy in Ukraine
Traditional Belarusian exports to Ukraine included mechanical
engineering products, agricultural equipment, oil products,
foodstuffs and chemicals. Key imports from Ukraine are metal
products, electric power, pharmaceuticals, sunflower oil,
confectionery products, and construction materials.
Mutual investments were traditionally insignificant: Ukraine
invested around U.S. $2 million in the Belarusian economy in
2009. Belarus kept focusing on developing its commodity
distribution networks in Ukraine – there were over 150 networks
of this kind in 2009, performing both dealer and distributor
functions.
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The list of large Ukrainian productions represented in Belarus
includes Neftegaz Ukrainy, Leninskaya Kuznya, Poltava turbo.
mechanical plant, Interpipe Corporation, and Donetsk metal plant.
Last year, Ukraine registered the following Belarusian.Ukrainian
joint ventures: TOO Belresursy Ukraina, based in Kiev, Vollun, in
Volyn Region, OOO Belarusian.Ukrainian company (Zhitomir
Region), OOO Belprodobespechenie (Zhitomir).
The interdepartmental Ukrainian.Belarusian mixed
commission for trade an economic cooperation contributed a lot
to the efficiency of bilateral trade. In 2009, there were two sessions
(the 16th session took place in Kiev, and the 17th session was held
in Minsk), addressing ways to expand bilateral cooperation,
including in the context of the Eastern Partnership Initiative,
especially in the development of the 9th transport corridor and
diversification of energy projects.
In June, Ukraine resumed electrical power exports to
Belarus – supplies reached 700 million kilowatt.hours (kWh) in
2009, and an increase to 5 billion kWh for the year 2010 was
discussed. The possibility was confirmed in November during a
top.level meeting, where an agreement was reached on
preferential electricity prices as a repayment of the Ukrainian
debt to Belarus.
At the same time, Belarus and Ukraine failed to reach an
agreement on transit of Ukrainian power to the Baltic States
through Belarus. One problem besides objective technical
difficulties is that the Belarusian side does not want to transit
Ukrainian power to Lithuania, but resell it.
BelarusianEUkrainian dialogue beyond
official agenda
In 2009, the Ukrainian.Belarusian relations at the level of civil
society organizations, expert institutions and cross.border
communities were developing both on the basis of traditional
approaches and new preconditions resulting from changes in the
political situation in Ukraine, Belarus and the entire CEE region.
Ukraine remained a favorable venue for Belarusian
communities to hold their events in the framework of international
organizations. Although such meetings were not as intense in 2009
as in previous years because of the liberalization of the internal
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political situation in Belarus, Ukraine hosted training sessions and
seminars for Belarusian human rights activist, journalists and
representatives of Belarusian democratic forces in the framework
of European Commission projects, PACT (USA) and East European
Democratic Center (Poland).
Scientific and expert cooperation between Belarus and Ukraine
intensified in 2009, compared to 2008. Warmer relations between
Belarus and Brussels and inclusion of Ukraine and Belarus in the
Eastern Partnership acted as catalysts.
At the community and expert levels, the engagement
between the two countries was developing along two lines. First,
Ukrainian and Belarusian NGOs focused on working out
specific proposals to flesh out the Civil Society Forum as a
mechanism of communication between civil society institutions
and the authorities. Second, representatives of the expert
communities of Belarus and Ukraine joined the work to design
the concept of sectoral cooperation for specific Eastern
Partnership platforms and initiatives. On October 29, 2009,
Minsk hosted the first session of the Energy Club under the
auspices of international organizations. Attending were experts
from Belarus, Ukraine and Russia, who addressed regional
cooperation in energy security.
Belarusian.Ukrainian cross.border cooperation was also more
intense than before in 2009, mostly because of the general revival
of the Belarusian.Ukrainian dialogue at the interstate level. It
should be noted, though, that this cooperation segment depends
entirely on the initiative of the authorities, not personal contacts.
In 2009, there were a few events at the level of NGOs, regional and
local authorities, and scheduled events in the framework of Bug
and Dnieper Euroregions.
However, some serious regulatory and institutional problems
prevented what could have turned into a breakthrough at the cross.
border level. First, the subcommission for cross.border cooperation
did not have its first session in 2009; second, Belarus has no law on
cross.border cooperation to introduce the legal framework for
Euroregions or stipulate the powers of local authorities in
interregional cross.border collaboration with neighboring
countries.
Cultural cooperation showed positive trends in 2009: Kiev
hosted a festival of contemporary uncensored Belarusian culture
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“Belarusian Spring 2009” from May 3 through May 18. That was
the third season of the festival in Kiev. “Belarusian Spring 2009”
in Kiev and other regional centers of Ukraine presented concerts,
poetry slams, literary soirees, film and photographic exhibitions.
The festival had been initiated by “Initiative Solidarnost”, the
community of Ukrainian Belarusians.
In August, Ukraine hosted the third international rock festival
“Be Free”. The organizers of the festival – Belarusian musical
alternative, Studformat initiative, European Radio of Belarus –
said the event was aimed at promoting Belarusian.Ukrainian
contacts.
The decision to create a department of the Belarusian language
in a Ukrainian university made by the two presidents during
Lukashenko’s visit to Kiev may give an additional incentive to the
development of the cultural and educational dialogue.
Conclusion
The year 2009 marked a transition in Ukrainian.Belarusian
relations. The transformation of the political dialogue proves
conclusively that the Belarusian and Ukrainian sides are willing
to step aside from the dominating orientation to external factors
when determining bilateral cooperation priorities. At the same
time, neither Kiev nor Minsk is capable of ignoring external
influences.
Ukraine and Belarus managed to arrange a top.level meeting
in 2009, thus breaking the “tradition” of postponing summit
meetings maintained since 2005. The compromise solutions and
agreements reached during the four meetings of the presidents of
Belarus and Ukraine attest to the willingness of both sides to
develop strategic areas for cooperation.
The recession that the two economies reported in 2009 did
not allow the trade partners to reach the 2008 level in trade
turnover, however, the additional measures taken to increase
economic cooperation amid the downturn were efficient enough
to achieve the level of 2007. The Interstate program for long.term
economic cooperation between Ukraine and Belarus for 1999–
2008 expired in 2008, and so did the agreement on economic
cooperation for 1999–2008, but new documents were not
developed in 2009.
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The EU’s Eastern Partnership Initiative became one more
incentive to a more active cooperation in the development of
approaches toward the implementation of joint energy and
transport projects. Cooperation between Belarus and Ukraine was
developing both at the state level and in the context of
communities and experts.
This article uses materials of news media of Belarus
and Ukraine, Foreign Ministry of Ukraine,
Foreign Ministry of Belarus, diplomatic missions.
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BELARUS – USA:
WHO SHOULD TAKE THE FIRST STEP?
Andrei Fyodorov
Summary
Some tendencies that became apparent in Belarusian domestic policy on
the eve of 2009 gave certain hope for a possible easing of the longterm
confrontation with the West. At the beginning of 2009 this hope was
supported by the assistance rendered by the USA in allocating IMF credits
to Belarus.
In other respects the BelarusianAmerican relations saw no changes. The
existing stalemate was not resolved, even after the unprecedented visit of the
USA Congress delegation to Minsk, the only real consequence of which was
the pardon for U.S. citizen Emanuel Zeltser.
Tendencies:
• the USA softened its economic pressure on Belarus, having frozen its
sanctions against Belarusian enterprises, and began to provide limited
financial support via international financial institutions;
• the level of political contacts but not the level of political mutual understanding
has increased;
• diplomatic interaction remained minimal.
Futile distance polemics
The year 2009 began with enthusiasm about Belarusian.American
relations, based on steps of the Belarusian government towards
easing the internal political situation in autumn 2008. Although in
November the U.S. Charge d’Affaires a.i. in Belarus Jonathan
Moore had expressed the belief that the election of Barack Оbama
as the president of the country would not affect mutual relations,
the Belarusian authorities were looking forward to the accession
of the new American administration to power, obviously expecting
to improve its position vis.а.vis the Americans.
The first events appeared to be truly encouraging: the
International Monetary Fund allocated to Belarus a credit of $ 2.5
billion, which could not have happened without the support of
Washington. On January 13, the U.S. embassy made a statement
on the matter in which the steps undertaken by the Belarusian
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authorities for overcoming an economic crisis were evaluated as
positive. At the same time it was noted in the statement that
additional measures on a structural economic reform should
follow – further price liberalization, transparent privatization of
state enterprises, legislative reform and reform of regulative
mechanisms promoting the development of a prosperous private
sector.
The next burst of enthusiasm in Minsk was caused by the
appointment of Hillary Clinton as the U.S. Secretary of State.
Commenting on this event, Andrey Popov, press.secretary of
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Belarus, informed journalists
that Belarus is ready to engage in a dialogue with the United
States based on mutual respect of interests. At the same time
he affirmed the consistency of the Belarusian position
concerning the need for Washington to cancel “discriminatory
decisions of an economic character” established by the previous
administration. Soon after the head of the Belarusian Ministry
of Foreign Affairs expressed his opinion on the matter. Sergey
Martynov declared that Minsk expects from Washington that
it cooperates in revising mutual relations and, on behalf of the
country’s highest authority, expressed the readiness to work
for their improvement.
The Secretary of State didn’t respond to these calls but the new
Director of National Intelligence Dennis Blair did remember about
Belarus. On February 12, speaking at a hearing in Congress he
expressed his opinion that Minsk could make steps for improving
relations with the West. According to him “the Lukashenko regime
appears willing to cooperate with Russian efforts to counter U.S.
missile defense plans with Prague and Warsaw. However, Russia’s
continuing efforts to control key Belarusian economic sectors
could prompt Minsk to improve ties with the West to balance
Moscow”. At the same time Blair warned that the government in
Belarus “maintains an authoritarian grip on power and could return
to repressive measures if public discontent over the worsening
economy turns to protest again”.
A week later the U.S. Charge d’Affaires a.i. in Belarus
Jonathan Moore gave an interview where he outlined the
American vision of the state and prospects of mutual relations.
According to him the signing by Russia and Belarus of the
agreement on a fully integrated Commonwealth of Independent
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States air warning system, which took place on February 3, did
not cause serious concern in the United States. However, the
recognition of Abkhaz and South Ossetian independence by
Belarus would be a very negative moment. The diplomat also
noticed that the situation in Belarus hasn’t changed over the last
six months: “Fundamental questions which cause our concern
remained the same. If the Belarusian authorities took more active
positive steps, the reaction of the U.S. administration would be
far more positive”.
Nevertheless, at the end of February the Treasury Department
of the USA prolonged the decision on lessening of sanctions
concerning enterprises “Lakokraska” (Lida city) and “Polotsk.
Steklovolokno” till June 1. It found a positive response from the
official Minsk. The first deputy minister of Foreign Affairs Igor
Petrishenko declared: “In case of cancellation of sanctions we
will be ready to sit down at the negotiating table with the
American partners to discuss the whole range of bilateral
relations and to solve accumulated problems. … The way to
normalization of the Belarusian.American interaction runs
through a change in approach of Washington to our country –
the refusal of political ultimatums and transfer of bilateral
relations to constructive dialogue and mutually advantageous
cooperation”.
At the end of the month the spokesman for the U.S. State
Department Robert Wood continued the discussion. Answering
the question whether the USA are going to take similar steps as
the European Union in normalizing relations with Belarus, he
rejected the possibility of policy change, having underlined that
“Washington made very clear what our position is with regard to
what Belarus needs to do to improve relations with the United
States”. In response Andrey Popov made a statement about his
readiness to agree with the American colleague provided that in
his statement the word “Belarus” would be followed by “and the
United States”: “Such change would be a display of great
flexibility of the Belarusian side because all know that it is not
Belarus that created today”s state of affairs in Belarusian.
American relations”.
The situation was aggravated by the report of the State
Department on human rights in the world published at the
beginning of March in which the situation in Belarus was defined
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as “very bad”, despite the fact that some positive elements were
nevertheless pointed out. On March 31, A. Lukashenko as if in
response accused Americans in provoking the global economic
crisis. On April 23, addressing the National Assembly he was better
disposed and called for a normalization of Belarusian.American
relations.
However, in two weeks, speaking about a possible return of
the American ambassador to Belarus the Belarusian leader
stressed: “What for do we need here the U.S. ambassador and the
embassy of the USA if he comes back only to continue the sanctions
against Belarus? If Americans really want to cooperate and
consider us partners in such a degree that there should be the
embassy and the ambassador here we are always for it”. At the
same time he expressed the hope that with the new American
president there would be progress in relations between the two
countries, although he admitted that Barack Оbama would have
to break with Bush’s policies and the tendencies natural to a
country like the USA.
To sum up, in the first six months both sides made their
positions clear: both considered that the first step should be taken
by the other. As a result the situation practically came into a
standstill if not to take into consideration that in May the
suspension of certain economic sanctions was prolonged once
more for half a year and Jonathan Moore noted that the embassy
received greater access to Belarusian officials.
Who moves first?
Such a state of affairs seemed to persist as no prerequisites for
change were observed. However on June 30 the nearly impossible
happened: the representative delegation of the U.S. Congress
headed by Senator Benjamin Cardin, the co.chair of the
Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe, arrived on a
one.day visit to Minsk on their way to the session of the
Parliamentary Assembly of the OSCE. Among the delegates was
Congressman Christopher Smith, well.known in Belarus for being
one of the main critics of the Belarusian regime in the American
legislature, and one of the main authors and lobbyists of the Belarus
democracy Act. If we consider that only a couple of years ago the
Belarusian authorities refused to issue a visa for senator John
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McCain because of even “lesser wrongdoings”, then this shift
looked surprisingly progressive.
The American legislators visited Kurapaty and a memorial of
the Minsk ghetto, met with representatives of the opposition and
civil society. According to the latter, the congressmen welcomed
their proposal to give credits and investments only in exchange
for internal political dialogue and free elections, under condition
of observance of the moratorium on political prosecution and
absence of political prisoners.
But, certainly, the focus of attention was the negotiations of
the visitors with Alexander Lukashenko. Having reminded his
audience of the changes in the policy of the European Union
concerning Belarus, he encouraged the Americans “to take off their
dark glasses” to look at Belarus “in an unbiased way” and “to leave
old schemes and stereotypes”. The main points of his statements
were the following:
• in America they do not know the real situation in Belarus;
• Belarus can not permit ambassadors of foreign states, including
the USA, to support oppositional actions as it was done by
ambassador Stewart and her colleagues;
• Belarus and the USA have considerable potential for mutual
efforts in trade and economic and investment spheres;
• Belarus and the USA are united by the general interests in the
context of global security;
• Belarus is ready to resume the conversation on restoration of
valid mutual diplomatic presence under condition of
cancellation of the sanctions against our country and their legal
basis – the Democracy Act at the legislative level.
The contents of the guests’ statements were derived from
Cardin’s brief press conference and from the interviews given by
the delegation members. According to them the main point was
the necessity of observance of human rights in Belarus,
continuation of democratic transformations, the reform of election
legislation, safeguarding of freedom of mass.media, opinion,
assembly, association, and protection of the rights of religious and
national minorities were mentioned as top priority tasks. Also the
belief was expressed that U.S. concern can not be considered as
an intervention into internal affairs of Belarus because according
to the Helsinki Accords each member country of the OSCE should
point out the breach of obligations by another country.
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The head of the Helsinki commission also touched upon the
economic aspect, having declared that by moving towards reforms,
Minsk would only benefit from this cooperation. Congress can
support such transformation but they should begin at some point.
Until then, the basis for increasing trade and credits will be too
narrow.
The final point of view of the American congressmen can be
summed up by the often repeated phrase: “Now the ball is on the
Belarusian side”. Thus the conclusion can be drawn that the
conversation was tense. Actually it is difficult to imagine that it
could be any other way: the two sides have too different views on
the internal political situation in Belarus. However they managed
to solve one particular problem. When the congressmen expressed
their concern about Emanuel Zeltser’s state of health, the U.S.
citizen serving a prison sentence in Belarus on criminal charges,
A. Lukashenko promised to sign the decree about his pardon,
which he did the same day.
Diplomacy Without Change
A week after the visit the post of the U.S. Charge d’Affaires a.i. in
Belarus taken by Jonathan Moore was given to another career
diplomat – Michael Scanlan. According to the new head of
the mission he would try to clarify the embassy’s status about
the number of American diplomats who can work here.
Representatives of the Belarusian authorities answered that in
the foreseeable future expansion of present personnel is
impossible.
Within a year the building of the American embassy was
practically empty: only five diplomats, including the Charge
d’Affaires a.i. have the right to stay in Minsk. The American side
has always negotiated the question on possible management of
the diplomatic conflict. At some times it was allowed to temporarily
increase the number of diplomats, without ever receiving
permission to do so on a constant basis.
As a result educational exchanges, contacts in the military
sphere, cooperation in the fight against international crime,
development of commercial ties suffered. All these activities
require a certain number of employees. One more essential
problem is the impossibility to render valid consular services. This
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creates big inconveniences for Belarusian citizens who have to go
to Kiev or Moscow in order to get visa.
Besides the shortage of personnel, other difficulties occur from
time to time. After a Belarusian girl didn’t return in time from her
trip under the program of improvement of children’s health in the
USA in 2008, the program was closed until the corresponding
agreement was signed. As a result only 15 children who needed
treatment could fly to America last year and it was done only as an
exception while the year before there had been a thousand and a
half of them.
From their side, as J. Moore said, the United States had never
limited the number of Belarusian diplomats and if the local
authorities intended to send fifty or even one hundred diplomats,
visas would have been issued within a week. So far in the leading
state of the world with a population of over 300 million, the
interests of Belarus are represented by only four employees of
the diplomatic mission in Washington and the consul in New
York. It can be said that during the previous year nothing has
changed in this respect and diplomatic relations have remained
in a semi frozen condition.
Preservation of the Status Quo
Possibly, clarification of the positions at the above mentioned
negotiations with the congressmen led to a reduction of the amount
and diversity of verbal activity from both sides in the second half
of the year. A. Lukashenko made some statements on the subject,
which, however, didn’t contain anything new.
The visit of Phillip Gordon, the Assistant Secretary on European
and Eurasian Affairs, to Minsk, in August also deserves attention.
First of all because he is the most high.ranking representative of
the State Department who visited Belarus during the last ten years
and, secondly, as the contact at such level was the only one, Mr.
Gordon met representatives of civil society and opposition, the
head of the Presidential administration Vladimir Makey and
Sergey Martynov. Judging by the fact that official sources confined
themselves to the standard type of information concerning the
meetings, like: “The questions of the development of the bilateral
relations, including the use of available possibilities for expansion
of trade and economic cooperation and interaction in the field of
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the international security were discussed”, it is obvious that no
breakthrough was achieved.
The representatives of democratic forces were interested to
know whether the continuity and sequence of the American policy
concerning Belarus would remain and whether the dialogue with
official Minsk would be conducted based on democratic values.
Gordon confirmed that the priority criteria for the United States
are human rights and democracy. America still maintains that
Belarus should release all political prisoners, give more freedom
to non.governmental organizations and the media, and also to hold
free and transparent elections. He repeated that sanctions
concerning Belarus are the result of infringement of human rights
by the authorities and that is why they will be cancelled only when
the country follows a democratic way.
As a result, the only real achievement of the year was Zeltser’s
release. By the way, it is possible that in this case the Belarusian
authorities tried to act out with America the same scenario which
a year before had been rather effectively applied to Europe.
However Washington, to all appearances, considered the fact that
it does not interfere with regular transfers of IMF credits to Belarus
to be a sufficient compensation. In this respect it is possible to agree
with Michael Scanlan according to whom: “Unfortunately, it is
possible to name 2009 at best the year of preservation of status
quo”.
Most likely, the unwillingness of the Belarusian power.holding
structures to make concessions is explained by the fears that even
insignificant democratic transformations can cause radical
changes in public consciousness. It is only the fear of a direct
external threat that probably can overcome this, which was clearly
demonstrated in August 2008. Apparently the recurrent and
sometimes quite dramatic rows with Moscow that took place
during the year did not become a factor for change.
As to the USA it is most likely that the new administration does
not have any particular reasons for changing its policy towards
Belarus. Given the necessity of solving the problems connected
with the economic crisis and also other serious internal problems
it is not a surprise that Belarus received only marginal attention of
U.S. policymakers.
All these considerations justify the conclusion that in the near
future it is hardly possible to expect the positions of Minsk and
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Washington to converge and, accordingly, improvement of
Belarusian.American relations. In this situation the only (though
weak) encouraging fact is that contacts at a quite high level
nevertheless occur from time to time.
The article uses materials of BelTa, BelaPAN
and Interfax news agencies.
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FROM KARAKAS TO TEHRAN:
BELARUSIAN DIPLOMACY IN ASIA, AFRICA,
LATIN AMERICA AND AFRICA
Sergei Bogdan
Summary
In 2009 Belarusian policy in developing countries of Asia, Africa and Latin
America remained oriented to definite countries: China, Venezuela, and Iran.
Belarusian leaders repeatedly stated that foreign trade is very important, but
serious fluctuations of commodity circulation testify that a systematic approach
has not been fully applied.
The geography of Belarusian missions abroad and contacts of officials show
that economic reasons are not the only guidelines for the Belarusian government
in its foreign policy. At the same time it is still unclear whether official information
on cooperation with a number of countries is complete.
Tendencies:
• the discrepancy between economic pragmatism and political contacts,
between the stated political course and actual cooperation marked foreign
policy;
• Iran and Venezuela remained strategic partners in the socalled Third World;
• closer relations with India, Pakistan and Saudi Arabia made policy towards
developing countries more systematic.
Speaking of the “third” vector of Belarusian foreign policy (the
first two are Russia plus the CIS countries and the West) we will
consider relations with developing countries of Asia, Latin America
and Africa, leaving out those which geographically belong to these
areas but are not “developing” any more (Japan, the Republic of
Korea, Israel, South Africa). It should be noted that Belarusian
officials often regard foreign relations only in “the near and far
abroad” categories, without further subdivision of “the far abroad”
into smaller parts1.
This direction of foreign relations (countries of Asia, Africa and
Latin America) is assigned a lot of attention in political rhetoric of
1 See examples on the Foreign Ministry websites: “Foreign trade. Commodity
and services trade in 2009”: http://www.mfa.gov.by/ru/economic/, and
the National Statistical Committee “Foreign trade. Main results of foreign
trade”: http://belstat.gov.by/homep/ru/indicators/ftrade1.php.
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Belarusian leaders, though many aspects of cooperation remain
controversial from the point of view of the good of the country.
That is why they look more like voluntary directives than elements
of a calculated strategy. It is clear that relations with some countries
are marked by definite political accents, but we do not dispose of
serious research findings and information is limited, so we should
be very careful when we define political and ideological closeness
(for example, in relation to anti.Americanism) as a ground for
relations of the official Minsk with this or that country.
But we need to mention the personal factor: the Belarusian
president, his likes and dislikes, play an important role in a number
of international contacts (in Belarus, like in many other post.Soviet
countries, non.official politics and non.official mechanisms tend
to be more significant than the official ones). Belarusian authorities
established the most active contacts with “charismatic” leaders of
Iran and Venezuela, who are quite liked by the Belarusian
president.
In 2009 the most intensive relations were those with China,
Venezuela, and Iran. It should be noted that these countries also
have close relations with each other, but we cannot speak of a kind
of bloc in the world arena.
Relations with the Far East countries
In late March – early April the head of the Presidential
Administration V. Makey visited China for negotiations with PRC
officials. He also discussed the problems of the largest project in
the history of Belarus.China relations with the CITIC International
company: construction of 3 cement works in Belarus. During
realization of the project, Belarus blundered on difficulties caused
by additional clauses put forward by the Chinese side.2 In April
Minister of Defense L. Maltsev visited the PRC to meet the Vice
Chairman of the Central Military Commission (the CMC) General
Guo Boxiong and a CMC member, Minister of National Defense
of the PRC General Liang Guanglie. On April 10, 2009 the
Consulate General of the Republic of Belarus was opened in
2 See: Head of the Presidential Administration visit to the PRC: http://
www.china.belembassy.org/rus/news/~page__m12=4~news__m12
=17784.
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Shanghai. In late August Vice Premier of the State Council of the
PRC, member of the Politburo of the Communist Party of China
Hui Liangyu, visited Belarus.
It was very important for Belarus that the country concluded
an agreement with China on national currencies exchange (the
so.called “swap” transaction), which is aimed at developing
investment cooperation and increasing bilateral commodity
circulation. As a result of the 3 years’ agreement Belarus received
CNY 20 billion (appr. USD 3 billion), and China received BYR 8
trillion (USD 2.7 billion). Similar agreements were concluded by
the PRC with South Korea, Malaysia, Indonesia, and Argentina.
Belarus is cooperating with China in modernization projects
of cement and energy industries. Two joint companies: one
assembling electric house appliances “Horizont.Midea” and
another assembling industrial wheel tractors “Sanjiang.Volat”
have been established. Projects of establishing joint ventures
assembling pit.run dumpers BelAZ, Belarus tractors and
Gomselmash combines are being realized.
For the last years mutual trade turnover was growing rapidly;
it doubled in 2006–2008, exceeding USD 2 billion. In 2009 trade
with China made up 2.5% of Belarus’ overall foreign trade turnover
(7th place among foreign trade partners), but export reached only
28.4% (USD 173.9 million), and import only 76.4% (USD 1,081.4
million) of the 2008 level.
In 2009 contacts with Vietnam remained minimal despite active
mutual trade with a surplus for Belarus. In April Deputy Minister
of Foreign Affairs of Belarus Sergei Aleynik visited Vietnam and
took part in Belarusian.Vietnamese inter.MFA consultations on
bilateral cooperation. In late April President of the National
Assembly of Vietnam visited Belarus.
Other Asian countries
In 2009 more active relations with India, Pakistan, and, to less extent,
Indonesia was branded as a success of Belarusian diplomacy.
In February Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs of Pakistan Akbar
Zeb visited Belarus. Although the official Minsk shows preferences
rather to India than Pakistan and political contacts between Belarus
and Pakistan are minimal, mutual trade makes up tens of millions
of US dollars with a significant surplus for Belarus3. In September
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Belarus welcomed Indian External Affairs Minister Somanahalli
Krishna. In 2009 India came 10th among Belarusian foreign trade
partners (1.2% of Belarus’ overall foreign trade turnover). Belarusian
export to India totaled 155.5% of 2008 level (USD 487.8 million),
import dropped and totaled 99.3% (USD 115.9 million).
Belarus had minimal relations with such a large South Asian
country as Indonesia. The 2nd intergovernmental meeting of the
Belarusian.Indonesian Joint Commission on trade, economic,
scientific and technical cooperation with Deputy Foreign Minister
of Belarus Aleynik in November 2009 can be regarded only as an
attempt to create a basis of cooperation.
Middle East
Iran
Relations between the countries were marked by active contacts
on a high level. On February 2009 Iranian Minister of Commerce
Massoud Mir Kazemi visited Belarus and Iran hosted a meeting
of the Mixed Belarusian.Iranian Commission on the issues of
trade and economic cooperation. In April 2009 Head of the Iranian
Judiciary Power Seyed Shakhrudi and Iranian Minister of Justice
Gholam.Hossein Elham visited Belarus. Chairman of the Council
of the Republic of the National Assembly of Belarus B. Batura
visited Iran in June 2009; in November Belarus hosted Governor
of the Central Bank of Iran Mahmoud Bahmani; Belarusian
Minister of Industry A. Rusetsky visited Iran in December.
Meetings at the highest level were held during these visits.
In 2009 Belarus and Iran intended that mutual trade to total
USD 100 million, but in reality it dropped, in particular Belarusian
exports dropped: because of the economic crisis supplies
decreased and prices went down4.
The most resounding mutual project is oil production at Jofeyr
field in the south west of Iran. The service contract for development
3 On the visit of Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs of Pakistan to Belarus //
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Belarus website: http://
www.mfa.gov.by/ru/press/news/b8208cdcce6fba2e.html.
4 See: Trade.economic cooperation: website of Embassy of the Republic of
Belarus in the Islamic Republic of Iran: http://www.iran.belembassy.org/
rus/relations/trade/. Date of access 26.02.2010.
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of this well was concluded in September 2007 and a joint venture
Belpars Petroleum Company Ltd. was founded (BPC). But by the
end of 2009 PBC had not started oil extraction. It is supposed that
the first oil will be extracted in 2010.5 Another large.scale
Belarusian.Iranian project is Samand car assembly plant. The
Samand cars maker, the Iranian.Belarusian.British joint venture
Unison, is the only car manufacturer in Belarus. In 2009 Unison
produced 241 cars. The company’s representatives declared their
intention to increase their production rate in 2010 by 4.5 times
compared to 2009 and produce 1.1 thousand cars6.
Samand assembly turned out to be “not very profitable”, the
Iranian ambassador admitted. The Iranian side hopes that Belarus
joining the Customs Union will “lead to a duty increase which will
make home car assembly profitable.” It was decided to produce 2
more Samand car models in Belarus.7 For the last years cooperation
in scientific and educational spheres was marked by the fact that
less Iranian students has been studying in Belarus. Meanwhile,
there was an obvious mismatch of partners. In December the
Belarusian State University signed a cooperation agreement with
the Free Islamic University. Whereas the former is the leading
university in Belarus, the latter is just an ordinary mass
establishment with commercial higher education.8
In 2009 information about probable supplies of C.300 mobile
antiaircraft missile systems from Belarus to Iran9 caused a scandal,
but this issue remains disputable.
Persian Gulf states
Belarus’ relations with Iraq that used to be a significant partner
turned out to be uncertain. In 2002 Iraq was one of the key trade
5 See: Belarus walking on the razor’s edge in its oil cooperation with Iran //
AFN. January 29, 2010: http://www.afn.by/news/i/130744.
6 See: Belarus will increase car production by 4 times // Interfax. February
11, 2010: http://www.interfax.by/article/58960.
7 Kalinovskaya, T. Jofeyr awaits the presidents // Belorusy i rynok
(Belarusians and Market). № 8 (894). February 22–28, 2010.
8 Sereda, A. BSU and Islamic Azad University signed an agreement on
cooperation // BelaPAN: http://news.tut.by/154910.html.
9 Alesin, A. Image is everything // Belorusy i rynok (Belarusians and Market).
№ 4 (890). January 25–31, 2010.
Foreign Policy
104 	



and economic partners in the Middle East, Belarusian exports to
this country totaled USD 32.6 million. In 2004 this figure was only
USD 1 million, in 2005–2007 practically zero, in 2008 it grew to
USD 1.65 million. From January to May 2009 exports to Iraq grew
9.5 times compared to the same period of 2008 and totaled USD
4.57 million.
Belarus has not imported commodities from Iraq in 2000–2009
as it has not from a number of other Middle East countries.10 The
visit of Iraqi Minister of Housing and Construction Bayan Ismail
Desai in July 2009 can be regarded a sign that economic ties with
this country could be renewed. The embassy of Belarus in Iraq was
closed with the beginning of the war, as was that of Iraq in Belarus;
but the Iraqi Embassy reopened in 2008.
The only trace of former active contacts is mutual recognition
of academic degrees, thus the number of PhD students from Iraq
in Belarusian universities is quite significant.
In 2009 active work was aimed at building cooperation with
other countries of the Persian Gulf. In January the United Arab
Emirates opened their embassy in Minsk. In May Belarus
welcomed Minister of Foreign Affairs of the United Arab Emirates
Sheikh Abdullah bin Zayed Al Nahyan.
Speaking of relations between Belarus and the UAE, the head
of the Belarusian foreign.policy office mentioned investment
projects, cooperation in the spheres of science and technology,
and “joint work on economic projects in third counties.”11 These
areas of cooperation were also discussed a bit earlier, in April, when
the Emir of Qatar Sheikh Hamad bin Khalifa al.Thani paid an
official visit to Belarus. We can assume that possibilities of
cooperation with poor countries with financial support of other
states in the region were also looked into during Belarusian Deputy
Foreign Minister Aleynikov’s visit to the UAE and Qatar in June
and during Saudi Arabia’s Minister of Finance and National
Economy Ibrahim Abdel Aziz Al Assaf’s visit to Belarus in July.
10 See: Oil derricks in exchange for oil // moneyby.ru. July 22, 2009: http://
moneyby.ru/news/10.html.
11 Transcript of the speech of the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic
of Belarus Sergei Martynov on the results of the visit to Belarus of the
Minister of Foreign Affairs of the UAE Sheikh Abdullah bin Zayed Al
Nahyan on May 23, 2009: http://www.mfa.gov.by/ru/press/news/
f3170730cbc3d260.html.
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The last visit was a really important step towards development
of relations between Belarus and Saudi Arabia: it was the first visit
of such a high.ranking Saudi Arabia official to Belarus, which
resulted in signing a double taxation avoidance convention. As
the important guest remarked, “we start trade and economic
cooperation with Belarus from scratch.”12
The Belarusian side declared its hope to find in Saudi Arabia
markets for automotive and road.building machinery, and other
high.tech produce, to involve businessmen of that country in hotel
and shop construction, and to enter markets of Saudi Arabia’s
neighbors and African countries through it. Belarus.Saudi Arabia
trade turnover has been insignificant so far.
Syria
Contacts between the countries were quite limited. In March the
first round of experts’ consultations on Agreement on cooperation
for establishing a free trade zone between Belarus and the Syrian
Arab Republic was hosted in the capital Damascus. In November
2009 Damascus hosted the 5th meeting of the Joint Belarusian.Syrian
Commission on trade, economic and technical cooperation with
participation of Belarusian Minister of Economy N. Zaichenko.
The military.technical aspect of cooperation was also
conspicuous. In February 2009 the military attachй of the Syrian
Embassy obtained accreditation from the Ministry of Defence of
the Republic of Belarus. In March 2009 Syrian Minister of Defense
General Hasan al.Turkmani paid a visit to Belarus.
During 4 months in 2009, Belarusian exports to Syria totaled
USD 16.8 million with a surplus of USD 16.5 million. The largest
project of Syrian business in Belarus was Velcom mobile operator,
which originally was fully owned by Syrian businessman Ead
Samawi (who was said to be very close to the Belarusian president).
At present he owns only a 15% share, and in 2010 Telekom Austria
plans to buy it out.13
12 Krapivina, L. Belarus invites Saudi Arabia’s businessmen to participate in
investment projects // BelTA. July 20, 2009.
13 Mader M. Die Telekom greift in Weirussland nochmals zu („Telekom
Austria strikes again in Belarus“) // Wirtschaftsblatt.at, 01.03.2010: http://
www.wirtschaftsblatt.at/home/boerse/bwien/410383/index.do?_vl_
pos=r.1.NT.
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Libya
During 2009 Libya and Belarus kept quite intensive contacts.
Belarusian delegations were headed by: First Deputy Prime
Minister Viktor Semashko (April), Deputy Minister of Industry
Gennady Svidersky (April), President’s assistant on national
security issues Viktor Lukashenko (a son of the president) (late
August – early September), Minister of Defence Yuri Zhadobin
(December). In October Belarus hosted the Libyan Deputy Minister
of Industry, Economy and Trade.
Similar to relations with Syria, Belarus.Libya’s relations are
marked by distinct military and political interests on both sides. It
is no coincidence that a small (only 4 diplomats) Belarusian
Embassy in Tripoli includes a military attachй (only Belarusian
embassies in the UAE and the PRC have military attachs).
Despite active political contacts and good relations between
leaders of the two countries, trade turnover rate remains very low.
In 2008, after a significant breakthrough in trade, Belarusian
exports to Libya totaled slightly over USD 19 million. The trade
turnover is mainly Belarusian commodities. Libya is a country
where the presence of the Belarusian Embassy can be hardly
motivated by official statistics on foreign trade. Hence, there are
other grounds for that.
Egypt
In July 2009 the heads of foreign.policy offices of Belarus and
Egypt met during the Non.Aligned Movement summit in
Sharm el.Sheikh. In October 2009 Minsk hosted bilateral
consultations between Ministries of Foreign Affairs of Belarus
and Egypt.
In 2009 mutual trade totaled USD 79.5 million (74.3% of the
2008 level). Exports totaled USD 66.5 million (71.8%), imports –
USD 12.9 million (90.2%)14. Exports dropped despite that in 2009
Egypt imported around 2.2 thousand tractors, which makes the
country one of the largest Minsk tractor works’ (MTZ) clients
beyond post.Soviet territory. There are 2 assembly productions
14 See: Trade and economic cooperation // Embassy of the Republic of Belarus
in Egypt website: http://www.egypt.belembassy.org/rus/belbelg/
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of Minsk automobile works (MAZ) lorries and MTZ tractors in
Egypt.
Latin America
Venezuela
Diplomatic relations between the countries were established in
1997 but it was not until 2007 that they began to develop intensively
due to political changes in Venezuela and the new course of its
president. This tendency also prevailed in 2009. In September 2009
President of Venezuela Hugo Chavez paid his 4th annual visit to
Belarus.
Thanks to the political will of the Venezuelan leader and
despite the economic crisis, mutual trade turnover between Belarus
and Venezuela doubled in comparison with the same period of
2008 (due to doubled export) and totaled USD 132.5 million. There
were practically no imports. Exports were consisted mainly of
industrial produce.
In Venezuela there is a mission of Belorusneft production
association, and the joint Belarusian.Venezuelan oil.extracting
enterprise “Petrolera Belo.Venezolana” that has already extracted
over 1 million tons of oil. The prospects of Belarus importing
Venezuelan (and Iranian) oil starting from 2008 were announced
back in 200715, but the first test tanker with 78 thousand tons of oil
was bound for Belarus only at the end of 2009.16 In 2010 Belarus
intends to double oil.extraction in Venezuela. In addition to the
two oil wells that are being developed the joint Belarusian.
Venezuelan enterprise has been allocated three more17. Earlier
Hugo Chavez declared that Russian and Belarusian companies will
have preferences on Venezuelan markets.18 In the construction
sphere there is a joint Belarusian.Venezuelan enterprise producing
construction materials and a joint venture for infrastructure and
15 Smialouskaya, Y. Venezuelan oil for Belarus over Lithuania: http://
www2.polskieradio.pl/zagranica/by/news/artykul.aspx?id=51360.
16 See: Belarus to save its oil refineries with Venezuelan oil // AFN. January
29, 2010: http://www.afn.by/news/i/130782.
17 Foreign Economic Co.Operation Review (Publication of the Belarusan
Ministry of Foreign Affairs). 2009. № 3. P. 28.
18 Ibid, р. 29.
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housing construction. Besides, the two countries are implementing
joint projects of phosphorites extraction and projects in science
and technology. The September visit of Venezuela’s president to
Belarus allowed signing agreements on production and sale in
Venezuela of Belarusian lorries and tractors (there are plans to
launch construction of two respective enterprises early in 2010). It
is supposed that the Venezuelan side will take part in privatization
of Belarusian enterprises.
The official Minsk brands bilateral relations with Venezuela as
strategic partnership.19 If two states manage to implement all
agreements, the mutual trade turnover will be counted in billions of
US dollars, believes President Lukashenko. He names 3 general
goals for development of relations with Venezuela: (1) strengthening
positions of both countries in the world arena, (2) strengthening
national security, (3) raising standards of well.being in both
countries.20
Brazil
Relations with Brazil have no political grounds but the mutual trade
turnover has always been quite significant, even larger than that
with “politically close” countries, in particular, with Venezuela.
In the second half of the 2000s Belarus.Brazil’s trade was stable
and totaled USD 0.5 billion, in 2008 it was much over USD 1 billion,
though it was seriously affected in 2009 as a result of the economic
crisis.21 Exports to Brazil totaled only 41.9% (USD 449.8 million)
and imports – only 76.4% (USD 118.4 million) of the 2008 level.
As a result, Brazil was only 11th among Belarus’ foreign trade
partners, leaving behind Lithuania, the USA, France, and
Kazakhstan.
Although there are no serious political contacts (despite left.
wing political attitude of the present Brazilian president) and
there is only a Consulate General of Belarus in Rio.de.Janeiro,
business contacts between the two countries have become
livelier. In particular, in 2009 Belarus welcomed 23 delegations
19 Foreign Economic Co.Operation Review (Publication of the Belarusan
Ministry of Foreign Affairs). 2009. № 3. P. 26.
20 Ibid, р. 27.
21 See: Trade and economic cooperation: http://www.brazil.belembassy.org/
rus/new_page_80/new_page_90/
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of business circles’ representatives from Brazil (in 2008 there
were 17).22
Argentina and Cuba
Contacts with Argentina are also devoid of a political component
(despite that there seems to be an ideological and political
closeness between Lukashenko and the present Argentinean
leader Cristina Kirchner). Until now there has always been a deficit
in trade with Argentina, which is quite untypical for Belarusian
relations with developing countries.
In 2009 Belarusian exports to Argentina dropped by 86.5%
compared to 2008 (when it reached a record level of USD 26 million
and grew by 331.1% compared to 2007). In 2009 imports dropped
by 11.5% (it was USD 115.4 million in 2008). In the period under
review the mutual trade deficit grew by UDS 9.2 million.23 These
export volume fluctuations testify to the absence of stable relations.
Meanwhile, some Belarusian enterprises operate in the
country, in particular, a Gomselmash production association
subsidiary. An MTZ subsidiary is also contemplated. Delegations
of the Belarusian Ministry of Natural Resources and Environment
Protection and that of Forestry visited Argentina within the
frameworks of international congresses. First consultations
between Ministries of Foreign Affairs of Belarus and Argentina
took place in Buenos Aires in October.
Relations with Cuba look quite sparingly. A delegation of
Cuba’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs headed by Deputy Foreign
Minister Dagoberto Rodrнguez visited Minsk in January. The Joint
Belarusian.Cuban Commission on trade and economic
cooperation with Deputy Minister of Foreign Trade and Investment
Ricardo Guerrero Blanco met in May.
It should be noted that trade turnover between Belarus and
Cuba in 2008 doubled compared with 2007 but even before the
crisis it was only USD 50 million with a significant surplus for
Belarus. In 2009 mutual trade was hit by the crisis, which made the
22 Business circles are paying more visits to Belarus // Consulate General of
the Republic of Belarus on Brazil website: http://www.brazil.belembassy.
org/rus/news/~page__m12=1~news__m12=61415.
23 Trade and economic cooperation // Embassy of the Republic of Belarus in
Argentina website: http://www.argentina.belembassy.org/rus/belbelg/
Foreign Policy
110 	



position of Cuba in Belarus’ external economic sphere even less
significant.
Africa
During his meeting with heads of Belarusian foreign offices in July,
President Lukashenko instructed the government to go
systematically into the issue of consolidating positions on the
African continent.24 Taking into account the situation in Africa it
will be difficult for Belarus to find solvent partners. But Belarusian
supplies to Africa could be sponsored by Qatar, the UAE, Bahrain,
or Saudi Arabia, in view of negotiations with these countries held
in 2009, the official Minsk believes. Minister of Foreign Affairs
Sergei Martynov said the following about the results of the Emir’s
of Qatar visit to Belarus: “Qatar renders large economic assistance
in third countries and we propose that Qatar uses Belarusian
machinery and technology in these programs.” 25
Actually the Foreign Ministry is trying to advance Belarusian
export through participation in economic assistance for African
countries programs. This is a new area in Belarusian foreign policy.
Conclusion
The Belarusian leader claimed foreign relations to be
“systematic”26 but actual foreign policy and economic steps of
Belarus during 2009 indicate the opposite. In other words,
Belarusian leaders (contrary to their rhetoric) did not follow a
holistic approach of foreign policy towards this or that country
(e.g. to cover the “Third World” countries or to strengthen ties
with political opponents of the USA). It is even less true for the
ideological framework. We should rather speak of opportunism.
Quite often Belarus maintained friendly relations with countries
at war: earlier it was Iraq and Iran, now it is Israel, on the one side,
and Iran and Syria, on the other.
24 Commodity Distribution Network. №2/2009. P. 3.
25 Interview of Minister of Foreign Affairs S. Martynov to the First National
TV channel about results of the Emir of Qatar visit to Belarus, April 19,
2009.
26 Foreign Economic Co.Operation Review (Publication of the Belarusian
Ministry of Foreign Affairs). 2009. № 3. P. 27.
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When we assess economic results of relations, we should bear
in mind statistical variability, deliberate or accidental. A vivid
example of this year is a serious discrepancy between mutual trade
data on the Belarusian and Israeli sides: the Belarusian side
estimated USD 68.2 million but, according to date of the Israeli
ambassador it was only USD 28 million.27 But statistical data on
foreign trade in many countries remains very unreliable and
difficult to access, though not because of deliberate concealment.
It is rather the business culture of Belarusian functionaries.28
Belarusian exports significantly exceed imports in almost all
countries from the group under review (except China and
Argentina), which makes them very significant partners as the
Belarusian government is fighting the foreign trade deficit.
Geographically Belarusian missions abroad do not fully reflect
the position of the official Minsk to increase the trade volume.
Trade (official) with some countries that have Belarusian
embassies, despite active contacts, is not significant (e.g. Cuba,
Libya, Argentina).
Meanwhile, there is a number of countries with significant
volumes of mutual trade, where there are no Belarusian missions
at all (as, for example, Uzbekistan, which lies outside the region
under review) or just consulates general (Brazil). But we should
note that Belarusian foreign policy does not limit itself solely to
promoting turnover increases.
27 Kalinovskaya, T. An old friend in new light // Belorusy i rynok (Belarusians
and Market). № 23(858) as of June 16, 2009.
28 It can be clearly seen on the website of the National Statistical Committee
and all Foreign Ministry publications.
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POLITICAL PARTIES IN TIMES
OF POLITICAL STANDSTILL
Yuri Chausov
Summary
Belarusian parties spent the year 2009 reorganizing and establishing coalitions.
The period under consideration was not marked by any election campaigns
and was a kind of “interim”. Therefore, the election calendar impelled the parties
to concentrate on innerparty rotations, interparty cooperation and preparation
for future election campaigns.
A lot of party formation processes in 2009 should be viewed in the context of
parties preparing for local council elections of the 26th convocation in April
2010, and especially for the presidential elections in early 2011. The intention
to prepare the party system for the upcoming campaigns manifested itself in
the state policy of legal regulations in this sphere.
Tendencies:
• introduction of  tougher legal restrictions stipulating conditions to deny
registration to a party; continued unwritten “ban” on registration of new
parties;
• absence of election campaigns encouraged parties to concentrate on coalition
building and innerparty discussions;
• parties have split into two blocs according to their sense of values and foreign
policy benchmarks, which can cause that at the presidential elections 2011
two opposition candidates will be nominated.
Operational and establishment climate
for political parties
As of January 1, 2010 Belarus counts 15 registered political parties
and 994 local organizational units put on record. In 2009, 18 new
organizational units of political parties were registered and put
on record. Despite that, the total number of organizational units
dropped because some oppositional parties’ units were liquidated
and taken off the record (as of 2009 they totaled 1008).
In 2009 new amendments to the law on political parties
concerning the administrative procedure of party registration were
adopted. On December 11 the House of Representatives passed
the law on alterations and amendments to some laws of the
Republic of Belarus on issues of administrative procedures, which
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came into force on February 5, 2010. The law stipulates easier
procedures of registration of some non.commercial organizations,
including political parties, and expands the list of probable
grounds to deny registration. The purpose of this part of the law is
obvious: to create a legal basis for ungrounded and arbitrary
denials to register organizations that the authorities want to
prevent from becoming legal.
The previous version of the law on political parties contained
provisions that a party could be denied registration if goals, tasks,
methods or territory of its functioning specified in the charter did
not comply with the legislation. Other inconsistencies of the
charter were regarded as amendable and could not serve as ground
for denial. But now any insignificant breach of the legislation in
the charter can cause denial of registration. Besides, new grounds
for denial were introduced. For example, a party can be denied
registration if it files documents other than the charter or/and
information inconsistent with the legislation, including counterfeit,
forged or out of date/invalid documents. The new version of the
law practically nullified the notion of amendable inconsistencies
in documents filed for registration.
Other alterations of the law on parties are not fundamental.
Minor technical innovations presented by the state mass.media
as a breakthrough cannot be regarded as such. The law stipulates
that the parties can file an electronic copy of the charter, which
does not actually make the procedure of document preparation
easier. It is also true for alterations concerning registration with
the tax inspectorate, statistical and other registration organs: they
are applicable only to those parties and associations that have
already managed going through the “sieve” of registration
censorship. The new term “registration suspension” that
substitutes the old “registration delay” is a new label for the old
notion. This is an example of new repressive catches that Belarusian
functionaries apply to circumscribe civil rights. The simplification
of the registration procedure was a camouflage for the
simplification of the procedure of denial.
The Special Section of the Tax Code of the Republic of Belarus
makes a provision for lower fees for registration of political parties,
their organizational units and for makings alterations and
amendments to the parties’ charters. The fee charged for
application to register a party, party unions or associations, was
115
reduced by more half: now it is 20 base (benchmark) units (one
unit of the kind is 35,000 Belarusian rubles); previously it was 50
units. As of January 1, 2010 the state does not charge a fee on
permits for seals of political parties, trade unions, and other civil
associations and funds. When the House of Representatives was
discussing the draft of the Special Section of the Tax Code of the
Republic of Belarus, the Ministry of Justice prepared and presented
proposals to reduce the fee for the actions mentioned above.
The Election Code of the Republic of Belarus passed the
alterations in the Parliament on December 11, 2009 and came into
force in January 2010. The state media voiced the official opinion
on these alterations as being aimed at expanding possibilities for
political parties to participate in the election process. The
introduced quota for political parties and civil associations in
forming election commissions was regarded as a positive change.
According to the Central Electoral Commission, one third of
election commissions, except for the Central Commission itself,
should be composed of representatives of political parties and civil
associations. It is easier now to nominate and register party
candidates to the House of Representatives and local councils:
parties are allowed to nominate their candidates in all election
constituencies disregarding the presence of the party’s
organizational units in the constituency.
As for election monitoring, parties are allowed to delegate both
party members and non.affiliated citizens to voting stations. These
amendments reflect a major part of the demands of the OSCE and
the EU, says Lidia Yermoshina, chairperson of the Central
Commission of the Republic of Belarus on Elections and
Republican Referenda (the State Election Commission). But the
opposition parties assessed these changes as superficial, because
they do not reflect suggestions and interests of political parties.
Abortive attempts to register new parties
The changes in legislation regarding registration of parties bore
no practical changes. In 2009 four attempts to register new parties
were unsuccessful (since 2000 not a single political party has been
registered in Belarus). In late 2008, at the fourth attempt, the For
Freedom Movement was registered. This fact became a ray of hope
for many unregistered organizations that supposed that the
Society
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procedure of registration of new civil associations had been
simplified. Several unregistered organizations stated their
intentions to file documents for registration anew.
The Belarusian Christian Democracy Party (the BCDP) was the
most persistent in its efforts and filed documents for registration
twice in 2009. But, despite its persistence, the initiative group never
managed to receive documents for legalization as a party (before,
the BCDP was denied registration as an NGO twice). The Ministry
of Justice motivated its denial to register the BCDP claiming that
a number of founders of the party renounced their participation in
the new party. These renouncements resulted from pressure on
the founders, say the BCDP leaders.
The Belarusian Party of Workers (the BPW) (successor of the
Belarusian Party of Work liquidated in 2005) did not obtain a legal
status, either. Similar to the case of the BCDP, this party was denied
registration on the grounds of questioning the founders. The
questioning was accompanied by pressure to make the founders
renounce their signatures, say the BPW leaders.
On April 18, 2009 the constituent congress of the Party of
Freedom and Progress (the PFP) was held in Mogilev. Over the
past years it was the 4th attempt of Vladimir Novosiad’s supporters
to register the political party. The party was denied registration
on the grounds that a number of founders renounced their
signatures. The denial was confirmed by the Supreme Court.
A number of local organizational units of opposition parties
received denials of registration, too.  In May 2009 Grodno region
organization of the Belarusian Popular Front (the BPF) was denied
registration on the grounds that the filed documents were printed
in wrong font type. Similar charges were pressed against a number
of organizational units of the United Civic Party (the UCP).
In 2009 no instances of liquidation or temporary suspension of
political parties were registered.  Meanwhile, the Ministry of
Justice as a registration body applied softer mechanisms to
influence political parties, breaching the laws. In particular, in 2009
it issued written warnings on two political parties: the Belarusian
Agrarian Party and the Republican Party.
It is significant that these warnings are issued on parties
supporting the existing political regime on the grounds that these
parties and their organizational units did not present their annual
reports on activity to the registration body, which is a grave
117
violation of law. The Republican Party did not meet the require.
ments stated in its charter concerning the schedule of meetings of
governing bodies and administration. These facts best illustrate
that even parties supporting the authorities are not an essential
element of the Belarusian political system and cannot be regarded
as actively functioning organizations.
Belarusian Popular Front Party
changes its leader
The election of the new leader of the Belarusian Popular Front Party
(the BPFP) was probably the most significant event in the life of
Belarusian parties in 2009. The regular election congress held on
September 5 in Minsk elected Vice.chairman Aleksei Yanukevich,
33, for the post of party chairman. It was not typical for Belarusian
political parties that the new leader was elected after an acute
struggle of political programs and not nominated as a successor
or resulted from a split.
The change of leadership in the BPFP was preceded by a
discussion about the role of the party in the political system,
strategies and tactics of the party activities. Coalition factors also
contributed to the delegates’ choice: whereas the former leaders
regarded the BPFP as participant of the United Democratic Forces
(the UDF), A. Yanukevich supported partnership with associations
of the similar national.democratic platform.
Liavon Borschevsky took the position of Chairman of the party
in December 2007 as a compromise, because none of the main
candidates had polled the necessary number of votes.  The decision
was interim and the Chairman was regarded a transition figure
called to resolve the internal party crisis and settle the conflict
between generations. But later L. Borschevsky announced his
intention to run for the presidency on behalf of the BPFP.
Over two previous presidential campaigns the BPF nurtured
the intention to nominate their own candidate for the presidency
who would be a party member bound by the ideological traditions
of the party program. The party units resented supporting
“ideologically indefinite” candidates from the “general demo.
cratic” coalition.
Yanukevich’s program covers the period up to 2015 and
actually is a long.term strategy for the party. The candidate said
Society
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that the party has an independent position and the coalition should
be formed with parties of the same ideological platform e.g. the
BCD, the For Freedom Movement, and, probably, nationally.
oriented members of the UCP. The inner.party electorate likes the
thesis that it is impossible for the BPFP to establish a union with
forces promoting Russia’s interests in Belarus, i.e. with the leaders
of the Party of Communists Belorusskaya who openly support the
renunciation of the national currency and introduction of the
Russian ruble, recognition of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, and who
promote unification with Russia.
A. Yanukevich also asserted the necessity to reconcile the
inner.party groupings. In his program much attention is given to
the problem of party building. He suggests giving up the
hierarchical party units system and relying on supporters of strong
regional leaders, which de facto has already been practiced.
Another advantage was that the party members were
dissatisfied with the then party leaders. After Liavon Borschevscky
had replaced Vincuk Viachorka, neither party nor the management
saw any renewal. Quite the opposite, out of the old stack
Borschevsky pulled out ideas from the 1990s and ruled the party
single.handed. A. Milinkevich and his For Freedom Movement (a
significant part of it is made up by former and present the BPFP
members) went strong on A. Yanukevich.
Thereby, the BPF Party congress discussed the following key
issues: the format of the party’s participation in the presidential
elections; nomination of the party’s candidate for the presidency
and its reasonableness; relations with other subjects of the
democratic opposition and inner.party development. After the
polling results had been announced, Borschevsky said that no
decision of the congress should split the party. He called upon his
supporters to restrain from any demarches and act upon the
general program.
InnerEparty controversy in the United Civil Party
Other opposition parties did not face such severe clashes
concerning areas of the party’s work as it was in the BPF Party.
But the United Civic Party were also discussing the position of the
party in the political system and searching for new approaches.
The discussion about reforms in the UCP was initiated by regional
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organizational units. An attempt to replace the leader in Grodno
regional branch showed that in the future the party could also fall
under the influence of the For Freedom Movement. But later these
processes were contained and turned into constructive discussion.
On December 27, 2009, the election conference in Minsk
regional organization of the UCP declared that the party needs to
be reformed and “have a more practical approach to the work with
the voters and party cadre”. Chairman of the organization Vladimir
Muliarchuk disagreed with the document and called it a populist
one.1 The initiators of the discussion pointed out that the core of
their proposal was to change the priority of the party’s activities.
The UCP’s vice.chairman Lev Margolin noted that the initiators
of the statement “repeat Milinkevich’s mistakes” but admitted that
the proposal itself and the discussion around it is a good idea,
especially on the eve of the regular UCP session. The controversy
in the UCP and the kind of arguments put forward by its
participants, reveal the conceptual disagreements among the
Belarusian opposition. It is typical for a lot of political organizations
that they are divided in supporters of tough opposition to the
regime and supporters of “social populism” tactics. All in all,
opposition parties feel it hard to find their position in the political
system: their common problem is isolation from society.
Opposition communists:
rebranding discussions
The Party of Communists Belorusskaya (the PCB) in 2009 was
renamed the Belarusian Party of the Left Spravedliviy mir (“Fair
world”) (initially the new name had the attribute “united Left”,
but the Ministry of Justice insisted on omitting it). The decision
was passed on October 25, 2009 according to the results of voting
at the second session of the 14th extraordinary congress (the first
was held in spring). The new name will win over not only young
people but also other representatives of leftist organizations that
were denied registration, believes party leader Sergei Kaliakin.
A year before that the PCB representatives started discussing
the party’s modernization. In May, just on the eve of the first session
1 Polemics on reforms / Belorusy i rynok (Belarusians and Market ). № 7(893).
February 15–21, 2010.
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of the extraordinary PCB congress, the party press.secretary Sergei
Vozniak said in the interview to BelaPAN news agency that “The
question of the name is only part of the problem. The thing is that
for the last 18 years we were working as the Communist Party of
the USSR used to do. But these years saw drastic changes and the
image of a communist became negative and deters young people.
That is why we decided to rename the party”2.
According to Vozniak, the party intends to nominate its
candidate to run for the presidency in 2011. The party leader Sergei
Kaliakin announced his own presidential ambitions more than
once. Experts say that the presidential elections 2011 prompted
the communist leaders to change the name.
The first session of the PCB congress on May 23, 2009 was
mainly devoted to inner.party discussions, including the renaming,
and was closed to the press. But it became known that a group of
the party members criticized Kaliakin, among other things, for his
initiative to rebrand the party. A question of confidence to Kaliakin
was even put to the vote and polled almost one third of the
delegates’ ballots. Besides criticism for the party rebranding,
Kaliakin was also accused of excessive cooperation with the right.
wing opposition.
A number of delegates declared their disagreement with the
congress’s decision and expressed an intention to create their own
“real communist party”. On August 29, 2009 in Machulischy (near
Minsk) the PCB delegates to the 14th extraordinary congress who
did not share the PCB leaders’ opinion on the issues of further
party.building, held a meeting. It was attended by representatives
from all regional organizations and Minsk, except that of the
Gomel region. Later the supporters and opponents of the renaming
exchanged strong.worded statements. In the end, some members
left the party as a result of disagreement over omitting the attribute
“communist” from the new name.
Coalition rearrangements on the eve
of the coming election campaigns
In early 2009 the Belarusian opposition had a joint coordination
centre – the United Democratic Forces (the UDF), which included
2 See: Charter’97: http://charter97.org/ru/news/2009/10/25/23091/
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more or less powerful organizations. Close to the end of the year
the situation turned to be less definite as a number of organizations
abandoned the UDF and established an alternative coalition: the
Belarusian Independence Bloc (the BIB).
For the first six months of 2009 the UDF was busy developing
an anti.crisis platform, a document with conceptual proposals of
the party on economic policy during the crisis. This document was
passed at the suggestion of the UCP and was basically developed
by economists affiliated with this party.
In 2009 the actions of the UDF in general and its members in
particular was focused on developing its position regarding
Belarus’ participation in the EU’s Eastern Partnership program.
Generally, the coalition supports the idea of Belarus joining this
program but under conditions and with reservations regarding
liberalization and democratization in the country. They announced
this position despite the presence of communists in the UDF, who
strongly support cooperation between Belarus and Russia.
It was possible to establish the BIB because parties that in early
2009 were members of the UDF had different views on foreign
policy. It was Kaliakin’s pro.Russia statements that impelled pro.
European political units to dissociate from the UDF. This
dissociation became technically possible in September when the
leadership in the BPF Party was taken by forces aiming for
cooperation with the partners of the same national.democratic
platform.
On October 27 a number of democratic movements in Belarus
signed an agreement to establish the BIB. The new coalition was
formed by the BPF Party, the For Freedom Movement, the Rightist
Alliance, the BCD Party, the Youth Front and a number of other
associations. But only the BPF is a registered political unit in this
association whereas in the UDF there are four such organizations.
The declaration was also signed by the leaders of organizational
committees of other associations: Artur Finkevich (the Young
Belarus movement), Viacheslav Sivchik (the movement of
solidarity Razam (“Together”) and Aleksandr Shumkevich (the
youth Christian social union “Young Democrats”).
The new political bloc stated the following priorities: to create
conditions for free and fair elections in Belarus; to launch economic
reforms and secure the well.being of Belarusian citizens with
priority for small and medium businesses; to promote civil rights
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for freedom of expression, of conscience, of association and
assembly; to work towards stopping political repression in Belarus
and releasing prisoners of conscience; to promote Belarusization
of educational institutions, mass media and other state and social
institutions; to condemn totalitarian communist and fascist
ideologies; to establish strategic cooperation with countries of the
Eastern Partnership and the EU.
When a certain organization was leaving the UDF it was
considered to be connected with the establishment of the BIB. But
the leaders of the UDF were criticizing the newly.established BIB
severely, charging it of compromise and even of collaboration with
the regime and accusing it of acting on orders from the secret
services. Therefore, further cooperation of pro.Russia’s and pro.
European forces within the UDF was impossible. On November
21 the Sojm (the national leadership council) of the BPF Party
stated that the UDF had ceased to exist as a coalition. Two weeks
before, on November 4, the steering body of the For Freedom
Movement adopted a resolution to leave the UDF.
It is difficult to define what kind of association the UDF was at
the moment when these decisions were made. But it was obvious
that they had ceased to be a coalition inside Belarus. They were
rather a trade name for external usage, a conglomeration of project
initiatives that are hardly connected but have a halo of the previous
cooperation in the election campaign in 2005–2006.  Exclusively
inner.party UCP initiatives turned into proposals of the whole UDF
in the framework of the National Committee of the Union; chamber
initiatives of single politicians were pushed through the UDF
mechanisms and formally became a concern of all democratic
forces of the country.
The steering bodies of the coalition were not functioning
properly: the representative steering body, the Political Council
elected at the 2007 Congress, had not assembled for a year. Even
the Presidium of the Political Council, a much smaller body, had
never had a quorum. In reality all decisions were made after non.
formal discussions that were passing themselves as coalition
bodies.
Formally, the UDF was established on November 20, 2004,
when 10 leaders of opposition parties signed an agreement to
create the Standing Meeting of Democratic Forces (that was later
renamed the UDF). The goal of this union was stated as “to work
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out, adopt and fulfill the mechanism of nominating a joint
candidate from democratic forces at the presidential elections”.
Further on, the association changed its name, composition,
working procedures and decision.making formats. In the end the
association was not able to fulfill its main function as a mechanism
for coordinating the opposition’s efforts to nominate a joint
candidate and beat the incumbent presidential candidate.
To sum up, the UDF as a coalition had functioned for exactly
five years, and this is long for Belarusian standards. The political
situation changed and caused changes within the opposition.  It is
quite logical to unite in the face of total repression, hence the
easing of the climate caused division among the opposition. The
opposition has not made a joint “fist” for a very long time, and
that is the spirit of the age. We cannot imagine a representative
delegation of the Belarusian opposition without the BCD leaders
(the party was never a UDF member), or without Milinkevich (who
was demonstrative in his rejection to become the UDF co.chairman
and makes no secret of his presidential ambitions). None of the
significant decisions of the opposition is adopted by the UDF
bodies, but rather within a framework of wider consultations. One
of such meetings that was discussing issues on who would
represent the Belarusian opposition at the Eastern Partnership
Parliamentary Assembly was held near Minsk on November 17,
2009. The participants representing all major opposition
organizations made a common decision without applying to
suspicious mechanisms of discussion within the UDF.
Different attitudes to foreign policy in the two blocs and
different views on how to reconcile the Belarusian regime with the
West should not be misleading: methods of political struggle
remain the same. In this regard, the task of the BIB is very simple.
The new coalition has one significant advantage: the people
understand its purposes. This is a Belarusian.speaking, pro.
European, conservative, anticommunist opposition. The new
coalition will probably be represented by Aleksandr Milinkevich,
whom a lot of people remember as a joint candidate from the united
opposition at the last presidential elections. The BIB declaration
does not contain any specific program or a new strategy; it is simply
a declaration of the participant’s unity.
The UDF position is more ambiguous, its members have to
prove their “oppositionality” and explain the people that it is they
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who are an alternative to the authorities, and not the BIB with the
BPF Party among its participants. Compared to the BIB, the UDF
have neither the program nor the unity. So, the UDF have nothing
left but to prove by contradiction “that, the other oppositional bloc
is a figurehead, controlled and fake”.
During 2009 a number of parties (the Belarusian Popular Front,
the Party of the Left Spravedliviy Mir (Fair World)) began their
own election campaign intending to nominate their own
presidential candidate. There are very few people now who firmly
believe in the success of the “joint candidate” plan, even those
supporting this strategy. It is becoming more and more popular to
argue that at the coming presidential elections will feature two
candidates nominated from the opposition – from the right.wing
and from the so left.wing parties. Both candidates will have enough
human resources for the campaign, and the donor field for this
configuration has already started to be transformed.
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THE THIRD SECTOR:
TWO RESPONSE OPTIONS TO CHALLENGES
Tatyana Vodolazhskaya
Summary
In 2009 the basic processes in the third sector were defined by development of
relations between Belarus and the European Union. The Belarusian authorities
stated their readiness to improve operating conditions for NGOs, but a number
of steps to this purpose, undertaken at the end of 2008, were discontinued in
2009, leaving the conditions in which NGOs operate unimproved.
At the same time, Belarusian organizations within civil society took advantage
of the possibilities appearing in the slipstream of the BelarusianEuropean
dialogue. Within a year, in the third sector a number of initiatives were taken in
cooperation with state bodies for joint solutions of socially significant problems
connected, for example, with construction of the atomic power station,
improvement of legal conditions for NGOs, etc. However these initiatives were
no success.
Cooperation of Belarusian NGOs with the European structures had more positive
effects, the main of which were amendments to the election legislation. Also,
the participation of a Belarusian delegation in the Civil Society Forum of the
Eastern Partnership program can be regarded as progress.
2009 was also marked by initiatives on creation of “social councils” under
various state structures – the Social Advisory Council under the Presidential
Administration, the Social Coordination Council on massmedia, but their activity
failed to bring any significant results.
Tendencies:
• full inclusion of representatives of Belarusian civil society in the Civil Society
Forum of the EU’s Eastern Partnership program;
• frame conditions of NGOs activity did not improve, state regulation in this
sphere remained rigid;
• attempts of large NGO associations to join the dialogue with the state on
socially significant problems appeared inefficient.
Challenge situation for the third sector
In 2009 resuscitation of Belarusian.European relations can be
considered a major factor of third sector development. Despite the
fact that the Eastern Partnership program (EaP) is developed first
of all at an interstate level, for inclusion of civil society into this
program the special nomination – the Civil Society Forum was
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offered. Inclusion of Belarus into a new program of partnership
and signing by Belarusian authorities of the corresponding
documents at Prague summit1 were factors of formal recognition
of the Civil Society Forum as one of the elements of Belarusian.
European relations.
Besides, the fact of inclusion of Belarus into the Eastern
Partnership program can be considered a compromise resulting
from requirements of “improvements of working conditions for
non.governmental organizations”. Therefore, conditions for third
sector activity became the object of special attention and
guarantee of development of relations with European structures
(along with mass media situation, presence of political prisoners
etc.). The Belarusian authorities stated their readiness to improve
operating conditions of NGOs and in 2008 showed a number of
pointed actions in this direction which, however, failed to provide
a basis for the consecutive action plan: 2009 became a year of
displaying initiatives stimulating a general movement in this
direction.
At the same time, 2009 is marked by initiatives on creation of
“social councils” under various state structures – the Social
Advisory Council under the Presidential Administration, Social
Coordination Council on mass.media. These initiatives created
one more essential challenge to civil society.
Thus, for the third sector in Belarus, 2009 was a year of answers
to the challenges which demanded a search of forms of full.fledged
participation in the dialogue both with Belarusian state and with
the European political institutions and civil society. Answers to
these challenges were realized within the framework of two
different approaches.
“Check by action”
The first approach consisted in checking of the borders of
liberalization and democratization concerning the third sector.
One of the main effects of “checking” was activity concerning
registration. In 2009 a lot of public associations made attempts to
be registered: some hoped for positive results, others showed the
1 Joint Declaration of the Prague Eastern Partnership Summit http://
eurobelarus.info/content/view/3094/163/
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real state of affairs of the registration procedure of NGOs in
Belarus. Repeated attempts of registration were made by “The
Assembly of NGOs”, Public human rights association “Nasha
Viasna”, “Berastseyskaya Viasna” and a number of other
organizations that either had lost their registration earlier or
previously failed to obtain registration.
Unfavorable results of this checking are reflected in the
monitoring results of freedom of association in 20092. Only among
national associations, 34 were denied registration; at the level of
regional administrations of justice there were even much more
cases. As a result, according to the Ministry of Justice, last year 94
new public organizations and 8 funds were registered. Given the
numbers in earlier years, 2009 does not particularly stand out: the
total number of organizations did not significantly change (2,225
for January 1st, 2010).
On the waves of advancement of liberalization of conditions
for the third sector, the Assembly of NGOs initiated a public
campaign dubbed: “Stop 193.1!”, calling for cancellation of
article 193.1 of the Criminal Code which establishes criminal
liability for activity on behalf of non.registered organizations3.
The efficiency of the campaign is hard to estimate: the article is
still in place, though there are signals that favor changing the
type of responsibility from a criminal offence to an administrative
offence.
The assembly inspected legal conditions of NGO activity
within the framework of the analysis of the changes introduced to
the Law on public associations. The analysis shows that the
introduced amendments do not really influence the general state
of affairs in legal conditions of the third sector. The registration
procedure has not actually been facilitated; it is more likely that
2 Freedom of associations and the state of NGOs. Final report of 2009.
Monitoring of carrying out of the proposals of the European structures in
the sphere of normalization of the state of NGOs and freedom of association
by Belarusian authorities. (The Assembly of NGOs). http://www.belngo.
info/
3 During the year a number of notifications of possible prosecution
according to article 193.1 were made. According to human rights activists
in 2009 one person was convicted in connection with the activity on behalf
of an unregistered organization (a penalty was not set due to amnesty
given).
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new possibilities for refusal in registration have been created4.
Positive legal changes concern simplifications of activity for
organizations already registered: now they will not need to
undergo such administrative procedures as registration in tax
inspection and social security bodies etc. As a whole in 2009 the
“achievements” in legislation liberalization are less considerable
even in comparison with 2008.
A new round of aggravation of the conflict over the non.official
Union of Poles in Belarus (UPB)5 is highly relevant to the third
sector as a whole. The antagonism of the Belarusian authorities
and a public organization that tries to keep its independence
testifies to the stability of the aims of the former to exercise control
over the latter. The local branch of the Union of Poles in Belarus in
the small town of Ivenets for its part, having improved its tactics,
finally managed to bring the problem from a latent condition onto
the level of an international scandal. At the present moment the
situation has not yet resolved, and it serves as an eloquent case
illustrating the difficulties that Belarusian civil society is
confronted with, revealing the true face of the Belarusian
authorities with regard to liberalization and democratization.
Within the framework of the designated approach it is helpful
to discuss several attempts of civil society organizations to engage
in dialogue with the state. The most vivid example is the public
hearings concerning the construction of an atomic power station6,
initiated by the state in accordance with the international
requirements on procedures of coordination during the construc.
tion of such objects. Representatives of civil society made use of
their legitimate right to become a partner in the dialogue and
decision.making on an important national question. Beside the
4 According to a new edition the basis for refusal can be contradiction of the
charter of the organization to the requirements of the legislation not only
concerning the aims, tasks, methods and area of activity (as it was earlier),
but also concerning any other parts and issues of the charter. Inaccuracies
in the submitted documents can now be instantly qualified as a fake or a
reason for invalidity of documents. Earlier there was a possibility to correct
inaccuracies and errors, now the authorities can instantly refuse.
5 For the history of the conflict with the Union of the Poles – see http://
naviny.by/media/2010.03_w2/download/spb_flash.swf
6 Lashkevich K. How they discussed the nuclear power station: universal
“OK”: http://news.tut.by/149632.html.
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unwillingness and unreadiness of the authorities to consider civil
society as a serious partner, the hearings, on the other hand, also
showed the unreadiness of the third sector for such dialogue.
One more traditional form of dialogue with the state was
working out the Concept of development of civil society, initiated
by the Assembly of NGOs. It is symptomatic that during the
discussion and completion of the project the Concept of
development of civil society turned into the Concept on assistance
of authorities to develop civil society7. The main objective of this
document is to become the basis for dialogue with the state.
Meanwhile the document is being discussed and coordinated
within the framework of the third sector. It is safe to conclude that
the resulting dialogue is unlikely to be successful.
Despite the plurality and variety of subjects within
representatives of civil society who had realized this approach in
2009, the Assembly of NGOs can be regarded as its true
embodiment without any doubt. It is reasonable not only because
it actively operated within the framework of this approach and is
the largest association in the third sector of Belarus, but also
because it embodies the basic policy for actions in an actual
situation.
In 2009 the Assembly of NGOs carried out a scale action – VI
Congress of NGOs of Belarus8. There were more than 300
representatives of the third sector; six regional and six thematic
round tables had been preliminarily held. Thus a considerable part
of civil society of Belarus – its most active part – took part in
these events. The main task of the Congress consisted in defining
an action strategy for the next period.
The basic dilemma consisted in that, whether it was necessary
to change the existing structure, forms and modes of work or to
leave them without change. Despite criticism and recognition of
exhaustion of the former forms of work in the actual situation, the
strategy accepted at the Congress confirmed adherence to old
forms and ways of action9. To a great extent it was connected with
7 Democratization of Belarus will begin from the dialogue between the state
and civil society: http://belngo.info/view.pl/padzieji/2010.03.01.
8 Final press release of the VI Assembly (Congress) of NGOs of Belarus: http://
belngo.info/view.pl/vi_kanhres.
9 Chavusau Yu. Post traumatic syndrome or new leadership // Journal of
civil society activists “Assembly”. 2009. No.1. pp. 3–5.
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stability of the formed structure of the third sector which dictates
possible and necessary ways of realization of the aims, etc.
Thus, actions within the framework of this approach revealed
that:
• Belarusian authorities failed to take any real steps for
improving the conditions for NGO activity;
• the structures of the third sector preserved the position of a
“suffering” side in relations with the state;
• the structures of the third sector are not ready for new forms of
work, and there is a lack of resources for effective campaigns.
“One’s own game”
The second approach consisted in using the possibilities which
had been provided by a new all.European platform for civil
society – the Civil Society Forum of the EaP. Preparations for the
Forum including work with European structures and civil society
organizations in Belarus served as an additional tool of
development of the third sector.
Active inclusion of Belarusian civil society in the Forum format,
promotion of its own proposals, working out principles for selecting
delegates, implementation of programs and the agenda of the first
day of the Forum were important consolidating factors for creation
of an NGO pool, the leader of which was the consortium EuroBelarus.
This pool included: consortium EuroBelarus, Belarusian association
of journalists (BAJ), Belarusian institute of strategic researches
(BISS), “The Assembly of NGOs”, public campaign “Budzma”,
Movement “For freedom”, the International institute for political
researches (IIPR), Office for Democratic Belarus, Belarusian Helsinki
committee, “Green network”, etc.
Within the framework of the preparation for the Forum a series
of landmark events took place. In December 2008 the conference
“Strengthening of participation of Belarusian civil society and local
governments in the European Union programs: problems and
prospects” was held. On April 22nd, 2009 the conference
“Participation of Belarusian civil society in the Eastern Partnership
Initiative” was held10 . In July 2009 public hearings “Civil society
10 Conference “Participation of Belarusian Civil Society in the Eastern
Partnership Initiative” http://eurobelarus.info/content/view/3101/164/
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and the state: interaction mechanisms” were carried out. The round
table “Eastern Partnership Civil Society Forum: Agenda for
Belarus” took place on October 19th, where strategic proposals on
actions of Belarusian delegation at Forum (from АHT and
EuroBelarus11, BISS12, Movements “For freedom”13) were suggested
and discussed.
Consortium EuroBelarus brought out the proposal for changing
the agenda of the Civil Society Forum for creating a procedural and
organizational base to indclude civil society in interaction between
the EaP.partners and the EU14. This proposal was approved15 in the
final resolution, which became the basis for successful action at the
Forum that took place on November 16–17th, 2009.
As a result of actions within the framework of this approach:
• there was consolidation of some NGOs within the framework
of the Eastern Partnership Civil Society Forum;
• the Eastern Partnership framework is open to expansion of
influence and inclusion of Belarusian civil society as a real
subject into Belarusian.European relations
At the same time the formed ties and achievements remain
weak and unstable.
Estimation and forecast
Quantitative characteristics of the third sector activity – actions,
events, people included in activity, etc. – are set by the mass
character of realization of the first approach in the activity of public
associations. Qualitative changes and points of development of
the sector are presented as policy options.
The results of the year showed that during realization of the
second strategy the civil society of Belarus could promote in self.
11 Egorov A. Eastern Partnership Civil Society Forum: Agenda for Belarus:
http://eurobelarus.info/content/view/3529/53/
12 Melyantsou D. Belarusian civil society community needs actorization:
http://eurobelarus.info/content/view/3535/53/
13 Lahvinets A. Eastern Partnership Civil Society Forum as a challenge:
http://eurobelarus.info/content/view/3548/53/
14 Egorov A., Vodolazhskaya T. Agenda of Eastern Partnership Civil Society
Forum: http://eurobelarus.info/content/view/3552/53/
15 Final resolution of the conference Eastern Partnership Civil Society Forum:
Agenda for Belarus: http://eurobelarus.info/content/view/3553/164/
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organizing and development. The first strategy, in its turn, allowed
concentrating once again on the state of affairs in the country.
Concerning the near future it can be said with confidence that
the policy of the first approach will prevail as it is fixed by an almost
20.year practice and consequently is hardly subject to changes.
At the same time development of the third sector is connected
mainly with activation of efforts within the framework of the second
approach. Prospects of the latter are connected with stability of
work of the pool of the public associations created during
preparation of the Forum for civil society, the leader of which is
EuroBelarus. At the same time there is a high risk to lose the rate
of work with regard to formulating an adequate reaction to the
situation.
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MASS MEDIA:
SELECTIVE LIBERALIZATION AGAINST
THE BACKGROUND OF REPRESSIONS
Alexey Medvetsky
Summary
In 2009 restrictions remained on access to information, monopoly of the state
on distribution of printed media. The inequality of working conditions between
state and nonstate social and political mass media stayed the same. The new
law “On Mass Media”, which took effect at the beginning of 2009, simplified
the procedure of registration of new media but at the same time it introduced a
number of additional requirements. As a result, five publications were denied
registration according to the new law, which led to reduction of the quantity of
mass media.
In 2009 the list of state and public institutes influencing the development of the
Belarusian media sector was extended at the expense of the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs, supervising accreditation of foreign mass media, the Public Coordination
Council in the sphere of mass media and Social Council on Morals.
It should be said that the success of 2009 was the inclusion of representatives
of the Belarusian mass media into the Civil Society Forum, which began its
activities in the framework of the “Eastern Partnership” program.
Tendencies:
• selective liberalization of the media sphere together with the preservation of
state dominance in the information sphere;
• tension in a narrow segment of social and political mass media;
• continuation of the dialogue Belarus – EU and inclusion of Belarus into the
“Eastern Partnership” program expanded the window of opportunities for
Belarusian media.
ReEregistration results
The new law “On Mass Media” took effect on February 8, 2009.
According to the document all Belarusian mass media had to pass
re.registration before February 8, 2010. According to the Ministry
of Information 1075 printed mass media (713 non.state and 362
state), 212 electronic mass media (154/58) and also 6 news agencies
(5/1) were re.registered. 230 printing (179 non.state and 51 state),
17 electronic (5/12) mass media, and also 3 non.state news
agencies were not re.registered.
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During 2009 – January 2010, 150 new periodicals and 2 news
agencies were registered in Belarus. Thus, as of February 8, 2010,
the State register of mass media numbers 1439 mass media,
including 1209 printed and 230 electronic ones and also 8 news
agencies.
As officials from the Ministry of Information underline, non.
state mass media occupy two thirds of the Belarusian informational
sphere. Usually such quantitative statistics is used to demonstrate
the liberal policy of the Belarusian state in the sphere of mass
media. However, as was repeatedly mentioned, the majority of
these publications is advertising or highly specialized.
According to estimates of experts from the Belarusian
association of journalists (BAJ), the only Belarusian public
organization that carries out regular monitoring of the state of the
Belarusian media sector, there are only nearly 30 social and
political printed publications. It is in this narrow sector where
various constraints start to be imposed which the Belarusian state
uses against independent mass media and which is criticized by
independent Belarusian and international observers.
Institutional framework of the Belarusian
media sector
An example of such a restriction, in addition to the already adopted
law, is decree No. 17, adopted by the Ministry of Information on
October 7, 2009. As noted by lawyers of the BAJ the new law “On
Mass Media” generally simplified the registration procedure of
new media at the expense of liquidation of the norm about the
necessary coordination of an editorial office location with local
executive authorities. However the mentioned decree introduced
a number of additional requirements, in particular correspondence
of the editor.in.chief’s qualification and an editorial premise to
the norms of legislation. As a result of this innovation at least five
publications were refused registration.
It could be argued that adoption of this decree promotes the
advance of professionalism of mass media and journalists. But the
extreme politicization of the relations of non.state social and
political mass media with the state practically does not leave any
room for such interpretations. Moreover, control of ideological
departments over information and accreditation in its Belarusian
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form essentially limits journalists’ work and taints the image of
Belarus abroad. In the rating “Freedom of the Press 2009” by the
international organization “Reporters without Borders”, Belarus
is listed on position 151 among 174 countries and has the status of
a state where the situation with press freedom causes “very serious
concerns”.
The other example of institutional restrictions is presidential
decree No. 65 issued on February 6, 2009, which establishes
personal responsibility of heads of state structures for working with
mass media. In particular, according to the decree the coordination
of work of state structures with mass media concerning internal
and foreign policy is assigned to the Presidential Administration.
Besides, funny cases are known to happen when employees of state
structures coordinate the information that they provide to
journalists with employees of ideological departments. As a result
a journalist’s inquiry about the places where it is possible to
skateboard can get stuck in the corridors of the executive
committee for some hours just to come back with the answer: “it is
possible to skateboard everywhere”.
It is obvious that decree No. 65 will bring mean that in case of
emergency civil servants will not want to take risks and will prefer
to play it safe, simply refusing to provide any information. The
lack of information and sluggishness of mass media became
apparent in autumn 2009 during a flu epidemic when the state and
non.state mass media could not cope with citizens’ demand for
information on the subject. This lack of information provoked the
appearance of articles containing sharp criticism in non.state
publications, two of which received warnings.
Another example of formal restriction of the work of mass
media in Belarus is the institute of journalists’ accreditation. BAJ
experts repeatedly note that in Belarus accreditation provided by
the licensing gives one the general right to work as a journalist,
whereas in international practice accreditation authorizes
journalists to access information with a certain priority. Both the
journalists of publications that are registered and included into
the Belarusian distribution network (“Narodnaya Volyal”) and
foreign mass media (TV channel “Belsat”, radio station “Racyja”)
experience difficulties obtaining accreditation.
The best example of the selective attitude of the Belarusian
authorities towards social and political mass media is the case of
Society
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“European radio for Belarus”. On November 11, the Council of
Ministers allowed the station to open a correspondent office, after
which the Belarusian Ministry of Foreign Affairs accredited 12
employees of the radio station. Since TV channel “Belsat” and radio
station “Racyja” received refusals in reply to similar applications,
they no often have to do their work in a legally grey area.
Nevertheless a month before, in October, the German publishing
house “Axel Springer AG” had entered the Belarusian media
market with its car magazine Auto Bild apparently without any
problems.
Public institutions and mass media
In 2009 the institutions regulating or influencing the activity of
mass media in Belarus grew when two public organizations were
created. The Public Coordination Council (PCC) in the sphere of
mass media was created according to point 2 of article 28 of the
new law “On Mass Media” by the decree of the Council of
Ministers and gathered for the first time on March 26. At the
Council session among other things it was suggested to create a
uniform code of journalistic ethics which would unite two
professional codes existing in Belarus (that of the Belarusian
association of journalists and that of the Belarusian union of
journalists).
During the following session on June 4, the Council made the
decision to address the leaders of the main national distributors of
printed publications “Belsoyuzpechat” and “Belpochta” with the
recommendation to consider distribution of some non.state
publications. At that moment 13 independent editions were
excluded from the state system of distribution. As of January 2010,
6 newspapers were still missing both from the catalogue of
“Belpochta” and from the newsstands of “Belsoyuzpechat”, 5
newspapers and the magazine ARHE were distributed either only
by “Belpochta” or only by “Belsoyuzpechat” or in a limited area1.
The Social Council on Morals, the creation of which was
initiated by the Belarusian exarchate of the Russian Orthodox
Church and the Union of Writers of Belarus, held its founding
meeting on July 8. The purpose of the Council is to preserve a
1 Monitoring data of BAJ
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high level of morals and moral responsibility in Belarusian society.
The Council also plans to watch the contents of the Belarusian
mass media and to fight for “purity of the Internet” as well.
It is necessary to mention that the “public” status of these
councils is artificial. The PCC in the sphere of mass media was
created by the decree of the Belarusian Council of Ministers and
the Council on Morals was founded with the assistance of the
Belarusian president, therefore both structures are rather initiatives
of the Belarusian state than of society. But as the decisions of both
Councils have the character of recommendations the appearance
of such institutes can be welcomed. They serve as a platform for
dialogue between the state and independent experts and also
proved a reason to focus highlight issues and provoke discussion
in Belarusian society.
Informal institutions
The initiative “Chisty Bainet” organized by BAJ and the civil
campaign “Budzma razam” should be defined as an informal
institute for self.organizing journalists active on the Belarusian
Internet. The campaign that set the goal to apply professional
standards of “traditional” journalism to the Internet started in
January 2009. Unfortunately, the initiative did not develop
properly: the campaign was openly supported only by a small
number of network mass media. It is should be noted that a similar
initiative of the state news agency BelTa on creation of the
Association of respectable and responsible publishers on the
Internet declared in June 2008, also had not received broad support
of Internet publishers.
The conclusion can be drawn that, despite the legislatively
uncertain status of the Internet, which creates favorable conditions
for self.organizing of the professional community and creation of
informal institutions of Internet regulation, Belarusian journalists
prefer the traditional dividing lines.
The main institutional watershed is the existence of two
professional associations: BAJ and BUJ. As the number of round
table meetings held in June and September showed, the
representatives of the two organizations can hardly find a common
language and only meet due to the intermediary efforts of
international organizations such as the Swedish Institute for Further
Society
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Education of Journalists FOJO (June) or the Minsk office of OSCE
(September). As the contradictions are of a value.ideological nature
and are aggravated by the unequal conditions of state and non.state
mass media, it is extremely difficult to eliminate disagreement
between these two professional associations.
EU factor
Since November 2006 the Belarusian media sector is under special
attention of the European Union. Among the 12 conditions set by
the EU for improvement of mutual relations with the official Minsk
the second point was to guarantee freedom of speech and to
respect the right of Belarusian citizens to receive unbiased
information. Besides, the EU insisted on removal of obstacles in
the work of journalists and in distribution of independent
publications, and also on cancellation of articles No. 367, 368, 369
and 369.1 of the Criminal code of Belarus. These articles establish
the criminal liability for slandering or insulting the President of
Belarus, insulting a representative of the authorities and also for
discrediting Belarus.
The requirements of democratization of the media sector are
part of the concept “windows of opportunities” which was offered
to Belarus by Brussels in October 2008 together with introduction
of a moratorium on the visa ban concerning a number of Belarusian
officials. In April and November 2009 the EU Council again
supported prolongation of the moratorium, having kept the
requirement of democratization of the social and political media
sphere. In January and April resolutions of the European
parliament on Belarus also contained the requirement of
democratization of the Belarusian media sector.
Belarusian experts assess this policy of the EU in various ways
but agree on the fact that changes in the sphere of the Belarusian
mass media have a fragmentary nature and are not irreversible.
For example, despite the fact that the new law “On Mass Media”
simplified the procedure for registration of mass media it deprives
mass media of registration after two warnings from the Ministry of
Information (with two warnings that it is on the verge of closing is
the newspaper “Narodnaya Volya”). Besides, a number of
journalists of the independent mass media repeatedly received
refusals in accreditation.
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Information policy
On April 1, an important event happened in the eastern direction.
The Telecommunication Trade Union (TTU) of Belarus that unites
cable operators and broadcasting companies of the republic made
the decision to exclude five Russian TV channels from Belarusian
cable networks. As a result “Pervyj kanal.Vsemirnaya set”, “RTR.
Planeta”, “NTV.Mir”, “TV.Tsentr” and TVCI disappeared from
cable TV.
The Ministry of Information explained it by the fact that the
Russian channels did not have a license for broadcasting. The TTU
directorate also noted that the decision was caused by the desire
to protect the domestic TV advertising market during the economic
crisis. According to the corrected forecast of ZenithOptimedia
agency, in 2009 the Belarusian advertising market was expected
to decline by 20 % on average, including a 22 % reduction in the
sector of printed mass media and television, 10 % in the radio
advertising sector, while for the Internet advertising sector a
growth of 15 % was predicted2.
But the greatest resonance in the mass media, as usual, was
caused by a political interpretation of TTU actions: the Belarusian
authorities played safe and closed the national informational field
from uncontrollable penetration from Russia. Such point of view
is proved by the extremely sharp reaction of the top management
of Belarus to the first visiting press conference which Russian
president Medvedev gave to invited Belarusian journalists on
November 23 in Moscow. This event was interpreted in Minsk as
an information.political intervention and president Lukashenko
named it “an absolutely senseless meeting”.
Conclusion
Despite the quantitative variety of the Belarusian media sector the
greatest political tension is still observed in the narrow segment
of social and political printed mass media (about 30 publications).
The destiny of this very segment causes the greatest interest and
anxiety of the international organizations with which the official
Minsk has to carry on the political dialogue during the last years.
2 Data from Marketing.by website
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It should be said that in the sphere of mass media the Belarusian
authorities carry out the same policy of “selective liberalization”
as in the economic sphere, and the changes are also stimulated by
the requirements of international institutions, first of all EU
structures. Therefore, the inclusion of representatives of Belarusian
mass media into the Civil Society Forum which began its work in
the framework of the “Eastern Partnership” program was without
doubt the biggest success of 2009. As a result, the representatives
of Belarusian independent mass media acquired additional
leverage to influence the internal political situation.
In 2009 the number of state and public institutions influencing
the development of the Belarusian media sector (the Ministry of
Foreign Affairs, supervising the accreditation of foreign mass
media, Public Coordination Council in the Sphere of Mass Media
and Social Council on Morals) increased. On the one hand, it
created a number of legal and informal obstacles for state and non.
state mass media (Statute of accreditation for foreign mass media,
decree No. 65) which, for example, in a situation of desperate lack
of information can lead to conflict between mass media and
supervising structures. On the other hand, the activity of new
public institutions creates additional opportunities to get
information and raises the interest of the Belarusian citizens in mass
media.
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BELARUSIAN MEDIA ONLINE:
USERS, STRUCTURE, LEGISLATION
AND REGULATION
Marina Sokolova
Summary
By 2010 the number of Internet users reached 30% of the Belarusian population.
As research findings show, social and political resources make up nearly 50%
of all online media, which is twice as much as the printed media. State
institutions are the only “regulator” of the Internet and online media sphere in
Belarus. Not solely because of the illiberal regime, but also due to the reactionary
stance of public organizations, which ignore the window of opportunity to
influence national policy in this sphere. By the end of 2009 online media
regulations remained insignificant, though “sleeping” norms of the laws and
regulatory acts adopted in 2008 early 2010 could be used as legal ground for
tightening control and censorship on the Internet.
Tendencies:
• the number of the Internet users grew due to infrastructure development,
lower costs of broadband access and mobile Internet development;
• news websites of professional journalists and multipurpose portals are
dominating, but metajournalism did not become a significant element of the
Belarusian online landscape;
• national policy on information and informatization is focused on defining
priorities and developing “tough” legislation in the sphere of Internet media
regulation;
• Belarusian legislation initiatives are still developed outside global initiatives
and discussions about Internet governance in general and online content in
particular.
Internet audience
At present, Belarus counts slightly over 3 million Internet users,
which make up one third of the country’s population1. Statistical
data provide an outline of the “average” Internet user: a male under
25 with higher education, lives in Minsk region and uses broadband
Internet, mainly at home. His main activities on the Internet include:
1 Bynet in Close.Up: http://neg.by/publication/2009_06_26_11604.html;
gemiusAudience Research 01/2010.
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sending and receiving e.mails, social networks, information search
for weather forecast (1st place in tut.by Top.10 search queries), jobs,
buying and selling goods and services, exchange rates, lottery,
erotica (10th place) and pornography (2nd place)2.
Figure 1. Age groups and sex distribution of Internet users (%)
Source: gemiusAudience 01/2010
Figure 2. Occupation distribution of Internet users (%)
Source: gemiusAudience 01/2010
2 Belarusian Portal TUT.BY Sums Up Search Results of the Old Year: http://
mc.by/internet/article/2009.12.24/Belorusskij_portal_TUT.BY_
podvodit_poiskovye_itogi_uhodjaschego_goda/
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One third of those who visit social and political news sites are
young people aged 15–24 (about 16% of views). But the most
active users of news resources are people aged 35–44 (21% of
users) who make up the largest part of all views (see Table 1).
Table 1. Composition of visitors of social and political information sites
Source: gemiusAudience 01/2010
Up to 45% of all news sites’ visitors are Minsk residents. The
analysis of “information preferences” across regions shows that
digital life style (onliner.by) and news analysis (naviny.by) draw
most attention in Minsk region, whereas in other regions ”digital
life style” and related news capture much less attention (see
Table 1). Only a very small part of Internet users visit more than
one news resource.
Online media
Different services based on the World Wide Web and its latest
modifications Web 2.0 and Web 3.0 stimulated development of
new mass communication models, which require that traditional
understanding of mass media be revised. In this situation the fact
that the online media position themselves as such could be the
most efficient criteria to define them (if they are not the Internet
version of a printed edition). Formal indicators of this could be
the following: key words in the name; creators’ indication that they
identify themselves and their resource with activities similar to
functioning of a mass medium (“interview”, “information source”,
“report”, “news”, “editor”); technologies promoting the website
as a mass medium; the description of the resource’s organizational
and legal status, which is usually presented in “about us” or “about
the project” sections.3
3 Lukina, M., Fomicheva, I. (2005). Mass Media on the Internet: http://
evartist.narod.ru/text19/034.htm.
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The Belarusian media landscape is still to undergo analysis.
Suffice it to say that different catalogues and media directories
provide different data on the number of resources in the section
“News and Mass Media”. For example, akavita.com includes 467
news resources4, eBelarus.org nearly 4805, the all.by catalogue 5616.
Main Belarusian catalogues and rating systems hold it that the
online versions of the offline resources (including electronic ones)
make up less than a half of the latter: from 32% (all.by) up to 49%
(akavita.com). All 7 Belarusian information agencies have their
“online representations”: Vladimir Grevtsov agency http: //
www.grevtsov.by; Minsk.News agency http://www.mk.by;
BelaPAN http://www.belapan.com; BelTA http://www.belta.by;
Interfax.West http://www.interfax.by; News Release agency
http://www.afn.by; Prime.Tass agency http://www.prime.tass.by.
More than half of Belarusian broadcasting companies have their
websites, FM radio stations have the largest representation (10 out
of 12)7. Internet.radio and Internet.TV are quite noticeable in the
Belarusian media landscape; they make up 7% of all electronic
media8.
It should be noted that, roughly estimated, social and political
resources make up nearly 50% of all online media, which is twice
as much as in the printed media.
Due to absence of any clear definition of the online media, their
classification principles remain debatable. Researchers usually
resort to the following working classification of online media: on.
line resources created by professional journalists (including media
portals); news catalogues and aggregators; special resources for
quality analysis and monitoring of online resources
(metajournalism), civil journalism.
Analysis of the online media indexed by Belarusian rating
systems shows that news sites of professional journalists and multi.
purpose portals are the most successful formats (for example,
tut.by, bymedia.net, np.by, mass.by). They make up both the major
4 Akavita: http://top.akavita.com/Mass_Media_and_News/
5 eBelarus.org: http://www.e.belarus.org/links/media.html.
6 Open.by: http://all.by/0701.html.
7 Rough Estimation. Sources: http://baj.by/m.bajPB.viewAll.html; http://
catalog.akavita.by/Mass_Media_and_News/Television/; http://www.
e.belarus.org/links/media.html; http://www.mininform.gov.by/rus/smi/
8 eBelarus.org: http://www.e.belarus.org/links/media.html e.belarus.
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part of the Belarusian social and political online media and top.10
of the most visited websites in this category (see Table 2).
Onliner.by also made it into this top.10; though it has not been
indexed by the two previous resources, its audience is 1.5 times
larger than that of the online version of “Komsomolskaya Pravda”,
gemiusAudience reports.
Table 2. TopE10 of informational, social and political websites
Multi.purpose portals become more widely spread with wider
possibilities for broadband Internet access. Together with
community discussion websites they dominate regional online
news resources, but their number of users is still one of the lowest.
The media landscape of a district town comprises a local state
newspaper (about 47% of such newspapers have an Internet
version), 1 or 2 private ones (entertainment, advertising), and, in
most cases, a town portal or/and a community discussion website9.
9 Resources: district and regional executive councils’ websites http://
belpost.by/services/subscription/; baj.by ; http://info.21.by
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According to the media directory eBelarus.org, news catalogues
(e.g., all.by, akavita.com, 21.by, blog catalogue http://blog.inf.by,
et al.) and news aggregators (e.g., akavita.news, news2.0,
informer.by, get.news, press.net.by, et al.) make up 8% of all the
news online resources. Civil journalism has nearly the same rate:
101blog.net; Narodniye novosti Vitebska (“Vitebsk people’s
news”): news.vitebsk.cc; Indymedia Belarus: http: //belarus.
indymedia.org; iBelarus.net: http: //www.ibelarus.net; Budzma!
(“Let’s be!”): http: //www.budzma.org; Release.BY10.
Metajounalism, defined as rating and reputation online
resources created by professional journalists to analyze and
monitor the quality and objectivity of online media, to assess
prospects of efficient content usage, has not become a significant
element of the Belarusian online landscape so far. Even if these
topics are raised, quite sporadically, they are on the periphery of
discussions of Belarusian journalists (http://community.
livejournal.com/paparazzi_by/, http://community.livejournal.
com/reporter_by) and professional journalist associations
(Belarusian Association of journalists baj.by, Belarusian Union of
Journalists http://www.buj.by). True, it gives hope that standards
of web journalism are actively discussed, for example, within the
students and professors’ community of the Institute of Journalism
of the BSU (Yousmi Web.Journalism Award11, the Internet
newspaper http://www.websmi.by, where “students of the BSU
jourfac (shortened from “journalism faculty”) are mastering web
journalism”).12  Such projects as Mіodzieїowa Akcja Multi.
medialna (“Youth Multimedia Action”)13  – Belarusian part of the
project: http://elekcyi.org/by/; http: //newmedia.era.
livejournal.com – also touch upon these issues. The Deutsche
Welle Academy and Minsk International Educational Centre
10 eBbelarus.org: http://www.e.belarus.org/links/media.html.
11 Director of the Institute of Journalism of the BSU Sergei Dubovik: „Web
journalism is our future and we will be working on it“ (23.02.2010): http://
belapan.by/archive/2010/02/23/media_jourfac_v/
12 It is significant that none of the professional journalist organizations was
invited as a founder of Yousmi Web Journalism Awards 2009.
13 An international project (Poland, Belarus, Ukraine) offering support to
schoolchildren and youth in newspaper creation using new technologies
and pre.made layouts. It is based on two portals: www.mammedia.org,
www.elecyi.org.
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under the aegis of Konrad Adenauer Foundation organize
seminars on online journalism.
The above mentioned peculiarities of the media landscape, where
offline journalism practices are dominating, allow us to single out
three characteristics of the Belarusian online media: focus on topicality
(update) and multi.media at the expense of hypertextuality; narrow
understanding of interactivity; underestimation of metajournalism.
Hypertextuality is almost disregarded as a strategic characteristic of
the online media. It is significant that Ales Lipai, director of the
privately owned information company BelaPAN, mentioned
“responsiveness, creativity, interactivity, and multi.media”14 among
the criteria that will be determining Belarusian the development of
Internet resources.
Regulation and legislation
The state informatization policy presupposes that state institutes
cooperate with civil society to work out national priorities of
informatization, which is regarded as “a multi.faceted process
including organizational and technical, regulatory, techno.
economic, and socio.cultural components”.15 The Internet
Governance Forum under the auspices of the UNO16 defines
Internet governance as “the development and application by
Governments, the private sector and civil society, in their
respective roles, of shared principles, norms, rules, decision.
making procedures, and programs that shape the evolution and
use of the Internet”17. An argument for developing such procedures
can be derived from the global character of the Internet, which
often makes “hard laws” ineffective and calls for both “soft laws”
and different forms of self.regulation and co.regulation.
National information and informatization policy is focused on
defining priorities and development of “hard laws”, whereas
14 Bykovsky, P. An Integral Feature of the On.Line Media (14.03.2010): http:/
/www.tor.cn/dw/article/0,,3402631,00.html.
15 Maliyevsky, N. Ilyina, M. State Information Policy and Mass Media. Minsk:
The Academy of Public Administration under the aegis of the President of
the Republic of Belarus. 2009. P. 27.
16 Internet Governance Forum: www.intgovforum.org/
17 Кurbaliya, Y., Gelbstain, E. (2005) Internet Governance: Problems, Entities,
Barriers. Moscow, MGIMO Internet Policy Centre. P. 13.
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international practice emphasizes principles and procedures of
making decisions on Internet usage in different spheres.
We should point out that neither the government nor civil
society in Belarus take part in discussions of such issues on a global
level. In particular, Belarus took part at none of the Internet
Governance Forum meetings, Belarusian government structures
are not represented in the ICANN Government Advisory
Committee. The Forum’s activities receive no coverage in
Belarusian mass media.
As a result, the agenda of online media regulation issues is
determined, on one side, by the government that continues to
implement informatization policy dating back to the 1991 law on
informatization, and, on the other side, by liberal opposition
representatives and civil society organizations that focus on
traditional views on freedom of speech from the epoch of printed
press and television. Thus, the actual global context of online
media regulation escapes the attention of the Belarusian public.
The problem of copyright on the Internet can serve as an example.
Journalists’ concern for observance of this right is easy to
understand. In 2008 a campaign “For Clear Bynet” was launched
to work out “a mutually accepted mechanism for treating another’s
content”18. It is significant that neither localization of the “creative
commons” license nor the conception of fair use of information
were discussed in the framework of this campaign. Any private or
state initiative in protecting the consumer from harmful content is
taken very negatively by the liberal public, which causes the
situation when the authorities and associations of professional
journalists cannot cooperate either in content control or in
implementation of users’ media education projects. It tells a tale
that the Belarusian press, including the online media, practically
ignored Safe Internet Day, which is part of the global program
safeguarding users’ security19.
As we can see, state institutions are the only “regulator” in the
sphere of the Internet and online media in Belarus, which is not
only because of the illiberal regime, but also due to the reactionary
18 “Clear BYNET”: On the Problems of Journalistic Ethics on the Web (June
4, 2008): http://baj.by/m.p.viewpub.tid.1.pid.5010.html.
19 Bykovsky, P. Safe Internet Day on Bynet (February 10, 2010): http://
www.tor.cn/dw/article/0,,5235555,00.html.
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stance of public organizations, which ignore “windows of
opportunity” to influence national policy in this sphere. That such
possibilities exist can be inferred from the fact that active public’s
protests against introduction of the online media registration
system have produced an effect so far. We should note that
Belarusian state institutions involved in online media regulation
often face serious obstacles in their legislative activities. In the first
place it refers to the definitions of media and mass media,
delimitation of notions mass means of communication and personal
information online. But in their attempts to resolve these
discrepancies Belarusian lawyers tend to borrow the corresponding
norms from legislation systems of Russia, Ukraine and
Kazakhstan20 rather than to participate in the European dialogue21
concerning these most problematic legal conflicts.
At present Belarusian online media are regulated by the
following legislative acts:
• law on information, informatization and information protection
(2008)22;
• law on mass media (2008)23;
• Presidential Ordinance № 60 On measures for improvement of
the national Internet segment usage (2010)24;
20 Karnei I. Zimouski: The Stronger State, the Less Concern for the Internet
(03.02. 2010): http://www.svaboda.org/content/article/1947100.html;
Investigation and Analysis Centre: the Ordinance on the Internet
regulation has been developed “with concern for people” (02.02.2010):
http://naviny.by/rubrics/computer/2010/02/02/ic_news_128_
325353.
21 A new notion of media? Political declaration and resolutions. 1st Council
of Europe Conference of Ministers responsible for Media and New
Communication (28 and 29 May 2009, Reykjavik, Iceland): www.coe.int/
t/dghl/.../media/MCM(2009)011_en_final_web.pdf
22 Law of the Republic of Belarus On information, informatization and
information protection of November 11, 2008 № 455.3: http://
www.tamby.info/zakon/zakon.455_2008.htm; International Expertise Of
The Belarusian Draft Law On Information, Informatization and Information
Protection: http://www.e.belarus.org/article/infolaw.html
23 Law of the Republic of Belarus On mass media of July 17, 2008 № 427:
http://www.mininform.gov.by/documentation; The New Law on Mass
Media: Examination: http://baj.by/m.p.viewpub.tid.12.pid.5.html.
24 Presidential Ordinance № 60 of February 1, 2010 On measures for
improvement of the national Internet segment usage: http://
www.mininform.gov.by/documentation.
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• Regulation of the procedure of cooperation between the mobile
operators and KGB and IAC (Investigation and Analysis
Centre) (2010)25;
• Information Society Development Strategies up to 2015 (the
project published in 2009).
In 2009, within the framework of the Electronic Belarus
program, the Project of the Information Society Development
Strategy up to 2015 was developed26. The government, health care,
education, employment, social welfare, economy, trade, mass
communication and electronic content systems were named
priority spheres for information and communication technologies
implementation27.
Both the ordinance On measures for improvement of the
national Internet segment usage and the law On information,
informatization and information protection have a “framework”
character and presuppose that a large number of regulatory acts
be adopted. Under the current illiberal regime there is a serious
danger that provisions of the ordinance will be treated as repressive
towards the online media, the Internet users or will entail extra
expenses on the part of the providers of Internet services28.
Sergei Alfer holds that Regulation of the procedure of the
cooperation between mobile operators and KGB and IAC “is more
an technical act that, according to the corresponding law, supports
investigation and search operations related to the Internet
infrastructure and content and does not impose extra restrictions
of citizens’ rights and freedoms”29. On the other hand, a number
of paragraphs of the Regulation contradict the European practice
25 Regulation of the procedure of cooperation between the mobile operators
and KGB and IAC (Investigation and Analysis Centre) approved by the
ordinance №129 of March 3, 2010 г.: http://telegraf.by/2010/03/polnij.
tekst.polozhenija.o.dostupe.k.abonentskim.bazam.operatorov.
svjazi.html.
26 Chumakova T. Project of the Information Society Development Strategy
up to 2015 has been Developed in Belarus (2009.11.16): http://
www.belta.by/ru/main_news_other?id=449571.
27 Litvinova D. Bynet Development was Determined by Delovoi Internet
(“Bussiness Internet”)(2009.10.23): http://neg.by/publication/
2009_10_23_12181.html.
28 Ibid.
29 Alfer S. The Right for Interference (2010.03.09): http://nmnby.eu/pub/
1003/09j.html.
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described in two documents: the Convention on the Protection of
Individuals with regard to Automatic Processing of Personal Data,
which is open for signing since 198130, and the Declaration on
freedom of communication on the Internet adopted by the Council
of Europe (2003).
The latter document calls upon all countries to provide access
to the Internet for all citizens and proposes 7 main principles that
would guarantee freedom of information on the Internet: not to
subject content on the Internet to restrictions; to encourage self.
regulation or co.regulation of the content; not to apply blocking
and filtering measures, or registration schemes; not to impose on
service providers an obligation to monitor content that they
transmit or store; to guarantee the right for anonymity.31 It should
be noted that despite the fact that Belarus has not signed either
the Convention on the Protection of Individuals with regard to
Automatic Processing of Personal Data or the Convention on
Cybercrime32, which are complimentary to each other, the
Regulation of the procedure of the mobile operators’ and KGB and
IAC cooperation mentions that only the latter document should
be signed.
Taking into account everything said above we can state that
at present there is little regulation of the online media, though
“sleeping” norms of the recently adopted laws and regulatory acts
could be used as legal ground of tight control and censorship of
the Internet.
30 Convention for the Protection of Individuals with regard to Automatic
Processing of Personal Data: conventions.coe.int/…/Treaties/Html/
108.htm.
31 Declaration on freedom of communication on the Internet and explanatory
note. Adopted by the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe on
28 May 2003: www.coe.int/.../Freedom%20of%20communication%20on%
20the%20Internet_en.pdf.
32 Convention on Cybercrime CETS No.: 185: http://conventions.coe.int/
Treaty/Commun/QueVoulezVous.asp?NT=185&CL=ENG.
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EDUCATION:
NO PROBLEMS, OR SELFEDETERMINATION
THE BELARUSIAN WAY
Svetlana Matskevich
Summary
In 2009, education in Belarus was in a state of incomplete selfdetermination.
The educational reform begun in the 1990s was brought to a close, its results
were hardly discussed and new ideas and concepts of development were not
suggested. At the same time the readiness to start “Europeanization” of
education within the framework of the Bologna process was announced.
The educational playing field is unaltered: the main player is the state. The
project of the Educational Code, adopted at the first reading is an official
instructive document directed at strengthening the position of the state in
educational administration and total control over the activity of educational
institutions of all types and levels. The question about how to take educational
development to the next level still demands an answer, but is not included in
the educational policy agenda and in the general state policy.
Tendencies:
• Quantitative indices of the education system remain satisfactory while positive
dynamics of educational quality is absent;
• The state dominates the educational sphere unchallenged;
• New initiatives in the sphere of informal education were declared;
• Imbalance between the educational system and the labor market remains;
• The course of “Bolognization” of education has not been reflected in any
way in the state policy in this sphere.
From the levels of education to problematic management
The system of the Belarusian education consists of “levels” that
include preschool, elementary school, vocational technical
training, specialized secondary, higher and postgraduate
education.
According to statistical data, in comparison with the academic
year 2008/2009 the number of educational institutes decreased
by 85 (2.2%), including elementary schools (by 8), basic schools
(by 73), secondary schools (by 20 schools). The reduction of
educational institutes is partly caused both by the demographic
factor: the general contingent of pupils decreased by 74,790
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people, or by 7.1%. Another factor is political: in order to execute
presidential decree No.15 of July 17, 2008 “On separate questions
of the general secondary education” the system of general
secondary education should provide a transition from a 10.year
term to a 9.year term of the general basic education and from a
12.year to a 11.year term of the general secondary education.
In 2009 the number of students in technical training colleges
increased by 6.7 thousand in comparison with 2008. The total
number of students at this level is 105.7 thousand people. The
contingent of those with secondary vocational education was 166.7
thousand people strong (in 2008, 158.2 thousand); in the academic
year 2009/2010 there were 430.4 thousand students at institutes
of higher learning (in 2008/2009, 420.7 thousand).
In the state education system the year 2009 passed under the
slogan of optimization of the system as a whole, the growth of
export of educational services as well as the share of paid services
in vocational training. The number of educational institutes was
about 9 thousand with more than 2 million students attending
them. In the educational sphere of Belarus 450 thousand people
work, including over 230 thousand of pedagogical staff.
What does education system optimization mean? Most likely,
this process consists in reformatting and renaming educational
institutes. So, according to the Ministry of Education, in 2009, 109
preschool centers were reoriented into preschool development
centers and sanatorium preschool centers; 713 groups became
special sanatorium groups and offices for corrective.pedagogical
help. 7825 groups, attended by some 132.5 thousand children are
reorganized (most of the groups, 1482 groups, are in Minsk).
According to the report of the Ministry of Education new forms
of organization are introduced in preschool centers with a short.
term stay (from 2 to 7 hours) of children (there are 1247 such groups;
in 2008 there were 347). The number of grammar schools grew by
16 units. The number of lyceums decreased. A network of
educational.pedagogical complexes (kindergartens) develops.
From 973 educational institutions of this type, 945 (97.1%) are
located in rural areas.
At all levels of the system of vocational training there is no
observable increase in the number of educational institutions. The
processes of renaming and optimization has nearly stopped. The
priority in this sphere is attracting foreign citizens for training in
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Belarusian universities. In 2009 at institutions of higher learning of
Belarus 9,048 foreign citizens from 84 counties were trained (in the
academic year 2008/2009 – 7,537, in 2007/2008 – 6568 people). This
mobility rate of students can be considered high if compared with
the neighboring countries which entered the EU – Latvia, Lithuania
and Estonia. But these numbers are tiny when to international mobility
data in developed countries, for example, Germany.
Table 1. Mobility of students (2007)
Source: UNESCO, http://stats.uis.unesco.org/unesco/
At the level of post.gradual pedagogical education, regional
institutes for improvement of professional skills are renamed
institutes of educational development. However it is unclear how
much this reorganization of the system of improvement of
professional skills actually changes the content and the quality of
education.
The statistical review of the education system according to the
accepted “level” criteria is obviously insufficient for understanding
the problems in this sphere. It is hard to assess the management
and decision.making activity behind all the numbers on various
educational institutes. The same holds true for reaching
conclusions about the human potential of Belarus.
The Ministry of Education does not describe the educational
sector in terms of segments (based ownership (state and private)
or on type (adult education, continuing education, etc.) for the
purpose of analysis and estimations. We will try to compensate
the lack of segment description of the education system.
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Private education
It can be said with confidence that in Belarus a system of private
education has been created and it functions at all levels. Though
for the last decade the quantity of private educational institutions
has not increased.
It is impossible to consider private educational institutes
completely independent from the state. The heads of private institutes
of higher learning are appointed by the Ministry of Education. The
state continues to supervise private educational institutes and
regulates their activity through accreditation and licensing
procedures as well as through the tax system. There is no system of
grants and state investment into the private education sphere.
The number of the private schools providing general secondary
education in 2000 was only 15 with 1104 pupils and by 2009 it
decreased to 9 with 586 pupils. The number of day schools of the
state pattern of ownership in 2009 was 3656 with 996,077 pupils.
The number of graduates of private professional educational
institutes (10 special secondary educational establishments and
12 universities) in 2000 was only 11.5% of the total number of
graduates of universities and 9.9% of graduates of special
secondary educational establishments. A substantial growth of the
number of students of private universities and special secondary
educational establishments was observed in 2003 (approximately
by 20 thousand). After that their quantity remained the same until
2009. The basic profiles of preparation in private educational
institutions are economics, law and the humanities.
Business education
During 15 years of independence a system of independent business
education was created, where short and medium term preparation
in many business directions (especially in the field of management
and human resources management) takes place. To estimate the
scale and the results of business education in non.state structures
quantitatively and qualitatively is not possible, due to the lack of
exact statistical data. The growth of such structures can only be
assessed by advertising and website reports1. Against the
1 TUT.by: http://jobs.tut.by/staff.agencies.phtml; http://www.ipm.by/;
http://www.krconsult.org/about/aboutus/1.html.
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background of the structure of business education only two
establishments have МВА programs: the Institute of Privatization
and Management and the Institute of Business and Management
of Technologies at the Belarusian State University2.
Expenses for education
According to national statistics, in 1998–2004 expenses for
education fluctuated within 6.1 – 6.6% of GDP. From 2005 till 2008
there was a decrease in expenses for education from 6.4 to 5.15%
of GDP. However, the decrease in state expenditure on education
was successfully compensated by the organization of the study.
for.fee form of education. Thus the payment of the population for
educational services comprised the greatest part of incomes of the
state universities. In 2009 the number of the students paying a
tuition fee at state universities was about 61% of the general number
of students; in special secondary educational establishments this
figure was about 50% (Fig. 1, 2).
Fig. 1 Distribution of students according to the forms of tuition fee at
state institutes of higher learning (2009)
Fig. 2 Distribution of students accordig to forms of tuition fee at
institutions of spesialized secondary education (2009)
2 http://www.sbmt.by
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The citizens of Belarus prefer study.for.fee education in state
educational institutions, although the cost of services in private
and state universities and special secondary educational
establishments is practically the same. Public opinion consistently
holds that in private educational institutes the quality of education
is lower than in state educational institutes. State universities and
special secondary educational establishments are aware of the
market situation and try to fix this through enrollment rules in
professional educational institutes. The entrants who have not
passed either free or for.profit branches of state educational
institutes have the possibility to apply to private educational
institutions where the entrance procedure starts later. As a result,
the students who are enrolled in private educational institutions
are those left over.
Providing secondary education for everyone in Belarus means
a huge demand for educational services of professional educational
institutes. Consumers of educational services focus on obtaining
a diploma that guarantees future social status. Pragmatism and
clear orientation on future labor activity are sidelined. The demand
for education formed in such a way is not helpful in qualifying the
population for professional life and leads to a level of trust in the
existing educational system that is unjustified.
The state successfully supervises this situation, hoping to
benefit financially. Using administrative, legal and financial
mechanisms, it directs these investments mainly to its own sector
of education instead of a private one, continuing to control the
content and quality of specialists’ preparation. Such system of
regulation considerably constraints the expansion of the sphere
of educational services and market formation, and it also limits
the independence of educational institutions both in state and
private sectors.
Informal education
In the system of informal education of Belarus, statistical research
and the calculation of the number of students are not carried out
so widely. But the system of informal education created during
the years of independence in many respects sets trends for
innovation in education and compensates the performance of those
functions which are not carried out by state education. Informal
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education includes confessional education performed by churches;
secular education performed by third sector structures; intellectual
and scientific education; business education etc.
Some initiatives of informal education which according to their
organization and activity are typical NGOs do not refer to this
sphere and identify themselves differently3. On the website
NGO.by, 432 educational and 383 professional organizations are
registered.
2009 became the year in which new educational initiatives from
private and non.governmental organizations were announced. At
least three initiatives were declared publicly, the beginning of their
realization was started.
1. Agency of humanitarian technologies (AHT) – the Center
of Social Innovations (CSI) with a group of partners (Fund of
L. Sapeha, the Fund of legal technologies, consortium
“EuroBelarus”, etc.) declared the start of the long.term program
creating a university. Since September, 2009 on the platform of
AHT.CSI a methodological seminar was held on working out of
the idea of a university4, and in December substantive provisions
of the new Concept of university were presented to public5. The
future university is seen by the authors of the Concept not only as
an educational establishment but – and first of all – as a place of
cultivation of national and project elites and cultivating a modern
way of thinking.
2. In December the initiative for the preparation of an
economic elite of Belarus was announced on the basis of a Belarus
economic research and educational centre which was created in
Kiev as a joint project of KSE, KEI, EERC and SITE, financed by
SIDA and USAid through the Eurasia Foundation6. At the
beginning of 2010 there was a call for post.graduate students on
the module “Macroeconomics”. Training will be conducted in
English.
3 By the end of the 1990s NGOs began to be secretly subdivided into pro.
state and “real” ones.
4 http://www.methodology.by/index.php?option=com_content&task=
view&id=409&Itemid=35
5 Experts: not a single Belarusian institute of higher learning has a right to
be called a University: http://zautra.by/cont/cmt_see.php?sn_nid=
5505&sn_cat=19&cmt_art_id=5505&cmt_art_cat=19.
6 http://www.beroc.by/rus/events/e5e3a0639e6c3a80.html
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3. Belarusian Collegium (A. Antipenko, V. Akudovich, etc.)
announced the start of a new project on creation of a Belarusian.
American University. The idea behind the project is not quite clear;
the orientation is said to be on improving the quality of education
and training abroad. The first steps on recruiting of Belarusian
students were made7.
Educational programs of non.governmental organizations
(Solidarity, POST, the Belarusian association of journalists, Rada,
the Third sector, VIT, Focus group, AKT etc) continue to function
and develop. Initiatives on developing distant education are
announced. Thus, the field of educational initiatives, especially
university ones, looks quite varied and modern, settling down in
European and global trends in educational innovation. However,
there are some problems which interfere with the realization of
these ideas.
Why do the ideas of classical and elite education start to arise
in the sector of non.governmental organizations which have
neither traditions nor experience in university education? This is
explained only by the fact that for the last decade a considerable
and most progressive part of the specialists were superseded (or
marginalized) from the sphere of state education into the sector of
NGOs.
Meanwhile the “fading” of the political processes in a natural
way generated a zone where it is possible to test these ideas, which
seemed fantastic ten years ago. In this situation the competition
within the non.state sector itself becomes a serious problem as a
result of which development processes are restrained by personal
ambitions and poor communications.
In many respects the skepticism about creating an
independent university is connected with limited resources and
state counteraction. Aggressive reaction from the state can be
extinguished by the external factor that the European structures
represent. The program “Eastern Partnership” becomes an
important and attractive orientation in the Belarusian state
policy8.
7 http://baj.by/belkalehium/study.htm
8 Yegorov A., Vodolazhskaja T Policy Paper: AGT – EuroBelarus: agenda for
Forum of the civil society: http://eurobelarus.info/content/view/3552/53/;
http://eurobelarus.info/content/view/3611/53/
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In its turn, representatives of Belarusian NGOs, actively
participating and being the leader in creation of the Civil Society
Forum, laid the organizational foundation for inclusion of the third
force – the independent expert structures, the non.governmental
organizations in the bilateral negotiating process between Europe
and the government of Belarus9. Estimating this tendency as
positive, we consider it to be insufficient for strengthening of
independent educational organisations in Belarus.
Bologna process: forecasts come true
In 2009 it was officially stated that Belarus prepared for joining
the Bologna process. The majority of experts regard this decision
as positive and important, though quite belated10. Experts agree
with the general statement of the question, but express concern
that the coordination with the principles and norms of the
European education will pass on a formal instead of a substantial
level.
Minister of Education A. Radkov stated that joining the
Bologna process wouldn’t touch the ideological and substantial
framework of Belarusian education. But this is the main problem
causing the rapprochement of the systems of higher education of
Belarus and Europe. Despite the statistical achievements in the
sphere of higher education it will be very difficult to reach
conformity with the basic principles of the Bologna process. The
introduction of a two.tier system of preparation and credit test
indicators is only a question of time and technology.
The main problem consists in conformity of Belarusian
institutions of higher learning to the key principles of the European
education:
• guaranteeing of the necessary quality of higher education,
mutual recognition of qualifications and corresponding
documents in the sphere of higher education;
• attributing “the European perspective” to higher education
(orientation to the all<European values) and increase of appeal,
competitiveness of European education;
9 Silitsky V. Forum of civil society of the European Partnership: next steps:
www.belinstitute.eu.
10 See: http://belapan.com/archive/2010/02/08/eu_eu1928/
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• guaranteeing of academic freedom for universities;
• formation of a democratic scheme of managing education.
2010 was declared the Year of quality by the government. The
public discourse on this question is in most cases reduced to
discussing parameters of quality of education instead of
procedures and estimation methods. The biggest problem which
the Belarusian government will face at demonstrating the quality
of preparation at university is guaranteeing the independence of
international and national examination.
The quality problem starts to be realized by the officials not
only because it is fashionable now to do so, and due to the
requirements ordered by the Bologna declaration. The main
impulse comes from within – from the labor market. For
introducing innovations in production and carrying out
necessary reforms in the political and socio.cultural sphere,
experts and managers with complex qualification are required.
Professionals, who not only know the subject, but also capable
to lead negotiations, correctly analyze the situation, project and
program the future, and make operative and long.term
decisions.
Unfortunately, training of managers and economists is still
carried out according to the principles of natural science
(industrial) instead of humanitarian principles. So, in 2009 the
number of graduates at universities on economic specialties was
22,512 people, on humanitarian universities 2,660 (8.5 times less).
Gradual curtailment of humanitarian preparation and reduction
of its contents to ideological directions makes it hard to get people
who are able to perceive new ideas and carry out changes in the
country. The level of functional literacy of the population causes
as much anxiety.
The analysis of economic, demographic and political factors
shows that there are no good reasons for starting reform of higher
education in Belarus today.
Education and labor market: no changes
Official statistical data allow the conclusion that the number of
graduates of professional educational institutions badly
coordinates with the registered need for personnel on the labor
market. Basically the number of specialists with higher education
Society
162 	



increases and there is a need of personnel of working specialties
with lower qualifications.
According to the Ministry of Education among almost 1000
jobless graduates 83.4% are those who were trained at the expense
of off.budget means, out of them 350 are economists, 170 are
lawyers and 162 are teachers. But the demand of the population
for economic and juridical specialties at the entrance to universities
continues to remain high. Educational establishments, especially
universities, appear in the situation when on the one hand there is
a great demand for services of education from the population, but
on the other hand, the labor market cannot absorb the already
existing stock of qualified people in those directions where there
is demand for education.
The mismatch between the education system and the labor
market is partially overcome by the regulated enrollment in
institutions of higher learning and introduction of a placement
system after graduation. However at the expense of regulation of
enrolment of students it is not possible to strike a balance in a
number of branches. The planned educational system reacts to
the demand with a delay: while universities reconsider the plans
of enrollment and prepare new experts, employers partially
liquidate their deficiency in personnel at the expense of
investments into retraining the personnel in already their firms.
The question about the necessity of obligatory placement of
graduates was raised repeatedly and discussed in the mass.media
throughout 2009. The Ministry of Education is inclined to keep
this system in place. The norm of compensation of expenses of the
state on education if a graduate abandons the placement is actively
applied11. The Ministry of Education justifies this measure by
financial reasons, also mentioning its market nature. We adhere
to another point of view, estimating the obligatory placement of
graduates as means of strengthening the Soviet administrative
system. Besides, such actions of the ministry should be examined
for the purpose of observance of human rights.
The education system does not have time to react to the
requirements of the labor market, not only according to the
11 According to decree no. 1255 of the Council of Ministers of the Republic of
Belarus of 23 September 2006 “On reimbursement of expenses spent by
the state for training of specialists (workers)”.
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nomenclature and the list of necessary specialties and qualifi.
cations, but – and in particular – according to the quality of
preparation and rendered educational services. It is the qualifi.
cation of those who teach and not of those who study that grows
most slowly.
The “transitive” and stabilizing buffer between the educational
system and the labor market (services of employment and
personnel agencies, a state sector and informal economy) functions
simultaneously in different modes: planned and market – it also
allows to provide both state and private sectors of the economy
with personnel. Mixed with the independent efforts of citizens this
system allows to satisfy the requirement for personnel and to
stabilize supply and demand on the labor market.
The code on education:
innovation or return to the past?
In 2009 at the autumn session of the National Parliament in the
first reading the Education Code was passed. The government and
parliament presented the Code as an innovation in the system of
the educational law. It is hard to agree with this because of many
things. First, the Code project on education represents a
mechanically joint version of the already existing laws applying
to education.
Second, the principles and directions of the educational policy
are considerably narrowed and formalized. Thus the main
principles of the national.cultural nature of education and
humanizing aspect of education are excluded. A lot of terms and
definitions look emasculated and empty. In particular it concerns
the concepts of educational activity, educational standards and
educational programs, levels and steps of education. The principle
of programming the state educational policy is excluded from the
Code. The declared principle of the secular nature of education is
at the same time cancelled by a statement which says that the
educational establishment may conclude a contract on cooperation
with religious organizations in coordination with the government
and the president.
Third, the circle of subjects of education was considerably
narrowed. Basically the Code normalizes and regulates the activity
of teachers and students to the smallest details, but it practically
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does not regulate the activity of civil officers in the system of
education and other educators – scholars, methodologists, etc.
In the Code the activity of private educational institutions is not
identified in any way. The earlier operating principle of the
government management of education (in the version of the
Education Law of 1991) was paraphrased into the state.public
nature of management of education.
The activity of public organizations is actually limited to the
right of the state to define the degree of “politicization” of their
purposes. The list of the types of educational establishments is
rigidly limited and the mechanism of their licensing is set, which
actually stops the process of creation of educational institutes of a
new type in the sphere of informal and additional education.
Fourth, the article of the law about academic freedom and
economic independence of educational institutes was withdrawn.
The lack of these principles is replaced by the mechanisms of
administrative control and submission.
As a whole, the Code is a departmental document of instruction
and is directed at strengthening the position of the state managing
education and total control over the activity of educational
institutes of all types and levels. To see this Code as progressive,
directed at the creation of conditions for development and
reforming the education system is not possible.
The forecast
On the basis of the analysis of the events and tendencies of 2009 it
is possible to make the following forecast.
1. Educational establishments at all levels and stages will
continue to function in their former mode of submission and
control by the state. The state will fix the absolute priority in the
field of management and the ideological control both legislatively
and organizationally. The Education Code will be accepted by
parliament in the second reading irrespective of public
discussion, and the Ministry of Education will receive carte
blanche for realization of its plans concerning both informal
educational spheres, and supplying the labor market with
specialists of the corresponding qualification. But simultaneously
with getting powers this department will be fully responsible for
the condition of the educational system in Belarus. The question
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is who will ask the state about the realized policy in the sphere of
education.
2. Formation of new subjects of education will process slowly.
To wait for public initiatives “from below”, from the management
of educational institutes and the pedagogical public is useless.
Potentially the role of these subjects can be performed by the
independent expert communities and NGOs which under the
condition of coordination of actions, support of mass.media and
foreign partners, will be able to become stronger intellectually and
in resources.
3. It is possible to predict the entrance of Belarus into the
Bologna process and other European educational programs – both
in the frameworks of “Eastern partnership” and the programs of
the European Commission. How much these possibilities and
advantages will be used for the benefit of citizens or the start of
reforming processes depends on the degree of critical attitude of
the governmental structures towards their own actions and their
ability to start a dialogue with the representatives of civil society.
When such aims are absent – which is quite probable – the
advantages of Bologna process will be neutralized by the make.
believe, formal nature of its course under the local conditions.
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SCIENCE:
INNOVATION, IMITATION, DEGRADATION
Alexander Gritsanov
Summary
Throughout 2009 science, once a rather independent public institute of the
republic of Belarus experienced an evergrowing pressure of the country’s
leaders, who demanded that the results of the scientific activity become
innovative as soon as possible. Thus, the former scheme “the state gives
money and receives knowledge” (the former system of Belarusian science)
should be fast transformed to the model “knowledge turns into money” (the
ideal of “innovative science”) as a result of the depletion of budgetary
resources.
Where scientific institutions earlier focused on keeping up the appearance that
they can live up to the ambitions global players in the international scientific
community have, this notion is now quickly abandoned.
Tendencies:
• senior executives of academic institutions and organizations clearly perceive
the big shift in working environment, which is characterized by a systematic
transfer of research programs to selffinancing;
• realization of a program according to which science must be innovative,
preserving the inflexible total administration;
• leading positions in the export potential of Belarusian science were again
taken by offshore programming; the authorities undertook attempts to bring
manufacture of microelectronic accessories on the same level;
• the main problems of Belarusian science (ageing of staff and “brain drain”)
remain and seem to get worse.
Innovation
Execution of the state program
of innovative development1
On February 26, 2010 the board of the State committee on science
and technology (SCST) summed up the realization of the State
program of innovative development of Belarus (SPID) for 2007–
1 See: Official site of the Institute of Systemic Analysis of the NAC of Belarus
(2 March 2010): http://center.basnet.by/
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2010. According to the Plan of SPID realization, approved by decree
No 523 of the Council of Ministers of the Republic of Belarus of
April 25, 2007 “On the approval of the plan of realization of the
state program of innovative development of the Republic of Belarus
for 2007–2010”, 715 projects were carried out in 2009. From these,
more than 90 were included in the list of projects that are most
important for the economic development of Belarus and connected
with creating new hi.tech enterprises and manufacturers in the
country’s regions (2008–2010).
The general expenses for realization of the innovative projects
of SPID were BYR 7,479,272.7 million (USD 2.51 billion). The
innovative production volume created as a result of the realization
of all innovative projects is estimated at BYR 5,055,732 million (USD
1.70 billion). A number of 2,408 jobs have been created in the
country.
According to information from Belsat, in 2009 in the Republic
of Belarus:
• the share of new production in the total amount of industrial
production was 15.4 % (the plan of 2009 was to reach 17 %);
• the share of certified production in the total amount of
industrial production was 68.3% (the plan of 2009 was to reach
69.5%);
• the share of expenses for purchasing cars, equipment, vehicles,
tools and stock in total investments in fixed capital was 39.1%
(the plan of 2009 was to reach 48.5%).
During the accounting period 7 governmental customers did
not fulfill the working stages of 16 SPID projects. Among the
principal reasons for failure to implement the SPID tasks the
following were identified: the untimely implementation and
insufficient level of preparation of the draft budget
documentation; the duration of the procedure of carrying out
tenders; non.implementation by contractors of treaty
obligations on carrying out civil and construction works and
equipment delivery; insufficient numbers of staff at project
customers.
At the board meeting the chairman of SCST I.V. Voitov spoke
about some reasons of non.implementation of SPID tasks and
prospects of innovative development of the country for the next
five years. First of all he mentioned the insufficient level of
financing of the scientific and technical sphere that in 2009
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according to all resources was only 0.63% of GDP (budgetary
financing was 0.31%) whereas in the USA and Japan this indicator
is more than 3%. Europe is also planning to reach the same level in
the nearest future (currently 2.5% of GDP is spent for these
purposes there).
According to I.V. Voitov, a very weak applied research sector
also needs additional financing. Based on an optimal (at least 1.5 %
of GDP) investment of financial means it would be possible to get
a quite developed scientific and technological sector. According
to the chairman of SCST it is necessary to consider creating
consulting agencies at ministries, regional executive committees
and other state bodies and developing corresponding partnerships
and venture financing based on them.
Dynamics of the development of a national system
of intellectual property2
According to the position of SCST in the country, the positive
dynamics in the development of a national system of intellectual
property is seen as one of the key elements of the development of
innovative activity. In 2009 1,297 patents for inventions were
registered (growth compared with 2008 was 4%): 965 patents for
working models (+12%) and 230 patents for industrial samples
(+17%).
Nevertheless, in order to catch up with countries with higher
technological levels, the state should change the conditions of
small and medium sized private enterprises for selling
technologies, at the expense of the budget.
According to the director of the Republican center for
technology transfer Alexander Uspensky, “the income of
Germany from export of licenses and patents is estimated as USD
520 billion a year. Thus, the income from the sale of licenses and
patents per German citizen is USD 6,100. In the USA this indicator
is USD 3,200, in Japan USD 3,100, in Russia USD 750, and in
Belarus USD 30. It shows how we make use of our intellectual
property”.
2 See: Belarusian news 2010. 28 February: http://www.naviny.by/rubrics/
economic/2010/02/28/ic_articles_113_166844/
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The expert notes that in the USA approximately 30% of
technologies achieve commercial success, in the EU countries this
is 20%, in the CIS countries about 3%. “If to speak about Belarus,
the legislation does not stimulate development of innovative
business and prevents selling intellectual property”.
Uspensky believes that internationally some models of the
rights to intellectual property can be found which are developed
at the cost of the budget. The most promising model is the one in
which the rights to the developed intellectual product belong to
the organization which carries out the research. Such a model
applies to the USA, Japan, and Great Britain. The advantage of
this model is that the organization which possesses the rights to
the technology has an incentive to engage in commerce.
The second scheme presupposes that the right to the developed
intellectual product belongs to the state. Belarus works according
to this scheme. But “in Belarus the technology developed at the
expense of the budget can be transferred free of charge only to
state enterprises. Private enterprises or enterprises of mixed
ownership should pay for it and besides pay a lot. Approximately
it is as much as the amount of money that was spent for developing
the technology. But development of new technologies is always a
big risk. Therefore I do not know any private or mixed ownership
enterprise which would buy the technology developed at the
expense of the budget at a high price”.
However, many state enterprises do not show much activity
in development of new technologies, but it happens for other
reasons. “Monopolies and large enterprises all over the world
simply are not interested in modernization. They are fine the way
they are. The only stimulus for them is the competition for
commodity markets with similar national or foreign firms”.
Independent experts point out that this is the reason why
Belarusian industry faced an uncontrollable growth of warehouse
stocks last year.
“New technologies should be profitable, should open new
possibilities for producing competitive products, and contribute
to the improvement of the quality of life. Therefore, the state should
put their stake on small and medium.sized enterprises who take
more initiative. It is necessary to change the conditions of selling
technologies, developed at the expense of the budget, to business”,
Uspensky believes.
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Imitation
Updating the control mechanism of science3
Last year there was a redistribution of power between the National
Academy of Sciences (NAS) of Belarus and the State Committee
on Science and Technology. The corresponding norms are to be
found in Decree No 9, signed on August 4, 2009 by the head of
state “On modification and additions to Presidential Decree No 7
of March 5, 2002”.
The organization and coordination of all scientific research
(except for scientific and technical programs), irrespective of the
fact what department their staff belong to, and also the
organization and conducting state scientific research fall within
the jurisdiction of the NAS. The Presidium of the NAS is
authorized to realize these tasks. It is also responsible for the
interdepartmental council on coordination of fundamental and
applied research, which used to work under the National
Academy of Sciences on public principles.
The basic function of SCST is to carry out state policy in the
innovative sphere within the framework of which the monitoring
of global industrial tendencies will be conducted. Supported by
analysis, they work out recommendations concerning the
formation of an innovative infrastructure and creation of hi.tech
manufacturers. The control function over performance of scientific
and technical programs and adoption of research results,
experimental design and experimental technological work has
remained at SCST.
Rendering IT Services
as an unattainable standard for
the rest of applied science4
According to Forbes, in 2008.2009 the income from IT services
export in Belarus was more than USD 35 per capita on a
population of less than 10 million, having increased throughout
the last three years by 75%. (In India this indicator was at the
3 BelTA. 2009. 6 August.
4 Press service of the Park of High Technology, 11 August, 2009.
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level of USD 40 per capita on a population of more than 1.1 billion,
in Russia this was nearly USD 18, in China USD 16, in Ukraine
USD 12.) Belarusian companies are among the largest service
providers of offshore programming in Eastern Europe (in the
Czech Republic IT services export brings in more than USD 35
per capita a year).
The majority of large Belarusian IT companies are focused
on exporting their services. As predicted by 2011 the volume of
Belarusian export of computer and information services will
have considerably grown, having reached (or even having
surpassed) the present Indian per capita level, but its share in
the general structure of services export will remain quite low –
about 4%.
Games of lobbies
In the middle of 2009 lobbying efforts of some industrial structures5
for realizing “scientific.industrial, technical implementation
innovative park Integral PHT No 2” proceeded. The park of high
technology No 2 aims to bring Belarusian manufacturers of
microelectronic components under one roof.
The necessity to create techno park “Integral”, which carries
the name of the initiator of this project – Research and Production
Corporation “Integral”, comes from the legislative limitation of
types of activity which can be interesting for manufacturers of
microelectronic components within the existing Park of high
technology. Actually today the preferential mode of PHT does not
extend to IT companies.
The position of PHT No 2 became less certain after the scandal
on releasing imitated products at two out of six enterprises of PHT
”Integral”, “Tsvetotron” and “Kamerton”6, and also after the hard
criticism of the President of Belarus for failure of the program on
introduction of submicroscopic manufacturing at “Integral” for
which BYR 300 billion (USD 100 million) of state resources was
devoted.7
5 Datebook, 25 August, 2009.
6 “SB – Belarus Today”, 10 February, 2010.
7 “SB – Belarus Today”, 13 November, 2009.
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Degradation
Financing reduction
According to the estimations of economist A. Luchenok8 in
2008, BYR 2 trillion (USD 671 million) was spent on the government
program of innovative development and in 2009 only BYR 700
million (USD 235 million) was assigned. While in 1997 the
budgetary component of science.related expenditures was equal
to 0.48%, in 2008 it decreased to 0.35%. In 2010 nearly BYR 500
billion (USD 168 million) was added to the budget to finance
science.9
When expressed in terms of scientific staff, before the crisis in
Belarus 10 times less funds for research and development was
allocated than in Slovenia, and 7.8 times less than in the Czech
Republic. Estonia invested 5 times as much as Belarus, and
Lithuania 3 times as much.
Remaining administration and
backwardness10
After a month when presidential decree No 123 “On some
measures on stimulation of innovative activity in Belarus” came
into effect on March 9, 2009 its fundamental flaws became obvious.
In the West 80% of enterprises meet the criteria of being
”innovatively active”. In Belarus this indicator is only 18%. The
level of commercialization of the results of research and
development according to the criterion of the number of successful
projects in EU is 20%, in the USA this number is 30%. In Belarus,
this number is approximately 1%.
The material base of scientific organizations is worn out. A third
of buildings and facilities belonging to them are deteriorated for
over 60%, and half of them show 40% deterioration. In Belarus
available scientific equipment per researcher is ten times smaller
than in developed countries. More than 60% of equipment is over
15 years old, although they should not be used any longer after
8 www.luchenok.com.
9 BelTA. 2009, 18 December.
10 Yakovlev Yu. Innovative way of development of Belarus – cramming
instead of inventions // AFN.by. 2009, 6 April.
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3–5 years of operation. The share of saved up amortization of the
active part of production assets reached 85% at the average annual
ratio of modernization of only 5%.
The main thing holding back progress is the idle chain between
the state, the innovator and the enterprise.
Staff training
In 2009 the higher certifying commission (HCC) of Belarus
conferred a scientific degree on 624 applicants, according to HCC
chairman A. Afanasyev at a press conference in Minsk on
February 1011. According to him, terminal degrees were conferred
on 51 people and doctorates were conferred on 573 people. The
mean age of applicants receiving a terminal degree was 49.8
years; the mean age of applicants who received doctorates was
33 years.
Afanasyev noted that by quantity of scientific degrees awarded
in 2009 the first place is occupied by engineering science (17.6%),
then medicine (16.5%), physical and mathematical (9.6%),
agricultural (7.5%), biological (7.1%) and historical (6.6%) sciences.
The HCC chairman also said that 11% of dissertations considered
by the HCC were rejected. The biggest number of rejected works
concerns the sphere of philological (15.6%), technical (13%) and
agricultural (10.4%) sciences. According to Afanasyev in 2009 the
academic status of professor was given to 41 applicants, that of
senior lecturer to 532 people.
As before, young persons are in great demand from Belarusian
institutions of higher education. According to statistics12 in the
Belarusian State University there are 27 scholars under 50 with a
terminal degree and only 4 persons are under 40. The mean age of
workers in the BSU (including support staff) ranges from 40 to 55.
Conclusion
The following conclusions can be drawn:
1. Applied research in Belarus is in a grave condition, which
will not quickly improve in the light of the economic crisis. For
11 TUT.BY: http://news.tut.by/160600.html
12 BelTA, 24 September, 2009.
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scientific institutions the only real possibility to survive are
investments and financing of research from the outside.
2. Rearrangement of functions and responsibilities among
various state bodies and academic science reduced the influence
of academic functionaries on budgetary financing.
3. The system of preparing postgraduate students and doctoral
candidates (in the light of stricter criteria for defending
dissertations) definitively became a battle ground for various
academic clans (the trend in 2008 continued in full strength).
4. The broadening economic crisis reinforced existing trends.
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RELIGIOUS SPHERE
DEVELOPMENT IN BELARUS:
BETWEEN THE POPE AND THE PATRIARCH
Natallia Vasilevich
Summary
The most significant events of 2009 were the election of the new Patriarch of
the Russian Orthodox Church and his visit to Belarus and President
Lukashenko’s meeting with the Pope in the Vatican. Compared to the previous
year, after the new Patriarch had been elected, the relations between the
Belarusian regime and Belarusian Orthodox Church (the BOC) are cooling; the
distance between the BOC and the Russian Orthodox Church (the ROC) is
growing. On the contrary, relations with the Roman Catholic Church (the RCC)
are growing livelier. Cooperation with main denominations is becoming the
main tool of creating “a favorable image of Belarus on the international stage.”
Nevertheless, cases regarding freedom of conscience resound in the
denomination sphere. Apart from traditional forms of pressure, there are
celebrated cases when believers are prosecuted under the criminal code for
refusal to take arms and demands of alternative military service.
The longawaited alterations to the law on freedom of conscience were not
adopted during the year; meanwhile the For Freedom of Religion initiative has
developed an alternative draft law. The attempts to register the Belarusian
Christian Democracy Party (the BCD) have been unsuccessful so far, but its
relations with Belarusian religious denominations are growing livelier.
Tendencies:
• further pressure on the religious sphere – persecution of certain religious
organizations and foreign citizens;
• the regime’s policy aimed at closer relations with the Vatican is dominating
the social sphere, but the president is not making any real concessions;
• relations with the Belarusian Orthodox Church and its leaders in Moscow
are cooling;
• the BCD is negotiating with religious denominations, especially with the
Catholic and Orthodox Churches, but it is most influential among protestants,
which determines the specific character of the political discourse.
General information
The most significant events of 2009 were the election of the new
Patriarch of the Russian Orthodox Church and his visit to Belarus
and President Lukashenko’s meeting with the Pope in the Vatican.
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These events were fully covered in the media, but being
extraordinary ones, they cannot give the picture of the whole
routine and fundamental tendencies in the sphere of religion.
The 2009 census traditionally included no questions about
religious affiliation, which is why there is no possibility to verify
the official data on the number of believers of this or that particular
denomination. Commissioner for Religious and Ethnic Affairs
Leonid Gulyako noted that under paragraph 5 of the law of the
Republic of Belarus on freedom of conscience and religious
organizations, “nobody has to give information about their attitude
to religion and cannot be forced to express his attitude to religion,
to practice religion, or to take or not to take part in activities of
religious organizations”1.
Although the same provision referring to national identity is
stipulated in the law on national minorities in the Republic of
Belarus2, the census questionnaire contained a question about
nationality. Having no supportive data, the functionary nevertheless
claims that 85% of believers call themselves Orthodox Christian
while only 12% call themselves Catholic. L. Gulyako’s opinion is
that the “mentality of Belarusians is balanced in this respect.”3
Summing up the results of the ethno.confessional sphere in
2009, L. Gulyako pointed out that in that year no new religious
denomination has been registered. As of January 1, 2010 Belarus
totals 25 registered religious denominations including 3263
religious organizations, among which “the Belarusian Orthodox
Church is considered by many the spiritual leader.”4 It counts 1509
communities, including 36 established in 2009, which is 15% less
compared to those in 2008.5
As for the Roman Catholic Church, Gulyako stated that “the
role of the ROC in Belarusian social life is growing.”6 As of January
1, 2010 there were 470 communities of this denomination, 3 of them
registered in 2009, which is three times less compared to 20087.
The tendencies in other denominations were not covered.
1 http://churchby.info/bel/409/
2 http://www.levonevski.net/pravo/razdel2/num3/2d350.html.
3 Ibid.
4 http://churchby.info/rus/news/2010/01/15.2/
5 http://www.belta.by/ru/print?id=324661.
6 http://churchby.info/rus/news/2010/01/15.2/
7 http://www.belta.by/ru/print?id=324661.
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The functionary draws the conclusion that in 2009 the state
was cooperating with the leading confession more closely with the
purpose to strengthen stability in society and secure a positive
image of Belarus on the world stage, an image of a country where
different religious and ethnical groups co.exist peacefully8. We
can infer that “to create a positive image of Belarus on the world
stage” is turning into one of the leading strategies of the Belarusian
regime, including the sphere of religion; or even predominantly
in this sphere.
The main role in this strategy is assigned to the Catholic
Church, the relations with which were developing in this very
framework: among others we can count such events as Cardinal
Tercisio Bertone’s visit to Belarus in 2008; A. Lukashenko’s visit
to the Vatican (this was his first official visit after visa sanctions
had been lifted, which is highly symbolic); preparation of the
concordat; A. Lukashenko’s attempt to organize a meeting
between the Moscow Patriarch and the Pope.
But the regime’s actions did not contribute to a positive image.
One way or another the confessional sphere was shaken by cases
concerning freedom of conscience: Baptists were fined for misuse
of buildings (the evangelist Baptists’s Transfiguration church,
Vitebsk region); Jehovah’s Witnesses (Mogilev region)9, New
Generation (Baranovichi)10, and minister Iryna Marshalkouskaya.
Gryk (Chauss district, Mogilev region)11 received a fine for
unauthorized religious activities. Two Catholic priests, Edward
Smaga and Antoni Bankouski (both Polish citizens), were denied
prolongation of visas for religious activities; the case with the
building of the New Life Church12 is still developing.
Apart from traditional forms of pressure, there were cases when
believers were prosecuted under the criminal code for refusal to
take arms and demands of alternative military service: these were
the cases of Dmitri Smyk (Jehovah’s Witnesses, Gomel)13 in
November and Ivan Mokhailov (Messianic Jews, Minsk)14 in
8 http://churchby.info/rus/news/2010/01/15.2/
9 http://churchby.info/rus/news/2009/10/20.1/
10 http://www.forum18.org/Archive.php?article_id=1327.
11 http://www.prochurch.info/index.php/news/more/15904.
12 http://churchby.info/bel/431/
13 http://www.euramost.org/index.php?artc=13025.
14 http://spring96.org/be/news/32013/
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December. We can observe the tendency that over the last years
military service has been used as a repressive mechanism.
President Alexander Lukashenko’s repressive religious
policies remain unchanged, Forum 18 finds in its survey analysis
of freedom of religion or belief in Belarus. The analysts of “Forum
18” note that “legal” restrictions include: requiring all religious
activity by groups to have state permission, and be limited to one
geographical area; barring meetings for worship or other religious
activity in private homes that are either regular or large scale;
requiring all places of worship to be state.approved; and routinely
expelling both Catholic and Protestant foreign religious workers15.
Similar opinion on the religious sphere in Belarus is expressed by
the U.S. Department of State in its annual human rights report16
and international religious freedom report17.
European institutions also express their concern for the
situation in Belarus: in two resolutions of the European Parliament,
in January and in December 2009, freedom of conscience is still
considered a hot issue. But the authorities managed to reduce this
issue to single instances of persecution and to avert attacks on the
key instrument of religious policy, i.e. the law of the Republic of
Belarus on freedom of conscience and religious organizations.
Legislation and institutions
In 2008 50,000 signatures were collected to alter or amend
Belarusian legislation on religion, because the law adopted in 2002
was regarded as the basis for the repressive state policy; these
signatures were also sent to European institutions. In January 2009
the European Parliament adopted a resolution on the EU strategy
towards Belarus, which contains a separate paragraph calling on
Belarusian authorities “to respect freedom of religion” and
condemning the fact that “European citizens, including priests,
are being repeatedly expelled from Belarus, which is contrary to
the confidence.building process with the EU.”18
15 http://www.forum18.org/Archive.php?article_id=1311.
16 http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2009/eur/136021.htm/
17 http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/irf/2009/127300.htm.
18 http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=.//EP//
TEXT+TA+P6.TA.2009.0027+0+DOC+XML+V0//EN&language=
EN.
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Therefore, for European institutions the “facts” of violation of
human rights for freedom of religion are the problem, not violation
of the law. In December 2009 the European Parliament’s resolution
on Belarus, paragraph 15 (9 conditions for the sanctions to be
completely lifted and for full re.engagement with Belarus)
included the following requirement: “safeguarding freedom of
religion for religious denominations other than the Orthodox
Church, in particular to let New Life Church operate freely.”19
As we see, European institutions do not regard the law, by
which all confessions, Orthodox and non.Orthodox, traditional and
non.traditional exist as the root problem. It is the enforcement
practice that causes problems. Now they do not draw attention to
the law, nor to the norms of the resolution of the Council of
Ministers of the Republic of Belarus of January 30, 2008 № 123
that regulates invitation of foreign citizens and stateless persons
to the Republic of Belarus for engaging in religious activities, and
these are regulatory documents for the religious sphere. Such
position of Europe allows the Belarusian regime to solve the issue
of one religious organization favorably thus complying with the
demands of the European Parliament.
Although the law on freedom of conscience was changed the
long.awaited alterations were not adopted. Alterations to the law
of the Republic of Belarus on freedom of conscience and religious
organizations parts 17 and 18 were insignificant and referred to
the procedure of registration of religious communities and
associations. The law on alterations to the laws № 109.3 passed
the second reading on December 11, 2009 and was signed on
January 4, 2010. Meanwhile, the For Freedom of Religion initiative
developed an alternative law20, without the preamble of the present
version and without some repressive norms hampering religious
organizations activities.
On July 8, 2009 the founding meeting of the Civil Council on
Morality marked the beginning of the Council’s functioning.21 The
initiators of the Council were the Belarusian Orthodox Church and
the official Writers’ Union led by Mikhail Charginets. Heads of
19 http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?type=TA&reference
=P7.TA.2009.0117&language=EN&ring=P7.RC.2009.0248.
20 http://forreligiousfreedom.info/documents/proekt.zakona.htm.
21 http://www.belta.by/ru/belta_news?id=393309.
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the Orthodox, Catholic, Lutheran, Jewish and Muslim confessions
(i.e. mentioned in the preamble to the law on religions) became
members of the Council. It was assumed that the Council would
adopt resolutions, recommendations, appeals to broadcasting
companies, periodicals, etc. But during 2009 there was not a single
case in which the Council took part in or influenced any decision
making.
On March 27, Metropolitan Filaret spoke at the meeting of
the Synod of the Belarusian Orthodox Church with the president
saying that “the Church calls upon the authorities to introduce
efficient internet.regulation legislation, similar to that of some
countries, for example, China, because this problem is extremely
serious.”22 The ordinance № 60 On Enhancement Measures of
Usage of the National Segment of the Internet was adopted on
February 1, 2010 and will come into force in summer 2010. The
state bodies abstained from imitating the “Chinese experience”,
but regulations of this sphere promise to be more stringent.
The authorities declined the proposal of the Belarusian
Orthodox Church to initiate religious education in schools in any
possible form despite that the Church spared no effort. The
question of religious education was raised at the meeting of the
Synod with the president. The Russian archpriest Andrei Kuraev,
author of a course of Orthodox culture for schoolchildren, visited
Belarus to promote religious education. The priest accompanied
the Russian Patriarch during his visit to Belarus and held a number
of meetings with pedagogical staff to prepare the ground for a
possible introduction of such course in Belarus. But on October 5
the House of Representatives passed the first read of the Code of
Education23, which became the kiss of death for these plans.
Belarusian Orthodox Church:
the new Patriarch
The main highlight for the Moscow Patriarchate of 2009 was the
assembly of the Local Council of the Russian Orthodox Church to
elect the new Patriarch of Moscow. Metropolitan Filaret of Minsk
and Slutsk, as had been predicted during the previous decade,
22 http://churchby.info/bel/288/
23 http://house.gov.by/images/page16/4proekt_kodeksa3sessija2.doc.
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became one of the candidates to the throne. But being aged and
sickly, he decided not to compete and withdrew his candidacy.
On January 27, 2009 Metropolitan Kirill (Gundyaev) was
elected Patriarch. Belarus became one of the first countries of the
“canonical territory” to which he paid visit. On the eve of the visit
the public was considering some topical issues: 1) will the new
Patriarch with his reputation for being a “philocatholicist” (“loving
Catholics”) approve of the Pope’s visit to Belarus?24 2) will the
Belarusian Orthodox Church gain wider autonomy in the Moscow
Patriarchate? 3) how will the relations between the Belarusian
regime and the Russian Orthodox Church develop? The first year
of Kirill’s primacy let us assume possible answers to these
questions.
President Lukashenko might have fallen victim of the rumors
about Patriarch Kirill’s “pro.Catholic” stance and imagined himself
to be in a position to make Belarus the meeting point of the Pope
and Patriarch Kirill. He initiated several meetings with the
Patriarch. But the Patriarch and the Russian Orthodox Church
dealt shortly with the president and gave him to understand that
the Moscow Patriarchate requires no mediation25 and can negotiate
with the Vatican directly26. Lukashenko’s attempt to become the
ROC’s ambassador of peace was decisively repulsed and he had
to backtrack27.This was as if old stereotypes broke: the new
Patriarch is independent and confident; he asks the president for
nothing and gives nothing back. Is that the “new guideline for
church.state relations”, of which the Patriarch spoke?
Anyway, it was the first time that the president ignored the
Easter mass at the Holy Spirit Cathedral where he had been
traditionally awaited. And after just a few days he visited the
Vatican. His relations with Patriarch Kirill seem to be falling apart.
These discrepancies became even more evident during the
Patriarch’s visit to Belarus in September.
Firstly, during his speech at the Palace of the Republic the
Patriarch voiced the geopolitical project “Russian world”, an
association of Russia, Ukraine, Belarus, and Moldova as an
24 http://www.svaboda.org/content/transcript/1376030.html.
25 http://news.tut.by/136668.html.
26 http://churchby.info/rus/news/2009/11/15.2/
27 http://churchby.info/rus/news/2009/06/27.2/
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Orthodox civilization based on Orthodox values. The project was
presented as an opposite to that of President Lukashenko’s and
Belarusian state ideology that would compromise the Pope’s visit
and his meeting with the Patriarch in Belarus, so that Belarus would
become a bridge between the West and Russia. For the Patriarch
Belarus is not a bridge but a part of the “Russian world”.
Secondly, from the stage of the Palace of the Republic, the most
official place in Belarus, the Patriarch announced that Kurapaty is
one of the symbols of Belarus. Kurapaty is the place feared by the
regime, the authorities even ordered to destroy the chapel of the
BOC blessed by the deceased Patriarch Alexy II during his visit to
Belarus; the Belarusian exarchate suppresses this fact. The
Patriarch showed both the Belarusian exarchate and the president
what model of church.state relations he appreciates. This model
does not include formal declarations of cooperation, the object of
pride of the Belarusian Church and the regime, formal ones
because the Orthodox religion is not taught at schools, academic
degrees are not recognized, the Church receives no real financial
help (the allotted funding for certain projects are insignificant even
for Belarusian reality).
President Lukashenko ignored not only the Easter mass but
the Patriarch’s speech at the Palace of the Republic as well. Even
having been decisively repulsed by the ROC the president has no
doubt as for the possible meeting of the Pope and the Patriarch28.
Although the tone of his statements about his moderation in this
process has altered, he still keeps touching upon this issue. To
sum up, the new Patriarch’s stance on issues of the Pope’s visit to
Belarus and church.state relations is quite definite and clear.
Let us consider the issue of autonomy of the Belarusian
Orthodox Church. Firstly, Lukashenko set his meetings with the
Patriarch without knowledge of the Belarusian exarchate.
Secondly, if we analyze the issues raised by Metropolitan Filaret
during the meeting of the Synod with the president (Internet
regulation, the Council on Morality, edition of the New Testament
of Slutsk, “the moral.spiritual component in Humanities”)29 it
convinces us that president managed to buy the exarchate off with
the Council on Morality, which has no real power: the Council’s
28 http://churchby.info/rus/news/2009/11/29.1/
29 http://churchby.info/rus/news/2009/03/30.1/
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attempt to forbid the concert of Rammstein in Minsk failed; the
New Testament of Slutsk was printed in 500 copies.
The authorities accepted the proposal on Internet regulation;
probably it was the authorities who induced the Belarusian
Orthodox Church to come out with this proposal. As for the main
question, Orthodox education at schools, it is still unresolved.
Moreover, previous negotiations about introduction of a special
subject were reduced to the issue of “the moral.spiritual
component in Humanities”30. The issue of PhD theses recognition
is also unresolved.
After election of the new Patriarch, relations of the Belarusian
Orthodox Church and the centre in Moscow have also changed.
Patriarch Kirill’s strategy nullifies speculations about wider
autonomy for the BOC. We can even talk about the tendency of
narrowing autonomy. The sharp and undiplomatic position of the
Patriarch towards President Lukashenko actually nullifies all
servile efforts of the BOC to achieve those minor goals that have
already been achieved. As a result, relations between the
Belarusian regime and the BOC are cooling. On the one side, there
are clerics of the BOC, used either to support any proposal from
the authorities or keep silent; on the other side, there is the
Patriarch with his open and clear position. This Gordian knot, if
resoled, may develop into two directions: either the BOC becomes
less dependent on the Russian Orthodox Church, if it continues
its compromising policy towards the Belarusian regime; or the BOC
becomes less dependent on the Belarusian regime, if it chooses
solidarity with the political strategy of the ROC.
A possible answer to this question may be found in the
pastoral letter of the Synod of the Belarusian Orthodox Church
to the Patriarch31. If we compare this letter to a similar one in
2008 issued on the occasion of the late Alexy’s II visit to Belarus,
which was greeted with nostalgia for the USSR and rhetoric of
the Holy Triune Rus’, the letter to Patriarch Kirill also contained
the discourse of the Holy Rus’ and unity, but with less West.
Russian rhetoric. On the contrary, the Synod of the BOC
mentioned visits of the Patriarchs of Constantinople and
Jerusalem, which took place quite a long time ago, and the
30 http://www.president.gov.by/press69021.print.html.
31 http://www.church.by/resource/Dir0301/Dir0302/Page2469.html.
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Patriarch of Antioch visit on the 1000th anniversary of the Baptism
of Russia, which probably was meant to point out that Belarus
belongs to the global Orthodoxy in the first place, and, only in
the second place, to the Russian Orthodoxy. The cross of St
Euphrosinia of Polatsk was also mentioned as the “sword to
protect the state dignity of Belarus”.
Or, we could try to infer the answer from another incident,
when the Belarusian Orthodox Church in the person of
archimandrite Alexy Shinkevich supported the organizational
committee to establish the Belarusian Christian Democracy Party
and protested against the Belarusian TV1 that broadcasted a
defamatory video report about this movement involving
comments of representatives of different denominations.
Archimandrite Alexy called the video “sponsored”32, which in
Belarusian society where the Belarusian TV1 is the voice of the
regime and the opposition, including the BCD, is by definition
embodiment of the evil, such statements could be qualified as
heroic and even undermining the constitutional order. The video
about the BCD was broadcasted together with reports about
Patriarch Kirill’s visit and the archimandrite’s reaction followed
it immediately. Probably, this brave statement was inspired by
the Patriarch’s open speech.
Roman Catholic Church: is the Pope coming?
In 2009 the Roman Catholic Church celebrated the 20th anniversary
of its renaissance. September 29, 1989, observance day of Saint
Michael the Archangel, is celebrated as renewal of the RCC’s
service in Belarus.33 All religious events in 2009 were happening
in the context of two questions: firstly, if the “turn” of the
Belarusian regime to the Catholic Church will prove fruitful,
foremost, if the Pope will accept Lukashenko’s invitation and visit
Belarus in the nearest future; secondly, if Belarus and Vatican sign
the concordat, an agreement on cooperation.
Already during Vatican Secretary of State Cardinal Tercisio
Bertone’s visit to Belarus in summer 2008, Lukashenko made an
attempt to invite the Pope to Belarus. Mid.April 2009 the president
32 http://churchby.info/rus/news/2009/10/03.1/
33 http://churchby.info/rus/news/2009/09/29.1/
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met head of the Catholic Church in Belarus Metropolitan Tadeush
Kondrusevich34 and the news that Lukashenko is to visit Vatican
broke after less than 2 days.
It is hard to judge if the Belarusian president was welcome in
the Vatican, but an audience with the Pope was a symbolic event
for Lukashenko. Lukashenko needs the Pope to enlarge his
symbolic assets both inside the country and outside it. Two facts
should be taken into account: firstly, that it was a private audience,
one of many the Pope has during each day. Lukashenko spared no
effort to change the audience’s status, but the Vatican’s official
press.release was rather bare.35 Secondly, Alexander Lukashenko
made another attempt to become a peace maker, and in the name
of the Pope announced that the latter meant to meet Patriarch Kirill
in the nearest future.36 But this was nothing but bluffing, make.
believe of improvement of relations with the Roman Catholic
Church.
The next step in the development of these relations would
be the Pope’s visit to Belarus and signing the concordat. If in
2010 neither the Pope visits Belarus nor the concordat is signed,
all the president’s efforts will come to nothing. Even if the media
occasionally report about a possible meeting of the Pope and
the Patriarch of Moscow, it does not mean that the meeting will
take place in Belarus. Leaders of the Roman Catholic Church
during their visit ad lumina also passed the Pope an invitation
to visit Belarus, but the possibility of such a visit looks bleak,
the more so because the process of signing the concordat is
losing speed.
As for the concordat itself, after the visit to the Vatican the
Belarusian side made loud statements that the document was ready
and just about to be signed. Early in June Commissioner for
Religious and Ethnic Affairs Leonid Gulyako said that “Cardinal
Tercisio Bertone would visit Belarus before mid.2009 and that
during that visit an agreement between the Vatican and Belarus
was to be signed.”37 But none of the Vatican’s officials visited
Belarus in 2009. Neither the Pope nor even the Vatican’s Secretary
34 http://churchby.info/rus/news/2009/04/14.1/
35 http://churchby.info/bel/news/2009/04/27.1/
36 http://churchby.info/rus/news/2009/04/29.1/
37 http://churchby.info/rus/news/2009/05/08.1/
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of State came to Belarus. The prepared concordat was not signed,
either. Only Metropolitan Tadeush Kondrusevich makes
occasional remarks that there have been a lot of talks about the
concordat, but nothing happens.38 Among all Vatican
functionaries, only Walter Kasper, President of the Pontifical
Council for Promoting Christian Unity and thus involved in
Catholic.Orthodox relations, visited Belarus at the end of the year.
This could have furthered the issue of the meeting between the
Pope and the Patriarch. But nothing happened.
Nevertheless, we can state that the regime won in its relations
with the RCC by promising the Pope’s visit and signing the
concordat: despite its connection with Poland and the Polish
national issue, the Roman Catholic Church in Belarus maintained
neutrality in the conflict with the unregistered Union of Poles in
Belarus (led by Andїelika Borys). It is uncertain how long the
regime will go on keeping the RCC in this neutrality. The
authorities continue persecution of Roman Catholic priests who
are Polish citizens and deny visas to Edward Smaga and Antoni
Bankouski39.
The Greek Catholic Church
The life of the Belarusian Greek Catholic Church (the BGCC) in
2009 was centered around two issues: to acquire its own church
in Minsk (this issue is discussed with the authorities) and to have
its own bishop in Belarus (this question is negotiated with the
Catholic Church leaders). Though being unprivileged, the Greek
Catholic Church is rallying national intelligentsia around itself,
who mid.April 2009 sent a petition to the president asking to
consider the possibility of building a church on the territory of
the former Holy Spirit Church which is currently being
reconstructed for the Children’s Philharmonic and pointing out
that for 19 years since the renewal of the BGCC its believers have
not received permission to build their own church in Minsk. But
they received a negative answer40, just after the president had
returned from the Vatican.
38 http://churchby.info/bel/238/
39 http://churchby.info/bel/431/
40 http://churchby.info/rus/news/2009/06/17.1/
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The Vatican became the addressee of another letter of the
Belarusian Greek Catholics. This time it was written by Greek
Catholic priests and it concerned the canonical structure of the
BGCC41. But the answer has not been received yet.
If both wishes come true: the Greek Catholics have their own
bishop appointed (it means they will be a fully canonical church
structure) and receive their own church, it might strengthen its
positions, at least among the youth and nationally oriented
intelligentsia. Within the area of Minsk the Greek Catholic Church
could compete with the Roman Catholic and Orthodox Churches
or even become an alternative to them. Celebrating Liturgy in
Belarusian and thus uniting national intelligentsia, the BGCC is
another danger to the authorities who will hardly allow it to
develop.
Alternative Orthodoxy
In the status of a delegate to the Fifth Congress of the Belarusians
of the World, Bishop Sviataslau Login, leader of the Belarusian
Autocephalous Orthodox Church (the BAOC) visited Minsk,
where he, among other activities, consecrated a new priest for the
BAOC in Belarus. But further information about the priest’s name
or his service is not available. Meanwhile, there is less activity
within the Belarusian (People’s) Autocephalous Orthodox Church,
namely of the priest Yury Akalovich who had been the “face” of
Belarusian opposition for a long time.
The development of Belarusian alternative Orthodoxy could
be stimulated by events in Ukraine, particularly the fact that the
Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church (led by Metropolitan
Methodius Kudriakov) applied to the Patriarchate of Constan.
tinople for membership. The delegation of the Constantinople
Patriarchate is to visit Ukraine.42 But it is still too early to speak
about Constantinople’s interference into Ukrainian affairs. The
Fourth Pan.Orthodox Consultations in Chambesy (Switzerland)
allow us to state that relations between the Patriarchates of
Constantinople and of Moscow are improving and Ukraine will
not become the arena of their confrontation. As for the
41 http://carkva.gazeta.org/data/63/index.php?id=8.2.php.
42 http://churchby.info/rus/news/2009/09/30.1/
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Constantinople Orthodoxy, there is a Belarusian initiative
alternative both to the BAOC and the BOC: the Greek Orthodox
movement of Belarus “Belarusians for the Patriarchate of
Constantinople”43 led by Bishop Vasil Kastsiuk. But this movement
is quite marginal and conflicting, even Kastsiuk’s fellow co.
member Reverend Siarzhuk Gorbik left it.44
Belarusian Christian Democracy
As was predicted in the forecast for 2009, this year became year of
the Belarusian Christian Democracy Party. There were two
founding congresses of the party during the year but it still has
not been registered. Two significant events to do with the activities
of the BCD in the religious sphere in 2009 should be mentioned.
One had to do with the feast in Budslau, where security arrested
some BCD activists for distributing the Krynitsa (“A spring”)
bulletin. Another was the above mentioned video report about the
BCD in the Belarusian TV1 “Panorama”, in which they broadcasted
negative references of different religious figures about activities
of this party. This program was condemned by a Belarusian
Orthodox Church official.
As for the first incident, the BCD activists were intercepted by
ordinary Catholic churchgoers who formed the security. This fact
impelled Paval Seviarynets to issue an open letter to Metropolitan
Tadeush Kondrusevich45. The latter had to express quite a
moderate opinion of the BCD activities in his response.46
Nevertheless, the party enjoys very little popularity among
Catholics, their percentage in the party is the lowest (about 11–
13%47), although Catholics are traditionally regarded as a more
nationally oriented confession in Belarus. A lot of issues of the
BCD’s social ethics are similar to those of the RCC. Even that fact
that some priests openly support the BCD does not add to the
party’s authority among Catholics.
43 http://belpat.narod.ru.
44 Ibid.
45 http://sieviarynets.net/index.php?newsid=135.
46 http://old.bchd.info/modules.php?name=News&file=view&news_id
=3507.
47 The information was voiced at the party convention.
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The BCD makes attempts to count Orthodox believers to its
supporters, saying that the majority of the party members belong
to this denomination. But it is very difficult to evaluate the degree
of the BCD’s authority among the Orthodox because there is no
open support. We must bear in mind that in September 2009 a
significant event, mentioned in the part about the Orthodox
Church, happened. Archimandrite Alexy Shinkevich declared that
the Belarusian Orthodox Church has nothing to do with the
Belarusian TV1 and the official anti.BCD propaganda48. But
nevertheless we cannot say that the BOC supports the BCD. The
video in the Panorama program was meant to drive off the BCD’s
social basis, Christian believers, but the BCD benefited from
archimandrite Alexy Shinkevich’s advocacy.
We should note that if the BCD continues regarding this kind
of advocacy on the part of the Roman Catholic Church and the
Belarusian Orthodox Church as proof that both Churches support
it, it could happen that supportive comments on the BCD from the
clerics may cease.
Forecast
It is intended that in 2010 the Pope visits Belarus and the concordat
with the Roman Catholic Church is signed. These plans will be
developed but it is most likely that neither of them will be carried
out. They will be point of the greatest public attention and the
regime will try to make use of this fact.
As for the Orthodox Church, its relations with the Belarusian
regime will remain tense. If Lukashenko does not review his
strategy and makes no concessions in different issues, including
less attention to the Catholics and introduction of the course of
basics of the Orthodox culture in schools, which has already been
developed and is lobbied by the Belarusian exarchate together with
the Ministry of Education49, then relations may worsen. Moreover,
there might be some staff changes if the Belarusian exarchate; it
may become less autonomous from Moscow.
During 2010 the BCD will continue its work, first of all with
different religious confessions. It might possibly lead to more
48 http://churchby.info/rus/news/2009/10/03.1/
49 http://www.nn.by/index.php?c=ar&i=34744
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serious pressure on those associations that will cooperate with this
party.
Within the regulatory framework and law enforcement policy
there might be more pressure on the part of local bodies of
ideological work, the network of which will grow and strengthen
on the threshold of the local council elections.
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CULTURE:
QUEST FOR NEW MATRICES
Maksim Zhbankov
Summary
The last year’s performance is very contradictory. The death of the “culture of
resistance” cancelled out the fussy activities of its opponents. The anguished
ideological confrontation of the early 2000s actually came to naught. That
reduced the demand for cultural figures in the propaganda recruitment stream,
which is true for both sides.
On the other hand, having lost much of its air of heroic struggle, Belarusian
culture has never worked out new signposts for its development. When analyzing
performance in culture in 2008 we used the term “pause” to say that culture
was developing on a basis of selfcitation with no free market mechanisms for
its regulation and absence of a definite set of cultural models. This condition
was developing within the framework of socalled “liberalization”. Actually, it
is a kind of attempt to upgrade the cultural discourse that is still allowed at the
expense of external resources, which go hand in hand with the attempt to
expand the ”domestic Europe” zone – the domain of western format projects
and cultural texts. Another key feature of 2009 was that unofficial culture tried
the role of a decorative marginal outsider with no prospects of near social
changes.
Tendencies:
• state cultural policies undergo “liberalization”: there is a selective substitution
of prohibition for permission;
• local creative “minorities” consistently master western formats of cultural
creativity;
• demonstrative marginalization of unofficial culture.
Liberal turn:
fragments of styles, ideological ghosts
The new course of state cultural policy shows a decorative
friendliness towards earlier disfavored artists and genres (from
large N.R.M. and Krama concerts in Minsk concert hall to
“Massacre” launched by Belarusfilm motion picture studio, a film
by previously illicit director Andrey Koudinenko). We can regard
this as an attempt to save the nation’s Haut Style at the expense of
external (in relation to it) resources.
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The discourse of power has no inner reserves left: War and
Victory myths become more and more difficult to exploit. And
Belarusian blockbuster “The Dnieper Defence Line” (director
Denis Skvortsov) proves it best. The movie was to show the courage
of people in the first days of war. But it turned out to be nothing
but a widescreen sacrificial offering of all the protagonists. The
desperate doom that marks this well.wrought movie stands in sharp
contrast to the usual Nation of Victors message and by no means
strengthens it, undermining the authors’ intention.
The authorities show practically no counter play (even at the
level of former propaganda statements) and operate in safe mode:
the “inconvenient” elements are carefully granted access into the
system of controlled culture. A romantic “forest brother”
Mechislav, hiding from the Soviets in the woods, arouses interest
in the 2009 movie “Cadet” (director Vitaly Doudin). But the authors
are clueless as to what to do with this “non.format” character, who,
to make things worth, is cooperating with the main protagonist,
the “format” suvorovets (Suvorov Military School student) Denis
Meshko. To brand the former as a traitor would be awkward, but
to keep him alive would be wrong.
One more instance of decorative liberalism is the approved
rock festival Bela Music held on the Borovaya flying club premises.
It was directed by previously banned artist Oleg Khamenko in
cooperation with Liniya zvuka (“Sound Line”) agency. Local
authorities and the Ministry of Culture also took part in it, but
humbly and shyly asked not to mention them (significant detail!)
on the fest’s posters. Neither white.red.white, nor official flags were
in sight. But the artists were performing guarded by a special police
squad and serviced by public catering in patriotic red and green
caps. The group of “exonerated” rockers was diluted by the “legal”
pop singer Piotr Elfimov.
The fest’s vague concept (“Fest for those who make rewards”),
songs with no political message, a strict ban on beer and neutral
friendliness, actively supported by the BRSM crowd (the
Belarusian Republican Union of Youth) – all this felt like a careful
extensive.form game. Actually, the ruling elite are quietly
penetrating into the spheres of symbolic culture and alternative
culture management, which had been inaccessible for it before.
“Liberalization” in the form of demonstrative renunciation of
severe politicization, aesthetic confrontation and cultural
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repression by no means lead to automatic “nationwide unity”.
Social and cultural campaign “Budzma!” proves the above
statements most vividly. It was launched in autumn 2008 as an
enlightening project and was managed by the international NGO
Batskaushchina (“Motherland”) activists. It gained the public’s
attention by its pledge to encourage “postpolitical” national self.
consciousness through promotion of values of Belarusian culture.
But very soon the campaign proved to be creatively impotent and
turned into a banal tool for traveling literary meetings and
presentations. Nevertheless, its present status fully fits into the
current “liberalization”, which is supposed not to develop new
culture but to make one.occasion injections on a “from visit to
visit” basis. It is state culture that has permanent status; “Budzma”
is just “visitors”.
The official canon of culture provides little room for a “liberal
upgrade”. The sphere of legal creativity is limited to the
“farmstead” Belarusian culture zone, burnt down by political
struggle and repressive.prohibitive cultural policy, without any
external financial and conceptual investment. That is why
“liberalization” in the form of granting amnesty to dissidents is
capable, at best, to win over only invalids of the former war of
cultures. The latter have the depressing underground experience
but no definite scenario of their further existence. They also feel
the urgent need for external guidance and legal sites.
The political and aesthetic sides of Belarusian culture were so
knit together for the last decades that it lead to a synchronic
collapse of political technologies and cultural myths.
“Liberalization” is a movement in the field of lost meanings. Noise
effects, residual phenomena, fragments of former concepts.
Therefore, everything that is happening within should be regarded
as gestures, not messages, like, for example, the appearance of
the “kind master”, head of the Ministry of  Culture and first minister
who speaks Belarusian, Pavel Latushko. What does his appearance
signify? Very little. Just a new cog in the machine.  Important for
other cogs.  And those who want to become one.
Go West: New Europe or internal emigration?
As we mentioned above, meaning.forming elements in the culture
of struggle are depreciating, and leading figures of the cultural
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process show an inability to create convincing matrices for
collective attitudes. All this induces the creative minority to look
for models and guidelines outside their own region. In other
words, lack of internal dynamic culture makes the most ambitious
authors look for the ways to join external culture processes. By
doing so, they become internal emigrants, that is, those who live
by the rules of other cultures. The year under review resulted in
a whole range of “internal emigration” products, the most
significant of which are: hard.rock band “The Toobes”, the “U”
gallery, and the art project “Belarusian Pavilion of the Venetian
Biennale”.
“The Toobes”, three shaggy guys in sneakers and red jeans,
appeared between the lines of the Belarusian rock mainstream,
where the “conscientious” rock.and.roll, heavily spiced with ethno
tunes and political radicalism, was competing with “the Russian
rock” and Moscow pop scene clones. Time seems to be standing
still: our post.Soviet country, as it did under Brezhnev, welcomes
classical “westernizers”, imitating energetically the old.fashioned
British hard rock. But their candidly obsolete style does not dismiss
the main point: the Belarusian stage has not seen anything equally
vigorous and lively for the last seven years.
We should point out their protesting incompatibility with the
Belarusian context: the novices set a new level of quality for
themselves, they prefer to compete with their western opponents
like “Raconteurs”, not with Lyapis Trubetskoy or “J: Mors”. To
win the Belarusian.Swedish BandScan contest, not the Rock
Crown. And to perform in Sweden and Lithuania. The artists
position themselves as an autonomous creative unit, showing
healthy European individualism.  They live in their shaggy world –
everywhere and nowhere. And choose not to speculate about the
fortunes of their Motherland.
The “U” gallery in Minsk was established after the Podzemka
(“Underground”) art.project collapsed. And the latter was one of
“injections of the West” at the heart of the capital city. The
premises of a former out.of.the.way food store with a bottle
redemption point were turned into an open space of aesthetic
communication, a site for exhibitions, performances, lectures, and
film.shows. Plus a cafe and a book shop. The “U” gallery’s roots
are local art enthusiasts and a couple of respectable financial
organizations.
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It should be noted that the gallery also has contextual
problems: functionaries of culture keep ignoring it, “legal” artists
keep giving it a wide berth, and art promoters are out of sight. But
the audience also gives reason for complaint: the quiet and old.
fashioned Minsk public is used to absolutely different art. Young
people, who have been abroad, accept this style without
consideration. But the thoughtful majority, what should we do with
them? Can we influence Belarusian artists, can we tune them to a
different wave? And the main question: do we need to do that at
all? So far, the gallery’s best projects have come from abroad. And
foreigners have been the most reliable partners. And trips abroad
provide the curators with most striking impressions. The project
has no internal resources for its growth. This fact calls its efficient
development in question.
The “Belarusian Pavilion of the Venetian Biennale” was a baby
of a fortuitous encounter of art bohemia with technical error: all of a
sudden the whole VDNKh floor (Exhibition of Achievements of the
National Economy in Minsk) was free for a week. It was instantly
filled with topical Belarusian art. And was passed for “Venice here”.
The good part is that delivery is easy. The bad part is that Venice
does not care about Belarusian art. It still remains unclear, how much
topical art is there in the country and who needs it.
But what makes the cute game with the “Belarusian Pavilion
of the Venetian Biennale” most interesting is not the campaign
itself, but the follow up. The Ministry of Culture got the message
and launched a serious art mission to Venice. But the authors of
the concept, the project’s curators, foreign counselors and other
people involved, that is, those who had started developing the
project after the “Biennale” event, were ordered out of the list of
managers and participants. The private “Venice” was nationalized
and received new – reliable – management. Belarus seems to be
represented at the next biennale in compliance with instructions
from above.
While playing on the field of controlled culture, the creative
minority has to take into account the local factor. Western formats
of author’s expression that are topical codes of contemporary
culture are hardly compatible with local inert taste, the state
monopoly on information and bureaucratic regulation of cultural
trends. This automatically scales up Belarusian internal
emigration. But does not bring Europe closer.
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The whole circus:
being a marginal is a respectful surrender
Marginalization of unofficial culture is one of the obvious and
conspicuous tendencies of the year. It is a clear refusal to claim
leading parts. And a ceremonial departure into the underground.
The state of global apathy and self.citation makes the tale of the
counterculture as a project of new reality (commensurate with
radical political shifts) absolutely irrelevant. There are not many
options left: either join the system, or remain in the “niche”, or
declare oneself an outsider, a marginal persona. A persona with
no chance for leadership. Or a decorative leader.
This tendency was best revealed in music. The new album
“Proletkult” (“Proletarian culture”) by Lyapis Trubetskoy,
country’s best commercial project, consolidated the band’s image
as “circus of cosmic outsiders”. Mikhalok’s team has always
attentively monitored pop market tendencies. Their perfect
“vaudeville antiglobalism” makes for a good example of how
radical social actions can be turned into a set of stage amusements.
March.like militant but cute songs that denounce mysterious
“capitalists”, promise “the new world”, cite popular children’s
books from the early 1960s and quote applicable lines from
Mayakovski, Tolstoy and Pushkin, are too overloaded with
borrowed symbolism for us to take them seriously. And too
tentative for somebody to be offended or inspired. Lyapis
Trubetskoy are actively exploiting the heroic image of a tattooed
pop rebel. But they do it very cautiously: just to the extent that
will not make the local authorities nervous or frustrate the touring
schedule.
The most symbolic edition of the year is also marginal: the
hand.made pocket book “Yopity” (“Geessays”) by Siroshka
Pistonchyk (Siroshka Womanizer) and Ulasik Smarkach (Ulasik
Snotnose), a plucky literary project by the poet Sergey Prilutsky.
Again balancing between “high” and “vulgar” art. Again beyond
the common. But the provocatively “wrong” pseudo.profane
Prilutsky’s prose accomplishes its mission: it pushes the envelope,
which impels Belarusian literature to develop.
The launch of the first Belarusian horror film at Belarusfilm
motion picture studio is also highly significant. Andrey
Koudinenko’s “Massacre” is definitely not capable of exonerating
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the studio before millions of viewers. But it is the attempt to master
“trash” popular genres that is important, which is opposed to
obsolescent patriotic comic strips about spies, snipers and SWAT
squads. Marginal genres are a strait way to folklore traditions, that
is, to national identity.
The striving for risquй prose reveals itself in even sharper forms.
The aesthetic ethno chants were not fashionable in 2009, the latest
fashion was psychedelic refrains of Loop of Bias band and
grotesque marginal Mikhey Nosorogov’s cabaret. Tom Waits’
depressed swank is mixed with four.letter.word folklore and
multiplied by eternal (post)Soviet bohemia melancholy.
The hand.made music video of the band “Razbitae sertsa
patsana” (“Dude’s Broken Heart”) made a local stir: naked but
body.painted artists dancing to their own tune and bravely
showing their privates. The public opinion was split – from
absolute delight to full disapproval. The artists’ inclination to
scandal and extreme measures is very indicative. Shock
amusement is the last weapon of an author who has exhausted his
palette. Or a desperate attempt to seek after style in when all styles
have depreciated. Actually, culture has returned to its starting
point. And is ready for a restart.
It was precisely the “naked” art calendar “End of Words” that
blew up the inertness of “cultivated” Belarusian public. The project
(idea by Maryjka Martysevich, concept by Darya Sitnikova) was
an attempt both to revise the sugary myth of the poet as a gods’
favorite and to play with gender stereotypes. Belarusian literary
figures who participated in the project enclosed their texts with
the photos. And this range of eccentric pictures by means of
“glamour” codes was called to draw attention to the marginal (for
the majority) activities of Belarusian authors.
The response was mixed but predictable: the conceptual
content of the project was appreciated by only a few people. The
public at large (just like the majority of the media) saw only the
“scandalous” side: “The poets stripped naked!” and started a lively
discussion as to “Is a man of letters allowed to take off his pants?”.
“End of Words” walked on the verge of the acceptable and drew
such a wide public response, that none of the “other” culture
projects had witnessed for a long time.
In our society of cautious transitivism, marginalism is turning
into a popular role and cultural mission. It is the marginal personas
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that are clearing the waste of dead canons of culture for fresh
sprouts of new Belarusian culture. But the marginal personas
themselves have no prospects for development in the current
situation. Well, there is no actual need for that: the ruling social
system presupposes neither renewal nor rotation of basic cultural
codes.
The underground as a creative laboratory and a site for
experiments is ghettoized, instead of being developed. It seems
like we witness the new “lost generation” to be emerging. New
underground people with no hope for a better life.
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HEALTHCARE:
HIGH TECHNOLOGIES
vs MANAGEMENT INEFFICIENCY
Maria Eismont
Summary
In 2009 the following problems and policies were raised as top priority for the
Ministry of Health and the system of public health in general: the development
of the ambulatory care; the elimination of the medical personnel shortage;
increase in the number of hitech operations. The list also contains an article
about the activation of measures directed at saving resources. 2009 was a
breakthrough with respect to the introduction of complicated surgery
technologies. At the same time this year revealed the operating efficiency of
the Ministry of Health. At the beginning of the year there was a jump in medicine
prices in the country; at the end of the year the Belarusian pharmaceutical
service and the whole system of public health appeared unprepared to the
epidemic growth of flu rates.
Tendencies:
• the policy of introducing high technologies in medicine and increase in
accessibility of hitech medical aid for the population continued;
• financing of the sector decreased; saving resources became one of the
priorities of health authorities;
• realization of the government program of import substitution and efforts of
the Ministry of Health to restrain medicine price increases could not prevent
a jump in prices;
• flu epidemic as part of the pandemic has revealed the inefficiency of the
Ministry of Health.
Transplantation as massEproduction
2009 certainly added a new page to the history of Belarusian
medicine. Three types of transplant operations were performed
for the first time in the country: a heart transplant operation, a
child’s kidney transplantation, and a pancreas and kidney
simultaneous transplantation.
The first heart transplantation in Belarus was performed in the
night of 11/12 February, while the second operation followed less
than a month and a half later. On April 7, transplantation specialists
gave third patient another chance to live, having transplanted a
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donor heart to him. In total during a year 11 heart transplant
operations were performed.
In the night of 6/7 April the first two kidney transplant
operations were performed on children from parents at the 2nd
Children’s clinical hospital, with the expertise of the Republican
Center for Urology and Nephrology. This is a significant event in
Belarusian medicine: until 1997 Belarusian children suffering from
chronic nephritic insufficiency died without having received
medical aid. On May 10, 1997 in Minsk the centre of children’s
hemodialysis was organized in the 2nd Children’s clinical hospital.
Children got the chance to reach maturity and only then to hope
for kidney transplantation. Some kids were operated on abroad,
but they were isolated cases.
At last, during 2009 eight children’s kidney transplantations
were performed: four were living.related transplantations, from
parents to children, and four – from deceased donors. An equal
number of analogous operations were performed on Belarusian
children abroad during the last ten years. On June 13, 2009 in
Belarus the first and so far the only simultaneous transplantation
of pancreas and kidney was performed.
Last year in Belarus 25 liver transplantations were performed;
85 of them kidney transplantations, 127 bone marrow trans.
plantations and transplantation of hemopoietic cells to adults and
children. All transplantation operations in Belarus are performed
at the expense of the budget. For patients with transplanted organs
the post.operational treatment is also free. Throughout the whole
life they have to take medicine to prevent rejection of transplants.
On average, the treatment of one Belarusian with a trans.
planted kidney costs the state budget around USD 5,000. The same
sum is required for the treatment of patients with a transplanted
liver. Twice more is spent for maintenance of immune systems of
patients with a transplanted heart – USD 10–12,000 a year.
According to the Ministry of Health, 2009 is a year of
breakthrough in the sphere of high technologies in medicine. In
all regions of the country such difficult operations as diagnostics
of coronarography, implantation of pacemakers, stenting of
arteries, including coronary are performed. There were made 3,045
hip replacements and 465 knee joint replacements. There are
achievements in neurosurgery – endovascular means of
intervention in pathology of cerebral blood vessels and spinal cord
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vessels, minor traumatic microsurgical techniques of brain tumor
removal, etc.
Financing down, saving up
But all successes occur against the background of sharply
reduced state spending on public health services. Because of this
it is possible to draw the conclusion that medical services receive
less necessary financing including the ambulatory level, the
development of which belongs to one of the priorities in the
public health system in 2009. The Ministry of Health made an
attempt to reorient resources from hospital level to ambulatory.
According to preliminary data nearly 35% of all pubic health
funds were directed to the primary sector of medicine. This is
done in order not to admit patients into hospital. Thus in.patients
are stopped at the level of polyclinics where the treatment costs
less for the state.
At the beginning of 2009 the consolidated amount of the state
public health financing was estimated as BYR 6.64 trillion or 3.9 %
of GDP1. At the beginning of 2010 it was found that in 2009 the
public health system had received only BYR 4.889 trillion2, or 3.31 %
of GDP. Hence, according to the official statistics, expenses in
public health services per person also decreased: if in 2008 on
average USD 234 was spent on treatment of one person, in 2009
this was only USD 189.
Despite the lack of financing the Ministry of Health does not
forget about the obligations undertaken at the beginning of the
year to activate the measures directed at rational use and
economizing on resources. At the end of the year the department
reported that the funds saved by the organizations of the Ministry
of Health stood at BYR 48.8 billion3. The budgetary fund cuts were
done at the expense of the optimization of hospital stock (BYR 1.1
billion), established posts (BYR 1.5 billion) and other actions (BYR
35.8 billion). “Other actions” that provided the basic part of the
cuts made in funds allocated to people’s health include reduction
1 Interfax: http://www.interfax.by/news/belarus/52062.
2 TUT.by: http://news.tut.by/economics/161630.html.
3 Web site of the Ministry of Health of the Republic of Belarus: http://
minzdrav.by/med/article/see.php?&art_nid=334.
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of hospital stock and reduction of expenses on medical products
and products of medical purpose.
The medicinal market:
struggle with prices and import
2009 began with a jump in medicine prices. In January in Belarus
the prices for medical products grew 20–34 %. In February the
Ministry of Health stated the intention to offer all legal bodies and
individual businesses that have licenses for pharmaceutical activity
to provide the lowest possible wholesale and retail prices. The
Ministry of Health sent the Ministry of Economy a proposal to
expand the list of Belarusian medicines from 128 to 221 titles, the
prices of which are regulated by the Ministry of Economics.
The proposal was accompanied with threats: the Ministry of
Health stated that every week it would carry out additional
monitoring of retail prices of the most demanded medicines
(domestic and import) in drugstores of all patterns of ownership.
In case of revealing substantial increase of retail prices for separate
titles of medicines, perpetrators would be seriously punished up
to depriving them of their sales license.
In spring it became clear that it wouldn’t be possible to curb
the prices. On May 20, the head of the department of pharma.
ceutical inspection and the organization of medicinal provision of
the Ministry of Health Lyudmila Reutskaya stated that at the
Ministry the Social Council for the Control of the Prices for
Medicine was created and it would work out “the ideal prices” for
powders and pills. At the beginning of May more than one hundred
manufacturers of medical products were invited to sign the
“Memorandum on restraint of the prices for medical products”.
As compensation for the annual moratorium on prices the Ministry
of Health promised to producers and importers of pharmaceutical
products to cancel the customs duties and the value.added tax for
those medicines that are imported from Russia. Promises
concerned also the decrease of the registration rate for new medical
products. However out of 100 domestic and foreign firms hardly
more than half of them singed the memorandum4.
4 Web site of the Ministry of Health of the Republic of Belarus http://www.
minzdrav.by/med/docs/sprav/Farm_producers_and_distributors.doc.
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It remains obvious – and the Ministry of Health understands
it – that the suppliers of medicines are ultimately guided by
exchange rates, and producers by the cost of imported substances.
As a result, according to Belsat data in 2009 in Belarus the medicine
prices grew by 20–24 %. The efforts of the Ministry of Health
directed at correcting the pharmaceutical market were regarded
by many analysts as an attempt to create competitive advantages
for domestic medicines.
It is important to note that in 2009 the topic of protection of
domestic medicine producers was brought to a new scale. To
protect the interests of domestic producers the Belarusian
authorities created a rigid monitoring system over imported
foreign medicines. In particular, the permission to import
foreign medicine can only be obtained if it is not produced in
Belarus or its production is insufficient to satisfy the needs of
the population.
In the first quarter of 2009 in comparison with the same period
the previous year the import of foreign medicines was almost 23 %
less5. At the same time the amount of medicine production in
January.November 2009 in Belarus increased by 7 % in comparison
with the same period in 2008. The Chairman of “Belbiofarm”
Mikhail Cherepok stated with pride that every second packing of
medicine in the market is produced in Belarus6.
On December 2, 2009 the Council of Ministers passed the
program on development of import substituting production of
pharmaceutical substances, ready medicinal and diagnostic
means (“import substituting pharmaceutical production”) for
2010–2014 and till 20207. During the realization of the state
program it is planned to develop and organize the industrial
release of 36 pharmaceutical substances, 110 medical products
(including 53 original), 20 herbal medicine and biological
compensators, 33 new sets and reagents for hospital.laboratory
diagnostics of diseases.
At the press conference on October 12 in Minsk the vice.
president of “Belbiofarm” concern Pyotr Mandrukevich informed
5 When the article was written the statistics on 2009 were not yet available.
6 BelTA: http://www.belta.by/ru/actual/interview?id=431689.
7 NAVINY.by: http://naviny.by/rubrics/economic/2009/12/10/ic_news_
113_322620/
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that in Belarus five new pharmaceutical factories were under
construction8. One enterprise will be built in Logoisk, two – in
Vitebsk. “Belmedpreparaty” will erect a new factory in Minsk
on the basis of the “Integral” plant. The Russian businessman
Vladimir Bryntsalov is also building a new factory of 6,000 square
meters in area on the basis of “Dialek” unitary enterprise in
Minsk.
Epidemic of concealment
In November 2009 in Belarus the growth of flu had been stabilized.
The situation connected with the spread of the disease including
pandemic flu А/Н1N1 highlighted a number of problems
including inefficiency of work of the Ministry of Health.
The pandemic of the so.called “swine” flu was announced by
the WHO in June. But the state republican unitary enterprise
“Belfarmatsiya” did not consider it necessary to spend a hundred
thousand Euros for purchasing an effective remedy for its
treatment, the medicine “Tamiflu”, to build a stock of it so that in
case of emergency all clinics of the country could be supplied with
this medicine. As to the second medicine that is effective against
virus А/Н1N1, “Relenza”, it was not registered on the territory of
Belarus at all.
When in November cases of “swine flu” started to be registered
and the death rate of pneumonia caused by the virus А/Н1N1 in
hospitals increased rapidly it was found that the Belarusian
pharmaceutical service and the whole system of public health were
not ready for an epidemic rise of flu incidence. In drugstores there
was a shortage of anti.flu medicine and in hospitals there was a
lack of equipment for artificial ventilation of lungs. The Ministry
of Health was cautious and brief while making comments on the
situation; the disease statistics and the number of fatalities caused
by flu A/N1H1 was suppressed. Two independent publications,
newspapers Komsomolskaya pravda v Belarusi and Nasha niva,
received warnings from the Ministry of Information for publication
of supposedly inadequate information about the situation
concerning “swine flu” in the country.
8 NAVINY.by: http://naviny.by/rubrics/zdorovie/2009/10/12/ic_articles_
292_164921/
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Only in February 2010 it turned out that in 2009 in Minsk 11,550
people9 had been hospitalized with the diagnosis “pneumonia”.
In resuscitation departments of the capital 123 people died from
pneumonia, 88 of them were diagnosed with the virus of pandemic
flu A/H1N1. The statistics on the whole country is unknown,
officially it has not been reported.
One more fact that attracts the attention is that none of the
officials of the Ministry of Health was dismissed; at the official level
no names of those who “overslept the epidemic” were published,
not even administrative penalties were handed out.
9 BelaPAN: http://belapan.by/archive/2010/02/22/
Society
206 	



SPORT STUCK IN THE DEVELOPMENT MODEL
Boris Tasman
Summary
In the postOlympic year, Belarusian sport showed clear signs of degradation.
Belarusian athletes’ achievements on the world and European forum were
limited, in contrast to the previous period. The trackandfield athletes’ failure
at the Berlin championship was especially acute: not a single medal was earned.
Swimmers, sport gymnasts, cyclists, fencers also showed poor results.
The national football team under Head Coach Bernd Stange from Germany
played unsuccessfully in the World Championship playoff qualification. The
doping disqualification trial for Olympic silver and bronze medal hammer
throwers Vadim Deviatovski and Ivan Tsikhan remained unclear and was
postponed until 2010. Beijing hero Andrei Ariamnov really shocked the
Belarusian public when he was repeatedly caught drunk behind the driving
wheel. He was temporarily stripped of the presidential grant.
Triumphant victories in kayaking and canoeing in World and European
championships were like a breath of fresh air in the mildewed atmosphere
of these scandals. Nevertheless, the resignation of then minister of Sport
and Tourism Aleksandr Grigorov was a settled question. His place was taken
by Oleg Kachan, but he did not show himself in action for half a year.
Resounding resignations took place in hockey as well: Canadian coach Glenn
Hanlon resigned from the national team, and soon the former Interior
minister Vladimir Naumov quit as head of the Hockey Federation of the
Republic of Belarus.
Tendencies:
• Belarusian kayaking and canoeing athletes become world leaders;
• sport functionaries do not shun falsifications;
• most sports are lagging behind in technological terms;
• Belarus is losing its positions in traditionally prizewining sports;
• game sports suffer from unprofessionalism;
• budget financing proves to be less and less efficient.
GoldEbearing water
In all 2009 world championships Belarusians won only 12 medals
(4 medals for gold, silver and bronze respectively) in 48 Olympic
sports. Since 2003, Belarusian sportsmen and women have been
winning less and less medals (see the medal chart from the
newspaper PressBall).
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Chart. World championships 2003–2009
To mislead the public and conceal the actual situation, one
functionary of the National Olympic Committee (the NOC)
released information about 527 medals in late 2009. The article
“Last year performance in sport” on the NOC website contains
the same information: “The old year’s medal harvest turned out to
be really rich. 527 medals (167 gold, 166 silver, 194 bronze) in world
and European championships and cups is best result in the history
of Belarusian sports...
We did quite well in Olympic sports: Belarusian athletes
stepped on the podium 208 times (66 gold, 65 silver and 77 bronze
medals)”.1
Only if the NOC counted everything from waterskiing to boat
model making, arm wrestling and power lifting they could get this
wide discrepancy with the actual situation. Probably, “Uncle
Johnny and Aunt Mary cups” were counted in together with world
championships. That is how petty functionaries blow smoke into
the eyes of their bosses and the public. But it obviously did not
work because just three weeks after New Year president
Lukashenka dismissed Gennady Alekseenko, the president’s
assistant on physical education, sports, and tourism development
issues and first vice.president of the NOC.
In 2009 all 4 world gold medals were won in sculls – one by
the outstanding Katerina Karsten, other three by kayakers Roman
Petrushenko and Vadim Mikhnevich (double sculls) and together
with Aleksei Abalmasov and Artur Litvinchuk (coxless four). They
are all Beijing champions. The canoeist Denis Garazha, 21, made
his debut in significant tournaments and won. All in all the national
Belarusian kayaking and canoeing team won 7 gold medals in the
Canadian World Championship: 3 in Olympic and 4 in non.
Olympic sports. The Germans scored equally, others fell
significantly behind.
1 See http://www.noc.by/news/htnews/601/
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Belarusian kayakers and canoeists also won 2 gold and 1 silver
medals in Beijing 2008. This invariable success is not accidental.
The Chief Couch Vladimir Shantarovich was getting experience
during his 14.year work in junior, youth, adult and trade union
teams in the USSR. His experience and analytical mind convinced
him that the learning and training process required a scientific
approach. Currently a sports physician, a masseur, a psychologist,
a physiologist and a biochemistry specialist help the team of
coaches train the national team of kayaking and canoeing. The
athletes undergo an all.year.round control in the Problem.solving
Laboratory of Gomel State University under Prof. Gennady
Narskin. Vladimir Shantarovich cooperates with Specialized
Children and Youth Sports Schools of the Olympic Reserve
(commonly abbreviated in English SDUShOR). But this system also
suffers from some shortcomings: women teams show no great
results.
The national freestyle team also has such level of education
and training. As a result, ski acrobats successfully compete with
American, Canadian and Chinese athletes and please the
Belarusian nation with medals. This does not hold for other sports.
Using old templates
How did it happen that while the Olympics of 2008 brought 19
medals (record for Belarus as a sovereign nation), the 2009 results
are so embarrassing? In Beijing track.and.field athletics brought
7 medals, weightlifting and kayaking and canoeing 3 medals each,
boat racing and gymnastics 2 medals each, Greco.Roman and
freestyle wrestling 1 medal each, in a total of 7 sports.
In 2009 the kayakers confirmed their position, power lifters,
boat racers and gymnasts lost 1 medal each. The wrestlers won 2
instead of 3 medals, Sergei Shundilov (judo) and Victor Zuyev
(boxing) also added 1 medal each. So, not counting track.and.field
athletics, the total is again 12 medals.
Some track.and.field athletes did not confirm their Beijing
triumph. In Berlin the Olympic champion Oksana Menkova
(hammer.throwing) did not qualify for the final. The Olympic
champions Natallia and Andrei Mikhnevich (shot put) remained
at the 4th and 7th places respectively. Nadezhda Ostapchuk did not
go to Germany, but just 3 days after the world championship won
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the Belgrade tournament. The Olympic silver medalist Andrei
Kravchenko (decathlon) remained at the 10th spot.
The Olympic champions in hammer.throwing Vadim
Devyatovsky (silver) and Ivan Tsikhan (bronze) were at odds with
the International Olympic Committee for their doping
disqualification. The athletes filed a suit to the International Court
of Arbitration for Sport (CAS) in Lausanne to appeal against the
procedure of doping probes.
The chief coach of the national track.and.field athletics team
Anatoly Baduev pointed out that athletes need a post.Olympic
break when he accounted for such a complete failure. But we must
disagree, because in Belarusian “top” sports – hammer.throwing,
shot put and decathlon – other Olympic champions stepped on
the Berlin podium again. They represent different countries: three
shot putters Valery Vili (New Zealand), Tomasz Majewski (Poland)
and Christian Cantwell (the USA); hammer.thrower Primoћ
Kozmus (Slovenia), decathlete Leonel Suarez (Cuba). Only
women’s hammer.throwing podium see changes (Yipsi Moreno
from Cuba is on maternity leave). These athletes, including the
great sprinter Usein Bolt, Jamaica, did not need any break.
The chief coach Vladimir Shantarovich is sure that athletes of
higher qualification require only a 24.day holiday, just like other
working people. It is obvious that we see 2 diametrically opposed
approaches to education and training. Our track.and.field athletes
are on the margins of international progress in technology. Other
facts also speak for that: in Berlin 23 out of 25 athletes did not reach
their peak form and showed significantly worse results compared
to earlier starts. The 2000 Olympic champion Ellina Zvereva and
2003 world champion Irina Yatchenko demonstratively
overstepped in qualifications as they did not want their poor
performance to be formally recorded. Belarus did not manage to
nurture world class athletes in other 42 (!) kinds of sport like
running, jumping, and other types of throwing, race walking.
Nevertheless, Baduev and his henchmen Tatyana Ledovskaya, Yuri
Moiseevich et al. had cart.blanche to bring Belarusian athletics
(referred to as «the queen of sports» in post.Soviet countries) nearly
to death.
Belarusian athletes used to be very successful in aerobic
gymnastics, fencing, and shooting. But amateurishness of
functionaries and, probably, corruption brought them to a state of
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“half.decay”. Nevertheless, State Coach Antonina Koshel, who had
been responsible for gymnastics for many years, received a NOC
medal for services in promotion of the Olympic movement.
Meanwhile, Alina Sotnikova, the single Belarusian representative
in World Gymnastics Championship came 39th, 64th, 88th (twice)
and 96th. Perhaps the NOC should receive a medal for services in
distortion of reality!
SemiEpro
The women’s basketball team became 4th in the European
Championship and qualified for the World Championship 2010,
which is definitely a considerable achievement. The team of Anatoli
Buyalski was 3rd in the European Championship 2007 and 8th at
the Olympic Games 2008. Unfortunately, Anatoli Buyalski is slow
in introducing fresh sportsmen and veterans cannot keep up with
the high tempo of the game which must be the reason that the
women’s basketball team lost 5 matches out of 9.
We should also mention other team sports: the national hockey
team and the women’s volleyball team. The national ice hockey
team coached by Glen Hanlon got into the quarterfinal of the world
championship. But the main contribution was made by Andrei
Mezin (Russia), who has been playing goaltender for Belarus since
1998. He was chosen best goaltender of the championship. But
the whole team played insipidly.
In the European championship final, the Belarusian women’s
volleyball team came 14th out of 16. Men’s basketball and volleyball
teams, women’s and men’s handball teams and the football team
did not get through the elimination stage. Team sports are most
popular across the globe. They receive huge investments in other
countries which are returned by selling broadcasting rights and
advertising.
Belarus focuses on budget.financing. Hockey alone “eats up”
half of all allocations for sports, some sources say. But results are
more than insignificant. And the reasons lie on the surface: Belarus
has no professional sport leagues, hardly any professional clubs.
At best, there are semi.professional, like the football club BATE
Borisov and the hockey club Dynamo Minsk. Our “budget”
sportsmen cannot compete with professionals supported by big
business.
211
Naumov vs. Zakharov
Dynamo Minsk’s participation in the Continental (or
Kontinental) Hockey League (KHL, Russia’s alternative to the
NHL) was to be one of the highlights of Belarusian sports life
last year. The professional team was practically created from
scratch. The first season (2008/2009) was a failure: one of the
last positions in the KHL. The aim of getting into the play.offs
of the Gagarin Cup (16 best clubs out of 30) required serious
measures. In summer 2009 the club signed contracts with the
best hockey players from Finland, Sweden, The Check Republic,
and Canada. Glen Hanlon was invited to coach this team. It
required USD 20 to 30 million investments, which is big money
in a Belarusian context. Head of Federation of Hockey of the
Republic of Belarus Vladimir Naumov referred to certain
unnamed sponsors to the question about such significant
financing. The establishment of the farm.club Shakhtior
(“Miner”) (Soligorsk) to support HC Dynamo Minsk provoked
speculations that “Belarusian Potash Company” was the main
sponsor.
But even the team work of the Canadian coach Glen Hanlon,
the Finnish hockey team captain Ville Peltonen and the best
Finnish forward Jussi Mackonen together with the Slovak
defenseman Richard Lintner (world champion 2001) led to nothing.
A series of losses followed rare victories. During the home match
with Amur (Khabarovsk) in last October, somebody’s patience gave
way and Naumov announced Henlon’s dismissal. The Canadian
coach gave it some thought and resigned as Chief Coach of the
Belarusian national team as well.
There were less than 4 months until the Olympics left. That
triggered backstage games and Mikhail Zakharov was appointed
head of the national team. He coaches “Yunost” (Minsk) and plays
hockey in Aleksander Luckashenka’s trio. Nobody asked for
Vladimir Naumov’s opinion: he felt offended and resigned. It
should be noted that by that time Zakharov had already been
appointed coach of the Ukrainian national team.
Those spontaneous resignations worked negatively on the
team and Dynamo lost the play.off qualification, with just a little
better scoring. In the Olympic Vancouver, the national team did
make it into the quarterfinal.
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“Black holes”
In late 2009 two parts of the multifunctional sports complex Minsk
Arena were unveiled: the covered skating stadium with a 400 m
track and a versatile sports hall with 15,000 seats. The covered
velodrome was put in commission a year before and July 2009 it
held the European championship. By the way, the Belarusian
athletes showed very bad results.
All three objects lie close to each other near the University of
Physical Culture. There are two main issues concerning these very
costly objects: firstly, how to return on the investments, secondly,
how to use these modern facilities for the good of Belarusian sports.
Otherwise, they threaten to turn into all.devouring black holes.
The functioning of the velodrome does not give much hope.
Another palace for winter sports, the 17th in this country, was
unveiled in Baranovichi. And this is a city that lacks a track.and.
field athletics stadium, a standard team sports halls and football
fields to raise athletes. True, the palace has a hall which will be
shared by gymnasts and team games’ players. Baranovichi can
boast neither of professional hockey coaches nor hockey traditions.
It is good that the country constructs up.to.date sports objects.
But it is done unsystematically, with no regard for demands of
particular cities and types of sport. Meanwhile, there is a serious
shortage of track.and.field athletics stadiums (even the capital
lacks one), team sports halls, swimming pools, quality football
fields, i.e. of essential sports facilities. Imbalances and deficits
determine the whole picture.
Conclusion
Belarusian sports are standing still at the cross.roads. Budget
financing is the primary factor stalling its further development.
The economic situation in the country puts forward persistent
demands to minimize non.productive expenses. But the state
would not dare share its expenses with business structures, which
would appreciate tax benefits for that. Private sports clubs are meat
and drink for success in the sports sphere, especially for team
sports.
Most sports funds are concentrated in the bureaucratic
superstructure, which would never agree to reduce its profits
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despite the economic situation in the country. The machinery of
state funds allocators is huge. At the same time the basis of the
sports system, i.e. children and youth sports schools, are
suffocating without financing, which results in poor reserve
performance, boosted results in junior groups and a sharp
deterioration in the sports of higher achievements. The
construction of sports objects without a definite purpose worsens
the whole situation.
Until there are major changes in the financing of the sports
domain, infighting will take place over the biggest slice of the cake.
Even staff rotation in the highest echelons of Belarusian sports will
bring no changes.
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PUBLIC OPINION.
PRESIDENT’S RATING AS LAST ISLET
OF STABILITY
Sergey Nikolyuk
Summary
The analysis of public opinion revealed that the year 2009 is seen by Belarusians
as more difficult than the previous one. Belarusians are worried most about a
rise in prices, impoverishment of the population, unemployment and setback
in production. From media topics the Belarusians were disturbed by: rise in
prices, the “swine flu” epidemic, wage cuts and devaluation of the Belarusian
ruble. However the economic difficulties did not affect the rating of the president.
The majority of respondents blamed the economic difficulties on factors outside
the responsibility of the authorities.
As to foreign policy orientation, public opinion is polarized: the number of
supporters of integration with Russia is equal to the number of supporters of
accession to the EU. At the same time the majority of Belarusians support an
independent path of development for the country.
Tendencies:
• prevalence of pessimistic mood concerning economic wellbeing of the
country;
• constancy of the president’s rating, regardless of the direction in which the
economic position of Belarusians moves;
• gradual growth of the number of supporters of integration with the EU, who
equaled the number of supporters of integration with Russia by the end of
2009.
In 2009 it became clear to even to the most devoted supporters of
the authorities that Belarus is not an “island of stability”; public
opinion polls confirm this. In the first quarter of 2009 negative
moods grew in society, however the next polls fixed the change of
this trend: the public mood started to reflect the positive news.
The change of the negative trend into a positive one should
have made the final assessment of 2009 in comparison to 2008 a
little more positive, but this did not happen (Table 1)1. More than
half of respondents decided that 2009 was more difficult than the
previous year.
1 Data of the public opinion polls are at IISEPT website: www.iiseps.org.
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Table 1. Evolution of answers to the question: “Was the last year
more difficult or easier for Belarus in comparison with the previous
one?”, per cent
However with respect to private life the respondents assessed
the last year more positively.
Table 2. Evolution of answers to the question: “And personally for
you was the last year successful or unsuccessful on the whole?”,
per cent
Asked about the acute problems the country was faced with,
Belarusian citizens often mentioned on of following things: price
increase (79.8 %; down 2.7 % from 2008), impoverishment of the
population (42.6 %; up 4.8 %), unemployment (39.5 %; up 3.8 %). It
should be noted that unlike the quite stable level of perception of
unemployment as a threat throughout the last eleven years, the
level of the estimation of impoverishment fluctuated in rather a
wide range. Today, Belarusians are less afraid of impoverishment
than in 1999 but more so than in 2006.
The fact that against the background of social and economic
anxieties there was a general increase of alarm concerning the
decline of national culture (+3.9 %) and violation of human rights
(+3.1 %) attracts attention. On the other hand the urgency of the
Chernobyl disaster aftermath, which was so significant three and
a half years ago, is close to exhaustion (minus 2.5 %). The alarm
concerning the threat from the West (minus 4.3 %) also decreased
significantly. In 2006 this issue was put on the agenda by the
authorities as part of the election campaign, but the crisis and other
events shifted attention, leading to a new perception about which
problems are important, the result of which was recorded by the
December poll of 2009.
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Table 3. Evolution of answers to the question: “Which of the
following are the most acute problems for Belarus and its citizens
today?”, per cent
(more than one answer is possible)
Moving from the problems of the year to the topics of the year
(Table 4) we again find the price increase topping the list. “Swine
flu” takes second place with a difference of 11.7 %, the “popularity”
of which in its turn appeared to be 16.9 per cent higher than the
devaluation of the Belarusian ruble. Apparently the time factor
affected this: the epidemic frightened the Belarusians more at the
end of the year while the devaluation took place early in the year. It
also should be remembered that respondents, ranking events on
the degree of importance, are inclined to prefer the negative ones
and those that are emphasized by the mass media. Therefore it is
quite natural that the dialogue with the West, the IMF credit and
the Belarusian European Forum appeared at the end of the list.
The January devaluation, in our opinion, deserves separate
consideration. Firstly, it is the first time that an event like has
occurred in the contemporary history of Belarus. Secondly, it was
preceded by a public statement of the head of state that in 2009
the decrease of the Belarusian ruble exchange rate in relation to
dollar would not exceed 5 %.
Two weeks before the devaluation, 52.2 % of respondents
agreed that “it is rather probable”, only 8 % of those interviewed
217
adhered to the opposite point of view. Nevertheless in March
55.2 % of respondents stated that the devaluation appeared to be
“absolutely unexpected”. The most popular explanation of the
event is the “the authorities deceived people without warning them
about the forthcoming devaluation” (64.2 %).
Table 4. Distribution of answers to the question: “Which of the
following do you believe is the most important event of 2009
in Belarus?”, per cent
(more than one answer is possible)
As to practical consequences of the devaluation for the
respondents, 45.5 % noted that it affected them considerably,
35.4 % were affected insignificantly and 13.8 % said they were not
affected. The majority of respondents blamed the devaluation on
the International Monetary Fund (43.8 %). The respondents did
not overlook the role of the authorities: 20.2 % attributed the
devaluation to the wrong course the Belarusian economy has
taken.
Lukashenko’s electoral rating did not suffer from this negative
arithmetic; this is one of the most noticeable results of 2009. In
March it was 39.2 %, in June 40.9 %, in September 39.4 %, and in
December 42.5 % (Table 5). The last result turned out to be
highest, which is probably connected with the November rise in
pensions.
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Table 5. Real cash income of the population (per cent, compared with
the previous year) and approval rating of president Lukashenko
* Average value over a year.
It should be mentioned that stability of the electoral rating of
the head of state remained high against the background of the
significant decrease in growth rate of income of the population.
This is a new tendency. It will be recalled that at the turn of 2002–
2003 the historical minimum (26.2 %) of the electoral rating of
Lukashenko was recorded, which correlated with the decrease in
the real cash income of the population. When from the second
half of 2003 oil began to rise in price on world markets, the approval
rate of the head of state increased along with the growth of real
income of the population.
In many respects the stability of Lukashenko’s approval rating
is supported by official propaganda, which persistently advances
the idea that the economic crisis is a global phenomenon and the
Belarusian authorities are not to blame. Tables 6 and 7 partly reflect
these efforts.
Table 6. Distribution of the answers to the question: “If you believe
that the Belarusian economy is in crisis, to what degree do you think
it is possible to consider it a consequence of the country’s leaders
economic policy of the last years?”, per cent
Finishing the topic of the stability of Lukashenko’s approval
rating, it deserves mentioning that the crisis was preceded by
almost five “rich” years and the public mood does not change
overnight. Meanwhile, the probability of changes in 2010 should
be estimated as rather high.
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Table 7. Distribution of the answers to the question: “If you believe
that the Belarusian economy is in crisis to what degree do you think
it is possible to consider it a consequence of the of global financial
crisis?”, per cent
The relative stability of the level of indicators of social well.
being for the last two years is one more proof of the fact that in
2009 the crisis affected the Belarusians only indirectly. In this sense
the evolution of the answers to the question is significant: “If in
your city (area) actions are taken against deterioration of the
economic situation, will you participate in them?” The part of the
respondents declaring their readiness to take part in protest actions
is stable enough (opinions of respondents concerning such
readiness should not be taken for real readiness to act). In
September 2008, 15.7 % of the respondents declared their readiness
to protest, after three months there were by 2.9 % more of them
but after a year the number of the Belarusians declaring their wish
to protest returned to the pre.crisis level of 14.2 %.
Finally, 2009 offered one more surprise. For the first time in
the history of carrying out national surveys the number of
supporters of accession to the European Union exceeded the
number of supporters of integration with Russia (Table 8). In this
connection some experts started to talk about the changes in the
system of values of Belarusian society. Perhaps one should not
jump conclusions. We face just another result of the influence of
propaganda on public opinion. In 2009 the authorities publicly
recognized the inefficiency of a “one.winged flight” and started
reformation the Belarusian foreign policy monoplane into a
biplane. In a sense they were successful at it, which was reflected
by the polls in the second half of the year.
At the same time, when the specific wording of the question is
changed, the number of European.minded Belarusians starts
melting away. Answering the question: “What, in your opinion, is
a historical way of Belarus?” the variant “the own special way”
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(55.0 %) was unrivalled. There appeared to be more than twice
fewer supporters of “the general way of the western civilization”
(23.6 %), and almost as many respondents supported “returning
to the Soviet way” (20.7 %).
Table 8. Evolution of the answers to the question: “If you were to
choose between a union with Russia or accession to the European
Union, what would you choose?”, per cent
In conclusion, expectations of Belarusians from participation
in the “Eastern Partnership” program. The answers were
distributed as follows: “the possibility to go to European countries
for work and study” 37.7 %, “the approximation of Belarus to
European political, economic and cultural standards” 29.3 %,
“involvement of European investments and technologies” 27.8 %,
“accession of Belarus to the European Union” 21.2 %. The other
21.1 % of respondents answered that they do not care (the question
allowed more than one answer).
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ECONOMIC CRISIS:
2009 AS MIRRORED BY PUBLIC OPINION
Nadezhda Yefimova,
NOVAK laboratory of axiometric researches
Summary
In 2009 the economic crisis became an accomplished fact in the public
perception; the number of the people who experienced the crisis had
substantially increased. Admitting the reality of the financial and economic
crisis, throughout the first six months of 2009 the public opinion still tended to
believe that in Belarus “the scale of the disaster” was not as big as in other
countries. The end of 2009 was marked by the proportion of respondents who
thought that “the economic crisis is present in Belarus, and its scale is not less
than in other countries” exceeding those who having a more optimistic view.
The adaptation strategies to the crisis are individual (in opposition to collective)
and “regressive” (which assumes the deviation from a social position). In the
public perception, the current crisis is seen through the prism of the crisis in
the 1990s.
Tendencies:
• the growth of the number of respondents who admit the reality of the crisis
and influence of the crisis on their life;
• gradual replacement of the mindset towards consumption level preservation
(against the background of a real decrease in incomes) by the mindset
towards saving and selfrestriction;
• increase of atomization of society, an aggravation of the latent and obvious
animosities to each other, competition relations;
• passive adaptation to the situation is the prevailing tendency among crisis
adaptation strategies;
• collective actions and social protest are perceived by the majority of
respondents as impossible or improbable during the crisis.
In 2009 the main topic of public opinion polls all over the world,
including Belarus was the financial and economic crisis, its
perception and estimation by public opinion. As it is known, the
crisis began in the USA, and quickly spread to other countries.
Did Belarus join them? The official sources assured that it did not
and despite the negative processes of a global nature the situation
in the republic remained under control.
But except for the information from the mass media, people
have their own experience and own impressions, they can
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formulate conclusions, expectations and forecasts. This part of the
personal experience is addressed by the questions of the public
NOVAK laboratory opinion polls. The poll on the crisis was carried
out monthly throughout 2009 on a representative republic.wide
sample (the sample size is about 1100 respondents).
Dynamics of the perception of the financial
and economic crisis
The monthly poll allowed tracking the dynamics of the public
mood on a number of issues. And the first of them is the recognition
that there is the crisis in the country (Table 1).
Table 1. Distribution of the answers to the question: “Today much is
said about the global financial and economic crisis. Do you think it
concerns Belarus?” (percentage of respondents in each month)
As follows from the percentages in the table, 2009 began
uneasily. If in November 2008 the crisis was recognized by slightly
over 70 % of respondents, in February 2009 almost 90% did so. At
the same time the specific weight of respondents who did not have
a certain opinion about this question (answered “Difficult to
answer”) during the specified period decreased twofold, and the
specific weight of the respondents who did not believe in crisis in
Belarus practically died out. Thus, in 2009 public opinion
unambiguously signaled that the economic crisis became an
accomplished fact and the number of people who experienced the
crisis sharply increased.
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Why did the shift occur in early 2009? The results of the focus
groups carried out by the NOVAK laboratory provide an
unequivocal answer to this question: the majority of respondents
connect the beginning of the crisis in Belarus with the sharp fall of
the Belarusian ruble exchange rate with the dollar which occurred
during that period of time. As a result of the ruble devaluation the
actual income of Belarusians sharply fell and prices grew.
One of the focus group participants defined the beginning of
the crisis in the following way: “On New Year’s eve when 2008
came to the end and 2009 began, I clearly understood that the crisis
was not somewhere far, it had already reached us because there
was a surge in the dollar. Probably, it is possible to call it ruble
devaluation. In banks there is a flight of ruble deposits; everything
is changed into foreign currency, it is natural that there is nothing
to credit with. Well, it is possible to say that the bank system has
appeared to be in crisis...”
Admitting the reality of the financial and economic crisis
throughout the first six months of 2009 the public opinion tended
to the point that “the scale of the disaster” in Belarus was not as
big as in other countries. From January till April approximately
half of the respondents participating in polls permanently
answered that “the crisis in Belarus is present but less so than in
other countries” and about a third of respondents shared the
opinion that “the crisis in Belarus is the same as in other countries”.
In June the point of balance or the balance of public opinion was
fixed when the specific weight of the respondents who believed
that “the crisis in Belarus is reflected on a smaller scale than in
other countries” became equal to the specific weight of the
respondents who thought that “the crisis in Belarus has the same
scale as in other countries”.
According to the materials of the discussions in focus groups
it can be concluded that the growth of uneasiness of public opinion
in estimation of the economic crisis and its scale is connected with
an aggravation of the problem of the scale of production which
touched many enterprises and labor collectives. As a consequence
we see incomplete working weeks, essential reduction of salaries
and reduction of workplaces.
A focus group participant tells us about the situation at a factory
in Gomel: “Since May 2009 we have passed to four.day work... I
do not know how things are with the bosses but our salary was cut
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down by half. We receive 300–350 thousand, some USD 100. I
get 140–150 thousand a month... But I wanted to say something
about the other thing. Now all the production stays in the
warehouse, and the heads do not know where to give it away. Even
if they offer barter ‘we give you the machine tool, and you too give
something to us, so that we could make some repair, to cover the
roof or something else’ all the same they do not want”.
And this is a part from the discussion in Minsk: “We try to do
something. To sell some tractors at least in small lots. Earlier we
sold many, but now we are glad if we manage to sell a hundred.
Earlier one hundred was one day of work and now we do our best
for the sake of two or three. The lots are really small but people try
to do something”.
“Our enterprise concluded contracts with foreign suppliers in
foreign currency and after the surge of the dollar problems
appeared and relations with many of them stopped. Here was an
enormous reduction of sales volume. As a result branches were
closed and orders were withdrawn. And now the decision about
reorganizing the enterprise is taken as well as reduction of staff,
reshaping of structures. Many divisions were reduced, together
with the branches, for example at ’Gratsija’ there were 400
seamstresses – all were dismissed”.
The December poll, a last one in the year, showed that the
end of 2009 was marked by an excess of the specific weight of
the respondents who believed that “the economic crisis in Belarus
is real and its scale is not less than in other countries” over the
specific weight of the respondents who shared the more
optimistic opinion that “if there is a crisis in Belarus it is not so
strong as in other countries of the world”. From the moment of
the beginning of the financial and economic crisis, people
expected negative consequences and changes in their lives for
the worse (Table 2).
The most widespread negative expectations connected with
the crisis are reduction or freezing of income and consumption
restriction. “The whole year I have constrained myself in purchases,
I think about how to economize. The salary decreased, therefore
all the time I think where to find additional earnings and how to
save money. We save on trips, on clothes, on entertainment; we
don’t go to cafes and pizzerias any more” (a fragment of discussions
in focus groups, Minsk).
225
Table 2. Distribution of the answers to the question: “What do you
personally expect from the financial and economic crisis?”
(percentage of respondents in each month)
Note. More than one answer was possible.
About a third of respondents noted that they are afraid to lose
their job. Approximately a fifth of respondents mentioned that in
connection with the crisis it is more difficult to find additional
earnings (work on the side). Those who had taken credit before
the crisis found out that now it became much more difficult to pay
it back.
It is curious that in early 2009 to the majority of Belarusians
the main sign of the materializing economic crisis was the decrease
(freezing) of incomes and salaries. Later, in the second half of the
year, to be exact since May.June, this took the form of restriction
of consumption. If originally, despite the real decrease incomes
many people tried not to reduce their consumption level
maintaining it at the expense of savings then at a longer time scale
this tactics turned out to be ill.advised: at some moment self.
restriction and saving became the dominating lifestyle. This was
immediately reflected in the sphere of trade and services.
“After January 1, 2009 people were in panic, and we were as
well in our travel agency. People began to save very much. As a
result there were fewer clients. If earlier, well, about two years ago,
the salary grew slightly, but it grew, then it stopped, and then it
went down. And the light is not seen at the end of the tunnel. We
began to count how many clients we had lost. In comparison with
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Christmas 2009 the number of clients who wanted to buy a tour
went down by 30% in Christmas 2010. And taking into account
that people began to prefer cheaper tours the agency lost much
money” (a fragment of discussions in focus groups, Minsk).
Social positions:
distinctions in perceptions
The data of the discussions held by the NOVAK laboratory in 2009
testify that different social groups perceive the crisis differently.
For example, for those who work at a factory the crisis changed
the situation sharply and drastically: the workweek was reduced,
the prices for piecework fell and the sale of production stopped
(reduced).
For state employees the crisis is in general a usual condition
in which they have to exist. They say the same thing: “It has always
been difficult to live: before the crisis was announced and after. It
is a bit better or a bit worse, but basically it is always the same”.
Now it is a bit worse: the prices grow, and the income actually
falls. But doctors’ salaries earlier were small and now they remained
the same. The difference is that this situation is called now
“financial and economic crisis”, it means that we will consider it
as crisis.
Businessmen describing the situation as a rule state that they
faced the decline of solvent demand and end consumers, and
customer organizations. People stopped buying the same volumes
as they did before, customers postpone payment for work already
done, and they do not pay in advance. Deficiency of money is felt;
getting business credit is extremely difficult.
The most trouble.free participants of the focus groups were
students. For them, the crisis is a kind of theory. They would not
mind speculating about it, based on recently given lectures, but
they have not experienced its consequences personally. However,
those who faced ”adult” life spoke in a confused way: “they
promised me work, and now they don’t”, “the place where I earn
on the side brings me much less”, “I wanted to go on courses, and
they closed; they say now it is unprofitable to have such courses”.
In statements of workers, state employees, businessmen the
antagonism is growing in relation to potential competitors on the
labor market. This antagonism is little realized by respondents,
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but it is quite clearly expressed in vocabulary and intonation –
offended, revolted or suppressed.
Those people with whom respondents work, at times have
worked with for many years, started to cause suspicions –
suspicions in connections, relationship with the heads, in cunning,
reserve, intricate strategies. It seems, that all have some advantages
“compared with me”: people with experience, with other
qualifications, women without children and without a family (and
consequently, without claims for a more convenient schedule of
work, holidays in summertime and “sick leaves” certificates for
children) etc.
Everything what a person has, is suddenly perceived as a
burden when applying for work: children, aged parents, and a piece
of land (it needs money, time and care). In general, it reminds of
K. Marx: “The reserve army of labor breathes down our neck”. The
general social and psychological effect is atomization of Belarusian
society, aggravation of the latent and obvious animosity to each
other and in competition relations.
Adaptation strategies
What are the personal (individual) strategies of adaptation to an
economic crisis? Or, simply put how do people adapt to such a
situation? The general features of crisis adaptation strategies,
described by focus group participants are the following:
a) individuality, which means that everyone saves themselves
as much as they can; consolidation or asking help and support
from organizations, groups, funds, trade unions are not intended
and not common;
b) “regressivity”, which often means a deviation from that social
position which the person takes now; it is loss and humility,
accepting the loss. Probably, crisis stimulates action and
development in some cases, but in this situation the crisis is rather a
push to regress, decrease in the standard of living. Here is what the
participants of the focus groups said: “if they don’t pay at all we will
stay at the factory all the same just to keep the place”; “People will
steal and why not? Now it is different: now there are the rich, there
are those whom to rob”; “We will go for unqualified work”.
At the same time there is a certain hope that somewhere there
are separate ”lacunas” where it is possible to wait untill everything
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is over, to organize an easy and comfortable life, for example, to
work as service staff at some rich family, to become a family doctor,
teacher, tutor without taxes, without a license. The idea to go
abroad is also popular. And there, there are a lot of variants, in
particular the Foreign legion. People tell stories about guys who
served in the Foreign legion and returned satisfied with life and
with money.
Some are happy with things as they are for various reasons.
One of the participants of the discussion in a focus group says:
“At the computer engineering plant where I work, the workweek
was cut. All worry. But I personally have more free time now. I
have 3 days off, and I travel through the country with football fans
(I am a football fan). The main profit of the plant is from the premise
rent. The shop “Impulse” is our enterprise. We let out the premises
to private businessmen. Some workers and experts have time to
work both at the plant and at private enterprises during working
hours (at those enterprises that rent the area from us). So those
with whom I work don’t find themselves in a very tight situation”.
Contextual perception: the 1990s
Almost in all focus group discussions respondents spontaneously
related the current crisis to the experience of the 1990s, without
any help or provocation from moderators. (And repeatability of
explanatory schemes in focus groups is worth a lot, testifying to
their non.randomness in the public mind). Analysis of the
discussions showed that the reference of respondents to the
experience of the 1990s when discussing current events is
motivated by different reasons.
First, it is a base for comparison, a system of coordinates which
allows people to define where they are now and to estimate the
present situation: whether it is better or worse than that one that
occurred 15–20 years ago. The majority of respondents tend to
the idea that it is better: “Earlier shops were as bare as a bone and
what to expect the next day was unclear. And now it is different, it
is a bit better”.
Second, the experience of the 90s is a base for predicting the
development of the current situation. Such prediction of
respondents is in the spirit of Ecclesiastes: Whatever has already
been, and what will be has been before; so all is vanity of vanities.
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And if to quote certain statements of participants in the focus
groups it sounds like this: “In the 90s it was very difficult, but then
all gradually came to normal by itself. And now everything will be
the same, we just have to wait till everything is over and settles
down”.
Third, the people recollect how in the 1990s all rushed into
business with enthusiasm: “People went to Poland, traded. It was,
so to say, euphoria but they didn’t become rich”. Now such strategy
as a way out of the crisis in the spirit of “how to start a business” is
perceived more often with irony.
At last, fourth, the 1990s were remembered as the time when
there were a lot of strikes and rallies, but nothing came out of this
although the authorities were weaker than now.
A participant of the focus group discussion says: “I participated
in a strike in the 90s. Then I worked at the underground. Then the
underground was a part of the railway, the salaries were good but
as soon as the underground was taken by the Executive Committee
of the City the salaries were cut and a new head was appointed
who did not know the specificity of our work. The staff went on
strike, demanding the resignation of the protйgй of the Executive
Committee of the City. And so, that strike didn’t change anything.
Only after some time that head was dismissed, not because of the
strike but when someone from the higher officers wanted to dismiss
him. The train drivers who went on strike were replaced by others:
the drivers were dismissed from Orsha and Brest directions though
they were not connected with the electric trains at the
underground. This strike was just suppressed and that’s all. We
didn’t achieve anything”.
Thus, whether it is good or not, but the experience of the 1990s,
in the context of which public perception comprehends the current
crisis, has actually played a role of an original vaccination for those
who remember it, and maybe not only for them. Now, during a
new crisis collective action and social protest seem impossible or
improbable to people.
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MACROECONOMICS:
GROWTH BASED ON UNSTABLE FACTORS
Dmitry Kruk
Summary
The global financial and economic crisis produced a serious adverse impact
on the Belarusian economy in 2009, the first manifestation being a sharp
increase in the foreign trade deficit, which almost immediately affected the
foreign exchange market. The oneoff ruble devaluation in early 2009 helped
mitigate the negative effects of the crisis on the money market, but it could not
help address the fundamental reasons behind the widening foreign trade gap.
To finance the balance of payments deficit the state had to take loans from
external sources, and it is the administration of the country that acted as the
borrower, since the private sector is not capable of borrowing on international
markets. Simultaneously, the government pursued a policy to encourage GDP
growth, and, indeed, the economy expanded, while qualitative disparities
accumulated. Economic policies were adjusted at a later phase, reducing some
of the risks for the national economy.
Many of them remained, though, therefore, the main tasks for the authorities
in 2010 are to eliminate macroeconomic disproportions and create prerequisites
for sustainable economic growth rather than reaching GDP expansion targets.
Tendencies:
• GDP growth continued owing to additional external borrowing and
accumulation of macroeconomic disproportions in the Belarusian economy;
• the factors ensuring economic growth in previous years have almost been
exhausted, and the search for new factors of sustainable growth is regarded
as a priority task;
• the crisis has eventually spread over all sectors of the national economy,
resulting in structural changes, affecting both the manufacturing sector and
domestic demand.
The Belarusian economy showed a growth in 2009, which was
not typical of Eastern Europe and the CIS, where nearly all
countries reported recession. The growth in gross domestic
product, even though it was insignificant, looks even more
extraordinary given the fact that export markets, which are
essential for the Belarusian economy, shrank even faster than
national economies.
Belarus managed to ensure growth trends owing to its
economic policies, which were nevertheless very seriously adjusted
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during the year. In the first half of 2009, production expansion
remained the top priority. To this end, the government adopted a
package of measures to encourage a growth in output and an
adequate increase in domestic demand, which was supposed to
offset the dramatic reduction in foreign demand for Belarusian
exports. As a result, GDP kept growing, but Belarus paid the price
of accumulating qualitative disproportions, which created serious
risks for the economy. Such disproportions included, for instance,
hikes in unsold inventories and depletion of floating capital,
additional risks for commercial banks, resulting in chronic liquidity
shortages, and a widening foreign trade deficit, which had to be
financed from foreign loans.
In the second half of the year, the government phased out some
of the production incentives, which retarded growth, but smoothed
the disproportions. Those adjustments did not prevent economic
growth in the fourth quarter and the entire year, mostly because
of the year.on.year comparison with the modest performance at
the end of 2008. The authorities were taking chaotic decisions and
resorted to “manual control”, which could be efficient enough only
for a short term, and the Belarusian economy entered the year 2010
in quite a good shape, albeit with many risks. However, by now,
the government has not worked out a strategic plan to ensure long.
term economic growth.
Macroeconomic dynamics
GDP
In 2009, Belarusian GDP grew 0.2% on the year in real terms, which
was among the best results in the region. GDP growth was not
uniform during 2009, the main reason being adjustments in the
economic policy of the government.
In the third and fourth quarters of 2008, external demand for
Belarusian products started falling, and its all.time low had been
reached by the second quarter of 2009.
In early 2009, the government tried to guarantee high growth
rates while overlooking external tendencies. The authorities
justified their efforts by the absence of internal disproportions in
the financial sector, which were common for the entire region. The
Belarusian administration believed there were no fundamental
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prerequisites for recession in the national economy and it would
be logical to offset the lack of external demand by encouraging
domestic demand. The government resorted to monetary and fiscal
incentives, as well as administrative measures, to promote domestic
demand. As a result, capital investments continued to grow in the
first half of 2009, contributing 6.7% and 6.8% to GDP in the first
and second quarters, respectively.
Another essential contributor to gross domestic product,
household consumption, accounted for 2.9% of GDP in the first
quarter of the year, but narrowed during April.June, and its
contribution to GDP growth was negative, at minus 0.8%. The
efforts to prop up consumer demand led to a very strong demand
for imports. Since exports dropped dramatically last year,
involuntary import promotion resulted in a substantial negative
contribution of net exports (exports minus imports) to GDP –
minus 5.8% and minus 2.5% in the first and second quarters of 2009.
As a result, GDP kept growing in the first quarter, 1.1% on the first
quarter of 2008, whereas in the second quarter, a contraction of
0.4% was recorded.
The results of the first half of 2009 showed that increases in
domestic demand called for additional imports, which meant
measures to bolster domestic demand were offset by the negative
contribution of net exports to economic growth. An additional
price that Belarus paid for artificial promotion of domestic demand
and economic expansion was an accumulation of qualitative
disproportions in all sectors of the economy: a growth in the foreign
trade deficit, additional risks for banks and hikes in stocks of
finished products.
The accumulation of disproportions forced the government to
adjust its policy on promotion of output, domestic demand and
incomes, but its focus was never shifted from investment demand.
It was planned that investments could become a “growing point”
without increasing the trade deficit. On the other hand, the priority
status of investment demand was also consistent with the plans to
enhance the competitive power of Belarusian enterprises in the
long term.
Household consumption narrowed starting the second quarter
of 2009, mostly due to changes in the structure of incomes and
expenditures. Less determined efforts to promote domestic
demand in the second half of the year brought about a reduction
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in demand for imports, hence a decrease in external deficit
compared to 2008. As a result, net exports made a positive
contribution to GDP for the first time over the past few years. In
the third quarter, economic contraction continued, reaching minus
1.8% year.on.year, but growth resumed in the fourth quarter, when
GDP grew 1.8%. This was caused, again, by the comparison to the
quite poor performance in late 2008. Anyway, the economy
managed to grow year.on.year in 2009.
Real sector enterprises
Belarusian agribusiness managed to keep an impressive growth
despite the recession; however, the positive results were mostly
due to state subsidies. Whereas industrial output fell 3.6% on the
year in the first half of 2009, farm output rose 6.6%, the share of
agriculture in GDP increased, and overall economic expansion
could be attributed to the increase in agricultural production. Farm
output growth started slowing in mid.2009, and reached 1.3%
compared to 2008 at year.end.
The construction sector was another fast.growing industry –
it expanded 15% on the year in the second quarter of 2009 and its
share in GDP increased 1.9 percentage points to 11.9%. The growth
in the construction sector is explained by economic incentives,
aimed at improving access to loans, extended both for housing
development and non.residential construction. Extensive lending
facilitated additional inflows of investments in housing
construction from households’ savings. A reduction in housing
prices in U.S. dollar terms became another incentive for households
to spend their savings on new homes.
Of all sectors of economy, growth was registered only in the
fuel, chemical and cement industries. Mechanical engineering and
metalworking enterprises, as well as light industry and
woodworking companies were affected more than other industries,
because they are more export.oriented and more vulnerable to
foreign demand fluctuations. The above industries were
responsible for a new significant trend of 2009, namely, an increase
in inventories.
Overstocks had reached their peak by mid.2009, with unsold
inventories totaling 94.6% of the average monthly output as of
July 1. The chief reason behind the hikes in inventories was the
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policy of setting production targets irrespective of the economic
situation. At a later phase, after production targets were lifted
and domestic and external demand started showing the first signs
of recovery, inventories were reduced. Nevertheless, as of
January 1, 2010, some 5.5 trillion rubles’ worth of products was
“frozen” in stocks, 67.9% of the average monthly production
volume.
The crisis thus brought about quite serious changes in the
sectoral structure of Belarusian GDP. The share of the sectors
producing services and selling them on the domestic market was
growing. The government resorted to fiscal and monetary
measures to boost economic growth, but the former were limited
by Belarus’ obligations to the IMF, as the government had
committed itself to tightening budgetary discipline. Monetary
incentives, especially, efforts to ease access to loan, therefore were
preferable to fiscal instruments; however, the growth in the
manufacturing sector was achieved at the expense of the credit
and financial sector.
Companies’ finance
Many Belarusian enterprises were faced with a drop in sales
margins as early as late 2008, when external demand for
Belarusian exports started falling. The state policy promoting
production growth aggravated the situation, as floating capital
was transformed into overstocks, whereas new production cycles
called for additional financing, which could only come from
creditors.
During the early stages of the global crisis, only
manufacturing companies working primarily with foreign buyers
suffered from lower profitability rates, but the process spread over
other industries, including the service sector catering for
domestic consumers, in the first half of 2009. Profitability rates
were falling throughout the year: the average sales margin fell to
10.3% in 2009 from 14% in 2008, and profit margin contracted to
6.1% from 7.9%.
Belarusian companies’ profits fell 21.4% on the year, and net
profits dropped 27.6% (in real terms, the fall was by 33.7% and
40.5%, respectively). Despite the reductions in profitability, most
Belarusian companies remained profitable. The share of loss.
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making enterprises stood at 7.1% of the total number, including
17% in the manufacturing sector1.
Households
Incomes and expenditures of households
In January.June 2009, Belarusian industrial enterprises, including
those suffering most, kept working in the framework of directed
production and employment targets. Despite this policy, some
enterprises were trying to cut costs by freezing the nominal wage
and reducing staff and working hours. In January.November 2009,
real wages in mechanical engineering and metalworking fell 8.1%
on the year, and in the woodworking sector decreased 7.5%. In
real terms, wages fell 2% on the year in the manufacturing sector
taken as a whole. This was accompanied by staff reductions and
loss of working hours. Nationwide, wages dropped 0.4% year.on.
year in 2009. Therefore, wage differentials became more evident
during the global crisis.
Overall cash incomes of individuals increased 2.9% in 2009,
and per capita incomes in real terms rose 3.1%. This became
possible as a result of the change in the structure of incomes: the
share of compensations decreased 2.3 percentage points to 56.4%,
and social transfers (pensions and educational allowances) went
down 1.7 percentage points to 18.7% (in the framework of the
campaign to tighten fiscal discipline).
The main source of the increase in real incomes was the so.
called “other incomes” category, which includes entrepreneurial
incomes, revenues from sale of farm produce, etc. It appeared that
the crisis had forced people to seek additional sources of income
to offset the reduction/restriction of wages.
The structure of household expenditures changed a lot, too.
The average propensity to consume decreased, as the share of
incomes spent on purchases of goods and services dropped to
80.8% from 84.2%. The share of incomes spent on payments of taxes
and dues went up a bit, whereas the main increase in expenditures
1 As of today, statistics on loss.making enterprises is presented not branch.
wise, but by subordination of enterprises to specific ministries and concerns.
According to these data, the number of loss.making organizations
subordinate to the Industry Ministry amounted to 17.5% of the total.
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was in the savings segment, which accounted for 5.6% of incomes,
up from 3.8%.
At the same time, bank loans to households were growing
slower than previously (in relation to household incomes): in 2009,
retail loans increased by a sum equivalent to 4.2% of incomes,
compared to 6.2% in 2008. The more significant role of savings
and reduction in borrowing are important macroeconomic trends
indicating substantial concentration of resources available for
financing of investments on the domestic market. Furthermore,
the change in the structure of expenditures determined a reduction
in demand for imports and limitations of the balance of payment
deficit.
It is hard to say now whether this trend reflects structural
alterations in consumer behavior, as economists argue that the
propensity to save is exceptionally small in the Belarusian
economy, and its growth should be perceived as a transfer toward
a “normal” level or as a short.term reaction to limited wage growth.
Whatever the nature of the change in the structure of consumer
expenditure, the tendency became an important instrument for
households to respond to the crisis. On the one hand, it restricts
the current GDP growth rate because of limited consumption, but
on the other, it helps eliminate structural disproportions in the
Belarusian economy by creating additional prerequisites for
sustainable economic growth.
Commodity and service markets. Prices
Consumer prices increased 10.1% in 2009, which compares to an
increase of 13.3% in 2008, and the average annual inflation rate
was at 13%, down from 14.8% in the previous year. Inflation slowed
down in 2009 largely because of reductions in most of the
components of composite demand throughout the year. As we
noted above, individual income growth was contained, and the
share of consumption in overall incomes decreased, hence inflation
restraints caused by limited household consumption.
Food and non.food prices grew almost the same in 2009, by
9.4% and 10.1%, respectively. Prices of fish and seafood, tea,
vegetables, alcohol and cigarettes, cosmetics and pharma.
ceuticals increased more than the average in 2009. Fee.based
services prices rose 11.9% on the year in 2009, partly due to a
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17.3% rise in utility fees (which were raised with a view to phasing
down cross.subsidy and reducing the burden on the budget amid
the recession).
The reduction in consumer demand contained price growth
in 2009, which could be characterized as “moderate”. The key
factors behind the increase in prices were monetary instruments
aimed at promoting domestic demand by excess money supply
and increment in regulated prices for the sake of alleviating the
pressure on budget and state enterprises. To determine the ratio
between monetary and non.monetary inflation factors, we compare
the general inflation rate and core inflation rate, 10.1% and 8.7%,
respectively2, which indicates that government.regulated prices
were growing faster than market.based prices.
External sector
Foreign trade
The country suffered a double shock in the fourth quarter of 2008
due to a collapse in export demand for Belarusian industrial goods
in the Russian market and substantial decreases in prices of raw
commodities in the trading partners beyond the CIS. The adverse
influence of the global financial crisis on Belarusian foreign trade
grew even stronger in 2009: exports both to the CIS, primarily to
Russia and Ukraine, and non.CIS foreign markets almost halved
year.on.year, whereas the fall in imports was less significant
(especially imports from non.CIS foreign countries).
The poor non.CIS trade dynamics should be attributed to the
fact that exports of ferrous metals and oil products halved in value
terms, and potash fertilizer supplies fell almost three times (the
three commodity groups make up 67% of Belarusian exports to
countries beyond the CIS). The drop was caused by export price
cuts (ferrous metals and oil products) and reduction in supplies in
volume terms (in 2009, potash exports were just 20% of the 2008
level).
2 Core consumer inflation does not allow for the prices directly regulated by
the government, for instance, utility fees, fuel, tobacco, alcohol and sugar
prices, etc. Therefore, if regular inflation rates exceed core inflation rates,
the government raises administratively regulated prices faster than other
prices grow, and vice versa.
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The drop in external demand for Belarusian exports in the first
half of the year did not result in adequate import restrictions. In
trade with Russia, imports decreased in value terms because of
the fall in prices for imported energy resources; however, this
positive trend was offset by a proportionate reduction in prices for
exported oil products. At the same time, in volume terms, imports
of raw commodities remained at the level registered in 2008, and
Belarusian enterprises managed to keep their production volume
close to the pre.crisis level. In trade with non.CIS foreign countries,
imports were almost unchanged in 2009, both in their volume and
value, a result of income promotion, which bolstered demand for
imported goods.
Trade with Russia showed a 23% reduction in deficit in the first
half of the year, compared to January.June 2008; however, the
surplus of trade with non.CIS countries contracted in January.
March to 4.5% of the level reported in the first quarter of 2008, and
in April.June, to 13.4% of the same period in 2008. This pushed
the current account deficit up 160% on the year in the first quarter
and 36.6% in the second quarter; the deficit reached a new record
high of 18.6% of GDP in January.March 2009 and stood at 17.7%
of GDP in April.June.
In the second half of 2009, the situation in trade slightly
improved. In July.September, exports to some market outlets
resumed growth following the recovery of demand, however, in
most cases, export growth was connected with some sporadic local
developments rather than long.term positive trends (for example,
an increase in oil prices and rise in oil product exports to Western
Europe). The Belarusian contract for potash supplies to India
played an important role in the positive export dynamics in the
second half of 2009. At the same time, the situation on the Russian
market, the chief importer of Belarusian engineering products,
remained unstable, and so were Belarusian exports, which never
reached the pre.crisis level.
The foreign trade improvements were to a large extent due to
import trends. In the third quarter of 2009, imports from non.CIS
foreign countries fell 33.7%, compared to a 13.1% reduction in the
first quarter. The most serious decrease was in the “investment
commodities” group, the main reason being the governmental
policy aimed at narrowing the foreign trade gap. As a result, in the
third quarter of 2009, the commodity trade deficit shrank 43.6%
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on the year and 43.5% from the previous quarter. It would not be
wrong to apply the term “adaptive reaction” here, as demand for
import fell, which is typical of almost all countries amid the crisis.
However, in the fourth quarter, the positive tendencies
weakened. At the end of the year, both exports and imports were
recovering faster than in the first three quarters, and in November,
they increased year.on.year for the first time in 2009. The balance
of payment deficit kept decreasing, but not as fast as in the previous
quarter. In October.December, the foreign trade deficit shrank
only 12.7% on the year (the deficit reached its maximum in the
fourth quarter). This deterioration should be attributed to the sharp
increase in car imports in late 2009 (caused by the expectation of
import duty hikes in early 2010). This was not the only trend
underlying the unfavorable situation in Belarusian foreign trade
in the fourth quarter, compared to the third quarter.
Commodity trade showed a deficit of U.S. $7.3 billion, an
increase of 6.9% from the 2008 level to a new record high of 14.8%
of GDP. In early 2010, the situation in foreign trade remained
uncertain, as it is not clear whether Belarusian producers will be
competitive in the post.crisis period.
Other external flows and balance of payments
Current account deficit amounted to U.S. $6.4 billion in 2009, or
13.1% of GDP3, compared to 8.4% of GDP in 2008. Commodity trade
deficit based on the balance of payment methodology reached U.S.
$7 billion (14.2% of GDP). Compared to the year 2008, the surplus
of trade in services remained almost unchanged, at 2.9% of GDP.
However, since commodity trade deficit was widening faster than
before, the surplus in service trade was sufficient to offset only
20% of the commodity trade deficit in 2009, down from 27% in 2008.
Foreign exchange market
A massive deficit of foreign exchange became the first manifes.
tation of the global crisis on the domestic currency market. Belarus
3 A similar deficit was observed in 1997, which was followed by the crisis
year of 1998, with a deficit of 14.9% of GDP. A devaluation of the ruble by
11.6 times helped address the deficit then (January 1, 2000 to August 1,
1998).
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was faced with a current account deficit even before the crisis, and
net demand for foreign exchange was common for the Belarusian
money market in 2007 and early 2008. This was to a large extent
due to the change in the status of resident corporate entities, which
prior to the second half of 2007 had acted as principal suppliers of
foreign currency to the domestic market. However, the trend had
reversed by mid.2008, when resident (non.financial) companies
turned into borrowers as a result of taking substantial foreign loans.
The new trend grew stronger in 2009, when Belarusian companies
purchased about U.S. $900 million of foreign exchange in excess
of sales (net purchases) on a quarterly basis.
Finance
State finance
In 2009, the deteriorating economic situation produced a serious
negative impact on state finance. Fiscal policies were subject to
certain restrictions: budget revenues predictably dropped as a
result of the economic setback, whereas the government was trying
to use fiscal incentives to encourage economic activity while trying
to keep within the rigid financial administration framework
imposed under an agreement with the International Monetary
Fund, which prioritized tightening of fiscal discipline.
Consolidated budget revenues amounted to 45.9% of GDP in
2009, down 5.1% on the year. In the fourth quarter of 2009, budget
revenues fell by 1.6% of GDP year.on.year. Revenues from foreign
economic activity decreased by 2.4% of GDP – the worst fall in all
groups of budget revenues – because of the fall in oil product
prices and consequent reduction in export duties. The economic
downturn resulted in a reduction in profit tax.based revenues equal
to 1.3% of GDP. Excise tax collection decreased by 0.4% of GDP,
and revenues based on taxes on revenues (except for VAT)
decreased by 1% of GDP because of the prior agriculture support
tax cut to 1% of companies’ revenues from 2%.
Budget expenditures shrank 3% on the year in 2009 to 46.6%
of GDP. In nominal terms, expenditures decreased 11.8%. National
expenditures fell by 2.4% of GDP, spending on the national
economy decreased by 0.8% of GDP, partly because of the
reduction in state subsidies paid to oil importers. Social expen.
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ditures were the only budget item to increase in 2009 (in per cent
of GDP) – they rose by 1% of GDP in 2009 because of a 9.3% rise
in pensions. Consolidated budget deficit thus swung to a deficit
of 0.7% of GDP in 2009 from a surplus in 2008 amounting to 1.4%
of GDP.
In late December 2009, the government adopted the key
parameters of the 2010 budget, envisaging the abolition of
payments to the agriculture support fund, local taxes on sales, tax
on vehicle sale and car park tax. At the same time, the value.added
tax rate was increased to 20% from 18%. Another essential
amendment to the traditional budget pattern is the withdrawal of
the Social Security Fund (SSF) from the consolidated budget. As a
result, budget revenues were planned at 30.4% of GDP in 2010 (or
40.7% of GDP, SSF revenues included), expenditures at 31.9% of
GDP (or 42.1% of GDP, SSF expenditures included), and the budget
deficit was projected at 1.5% of GDP. Expenditures totaling 1.4%
of GDP have been included in the surplus fund, which means they
will be financed only if Belarus manages to achieve an 11–13%
GDP growth this year and budget revenues grow accordingly.
To offset the abolition of some indirect taxes in 2010, the
government increased excise taxes on all types of fuel 9% in early
2010; however, the move aggravated the situation in the oil.
processing sector, which is already under a tremendous pressure
from the new terms of trade with Russia. Budget adjustments, both
in revenues and expenditures, are very likely in 2010.
Improvements in the situation on foreign markets expected in
2010 allow an optimistic outlook for the Belarusian economy. The
chief task for the government’s economic policy will be to eliminate
the risks and disproportions accumulated throughout 2009.
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BELARUSIAN BANKING SECTOR AND MONEY
MARKET REVIEW 2009
Alexander Mukha
Summary
The severe reduction in export proceeds in 2009 resulted in a slump in foreign
exchange supply in the domestic money market. Imports of commodities and
services, on the other hand, fell less sharply, which bolstered demand for foreign
exchange. Growing expectations of ruble devaluation provided additional
demand for foreign currency, upsetting the balance on the money market. Under
these circumstances, the government and the National Bank of Belarus (NBB)
applied for a StandBy Arrangement (SBA) loan from the International Monetary
Fund (IMF). Following the Fund’s recommendations, the NBB devaluated the
Belarusian ruble on January 2, 2009 and repegged the ruble to a basket of
currencies.
In the second half of the year, the process of dedollarization resumed in Belarus
amid signs of stabilization on the domestic foreign exchange market: the demand
for foreign exchange subsided, while rubledenominated bank deposits
increased, showing that public trust in the ruble had been restored.
Tendencies:
• global economic crisis triggered devaluation expectations and demand for
foreign exchange in Belarus; however, in late 2009, dedollarization resumed;
• ruble devaluation caused foreign trade imbalance;
• key challenges – credit, currency and liquidity risks – remain high.
Devaluation shock
The step devaluation of the Belarusian ruble against the U.S. dollar
by 20.5% to 2,650 rubles to the dollar from 2,200 rubles on January
2, 2009 followed by a re.peg to a basket of currencies (consisting
of the U.S. dollar, the euro, and the Russian ruble, with equal
weights) was one of last year’s key events. After a decade.long
respite from the previous step devaluation (in 1998, after the
August financial crisis in Russia), the one.off drop in the value of
the national currency came as a shock for households. To compare:
in 1998, the ruble was devaluated by 348.1%, whereas since the
beginning of the global crisis in August 2008, the national currency
has been devaluated by 37.6%, to 2,905 rubles to the dollar as of
February 18, 2010 from 2,111 rubles in August 2008.
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Despite the devaluation, Belarus saw spiking net demand
(demand minus supply) for foreign currency since the global
financial and economic crisis erupted. There were two reasons
behind the increase in net demand for foreign currency: firstly,
currency supply dropped because of a decline in exports, and
secondly, the demand for foreign exchange hiked as a result of
devaluation expectations, shift of currency preferences towards
foreign currency and extensive repayment of external loans.
In the period from September 2008 through February 2009, net
demand for foreign currency from all domestic money market
players reached a new record high of U.S. $5.078 billion (up from
U.S. $415.1 million in January.August 2008), which included U.S.
$2.986 billion of net demand for foreign currency from corporate
entities, U.S. $2 billion of net demand from households and U.S.
$108.8 million of net demand from banks; non.residents, on the
other hand, sold U.S. $17.8 million in foreign exchange in excess
of purchases. There is no saying what could have happened to
Belarus’ gold and foreign exchange reserves and the national
economy as a whole had the government failed to attract loans
from Russia, Venezuela and the IMF, totaling U.S. $2.788 billion
(overall external financing, including Russian Gazprom’s U.S. $625
million payment for a shareholding in Beltransgaz, totaled U.S.
$3.413 billion).
The one.off devaluation of the ruble predictably resulted in a
transfer of ruble.denominated deposits of households to foreign
exchange deposits. Moreover, retail foreign exchange deposits
exceeded savings in rubles for the first time ever. The share of
currency deposits rose in 2009 to a level recorded back in 2002.
Before the crisis, households and companies used to spend and
save rubles more willingly than foreign exchange: the share of
ruble.denominated bank deposits of households ranged between
63.7% and 68.3% in 2007.2008, up from 26% in 1999 (after the 1998
crisis). However, by January 1, 2010, the share of foreign exchange.
denominated deposits had reached 55.9%, up from 41.7% in early
2009 and 32.6% on November 1, 2008, just a few weeks into the
crisis. Ruble.denominated retail deposits made up 44.1% of the
total as of January 1, 2010, down from 58.3% on January 1, 2009
and 67.4% on November 1, 2008.
Furthermore, according to our estimates, households have up
to U.S. $3.5–4 billion in savings stored at home. It would however
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be very difficult to lure at least some of this money back into the
economy.
Competitiveness of exporters
One of the objectives of the ruble devaluation was to increase
the price competitiveness of Belarusian exporters in conditions
where the main trade partners saw their national currencies
depreciate against the dollar. In 2008, the real effective rate of the
Belarusian ruble against the basket of currencies of the main trade
partners appreciated by 17.75% (December on December, allowing
for inflation rates in partner countries), whereas in 2009, the
devaluation reduced the nominal exchange rate by 19.77% against
the basket.
The ruble real exchange index was thus brought back to the
pre.crisis level. Moreover, National Bank Governor Petr
Prokopovich believes the ruble could appreciate against the
basket of currencies in 2010. For this year, the central bank had
set a peg to the basket of three currencies with a ±10% band
around central parity (the starting point being 1,036.27 rubles
vis.а.vis the basket as of December 31, 2009), which means the
ruble is projected to fluctuate between 932.64 rubles and 1,139
rubles to the basket.
However, the January 2009 devaluation of the ruble was not
enough to balance foreign trade: currency proceeds fell by U.S.
$11.876 billion, or 31.4%, year.on.year in 2009 to U.S. $25.911
billion, whereas payments for imports reduced by only U.S. $10.795
billion, or 26.6%, to U.S. $29.791 billion. As a result, Belarusian
export.import operations demonstrated a deficit of U.S. $3.88
billion in 2009, which compares to U.S. $2.799 billion logged in
2008.
In this situation, any reduction in the real exchange rate of
the Belarusian ruble would help anchor inflation processes, but
not devaluate the national currency in nominal terms. Real
sector enterprises should therefore be looking for sources of
increasing their competitive power in improving the quality of
their products and services, raising the share of innovative
products, cutting selling prices and attracting FDI instead of
insisting on having the ruble devaluated by the monetary
authorities again.
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DeEdollarization is back
As the money market grew more stable in the second half of 2009, de.
dollarization processes resumed: net sale of foreign exchange by
households reached U.S. $205.7 million, while individual deposits in
Belarusian rubles increased by 995.9 billion rubles in July.December.
It seemed trust in the national currency had been restored.
The current level of Belarusian gold and foreign exchange
reserves (U.S. $5.653 billion as of January 1, 2010, under IMF
SDDR) will suffice to smooth money market fluctuations and serve
as an additional guarantee of financial stability, at least in the short
run. Moreover, the IMF forecasts a substantial increase in
Belarusian reserves, to a new record high of U.S. $7.2 billion by
the end of 2010. The Fund projects Belarusian gold and foreign
exchange reserves at U.S. $15.4 billion by the end of 2014.
MediumEterm risks
Attention must be paid to the fact that the U.S. $2.591 billion
increase in gold and foreign exchange reserves in 2009 was entirely
based on external loans, payments for state property and SDR
allocation, totaling U.S. $5.145 billion. If Belarus had been left on
its own, gold and foreign exchange reserved would have plunged
by U.S. $2.553 billion.
The country’s international reserve assets, formed exclusively
by external loans and payments for state property, are not sufficient
under international standards. Under the IMF methodology, gold
and foreign exchange reserves in an economy are at an adequate
level if they cover three months’ worth of imports. Belarus falls
short of this standard with reserves able to cover 1.65 months’ worth
of imports. Since payments for import of commodities and services
were at U.S. $3.422 billion in December 2009, Belarus needs to
accumulate at least U.S. $10.26 billion in reserves in order to meet
the IMF standard.
However, countries that export commodities subject to high
price volatility, and this holds for Belarus, are advised to have
sufficient reserves to cover six months’ worth of imports, not three
(the Central Bank of Chile and the National Bank of Poland uphold
this criterion). This means Belarus should have at least U.S. $20.53
billion in reserves, 3.6 times the volume it has today.
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At the same time, it should be emphasized that further increases
in external borrowing could result in additional macroeconomic
and financial risks. Belarus’ foreign liabilities total U.S. $21 billion
(this includes the loans received in the fourth quarter of 2009),
and if this trend remains, the foreign debt.to.GDP ratio will exceed
the 50–60% threshold in two or three years.
Between October 1, 2009 and October 1, 2010, Belarusian
citizens will have to pay, or refinance, a total of U.S. $9.187 billion
worth of short.term external loans. Only principal debts are
included here, whereas overall payments under short.term foreign
debts, including the principal, interests, dividends, commissions,
etc., will amount to U.S. $10.10.5 billion.
Another important aspect is that overdue external
indebtedness rose 33.6% in the first three quarters of 2009 to U.S.
$797.6 million as of October 1, 2009. The increase in the current
foreign debt may threaten both companies (if they fail to gain
profits sufficient to cover the principal and interests) and the state
as the owner (the main risk is the loss of property in case of
bankruptcy and resulting negative image).
It cannot be ruled out that in the medium term, foreign
borrowing will not be enough to cover the balance of payment
deficit, because additional borrowing means additional spending
on debt service. As a result, the Belarusian ruble may lose its value
once more, whereas some corporate borrowers may run the risk of
going bankrupt.
The IMF loan repayment schedule looks as follows: U.S. $12.7
million in 2009, U.S. $74.4 million in 2010, U.S. $78 million in 2011,
U.S. $456.7 million in 2012, U.S. $1,704.4 million in 2013 and U.S.
$1,366.9 million in 2014, and U.S. $83.8 million in 2015. This means
the heaviest debt service burden is scheduled for 2012.2014.
Furthermore, Belarus will have to start repaying Russian state
loans, with a burden distributed evenly throughout the next ten
years.
Banks’ troubled assets
Amid the crisis, the key risks in the financial sector of the country
are the credit risk, liquidity risk and foreign exchange risk.
As of January 1, 2010, debts under loans and other active
operations of commercial banks stood at 66.288 trillion rubles, up
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37.5% compared with 2009. Troubled (extended and overdue) debts
rose more than 120% under the national methodology in 2009, to
657.9 billion rubles as of January 1, 2010. In December, troubled
debts fell by 255 billion rubles, or 27.9%, which indicates an
improvement in the financial position and financial discipline of
borrowers. On the other hand, the decrease may be caused by
banks’ efforts to make their financial reports look nicer and “mask”
soured debts to avoid additional expenditures on provisioning for
loans.
Banks frequently extend untied loans to defaulted borrowers
so that they could repay earlier loans (in December 2009, banks’
loan portfolio expanded by 2.49 trillion rubles). This scenario does
not seem to help, though, but aggravates the already unfavorable
situation and facilitates risk accumulation. Furthermore, the
increase in troubled assets (by international standards), by 250%
in 2009 alone to 3.014 trillion rubles as of January 1, 2009, is also
alarming.
However, reserves for assets subject to credit exposure are
formed based on the national methodology. By January 1, 2010,
special reserves (for possible credit loss) had reached 1.353 trillion
rubles, representing an increase of 120% from the level of January
1, 2009. The share of troubled loans in the banking system stood
at 0.95% as of January 1, 2010, and troubled assets made up 4.24%
of the total (in 2010, the National Bank has raised the ceiling for
troubled assets in the banking sector to 10% from 5%).
The gap between long.term assets and liabilities of banks kept
widening in 2009, indicating growing liquidity risks, which were
mostly concentrated in the two largest banks of the country –
Belarusbank and Belagroprombank (they are involved in financing
state problems more than other systemic banks). At the same time,
all commercial banks saw access to borrowings, both on the
domestic and foreign financial markets, narrow in 2009.
As inflows of resources from corporate entities, households and
administrations ran low (or stopped completely), the National Bank
remained the only source of support for commercial banks. Last
year, NBB funds in the resource base of commercial banks hiked
by 5.199 trillion rubles, or 160%, to 8.437 trillion rubles as of January
1, 2010. This significant increase in support coming from the central
bank prevented a “paralysis” of settlements in the banking system
and the economy as a whole.
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We believe it would be logical for the monetary authorities to
pursue the following policies: to further reduce the refinancing
rate (it went down to 13% on February 17, 2010), narrow the spread
between the refinancing rate and rates on bank liquidity support
operations (the ceiling is now 20.5%) and curtail (or set zero.rated)
reserve requirements for corporate and retail deposits.
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LABOR MARKET AND SOCIAL POLICY:
CONTROVERSIAL TARGETS:
WAGE PUSH AND PRESERVATION
OF EMPLOYMENT
Kiryl Haiduk
Summary
The repercussions of the global financial crisis on the Belarusian labor market
and social security system were felt throughout 2009. The underemployment
rate soared, while real wages dropped. The priority task for the government
was to preserve the number of jobs, and this was relatively successful.
The authorities still perceive the crisis as a temporary inconvenience. Wage
controls have been slackened a bit – both for senior managers and wage
workers. At the same time, the economy has entered the “election phase”, and
a U.S. $500 monthly wage target has been officially set. The ambitious plans to
raise wages this high while keeping the employment rate unchanged seem
impracticable, but even if the government succeeds, the country will have to
pay the price of rampant inflation and significant increases in external debt in
2011–2012.
Tendencies:
• the beginning of a demographically motivated reduction in workforce;
• the main way to respond to the crisis affecting foreign markets is to allow a
loss of working hours and increase in the underemployment rate, especially
in the manufacturing sector;
• minor reductions in real wages;
• wage controls have been slackened;
• preparations have started to have the political business cycle peak in late
2010early 2011;
• slight changes in the social security system have been outlined, but
fundamental measures are still at early planning stages.
Demographic indicators and labor market situation
Belarus had 9.48 million inhabitants as of late 2009. Although the
number of Belarusians fell by 13,000 people last year, the decrease
in population did not accelerate. The year 2009 was marked by a
narrower gap between the number of able.bodied citizens and
economically active population (workforce). The share of the
workforce, at around 4.52 million people, was at 46.7% of the total
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population in 2008, whereas in 2009, the figures were at 4.62 million
people and 48.7%. The share of able.bodied citizens remained
unchanged at 62%.
However, experts expect a reduction in the share of able.
bodied citizens in the next decade, the key reason being the decline
in birth rate in the 1990s and the fact that those born after WWII
will reach retirement age. He only way out now is to encourage an
increase in birth rate, because net inflows of migrants, registered
in the past few years, are not sufficient to make up for the
difference. In 2009, the number of migrants (mostly from Russia,
Kazakhstan and Ukraine) rose almost 50% on the year to 12,249
people (compared to 8,145 people in 2008), thus cutting the natural
population loss by almost half.
In turn, Belarusians are willing to leave the country to make
more money abroad. Last year alone, about 2,500 Belarusians
applied for residence permits in Lithuania (about 26% of the total
number of applications); more than 50% of them are connected
with employment issues, although it is almost half as many as in
20081.
The occupational structure remained almost unchanged in
2009: the service sector still dominates, while the manufacturing
sector and agribusiness accounted for 27.2%, down from 27.6%
in 2008, and 12% (no change) respectively. The construction
sector saw an increase in the number of the employed by 4.5%,
or 12,000 people, and so did the housing and public utilities
sector, with a 2.8% rise in the number of new jobholders, or 5,000
people.
According to job centers, the demand for blue collar workers
remains very high, almost 150% above the number of jobseekers,
whereas vacancies for specialists and white collar workers made
up only 23% of the total number, the same as in 2008. At the same
time, despite the absence of changes in the structure of demand
for personnel, in 2009, the number of vacancies in Belarusian job
centers fell 38% on the year to 34,500. The trend is likely to continue
in 2010.
In 2009, 869,400 people were hired (the figure includes 62,100
new jobs), down 9% from the 2008 level (the number of jobs created
in 2009 fell 13% on the year).
1 TUT.by: http://news.tut.by/society/162702.html.
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The contractual employment system marked its 10th
anniversary in 2009. According to the Federation of Trade Unions
of Belarus, about 35% of all job contracts were concluded for 12
months2 (the data cover the first three quarters). In turn, the
Federation suggested passing a law envisaging the possibility of
termless job contracts for “disciplined” workers, whereas
independent democratic trade unions (the Belarusian Congress
of Democratic Trade Unions and Belarusian Trade Union of
Workers of the Radioelectronic Industry) called for abolishing the
contractual employment system, as it failed to substantially
increase labor productivity, while contracts became a handy
instrument to fire “unwanted” workers.
The reduction in demand on foreign markets produced a
serious impact on employment in the manufacturing sector and
the economy as a whole. The dramatic increase in the
underemployment rate became the most significant result of the
global crisis in the Belarusian labor market, especially in the
industrial sector, which accounts for 87.8% of the total loss of
working hours. Deputy Prime Minister Andrei Kobyakov outlined
the priority of the state labor policy: prevention of growth in official
unemployment3 and wage reductions. This policy seems to agree
with people’s preferences, as only 10% of the population approve
of “shock treatment”, as President Lukashenko told Belarusian
news media4.
According to the Belarusian Statistics Committee (Belstat),
357,000 workers, or 10% of the average monthly workforce, were
made to work part time in 2009, compared to 3.9% in 2008. Of them,
23% were sent on unpaid leaves, and more than 200,000 worked
short weeks. The underemployment rate was short of the 1995
record of 983,000 workers or about 500,000 workers registered in
2002 and 2007, and settled close to the rate reported in 2004. The
2009 leaders by losses of working hours were the Minsk and Gomel
Regions.
Forced leaves turned into wage cuts for wage workers: under
current labor regulations, the employer is entitled to send an
2 Ezhednevnik.by: http://www.ej.by/news/2009.10.05/kontraktnaya_
sistema_nayma_v_belarusi_budet_smyagc.html.
3 TUT.by: http://news.tut.by/155469.html.
4 TUT.by: http://news.tut.by/156594.html.
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employee on a leave with two.thirds of the pay rate. Although the
employee’s consent to this scheme is required, given the hard
economic situation, most workers chose a three.day week instead
of unemployment. In turn, the Ministry of Labor and Social
Protection offered the workers on forced leaves additional
opportunities to participate in paid community services. The
package of measures adopted this year includes the abolition of
restrictions on multiple employment for workers sent on forced
unpaid leaves. In 2009, a 20.hour.per.week limit was imposed on
additional jobs.
Unemployment
The definition of unemployment was not revised in 2009. The
government chose to avoid a growth in official unemployment
believing that the crisis of the global economy was transient. The
average unemployment rate reached 0.9% in Belarus, whereas in
the Vitebsk, Grodno and Gomel Regions, it was at 1.1%, in the Brest
and Mogilev Regions, 1%, and in some districts, 1.6% to 2%. The
government had expected the number of officially registered
jobless Belarusians in excess of 1% in 2009, but the number of
“officially accounted for” unemployed people increased 8% last
year (25% in Minsk alone). The number of people who applied to
job centers rose 4%, and the number of those registered as
unemployed went up 6.1%.
There were no workforce surveys in Belarus last year, except
for the pilot one; therefore, it is hard to gauge the real
unemployment level. If we simply add those on forced leaves to
the official figure, we will have 2.7%–3%. Household surveys also
shed light on the situation with employment: according to these
data, the real number of jobless citizens is at least six times higher
than the official statistics, which means the actual unemployment
rate is close to 5.4%–5.8%.
The unemployment situation was not stable in 2009: most of
the unemployed were registered in August 2009, 44,600 people,
which was followed by a downward trend all the way to December,
when 40,300 jobless people were registered. The official growth in
the unemployment rate resulted in higher allowances for the
unemployed moving to rural areas (they were raised to seven
subsistence wages from five), whereas subsidies to jobless
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Belarusians starting their businesses in the countryside were
increased to 15 subsistence wages from 11.
In 2010, the number of officially registered unemployed
Belarusians is expected to increase to 1.2–1.5% of the total
workforce, which is projected at 4.74 million people. Based on these
forecasts, some 154 billion Belarusian rubles (over U.S. $50 million)
will be spent on employment promotion, including financing of
paid community services for 90,500 people.
Wages
The average monthly wage shrank 0.4% in real terms in 2009,
reaching 998,300 rubles, the equivalent of U.S. $356, although in
December 2009, wages rose 6.5% month.on.month to 1.093 million
rubles, or U.S. $384. Wages were highest in the construction sector,
whereas in mechanical engineering and metalworking they fell
10%. Regionwise, the Minsk and Gomel Regions paid highest
wages, and the Mogilev Region paid least of all.
Wage and salary cuts did not affect directors of private
companies and key specialists. According to Alfa.Bank analysts,
Belarus had about 10,000 U.S. dollar millionaires5. A similar figure,
between 7,000 and 10,000, was mentioned by the Priorbank CEO
in 20076.
The year 2009 saw changes in rules of wage calculation, which
applied both to senior executives and wage workers. In November,
the government adopted a resolution allowing increases in salaries
of directors of enterprises, organizations and banks starting
January 1, 2010. Scale.up factors used to work only for enterprises
subordinate to the state authorities, whereas the new rules enable
all enterprises irrespective of their ownership to pay directors up
to eight times the average wage paid at the enterprise.
On September 1, 2009, the state altered the procedure of
application of the Unified tariff system (which forms the basis of
the Belarusian system of wage calculation), allowing directors of
enterprises to additionally encourage their employees by raising
wage rates up to 300%.
5 TUT.by: http://news.tut.by/160910.html.
6 Naviny.by: http://naviny.by/rubrics/finance/2007/03/30/ic_news_
114_268869.
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Formally, the mechanism of application of the Unified tariff
system was simplified, but the new procedure makes it necessary
to justify the increase in wages and document it correctly (using
the acts regulating employment issues and labor remuneration,
including collective wage agreements, contracts and regulations
on compensations). In case of any mistakes, the employer will run
the risk of being fined 100 base units, or about U.S. $1,170. The
new norms call for a revision of internal regulations, hence
additional expenses. The new rules also allow reducing wages. It
is noteworthy that the ratios between compensations and
qualifications of workers within the framework of the Unified tariff
system were revised 11 times in the period 2002 through 2009.
Last year, the economic security department with the State
Secretariat of the Security Council of Belarus jointly with the
Finance Ministry called for abolishing the Unified tariff system;
the state agencies repeated the proposal that representatives of
Belarusian businesses had put forward long before. Private
commercial enterprises often find it problematic that in order to
increase the level of compensation for a single employee they need
to increase the first grade wage rate and the wage bill for the entire
enterprise. As a result, businesses tend to pay cash in envelopes to
be able to pay bonuses and restrain growth increases. One of the
greatest advantages of the Unified tariff system for the Ministry of
Labor and Social Protection is that it helps even out wage
differentials. The difference in wages paid to the most highly.paid
and low.paid categories of workers fell to 3.6 times from 6.7 times
in 2000–2009 (there was hardly any change in 2008 and 2009).
The Ministry has been working on a bill to abolish the Unified
tariff system starting June 1, 2010. Furthermore, the government
in early 2010 announced plans to cut mandatory transfers to the
Social Security Fund7 to reduce the tax burden on businesses.
Although there has been no substantial progress yet, the very fact
that the state has been paying more attention to labor
compensation may be regarded as an achievement.
In 2009, social security transfers made up 11.3% of GDP,
reaching about 14.5 trillion Belarusian rubles (about U.S. $4.87
billion), whereas wages accounted for 31% of GDP. The plans to
reduce payments to the Social Security Fund in 2010, not sooner
7 TUT.by: http://news.tut.by/159990.html.
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or later, were made for a good reason, namely, to help the
government meet the politically motivated promise and raise the
average monthly wage to U.S. $500 by the end of the year. This is
a very sharp increase indeed, and even the previous “election”
years, that is, 2001 and 2006, saw nothing of this kind. This wage
push would increase the tax burden on companies, while
reductions in payments to the Social Security Fund are projected
to cut the tax load.
Social security and pension systems
In 2009, two legislative acts concerning the disabled came into
effect in Belarus: “On prevention of disabilities and rehabilitation
of the disabled” and “On social protection of the disabled in
Belarus”. As of January 1, 2010, there were 506,700 incapacitated
people in Belarus, down 0.5% from January 1, 2009, and the primary
disablement level of working age population decreased 1.8% in
2009 to 32.8 per 10,000 inhabitants from 33.4.
Last year, approaches to the provision of targeted social
assistance were changed by presidential ordinance #458 “On state
social assistance” (it came into effect on January 1, 2010). The
document increased the neediness limit to 150% of the subsistence
wage from 120%, thus allowing payments of lump.sum allowances
to those earning between 120% and 150% of the minimum wage,
and doubled the period of provision of monthly social allowances
to six months. Also, the document introduces social assistance for
acquisition of rehabilitation equipment.
In 2009, targeted assistance was granted to 205,900 people,
about a third of those recognized as the needy, to the amount of
40.2 billion Belarusian rubles (U.S. $13.6 million). The number of
lower.income Belarusians requiring assistance decreased slightly
in 2009 to 6.5% of the total population. Social allowances remained
low, for instance, a lump.sum allowance was at 174,000 rubles, or
U.S. $62, and the average monthly allowance per capita reached
only 65,400 rubles, or U.S. $23.
The package of social support measures includes preferential
home loans. Last year, soft loans extended for construction or
acquisition of housing amounted to 4.555 trillion rubles (U.S. $1.6
billion), or 3.3% of GDP, which was 32% above the original lending
target for 2009. Belarusbank provided 75% of such loans.
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Concessional home loans are projected to reach 6.8 trillion rubles
(U.S. $2.28 billion) in 2010; all of them will be granted by
Belarusbank and Belagroprombank.
Pensions averaged 398,000 rubles a month in 2009, or about
U.S. $142, representing a fall by 4% from 2008. The average pension
made up 40% of the average monthly wage in 2009, down from
42% in 2008. There were certain regulatory changes concerning
pensions in 2009, but all of them came into effect on January 1,
2010. The state doubled the tax.deductible sum to 48 base units
from 24 for workers who conclude supplementary pension
agreements and take out policies for voluntary life insurance for
five years and voluntary medical expenses insurance.
Challenges of 2010
The two key challenges of the year 2010 are to keep the
employment rate low and reach a U.S. $500 average wage in the
national economy. Some positive moves have already been made:
companies have been enabled to increase wages in the scope of
the Unified tariff system and the minimum wage was raised to
258,600 rubles (U.S. $92) on January 1, 2010 from 229,700 rubles
(U.S. $87) on January 1, 2009.
The U.S. $500 wage target seems too high a bar for an open
economy amid a sharp decrease in demand on foreign outlets. Even
if the government manages to accelerate GDP to 11%–13% in 2010,
and consumer inflation remains within 9%–11%8, wages will have
to be raised about 30%, to U.S. $500 from U.S. $384. If the ruble
exchange rate remains stable, the only way to reach the target is
to reduce the workforce, because there is no way Belarus will
manage to achieve an adequate increase in labor productivity.
However, since preservation of employment is the number one
priority for the government, it is only through inflation hikes that
the average wage may reach the coveted U.S. $500 this year.
Furthermore, such a serious increase in wages might affect the
current account and inflate the already growing external debt.
Given the absolute priority of macroeconomic stability in the
official economic policy, the new record high wage may only be
8 Official website of the Council of Ministers: http://www.government.by/
ru/rus_interview20091217.html.
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achieved on paper, that is, it may be recorded statistically (by
excluding lower.paid categories and those working short weeks,
etc.), whereas real wage will turn out to be short of the target. The
authorities may as well change their mind as to the wage target
and offer wage workers another carrot instead, for instance, a less
stringent contractual employment system (which will never be
abolished, though).
The year 2010 will be a “political” year for the labor market.
The peak of the political business cycle will be observed during
pre.election months, and the “cost” of the cycle may prove very
high because of the efforts to raise wages while keeping the
employment rate at the pre.crisis level.
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ENERGY SECTOR: RENT CUTS
Yelena Rakova
Summary
Belarus enjoyed serious energy price advantages compared to the rest of the
region in 2009, despite the dramatic change in terms of Russian energy supplies.
The energy sector therefore sustained its dominating position in the country’s
economy, and there was no need for revising energy policies. Neither the drop
in the profitability of Belarusian oil refining, nor Russian plans to develop oil
transit routes alternative to Belarus motivated the government to launch energy
reforms and start looking for alternative suppliers of raw materials. The same
holds for natural gas, as its share in the country’s energy consumption remained
unchanged.
Energy tariffs for households and industrial consumers did not change much;
moreover, due to implemented in January 2009 devaluation of national currency,
in dollar terms they even had a slight decrease in rates. The only major revision
in the government’s energy policy may be triggered by the plans to build the
first Belarusian nuclear power plant; however, the economics of the project
and its role in enhancing the country’s energy security are not obvious.
Tendencies:
• preservation of preferential prices of Russian energy imports spared the
authorities the need to revise the structure of the energy sector, basic
principles of its operation and its role in securing the stability of the Belarusian
economic model;
• total dependence on Russia as the supplier of cheap energy resources and
for that matter the guarantor of economic stability remained;
• government’s efforts to ensure energy and economic security are mainly
focused on plans to build the country’s first nuclear power plant.
Oil sector
The oil industry retained its dominant position in the Belarusian
economy in 2009. The two oil refineries – Novopolotsk.based oil
refinery (OAO Naftan, in Vitebsk Region) and OAO Mozyr NPZ
refinery, in Gomel Region, – processed a total of 21.65 million
tons of crude oil in 2009, almost the same as in 2007–2008. OAO
Naftan processed 10.7 million tons of crude, up 2.8% from 2008,
and OAO Mozyr NPZ refined 10.95 million tons of oil, up 0.03%
on the year.
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Both refineries issued shares in 2002, when the government
planned to sell controlling stakes to Russian investors. Russia
controls 42.6% in OAO Mozyr NPZ1, whereas Naftan is almost 100%
controlled by the Belarusian government. In 2008, the government
decided to merge OAO Naftan and oil and chemical company
OAO Polimir (which almost completely depends on the Vitebsk
Region.based refinery)2. Belarus and Russia negotiated the
possibility of privatization of the Naftan.Polimir complex in 2008–
2009 (Lukoil and Rosneft were named the most probable buyers,
however, the conditions laid down by the Belarusian side made
the acquisition unprofitable for the potential investor). Since there
was no strategic private investor, the state managed to substantially
modernize the refineries on its own to increase processing volumes
and improve the quality of oil products.3
Despite the fact that domestic crude oil production is
insignificant, refined oil products remained crucial Belarusian
exports, providing a substantial part of the country’s foreign
exchange revenues (Table 1). Belarusian oil product exports kept
growing in the past few years, to 15.5 million tons in 2009 from 7.7
million tons in 2001. However, return on sales almost halved in
2009 from the 2008 level because of export price reductions and
high customs duties on imports of Russian crude.4 As a result, the
1 The State Property Committee of Belarus holds a 42.76% stake, Gazpromneft
and TNK.BP (the co.owners of OAO NGK Slavneft hold a combined stake
of 42.58%; ООО MNPZ Plus controls a 12.25% shareholding (owned by the
Belarusian state since 2005); and individuals control the remaining 2.41%.
2 The state used to control 99.8% in each, unspecified individuals were said
to control the rest.
3 Naftan General Director Vyacheslav Yakushev said at an investment and
economic forum on November 13, 2009 that Naftan’s development program
required U.S. $1.3 billion in investments; see http://naviny.by/rubrics/
economic/2009/11/13/ic_news_113_321216/.
4 Belarus had for many years profited from imports of cheap Russian crude oil
by keeping the difference between Russian domestic oil prices and high
global prices for oil and oil products. In January 2007, Belarus and Russia
signed an agreement on supplies of Russian crude oil to Belarus in 2007–
2009. Russia reduced the rate of export duty applied to oil deliveries to Belarus
to U.S. $53 per ton from U.S. $180, the standard duty Russia applied to exports
elsewhere (or to 29.3% of the standard export duty; in 2009, Belarus had to
pay 35.6% of the standard duty). The agreement also regulated the distribution
of revenues from exports of light oil products refined from Russian crude: in
2009, 85% of the export duty was transferred to the Russian budget.
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state had to pay the refineries and Russian suppliers that worked
under processing terms a special budget subsidy.
The profitability of the oil.processing sector of Belarus keeps
decreasing. In January.November 2009, it went down to 5.3% from
7% in 2008 and 12% in 2007, which is lower than the average return
rate for the industrial sector. Revenues from customs duties applied
to exports of refined oil made up less than 7% of overall state budget
revenues in 2009, which compares to 12% in 2008.
Table 1. Oil product export dynamics
Source: Belarusian National Statistics Committee (Belstat), author’s own
calculations
On the domestic market, oil product prices were growing
insignificantly: according to Belstat, gasoline prices rose 10% in
2009 (December on December)5. This was caused by populist
policies aimed at protecting households and farms, as well as
competition for transit road carriers (to encourage them to fill up
in Belarus instead of neighboring countries). Taxes and excise
taxes make up about 50% of Belarusian gasoline prices. The
domestic refineries and Russian oil traders that operate filling
stations in Belarus report losses when selling oil products on the
Belarusian market, however, they have managed to compensate
using high export revenues and state subsidies.
Acquisition of the Belarusian refineries at prices that the
government has set (for instance, investors are expected to pay
U.S. $3 billion for Naftan.Polimir) will hardly prove profitable
for investors. Firstly, the profitability of refining has been falling
because of Russian export duties imposed on crude oil deliveries:
in January.September 2009, OAO Naftan netted only U.S. $44
million in profits.6  Secondly, the refineries have to make
5 АI.92 gasoline cost 2,470 Belarusian rubles per liter (U.S. $0.90) compared
to 2,220 rubles (U.S. $1.00) in December 2008.
6 See: http://news.tut.by/158873.html.
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substantial transfers to the targeted budget national development
fund; the volume of annual transfers is established arbitrarily at
the top level.
Thirdly, apart from setting selling prices too high, Belarus has
special requirements for potential investors (preservation of jobs
and social infrastructure, large.scale investment programs, etc.),
therefore, investors cannot be certain that investments will pay
back even in the medium term. Russia will agree to buy into the
Belarusian oil sector only if the Belarusian government cuts prices,
whereas Belarus will only sell its oil.processing assets when it
requires external financing very badly, or when the profitability
of refining drops too far. Both might happen as early as 2010 or
2011.
The significance of oil transit, too, has been falling. The
suspension of the Baltic Druzhba pipelines by Russia and
construction of new pipelines (BTS.2) reduce the importance of
the Belarusian transit route. Moreover, oil transport by rail, which
competes with pipelines, complicates “oil blackmail” (and makes
transport tariff growth hardly possible). Belarusian oil.mains
provided transit of 89.6 million tons of Russian oil in 2009, up 5.3%
from 20087.
Gas sector
Natural gas is a strategic raw material for the Belarusian economy.
Belarus has increased the share of gas in its overall energy
consumption to 80% currently from 43% in 1990 in a bid to reduce
production costs of domestic enterprises owing to cheap imports
from Russia. This raises energy security risks, given that Russia
remains the only supplier of natural gas, with its dominating
position in the country’s energy budget (“fuel and energy
balance”).
In 2009, Belarus kept buying natural gas from Russia at
relatively low prices. The contract for gas supplies and transit
for 2007.2011 signed by Gazprom and Beltransgaz (last year,
the Russian gas monopoly controlled a 37.5% stake in Bel.
7 Oil transport is provided by RUP Gomeltransneft Druzhba and Novopolotsk
oil transport enterprise Druzhba. In 2008, both were included in the three.
year privatization plan; both are expected to issue shares in 2010.
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transgaz8) on December 31, 2006 pegged the gas price formula
to the average European price adjusted for the agreed discount
rate. In 2009, Belarus was supposed to pay 80% of the average
European price minus transport costs and the export duty (30%
of the selling price charged by Gazprom). The Belarusian side
had succeeded in having the discount for 2009 increased to 30%
from 20% (that is, to 70% of the average European price).
Because the price of the oil basket, to which the gas tariff is
pegged, changes on a quarterly basis, Belarus saw natural gas fees
change once in every three months. To compare: Ukraine paid U.S.
$230 per 1,000 cubic meters of gas in 2009, and the average
European gas price stood at U.S. $280. Changes in natural gas
import prices are presented in Figure 1.
Figure 1. Gas import price development in 2001–2009
Note: the value.added tax is not included
Source: Belarusian National Statistics Committee
Despite the serious price advantages, Belarus was paying U.S.
$150 per 1,000 cubic meters of natural gas in 2009, the projected
annual average price (the actual average price turned out to be a
bit lower, at U.S. $148 per 1,000 cubic meters, which represents an
increase of 16% year.on.year), although the verbal agreement
between the two presidents enabling Belarus to pay the average
8 Under the five.year contract between Beltransgaz and Gazprom inked on
December 31, 2006, the Russian gas giant acquires a 50% shareholding in
Beltransgaz for U.S. $2.5 billion. The payment is to be transferred in four
equal U.S. $625 million annual tranches in 2007–2010. Gazprom thus
acquires 12.5% in the gas transport company annually.
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price was never officially documented as a supplementary contract.
As a result, Belarus was accumulating its debt for gas during 2009;
however, the U.S. $246 million debt reported in late 2009 was paid
up before the end of the year.
Belarusian natural gas imports in 2009 were 4.5 billion cubic
meters short of the contracted volume of 22.1 billion cubic meters.
Belarus fell behind the gas import schedule (by a third) in the first
few months of 2009, when fuel oil (a reserve fuel) was burnt at
Belarusian TETs cogeneration plants (December 2008.April 2009)
to save expensive Russian gas. The government had decided to
use cheaper fuel oil instead of natural gas, thus saving U.S. $304
million during the heating season.
European consumers reduced Russian gas consumption, too,
and transit volumes going through Belarus fell to 44.2 billion cubic
meters in 2009 from 51.2 billion cubic meters in 2008. Gas transit
is controlled mostly by the Russian side, and Belarusian transit
revenues amount to U.S. $250 million annually, which cannot be
compared to, say, Ukrainian transit proceeds. The construction of
new gas pipelines bypassing Belarus will enable Russia to further
cut the “transit rent”. All attempts of the Belarusian administration
to convince Russia of the efficiency of the construction of a second
Yamal.Europe gas.main line in Belarus have been unsuccessful.
Tariffs for consumers
In 2009, natural gas tariffs for Belarusian industrial consumers
increased 9.8% to U.S. $174.18 per 1,000 cubic meters from U.S.
$158.67, excluding VAT). Tariffs for households rose only once in
2009, on January 1, by 3% for gas supplied for cooking and 20% for
gas supplied for heating. Adjusted for the 20% ruble devaluation
in January 2009, gas tariffs for households declined a bit in U.S.
dollar terms.
Tariffs applied to natural gas provided for heating and hot water
supply during the heating season amounted to 219,000 Belarusian
rubles per 1,000 cubic meters (U.S. $77, down from U.S. $80
previously) whereas summer tariffs reached 462,000 rubles (U.S.
$163, a reduction from U.S. $170). Cross.subsidies remained (lower
tariffs for households are covered by higher tariffs for
manufacturers), which reduces the efficiency of the gas sector and
fails to encourage households to save energy.
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Electrical power sector
The Belarusian power grid includes six independent regional
republican unitary enterprises, or RUPs, also called oblenergos9
and HV power lines connecting them to power grids of neighboring
countries (Russia, Ukraine, Lithuania and Poland). This system is
governed by Belenergo concern, which is accountable to the
Energy Ministry of Belarus. The power grid of the country is a
vertically integrated company, in which generation, transfer and
distribution are not separated.
Electrical power generation in Belarus totaled 30.1 billion
kilowatt.hours (kWh) in 2009, a drop of 14% from 2008. Although
Belarus is capable of meeting its domestic requirement on its own,
it is more profitable to import electricity in summer. Belarusian
imports of power from Russia reached 2.908 billion kWh in 2009,
up 34% on the year.
The government did not raise electricity tariffs for industrial
consumers and households in 2009. In U.S. dollar terms, the
tariff for industrial consumers decreased by 25% and amounted
U.S. 7.4 cents per 1 kWh because of the early year ruble
devaluation. Belarusian households pay U.S. 6.1 cents per
1kWth for power (in 2008 they paid U.S. 8 cents). The return on
sales in electrical power engineering decreased to 4.5% in 2009
from 6.7% in 2008.
Nuclear plant construction
The Security Council of Belarus in 2008 officially determined that
Belarus would build its first nuclear power plant near Ostrovets10,
in Grodno Region. Ostrovets hosted public hearings addressing
the possible environmental impact of the plant in October 2009,
however, both transparency and publicity of the hearings were
doubtful. A competitive tender was conducted to choose the
general contractor, and Russian state corporation Rosatom was
awarded the right to build the plant. Talks with Rosatom continued
9 RUP stands for a Republican Unitary Enterprise. All oblenergos are state.
controlled; there are no plans to turn them into joint.stock companies.
10 Grodno Region; straight distance from the site to Minsk is 134 kilometers,
to Ostrovets, 18 kilometers, to the Lithuanian border, 20 kilometers, and to
Vilnius, 53 kilometers.
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during 2009, but the official contract for the construction of the
nuclear plant was postponed until 2010.
The nuclear plant is projected to save the country around 5
billion cubic meters of natural gas a year (20% of current
consumption) and enable additional electrical power exports.
However, the authorities have not publicized economic feasibility
studies yet. Experts have serious concerns over the following
aspects:
• external debt growth: Belarus is expected to borrow U.S. $9
billion from Russia to build the plant, while external liabilities
have been growing at an alarming pace (reaching U.S. $19.3
billion in the first three quarters of 2009, up 30%);
• price competitiveness of the power generated by the nuclear
plant, given current natural gas prices and debt service costs;
• possibility of exporting electrical power: a few more nuclear
plants are expected to be built in the region (in Kaliningrad,
Lithuania, Poland and Estonia);
• the country’s energy security: growing dependence on Russia
as a creditor and supplier of fuel will hardly contribute to
Belarus’ energy security.
Conclusion
The energy sector plays a crucial role in the Belarusian balance of
trade, budget and economy as a whole. However, systemic risks
are accumulating in the sector, because structural reforms have
been postponed. The efficiency and competitiveness of the energy
sector enterprises are restrained by the shortage of their own or
state budget funds to finance modernization, aggravated by rigid
price and tariff controls. The current policies on privatization and
use of technical assistance of specialized international
organizations impose additional restrictions.
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MORE LOANS INSTEAD OF PRIVATIZATION
Tatiana Manionok
Summary
Contrary to expectation, Belarus failed to accelerate the privatization process
in 2009. The regulatory framework for selling state property was being formed
too slowly and lacked consistency. The number of privatized entities did not
reach the 2008 level, and the total value of privatization deals decreased
compared with the pervious year. The country’s administration resorted to
borrowing from foreign partners – international financial institutions and
Russia – to encourage production by staterun enterprises, while preserving
state ownership of the industrial complex and leaving the existing social and
economic model unchanged. The country was preparing for privatization,
though, by transforming statecontrolled enterprises into jointstock companies
and developing the necessary legal framework. However, privatization appetites
will have to be curbed for the time being.
Tendencies:
• casebycase privatization remained; privatization process slowed;
• development of the regulatory framework for privatization continued;
• foreign loans were used as an alternative to privatization.
Experts and potential investors had pinned high hopes on the
promised acceleration of the pace of privatization in Belarus in
2009. It seemed only natural that the crisis would force the
Belarusian authorities to pursue a more resolute policy regarding
privatization and attraction of direct investments. Moreover, active
privatization was among the key performance criteria for Belarus
established by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) when it
agreed to expand its financing of the economic program for Belarus
under the Stand.By Arrangement by U.S. $1 billion to U.S. $3.52
billion.
Regulatory framework for accelerating privatization
was not established
Despite its pledge, Belarus was developing the regulatory
framework for transparent systemic privatization too slowly, and
the two fundamental privatization documents – the law on
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privatization and a new law on the entities that may be owned
exclusively by the state – were not adopted in 2009.
The Belarusian regulatory framework concerning privatization
needs major adjustments. The current Law on Denationalization
and Privatization of State Property in the Republic of Belarus was
inked by then Chairman of the Supreme Council Stanislav
Shushkevich back in 1993. Many of the original rules have already
been amended by ordinances and instructions of the president.
As a result, privatization is now regulated by presidential Decree
#3 dated March 20, 1998.
The government has attempted to steamroll a new law on
privatization, but to no purpose. The State Property Committee
took over in a bid to meet the country’s commitments to the IMF.
“We intend to deepen and accelerate our program of privatization.
To this end, we have prepared a draft Privatization Law, and are
currently incorporating comments from the World Bank. We
intend to submit this law to Parliament by September 30, 2009,”
Prime Minister Sergei Sidorsky and National Bank Governor Petr
Prokopovich said in a letter to the IMF Director General. The
government had hoped the bill would be passed during the autumn
session of parliament, so that privatization would have a strong
start in 2010.
Both bills – on privatization and entities owned by the state –
had been included well in advance in the list of bills to be
considered in 2009. Both had been thoroughly reviewed and given
a go ahead in all concerned agencies, including the Presidential
Administration. However, the bill on privatization never made it
to the autumn session agenda, because the president turned it
down as conflicting with Decree #3 of March 20, 1998 (the Law
on the President has it that if a bill runs counter to a provisional
presidential decree, it is up to the head of state to decide its fate).
The new bill on the entities that may be owned only by the state,
which was coupled with the privatization bill, was better fated. It did
not have to be approved personally by the president to get to the
lower house of parliament. After lengthy discussions and numerous
approvals it made it to the autumn session agenda, but only had time
for the first read on the final day of the session, December 18.
Besides those two essential documents, the State Property
Committee prepared a Plan of Action to liberalize relations in
utilization of state property and privatization. Under the Plan, the
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government introduced the following amendments to privatization
and property sale procedures1.
– Presidential Decree #10 dated August 6, 2009 On Additional
Conditions for Investment Activity in the Republic of Belarus2.
The document introduces a three.tier system of conclusion of
investment agreements in Belarus; the volume of preferences
depends on the significance of the project. Investors that conclude
investment agreements are offered a package of general preferences,
such as allocation of land without an auction; stage.by.stage
preparation and execution of documents simultaneous with the
process of construction on occupied land plots; and construction of
facilities with simultaneous design of further construction phases;
exemption of imports of production equipment and spare parts
required during the implementation of the investment project from
customs duties and value.added tax, etc. Investors are also exempted
from compensatory payments for transfer and clearance of planted
areas in urban settlements; and from the state duty for issuance of
special work authorizations for foreign citizens engaged in the
investment project by the investor; whereas foreign citizens engaged
in the project are exempted from the state duty for issuance of
temporary residence permits.
– Presidential Ordinance #64 dated February 6, 2009 On
Amendments to Certain Ordinances of the President of the Republic
of Belarus concerning Construction, Withdrawal and Allotment of
Land Plots3.
The document abolishes auctioning procedures during allocation
of land plots to corporate entities and individual entrepreneurs
for construction and maintenance of real property designed to
produce commodities, provide services and perform work.
Auctions remain mandatory for allocation of land plots for
construction of filling stations and in settlements with over 50,000
residents (22 towns as of today).
1 For details, see.: Rakova E. Privatization in the Republic of Belarus:
Monitoring of Fundamental Changes (January – December 2009):
www.belinstitute.eu.
2 See.: http://pravo.by/webnpa/text.asp?RN=Pd0900010.
3 See.: http://pravo.by/webnpa/text.asp?RN=p30900064.
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– Presidential Ordinance #232 dated May 5, 2009 On Certain
Aspects of Holding Auctions (Tenders)4.
The document bans charges imposed on bidders in auctions and
competitive tenders for arranging and holding of and bidding in
auctions and tenders. Expenses incurred by the arranger of
auctions and tenders will be paid by the preferred bidder. The
ordinance also specifies procedures to set the starting prices of
real estate auctioned on the basis of a court ruling. Also, the
document makes it possible to sell real property even if the auction
is declared invalid because there is only one bidder.
– Presidential Ordinance #238 dated May 7, 2009 On
Amendments to Certain Ordinances of the President of the Republic
of Belarus concerning Utilization of State Property.
According to the document, decisions to sell state property may
be taken without documents confirming state registration of
property titles. Revenues from gratuitous transfer of state property
to private corporate entities and individual entrepreneurs are
exempted from taxes.
– Presidential Ordinance #518 dated October 23, 2009 On Certain
Aspects of Lease and Free Use of Property5.
The document introduces norms aimed at simplifying lease
relations. The amendments apply a unified approach to property
lease and ensure transparency and publicity of lease transactions.
Furthermore, the ordinance simplifies the procedure of calculation
of lease fees, streamlines lease contracting and facilitates a more
rational and efficient use of state property.
– Presidential Ordinance #622 dated December 11, 2009 On
Improving the Regulation of Land Relations and State Control over
the Use and Protection of Land.
The document simplifies the procedure of selling unused state
property in national (republican) ownership in the form of
permanent structures (buildings, constructions), uncompleted
permanent structures under construction and uncompleted
4 See.: http://www.pravo.by/webnpa/text.asp?RN=p30900232.
5 See.: http://www.pravo.by/webnpa/text.asp?RN=p30900238.
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permanent structures under suspended construction at auctions
with the opening price set at one base unit.
Transactions as a measure of last resort
The State Property Committee never stopped transforming state.
owned enterprises into joint.stock companies trying its best to
meet the target, and it did succeed.
Last year, 169 state.run enterprises went public. Only two
failed – the Hotel Sport in Minsk and Republican Unitary
Enterprise (RUP) Beltelecom. Beltelecom was not on the original
list of the enterprises that were supposed to issue shares in 2009,
but the government included it by its resolution № 1256 dated
September 29, 2009 in what seemed an attempt to prepare the
telecommunication monopoly for hasty privatization in case the
state budget needed a refill. It appeared that the budget did without
Beltelecom, and the monopoly felt free to postpone the transfor.
mation until 2010.
Despite the impressive progress in the transformation of state.
run enterprises, there was only one serious privatization
transaction in 2009 – the sale of BPS.Bank. In October, President
Alexander Lukashenko said he doubted that the sale to a single
bidder would be efficient, but a month later, he issued ordinance
#618 to sell BPS.Bank to Russian Sberbank for U.S. $280.7 million.
The Belarusian side had insisted on a much higher price of about
U.S. $500 million, whereas the Russian side was ready to pay U.S.
$200 million. A compromise was achieved, though, after Sberbank
signed an investment agreement and promised U.S. $2 billion in
credit lines for investment projects of Belarusian companies.
Besides, Sberbank was named the country’s privatization
consultant.
Also in 2009, the government was in talks over selling Belinvestbank
to a Western European bank, but the talks were not completed.
The pace of privatization in Belarus was therefore too slow in
2009.
Conclusion
The Belarusian authorities still regard privatization as a chance to
settle fiscal problems rather than an instrument of structural
Economy
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reorganization. If this approach persists, property transactions will
remain a last resort measure or a bargaining chip helping to haggle
over some of the most sensitive positions, especially Russian
energy supplies and additional borrowings.
The economic situation observed in 2007–2008 saved the need
for prompt privatization decisions. Favorable terms of trade on raw
materials markets, subsidies provided by the Russian Federation,
and external borrowing averted financial shortages. When things
got bad, the government resorted to case.by.case privatization to
stabilize the financial system. Last year, it was mostly owing to IMF
loans that Belarus managed to cover its foreign exchange deficit.
The deterioration of the situation on the key export markets,
widening foreign trade gap and restricted access to foreign loans
will definitely call for more resolute privatization decisions;
however, there are currently no serious preconditions for the
government to commence systemic privatization. Foreign
borrowing will remain the basic strategy for the Belarusian
government in the short term.
At the same time, if all liabilities to foreign creditors remain,
external debt service may turn into a bad headache for the
Belarusian administration as early as 2013. The combination of
these two factors – the necessity to stabilize the financial system
and repay external loans – may finally push the government
towards real privatization.
References
Last year, 3.6 trillion Belarusian rubles’ worth of revenues from
the use and sale of state property were transferred to the republican
budget, 29.6% above the target for the year.
The republican budget received 2.816 trillion rubles in
revenues from sales of state property, including shares (39% above
the original target), of them 2.802 trillion rubles from sales of shares
in open joint.stock companies and property complexes transferred
to the targeted budgetary national development fund (1.72 trillion
rubles from the sale of a stake in OAO Beltransgaz, 797.6 billion
rubles from the sale of OAO BPS.Bank and 284.5 billion rubles
from the sale of ZAO BeST).
Also in 2009, transfers of stock dividends to the republican
budget amounted to 284.1 billion rubles, 0.2% over the target.
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Seventy.three per cent of joint.stock companies controlled by the
state decided for dividend payout. The republican budget also
received 489.1 billion rubles in transfers of parts of profits of unitary
enterprises and state associations, 8.9% above the target. State
property lease revenues reached 57.3 billion rubles, 3.3% above
the target for the year.
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AGRICULTURE: IRREDEEMABLE DEBTS
Konstantin Skuratovich
Summary
According to official statistics, Belarusian agribusiness proved to be one of the
most successful sectors of the national economy in 2009. Although the original
growth forecast was not met, agriculture showed a 1.3% increase in overall
output yearonyear. This production expansion was accompanied by poorer
financial results, though: in 2009, overdue debts of agricultural enterprises
rose 36.6% from the 2008 level. In early 2010, the president allowed farms to
repay the debts that had been accumulated by January 1 in installments within
10 years. To make things even worse, Russia – the key market outlet for
Belarusian farm produce – kept challenging the quality of Belarusian exports,
which is why large batches of produce intended for the Russian market often
remained unwanted.
Tendencies:
• agribusiness was the only sector of the  economy to report a growth in
production in 2009;
• agriculture owes the state and the banking system more than any other
sector of the national economy; the debt keeps growing;
• agriculture reform is still not on the government agenda.
Gross indicators
In 2009, gross output of agricultural enterprises and private
households in value terms reached 26.5 trillion Belarusian rubles
(in comparable prices), up 1.3% year.on.year1. Agricultural
enterprises increased their output 4.2% year.on.year in 2009, with
animal production rising 8.2%, and crop production falling 0.7%.
Not a single region managed to meet the original production
target, and in Grodno Region, farm output decreased 0.7% from
the 2008 level.
1 According to the National Statistics Committee (Belstat), gross farm output
totaled 26.9 trillion Belarusian rubles in 2008 (expressed in current prices),
which is 400 million rubles above the gross production figure reported in
2009 (also in current prices). This discrepancy, alongside the increase in
the price index, places a question mark on the recorded growth in gross
indicators in comparable prices.
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In 2009, overall potato harvest decreased 18.6% year.on.year,
grain harvest fell 5.6%, sugar beet harvest went down 1.4%, and
flax fiber harvest dropped 23%. Vegetable harvest edged up 0.5%
on the year, and fruit and berry harvest increased 16.3%. In private
households, vegetable harvest rose 3.6% in 2009, and fruit and berry
harvest went up 15.5%, whereas grain production fell 6.7%, and
potato harvest dropped 17.8%. Only vegetable output met the
forecast in 2009.
Belarusian farms procured 110,300 head of cattle from private
households in 2009, down 3.4% on the year, and milk procurement
totaled 419,400 tons, down 7.6%.
Farms’ overdue tax arrears, including overdue transfers to the
social security fund, stood at 136.4 billion Belarusian rubles as of
December 1, 2009, making up 7.5% of the overall overdue payables
of agricultural organizations. Overdue tax arrears decreased 1.8%
in the period December 1, 2008 through December 1, 2009, went
up 1.1% in January.November 2009 and went down 0.7% in
November 2009 alone. Farms accounted for 43.2% of total
Belarusian overdue tax arrears.
Farms’ overdue debts under loans had reached 337.6 billion
Belarusian rubles by December 1, 2009, an increase of 60%
November.to.November. In the first eleven months of 2009, debts
rose 48.9%, and in November 2009 they shrank 1.8%. Farms
accounted for 32.8% of the total debt under loans in the country as
of December 1, 2009.
Farms’ financial results
Last year’s combined net profit reported by agricultural
organizations of all types of ownership2 totaled 1.5 trillion
Belarusian rubles, whereas overdue payables subject to penalties
increased 36.6% in 2009 to 1.9 trillion rubles on January 1, 2009.
Overdue payables of Belarusian agricultural enterprises made
up about 37% of total overdue payables in the Belarusian economy,
which makes agriculture the main debtor among all economic
sectors (given its relatively insignificant share in the country’s GDP,
standing at 8%), both in absolute terms and expressed as a share of
overdue payables and contributions to the gross domestic product.
2 All organizations engaged in farming operations.
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Farms’ loan commitments amounted to 10 trillion Belarusian
rubles in 2009, and overall financial liabilities of Belarusian
agricultural organizations had reached 34 trillion rubles by January
1, 20103, which deprives agribusiness of working capital, thus
paralyzing the entire sector. The problem comes down to the plain
and simple fact which the administration of the state has to
acknowledge: Belarusian agribusiness is bankrupt4.
The minister therefore as good as admitted the failure of the
project launched five years ago to find new efficient owners for
Belarusian farms. Agricultural enterprises were then “attached”
to successful industrial companies, banks and other businesses.
As a result, the sector that was almost broke was saved from formal
bankruptcy, while farms themselves acquired a legal channel to
pump out loans for further business processes.
The key investment efficiency criterion in Belarusian
agribusiness is such a synthetic indicator as “application/
disbursement of funds” based on the formula “what is given is
always applied.” Last year, some 4.6 trillion Belarusian rubles
were “applied” in agribusiness, or USD 212 per hectare of
farmland, which represents an increase of 30% compared to U.S.
dollar.denominated farm subsidies provided in 2008. The
program is definitely executed successfully when it comes to
investment growth, but the efficiency of disbursements remains
very low.
This is why the question of increasing or cutting subsidies is
not a matter of choosing the right path, but a matter of life and
death for the economic system. The administration of the country
seemed to have found a perfectly simple solution to this critical
problem of Belarusian agribusiness: Presidential Ordinance #92
allowed farms to repay the debt accumulated by January 1, 2010
in installments within 10 years. The document also cuts financial
obligations of agricultural enterprises to be discharged in 2010 by
1.6 trillion Belarusian rubles to 7.7 trillion rubles. As of November
1, 2009, financial liabilities of domestic farms amounted to 19.6
3 Belarusian gross domestic product amounted to 136.8 trillion Belarusian
rubles.
4 “Bankruptcy” is used in terms of a command economy here, when
bankruptcy is acknowledged by a decision of a supreme administrative
authority.
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trillion rubles.5 The press service of the head of state said the
document would facilitate the development of the agricultural
sector.
The measure described above is just a common instrument the
state has up its sleeve to ensure financial recovery of agricultural
organizations. If we leave out the “creative messages” that
accompany each decision to cut debts and allow farms to repay in
installments, the real reason behind such decisions is the assurance
of all concerned parties that Belarusian agricultural enterprises
are unable to pay their debts on their own. If they cannot pay, they
are not interested in trying to pay, especially those who got used
to not paying.
The state, in turn, cannot even demand that the best farms pay
their debts, because poor performers would interpret this as a
punishment for efforts. A combination of economic, psychological,
organizational and political motives encourages irresponsible
spending of budget subsidies and indifference to those who
provide budget funds and disburse them.
Since agricultural enterprises are unable to meet their current
liabilities, there is no use discussing payments in installments:
debts will simply be written off when the target date comes, like it
happened many times before.
The presidential ordinance offers installment plans for farms’
arrears of payments to the republican and local budgets, the Social
Security Fund and for consumed energy. Furthermore, the
document lists conditions of a ten.year respite to pay economic
penalties and fines imposed for untimely payments to the Social
Security Fund and violation of the order of payments.
In 2010, the state will be phasing down economic sanctions
against non.payments in agribusiness, and farms will only have to
pay 61 billion Belarusian rubles in fines, instead of 541 billion
rubles. Annual payments of fines are expected to be reduced by
61 billion rubles until 2013 and then increased by the same sum in
2014–2019.
5 Minister Shapiro said during a year.end meeting that overall financial
liabilities of Belarusian agricultural enterprises totaled 34 trillion Belarusian
rubles. Apparently, this includes the liabilities that the president allowed
covering in installments by his previous regulatory acts. In 2008, total
liabilities of farms exceeded their gross output for the first time, and in
2009, liabilities were 26% above the total output.
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Anyway, this scheme does not account for the overdue
payables that farms inevitably accumulate throughout the year.
In 2008, overdue payables rose 25.6% to 1.4 trillion Belarusian
rubles, and in 2009, they rose another 36.6% to 1.9 trillion rubles.
Even if the general economic situation in Belarus improves in 2010,
overdue payables of Belarusian agricultural enterprises will
definitely exceed 2 trillion rubles.
The inevitable growth in debts stops us from sharing the
optimism of official commentators, who claim that the presidential
ordinance will not only cut debts and make repayment easier, but
also encourage farms to develop productions and meet bank and
budget loan obligations. Our pessimism applies not only to the
future of the presidential regulatory act, but also to the entire
agricultural system of the country, for it is based on long.term
monitoring of Belarusian agribusiness, which shows that financial
appetites of the agricultural system have been growing, however,
strange as it may seem, performance indicators of Belarusian farms
seem to deteriorate in inverse proportion to increasing spending.
Fight for quality
The year 2010 has been dubbed the “year of quality”, however,
President Lukashenko set the agricultural sector quality.related
tasks back in 2009, when the Belarusian administration suffered
serious stress caused by the “milk war” with Russia. In August,
Lukashenko said during his visit to Nesvizh District: “We must be
able to sell milk and export it. The European Union does not mind
certifying our produce, but it must meet certain standards.” Quality
is determined by efficiency, in economic terms, but the president
chose to skip the issue of loss.making dairy farms, despite the fact
that they dominate in Belarus, and without them there is no
reaching gross production targets.
Meanwhile, it is the emphasis on quantity that impeded quality
improvements. There are state quality standards for milk and dairy
products, just like for any other commodities. Milk is categorized
into premium, first and second grades, and no.grade milk. None
of the above standards met European requirements, which is why
Belarus introduced a new “extra” grade in January 2008, whereas
procurement of no.grade milk by processing enterprises was
banned.
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It appeared that changing technical standards was easier than
improving milk quality. Domestic requirements will be met using
lower.grade produce, whereas “extra” class dairy products will be
exported. The compromise was hailed by everyone, despite the
fact that, based on various estimates, only 1% to 5% of Belarusian
milk meets the “extra” grade quality requirements.
Prospects of structural reform
Like any other command economy, Belarus keeps looking for the
best possible combination of performance indicators and
administrative controls. The number of indicators is growing, while
controls are getting tighter, hence changes in the structure of the
management system and emergence of new control and moni.
toring agencies. In mid.February 2010, President Lukashenko
decided on a new structural change and demanded that a new
control department be established in the agricultural sector, the
so.called Belselkhoznadzor.
When giving reasons for setting up a new control body, the
president cited not only internal circumstances, but also new
foreign trade requirements originating from Customs Union
agreements, which called for upgrading Belarusian standards to
those applying in the other member states. The new watchdog is a
crossover between the national quality police and state inspection
in the Agriculture and Food Ministry; the status of the former
grants it extraordinary powers, but the obligations of the latter will
make it a victim of the race for gross figures.
What does the outlook for the agricultural sector look like? It
will continue playing its role of the “absolute debtor” to the
national economy.
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REFERENCE INFORMATION
Overview
The Republic of Belarus is a unitary democratic social state
governed by the rule of law. The present Constitution of the
Republic of Belarus has been in force since 1994 with alterations
and amendments introduced following the republican referenda
of November 24, 1996 and October 17, 2004.
The President of the Republic of Belarus is the head of state.
The National Assembly of the Republic of Belarus, which consists
of two chambers – the House of Representatives (110 members)
and Council of the Republic (64 members) is the representative
agency of state power and body of legislation. The Council of
Ministers of the Republic of Belarus headed by a prime minister
performs functions of an executive authority.
The governmental power in the Republic of Belarus is exercised
on the basis of its division into the legislative, executive and judicial
branches. Government agencies are independent within their
mandates: they interact, constrain, and counterbalance each other.
The Constitutional Court of the Republic of Belarus exercises
supervision over constitutionality of statutory acts.
According to the United Nations Human Development Report
2009, the Republic of Belarus takes the 68th position among 182
countries with a high level of human development (the 64th position
in the previous Report). The human development index in Belarus
increased from 0,704 in 1990 to 0,826 in 2007.
Source: Human Development Report 2009. Overcoming
Barriers: Human Mobility and Development. M.: Whole World,
2009. [Electronic resource]
http://www.un.org/ru/ (с. 152, 172).
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AUTHORITIES
President of the Republic of Belarus
The President of the Republic of Belarus is the Head of State,
guarantor of the Constitution of the Republic of Belarus, human
rights and liberties. The President is elected directly by the people
of the Republic of Belarus for a term of office of five years by
universal, free, equal, direct, and secret ballot without re.election
restriction.
The rights, duties and the status of the President of the Republic
of Belarus are laid down in the Constitution of the Republic of
Belarus of and the law on the President of the Republic of Belarus
of February 21, 1995.
Alexander Grigoryevich Lukashenko has been the President
of the Republic of Belarus since 1994. He was re.elected twice in
2001 and 2006. In 2004, President Lukashenko initiated the third
referendum, following which the ban on more than two tenures
was abolished that allowed him to be elected for the third term.
Administration of the President
of the Republic of Belarus
The Administration of the President of the Republic of Belarus
is an agency of state administration, which renders assistance to
the President of the Republic of Belarus in the field of the state
personnel policy, ideology of the Belarusian state, law,
development, execution, and supervision over execution of
decisions of the President of the Republic of Belarus.
Legislative regulation of activity of the Presidential
Administration
The Constitution of the Republic of Belarus (the wording of
1996) entitles the President to form, dismiss, and reorganize the
Administration of the President of the Republic of Belarus.
The law on the President of the Republic of Belarus of February
21, 1995 establishes that the Administration of the President is
formed to ensure direct support to actions of the President in line
with regulations and staffing pattern approved by the President.
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Provision 1 on the Administration of the President of the
Republic of Belarus was approved by decree of the President of
August 5, 1994. Decree No.97 on the Administration of the
President of the Republic of Belarus of January 23, 1997, which
approved the new provision on the Administration of the President
of the Republic of Belarus and also its structure, was issued
following the adoption of a new wording of the Constitution of the
Republic of Belarus in 1996.
In 2008, decree No.58 of the President of the Republic of
Belarus of January 31, 2008 and decree No.572 of the President of
the Republic of Belarus of October 22, 2008 introduced alterations
and amendments to the provision on the Administration of the
President of the Republic of Belarus and its structure.
Presidential decree No.21 of January 11, 2001 (with alterations
and amendments under decree No.65 of the President of the
Republic of Belarus of February 11, 2005) approved regulations
on an assistant to the President of the Republic of Belarus, which
established the procedure of appointment and relief from duty of
assistants to the President, and their official duties.
As of late 2008, the composition of the Presidential
Administration was as follows:
Head of the Administration of the President of the Republic of
Belarus: Vladimir Vladimirovich Makey
First Deputy Head of the Administration of the President of
the Republic of Belarus: Natalia Vladimirovna Petkevich
(appointed January 9, 2009)
Deputy Heads of the Administration of the President of the
Republic of Belarus:
Leonid Vasilyevich Anfimov
Nikolai Gennadyevich Snopkov (until December 2009)
Valery Vatslavovich Mitskevich (since June 4, 2009)
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NATIONAL ASSEMBLY
OF THE REPUBLIC OF BELARUS
The National Assembly of the Republic of Belarus – the
parliament – is the representative and legislative body of the
Republic of Belarus
The Parliament consists of two chambers: the House of
Representatives and the Council of the Republic
The House of Representatives totals 110 deputies.
Election of deputies to the House of Representatives is carried
out in accordance with the law on the basis of universal, equal,
free, direct electoral suffrage and by secret ballot.
The Council of the Republic of the National Assembly of the
Republic of Belarus is a chamber of territorial representation. The
Council of the Republic consists of eight deputies from every region
(oblast) and the city of Minsk elected at meetings of deputies of
local councils of deputies of the primary level of every region (oblast)
and the city of Minsk. Eight members of the Council of the Republic
are appointed by the President of the Republic of Belarus.
Election procedures are established by the Election Code of
the Republic of Belarus No.370.З of February 11, 2000.
The term of powers of the Parliament is four years.
Decisions of the House of Representatives are taken by laws
or enactments. Enactments of the House of Representatives are
taken with regard to matters of order and supervision.
The legal status, principles, contents, procedures of orga.
nization and activities of the National Assembly are established
by law No.370.З of July 8, 2008 on the National Assembly of the
Republic of Belarus.
Rights and obligations of members of the House of Repre.
sentatives and members of the Council of the Republic of the
National Assembly, basic legal and social guarantees of perfor.
mance of their duties are established by law No.196.З of November
4, 1998 on the status of deputies of the House of Representatives
and members of the Council of the Republic of the National
Assembly of the Republic of Belarus. In 2008, alterations and
amendments to the law were introduced twice by law of the
Republic of Belarus No.408.З of July 15, 2008 and law No.409.З of
the Republic of Belarus of July 15, 2008.
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Activities of the House of Representatives, its bodies and
deputies are regulated by the rules of procedure of the House of
Representatives of the National Assembly adopted by resolution
No.1033.П3/IХ of the House of Representatives of October 9, 2008.
Activities of the Council of the Republic, its bodies and
members are regulated by the rules of procedure of the Council of
the Republic of the National Assembly adopted by resolution
No.57.СР4/I of the Council of the Republic of December 19, 2008.
Composition of the House of Representatives
of the National Assembly of the Republic of Belarus
A chairperson of the House of Representatives, vice.
chairperson and the Council of the House of Representatives
represent directing bodies of the House of Representatives.
Chairman of the House of Representatives: Vladimir Pavlovich
Andreichenko
Vice.Chairman of the House of Representatives: Valery
Nikolaevich Ivanov
The Council of the House of Representatives includes the
chairman, vice.chairman of the chamber and chairpersons of all
standing commissions of the chamber:
Nikolai Leonidovich Samoseyko, chairman of the standing
commission for legislation and judicial.legal matters;
Victor Aleksandrovich Guminsky, chairman of the standing
commission for national security;
Vasily Mikhaylovich Baikov, chairman of the standing
commission for state construction, local self.government and rules
of procedure;
Sergey Ivanovich Kryzhevich, chairman of the standing
commission for agrarian matters;
Vladimir Matveyevich Zdanovich, chairman of the standing
commission for education, culture, science and scientific and
technical progress;
Alexander Nikolaevich Yushkevich, chairman of the standing
commission for human rights, national relations and the mass
media;
Sergey Aleksandrovich Maskevich, chairman of the standing
commission for international affairs and connections with the CIS;
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Mikhail Ivanovich Rusy, chairman of the standing commission
for Chernobyl issues, ecology, and wildlife management;
Alexander Ilyich Antonenko, chairman of the standing
commission for budget, finances and tax policy;
Evgeny Antonovich Artyushenko, chairman of the standing
commission for monetary policy and banking;
Anna Nikolaevna Lavrukevich, chairperson of the standing
commission for labor, social protection, affairs of veterans and
disabled persons;
Oleg Ivanovich Velichko, chairman of the standing commission
for health protection, physical culture, affairs of family and youth;
Galina Vladimirovna Polyanskaya, chairperson of the standing
commission for housing policy, construction, trade and
privatization;
Sergey Aleksandrovich Semashko, chairman of the standing
commission for industry, fuel and energy complex, transport,
communications and entrepreneurship
Composition of the Council of the Republic
of the National Assembly of the Republic of Belarus
A chairperson of the Council of the Republic, vice.chairperson
and the Presidium of the Council of the Republic represent the
directing bodies of the Council of the Republic.
Chairman of the Council of the Republic: Boris Vasilyevich
Batura
Vice.Chairman of the Council of the Republic: Anatoly
Nikolaevich Rubinov
The Presidium of the Council of the Republic includes a
chairperson, vice.chairperson, and chairpersons of standing
commissions, namely
Eugeny Aleksandrovich Smirnov, chairman of the standing
commission of the Council of the Republic for legislation and state
construction;
Vadim Aleksandrovich Popov, chairman of the standing
commission of the Council of the Republic for economy, budget,
and finances;
Antonina Petrovna Morova, chairperson of the standing
commission of the Council of the Republic for education, science,
culture, and social development;
287
Gennady Vasilyevich Novitsky, chairman of the standing
commission of the Council of the Republic for regional policy and
local self.government;
Nina Nikolaevna Mazai, chairperson of the standing
commission of the Council of the Republic for international affairs
and national security.
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COUNCIL OF MINISTERS
The executive power in the Republic of Belarus is exercised by
the Government, the Council of Ministers of the Republic of
Belarus, the central body of state administration, which administers
the system of subordinate bodies of state administration and other
executive organs. Its major powers are established by the
Constitution and law No.424.З of July 23, 2008 on the Council of
Ministers of the Republic of Belarus.
The Government is accountable to the President of the
Republic of Belarus and responsible to the Parliament of the
Republic of Belarus.
The Government of the Republic of Belarus issues resolutions,
which have binding force in the entire territory of the Republic of
Belarus.
Decisions of the Council of Ministers of the Republic of Belarus
can be abolished by acts of the President of the Republic of Belarus.
According to the Constitution, the Government of the Republic
of Belarus consists of a prime minister, his deputies, and ministers.
The list of ministries is not established by the Constitution; its
structure is determined by the President in line with paragraph 7
of article 84 of the Constitution. He appoints and dismisses
deputies of a prime minister, ministers, and other members of the
Government.
The structure of the Council of Ministers is established by the
law on the Council of Ministers of the Republic of Belarus.
Composition of the Presidium of the Council of Ministers is
established by the Law on the Council of Ministers of the Republic
of Belarus:
• prime minister of the Republic of Belarus
• head of the Administration of the President of the Republic of
Belarus
• chairperson of the State Control Committee of the Republic of
Belarus
• chairperson of the board of the National Bank of the Republic
of Belarus
• deputy prime minister of the Republic of Belarus
• ministers
• chairpersons of state committees
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• head of the Council of Ministers’ machinery
• chairperson of the presidium of the National Academy of
Sciences
• chairperson of the board of the Republican Union of
Consumers’ Societies
• other officials by a decision of the president
Presidium of the Council of Ministers
of the Republic of Belarus
For operating decisions, which fall under competence of the
Council of Ministers of the Republic of Belarus, it forms a standing
body, the Presidium of the Council of Ministers of the Republic of
Belarus, which includes a prime minister of the Republic of Belarus,
his deputies, head of the Administration of the President of the
Republic of Belarus, chairperson of the State Control Committee
of the Republic of Belarus, chairperson of the board of the National
Bank of the Republic of Belarus, minister of economy, minister of
finance, and minister of foreign affairs.
The Council of Ministers of the Republic of Belarus is entitled
to form standing or temporary commissions and other groups to
elaborate offers on particular question, development of draft
decisions of the Council of Ministers of the Republic of Belarus,
and also for performance of particular missions.
Composition of the Council of Ministers
Heads:
Prime Minister*: Sergey Sergeyevich Sidorsky
First Deputy Prime Minister*: Vladimir Ilyich Semashko
Deputy Prime Minister*: Ivan Mikhaylovich Bambiza
Deputy Prime Minister*: Victor Pavlovich Burya
Deputy Prime Minister*: Andrei Vladimirovich Kobyakov
Deputy Prime Minister* (since June 2009): Vladimir Nikolaye<
vich Potupchik
Other members of the government
Head of the Presidential Administration*: Vladimir Vladimiro<
vich Makey
* Members of the Presidium of the Council of Ministers Constitutional Court
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Chairman of the State Control Committee*: Zenon Kuzmich
Lomat
Chairman of the Board of the National Bank*: Pyotr Petrovich
Prokopovich
Chairman of the Presidium of the National Academy of
Sciences of the Republic of Belarus: Mikhail Vladimirovich Myasni<
kovich
Head of the Council of Ministers Machinery: Konstantin
Alekseyevich Martynetsky
Ministries:
Minister of Architecture and Construction: Alexander Ilyich
Seleznyov
Minister of the Interior: Anatoly Nilovich Kuleshov (appointed
June 2, 2009)
Minister of Municipal Housing Economy: Vladimir Maksimo<
vich Belokhvostov
Minister of Health: Vasily Ivanovich Zharko
Minister of Foreign Affairs*: Sergey Nikolaevich Martynov
Minister of Information: Oleg Vitoldovich Proleskovsky (since
December 2009)
Minister of Culture: Pavel Pavlovich Latushko (appointed June
4,2009)
Minister of Forestry: Pyotr Mikhaylovich Semashko
Minister of Defense: Yuri Viktorovich Zhadobin
Minister of Education: Alexander Mikhaylovch Radkov
Minister of Taxes and Dues: Vladimir Nikolayevich Poluyan
Minister of Emergency Situations: Enver Rizaevich Bariev
Minister of Natural Resources and Environment Protection:
Vladimir Grigoryevich Tsalko
Minister of Industry: Alexander Mikhaylovich Radevich
(appointed June 26, 2009)
Minister of Communications and Informatization: Nikolai
Petrovich Panteley
Minister of Agriculture and Foodstuffs: Semyon Borisovich
Shapiro
Minister of Sports and Tourism: Oleg Leonidovich Kachan
(appointed June 26, 2009)
Minister of Trade: Valentin Sergeyevich Chekanov
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Minister of Transport and Communication: Ivan Ivanovich
Shcherbo (appointed June 26, 2009)
Minister of Labor and Social Protection: Marianna Akindi<
novna Shchetkina (appointed December 4, 2009)
Minister of Finance*: Andrei Mikhaylovch Kharkovets
Minister of Economy*: Nikolai Gennadyevich Snopkov
(appointed in December 2009)
Minister of Energy: Alexander Vladimirovich Ozerets
Minister of Justice: Victor Grigoryevich Golovanov
State committees:
Chairman of the State Security Committee: Vadim Yurievich
Zaitsev
Chairman of the State Military.Industrial Committee: Sergei
Petrovich Gurulev
Chairman of the State Committee for Property: Georgy
Ivanovich Kuznetsov
Chairman of the State Committee for Science and Technolo.
gies: Igor Vitalyevich Voytov
Chairman of the State Committee for Standardization: Valery
Nikolayevich Koreshkov
Chairman of the State Boundary Committee: Igor Anatolyevich
Rachkovsky
Chairman of the State Customs Committee: Alexander Frantse<
vich Shpilevsky
Government organizations subordinate
to the Council of Ministers:
Chairman of the Belarusian State Concern of the Food Proces.
sing Industry Belgospishcheprom (Belgospishcheprom Concern):
Ivan Ivanovich Danchenko
Chairman of the Belarusian State Concern for Oil and
Chemistry (Belneftekhim Concern): Valery Vladimirovich Kazake<
vich
Chairman of the Belarusian State Concern for Manufacture and
Sale of Light Industry Products (Bellegprom Concern): Gennady
Yevgenyevich Vyrko
Appendix. References
292 	



Chairman of the Belarusian State Concern for Manufacture and
Sale of Pharmaceutical and Microbiological Products (Belbiofarm
Concern): Mikhail Mikhaylovch Cherepok
Chairman of the Belarusian Industrial and Trade Concern of
the Forest, Wood.Working and Paper.Pulp Industry (Bellesbum.
prom Concern): Vladimir Edvardovich Shulga
Chairman of the Board of the Belarusian Republican Union of
Consumer Societies (Belkoopsoyuz): Sergei Dmitrievich Sidko
Director of the Republican Center for Recuperation and
Sanatorium Treatment of the Population: Nikolai Vladimirovich
Mazur
Commissioner for Affairs of Religions and Nationalities: Leonid
Pavlovich Gulyako
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CONSTITUTIONAL COURT
OF THE REPUBLIC OF BELARUS
Supervision over constitutionality of enforceable enactments of
the state is exercised by the Constitutional Court of the Republic
of Belarus.
The Constitutional Court is guided by the Constitution, law
on the Constitutional Court of the Republic of Belarus of March
30, 1994, Code No.139.З of the Republic of Belarus of June 29,
2006 on the judicial system and status of judges, decree No.14 of
the President of the Republic of Belarus of June 26, 2008 on
improvement of activities of the Constitutional Court of the
Republic of Belarus, and rules of procedure No.Р.58/97 of the
Constitutional Court of the Republic of Belarus of September 18,
1997.
According to article 116 of the Constitution of the Republic of
Belarus, the Constitutional Court of the Republic of Belarus is
formed of 12 judges from among highly qualified specialists in the
field of law, who, as a rule, have scientific degrees.
Six judges of the Constitutional Court are appointed by the
President of the Republic of Belarus and six judges are elected by
the Council of the Republic.
A chairperson of the Constitutional Court is appointed by the
President with the consent of the Council of the Republic. The
tenure of the members of the Constitutional Court is 11 years, but
reappointment is possible in line with the law.
According to paragraph 84 of article 11 of the Constitution of
the Republic of Belarus, the President of the Republic of Belarus
dismisses chairpersons and judges of the Constitutional Court as
established by the law and to the notification of the Council of the
Republic.
The Constitutional Court of the Republic of Belarus initiates
work and is entitled to make decisions as soon as at least eight
judges of the Constitutional Court of the Republic of Belarus are
appointed (elected).
Composition of the Constitutional Court
Chairman of the Constitutional Court: Pyotr Petrovich Mikla<
shevich
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Vice.Chairman of the Constitutional Court: Alexander
Vladimirovich Maryskin
Judges:
Tatiana Semyonovna Boyko
Stanislav Evgenyevich Danilyuk
Vladimir Petrovich Izotko
Lilia Grigoryevna Kozyreva
Valentina Vasilyevna Podgrusha
Leonid Mikhaylovch Ryabtsev
Olga Gennadyevna Sergeyeva
Anatoly Gerasimovich Tikhovenko
Sergey Petrovich Chigrinov
Tadeush Valentinovich Voronovich (since June 2009)
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SUPREME COURT
OF THE REPUBLIC OF BELARUS
The Supreme Court of the Republic of Belarus heads the system
of law courts being the supreme judicial body, which execute
justice on civil and criminal cases and cases on administrative
offences, exercises supervision over judicial activity of law courts
and exercises other powers in line with legislative acts.
The Supreme Court of the Republic of Belarus is guided by
the Constitution of the Republic of Belarus, Code No.139.З of the
Republic of Belarus of June 29, 2006 on the judicial system and
status of judges, decree No.54 of the President of the Republic of
Belarus of January 25, 1999 on some questions of activity of the
Supreme Court.
The Supreme Court of the Republic of Belarus operates in the
following structure:
Plenum of the Supreme Court
Presidium of the Supreme Court
Judicial board on civil cases of the Supreme Court
Judicial board on criminal cases of the Supreme Court
Judicial board on affairs of intellectual property of the Supreme
Court
Military board of the Supreme Court
System of the ordinary courts
The system of law courts is based on the territorial principle
and specialization.
According to the Code of the Republic of Belarus of on the
judicial system and status of judges, the law courts of the Republic
of Belarus include the Supreme Court, regional, Minsk city, district
(city), and military courts (the Belarusian military court and inter.
garrison military courts), in particular the Minsk city military court,
Belarusian military court, 6 regional courts, 142 district (city) courts
in districts, cities of regional subordination, which do not have
district division, and districts in cities, and also 6 inter.garrison
military courts in view of strength and deployment of military units
of the armed forces of the Republic of Belarus, other troops and
military units.
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Composition of the Presidium of the Supreme Court
Chairman of the Supreme Court: Valentin Olegovich Sukalo
First Vice.Chairman: Alexander Adamovich Fedortsov
Vice.Chairman: Valery Leonidovich Kalinkovich
Vice.Chairman: Valery Nikolaevich Vyshkevich
Vice.Chairman: Evgeny Mikhaylovch Tsarenko
Vice.Chairperson: Zhanna Borisovna Shkurdyuk
Judges
Mikhail Mikhaylovch Kashko
Leonida Iosifovna Bakinovskaya
Nikolai Ivanovich Germenchuk
Galina Kazimirovna Zhukovskaya
Alexander Timofeyevich Raidudin
Victor Adamovich Rakitsky
Vladimir Vasilyevich Sukach
Victor Petrovich Chertovich
Feodor Ivanovich Chubkovets
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SUPREME ECONOMIC COURT
OF THE REPUBLIC OF BELARUS
The Supreme Economic Court of the Republic of Belarus heads
the system of economic courts being a judicial authority, which
executes justice by resolution of economic disputes arising from
civil, administrative, and other legal relations, exercises
supervision over judicial activities of economic courts and
exercises other powers in line with legislative acts.
The Supreme Economic Court is guided by the Constitution
of the Republic of Belarus, Code of the Republic of Belarus on the
judicial system and status of judges of June 29, 2006.
The judicial procedure in economic courts is established by
the Constitution of the Republic of Belarus, the Economic
Remedial Code of the Republic of Belarus (the wording of law
No.137 of June 29, 2006).
System of economic courts
The Republic of Belarus has a uniform system of economic
courts based on the territorial principle. The system includes 8
economic courts, namely the Supreme Economic Court of the
Republic of Belarus and economic courts of regions and the city
of Minsk
Structure:
• Plenum;
• Presidium;
• Judicial board for consideration of cases as a court of primary
jurisdiction;
• Cassation board.
Alongside with that, the Supreme Economic Court forms
judicial boards for resolution of particular categories of disputes
on legal investigations with the participation of tax authorities and
legal investigations on economic insolvency (bankruptcy).
In order to elaborate scientifically grounded offers in the field
of economic activities and legislation, the Supreme Economic
Court has a scientific and advisory council in its structure.
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Composition of the Supreme Economic Court
Chairman of the Supreme Economic Court: Victor Sergeyevich
Kamenkov
Vice.Chairman of the Supreme Economic Court: Alexei
Petrovich Yegorov
Vice.Chairman of the Supreme Economic Court: Victor
Nikolaevich Ryabtsev
Judges:
Dmitry Petrovich Aleksandrov
Alexander Sergeyevich Dalinchuk
Valery Vladimirovich Zhandarov
Elena Vladimirovna Karavai
Ekaterina Aleksandrovna Karatkevich
Lyudmila Anatolyevna Kolesnikova
Sergei Leontyevich Kulakovsky
Nikolai Dmitrievich Madudin
Elena Mikhaylovna Mayorova
Oksana Nikolayevna Mikhnyuk
Margarita Cheslavovna Posled
Tatiana Mikhaylovna Protashchik
Stepan Petrovich Turmovich
Vladimir Viktorovich Filippovsky
Valery Vasilyevich Shobik
Ruslan Khadyevich Yumaguzhin
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PROSECUTOR’S OFFICE
The Prosecutor’s Office of the Republic of Belarus is an integrated
and centralized system of bodies of the Prosecutor’s Office entitled
to supervise strict and consistent execution of laws, decrees,
regulations and other enforceable enactments in the Republic of
Belarus, which also performs other functions established by acts
of law.
The area of expertise, structure, and operating procedures of
the Prosecutor’s Office are fixed in the Constitution, law of May 8,
2007 on the Prosecutor’s Office of the Republic of Belarus,
regulation on performing the service in bodies of the Prosecutor’s
Office of the Republic of Belarus (presidential decree No.181 of
March 27, 2008) and other legislative acts.
The Prosecutor’s Office is entrusted to ensure supremacy of
law, legality, law and order, protection of rights and legitimate
interests of citizens and organizations, and public and state
interests.
The Prosecutor’s Office of the Republic of Belarus includes
the Prosecutor General’s Office, which acts as a central machinery
of the system of bodies of Prosecutor’s Office, Prosecutor’s Offices
of regions, the city of Minsk, Prosecutor’s Offices of districts
(cities), inter.district Prosecutor’s Offices, and also specialized
Prosecutor’s Offices equated to Prosecutor’s Offices of regions,
districts (cities), and inter.district Prosecutor’s Offices.
Prosecutor General is subordinate to the president.
Prosecutor General of the Republic of Belarus
State Counsellor in Justice of the 1st Grade Grigory Alekseevich
Vasilevich (appointed by presidential decree No.72 of February
08, 2008)
Deputies of the Prosecutor General
of the Republic of Belarus:
• Senior Counsellor in Justice Sergey Ivanovich Myshkovets
• State Counsellor in Justice of the 3rd Grade Alexander
Mikhailovich Lashin
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• State Counsellor in Justice of the 3rd Grade Victor Aleksan<
drovich Konon
• Senior Counsellor in Justice Alexei Konstantinovich Stook
• Senior Counsellor in Justice Nikolai Ivanovich Kuklis
Prosecutors of regions, the Belarusian transport
Prosecutor , Belarusian military Prosecutor:
• Prosecutor of the Brest region: Senior Counsellor in Justice
Sergey Konstantinovich Khmaruk
• Prosecutor of the Vitebsk region: Senior Counsellor in Justice
Gennady Iosifovich Dysko
• Prosecutor of the Gomel region: Senior Counsellor in Justice
Valentin Petrovich Shayev
• Prosecutor of the Grodno region: Senior Counsellor in Justice
Victor Nikolaevich Morozov
• Prosecutor of the Minsk region: Senior Counsellor in Justice
Alexander Mikhaylovich Arkhipov
• Prosecutor of the Mogilev region: Senior Counsellor in Justice
Eduard Aleksandrovich Senkevich
• Prosecutor of the City of Minsk: State Counsellor in Justice of
the 3rd Grade Nikolai Nikolaevich Kulik
• Belarusian Transport Prosecutor : State Counsellor in Justice
of the 3rd Grade Anatoly Konstantinovich Dudkin
• Belarusian Military Prosecutor : Colonel in Justice Alexander
Nikolaevich Dranitsa
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STATE CONTROL COMMITTEE
The State Control Committee exercises supervision over execution
of the republican budget, use of state property, execution of acts
of the president, parliament, government, and other government
agencies, which regulate state property relations, economic,
financial, and tax relations.
The State Control Committee is formed by the president;
chairman of the committee is appointed by the president.
The Committee is guided by the Constitution, law No.369–З
of February 9, 2000 on the State Control Committee of the Republic
of Belarus, law No.414.З of July 16, 2008 on financial investigations
agencies of the State Control Committee of the Republic of Belarus,
and other legislative acts.
Management of structural units of the State Control
Committee and its bodies
Chairman of the State Control Committee: Zenon Kuzmich
Lomat
First Deputy Chairperson of the State Control Committee:
Lyudmila Aleksandrovna Borovskaya
Deputy Chairman of the State Control Committee: Director of
the Financial Investigations Department Victor Ivanovich
Baranovsky (hold the interim appointment)
Department for Financial Monitoring of the State Control
Committee: Valery Pavlovich Yaroshesky
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STATE SECURITY COMMITTEE (KGB)
Being a component of the national security system of the Republic
of Belarus, state security agencies ensure security of person,
society, and state from internal and external threats within the
delegated powers.
The president and Council of Ministers exercise direction of
state security agencies within the powers delegated by the
president. Prosecutor General of the Republic of Belarus and
Prosecutors subordinate to the Prosecutor General exercise
supervision over exact and consistent observance of laws and other
legislative acts of the Republic of Belarus by state security agencies
within the limits of their jurisdiction.
State security agencies are guided by the Constitution of the
Republic of Belarus, law No.102.З of December 3, 1997 on state
security agencies of the Republic of Belarus, presidential decree
No.116 of March 25, 2003 on foreign intelligence, concept of
national security of the Republic of Belarus approved by
presidential decree No.390 of July 17, 2001, regulation on the State
Security Committee of the Republic of Belarus approved by
presidential decree No.566 of November 18, 2004.
Composition of the State Security Committee
and its bodies
Chairman of the KGB of the Republic of Belarus: Major General
Vadim Yurievich Zaitsev
First Deputy Chairman of the KGB of the Republic of Belarus
for Counterintelligence: Major General Victor Pavlovich Vegera
Deputy Chairman of the KGB of the Republic of Belarus for
Economic Security and Fight against Corruption: Colonel Ivan
Stanislavovich Tertel
Deputy Chairman of the KGB of the Republic of Belarus:
Colonel Leonid Nikolayevich Dedkov
Deputy Chairman of the KGB of the Republic of Belarus: Major
General Igor Andreyevich Bakhmatov
Head of the KGB Bureau for the City of Minsk and Minsk
Region: Colonel Vladimir Viktorovich Kalach
Head of the KGB Bureau for the Brest Region: Colonel Igor
Evgenyevich Busko
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Head of the KGB Bureau for the Vitebsk Region: Colonel
Gennady Anatolyevich Gerasimenko
Head of the KGB Bureau for the Gomel Region: Colonel Ivan
Anatolyevich Leskovsky
Head of the KGB Bureau for the Grodno Region: Major General
Ivan Alekseyevich Korzh
Head of the KGB Bureau for the Mogilev Region: Major
General Igor Petrovich Sergeyenko
Head of the Bureau for Military Counter.Intelligence of the
KGB: Major General Alexei Ivanovich Zakharov
Head of the Institute for National Security of the Republic of
Belarus: Major General Igor Nikonovich Kuznetsov
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STATE BOUNDARY COMMITTEE
The State Boundary Committee of the Republic of Belarus is a
republican organ of government, which implements state
boundary policy, ensures boundary security, regulates and
manages activities in this sector, coordinates activities of organs
of government and other organizations in the field of state
boundary policy and boundary security. The State Boundary
Committee heads the integrated system of boundary service
agencies of the Republic of Belarus
The State Boundary Committee is guided by the Constitution
of the Republic of Belarus, legislative acts on state boundary policy
and boundary security.
Chairman of the State Boundary Committee of the Republic
of Belarus exercises direction of the State Boundary Committee.
Chairmen are appointed to the post and are dismissed from the
post by the president of the Republic of Belarus.
Chairman is subordinate to the president of the Republic of
Belarus, and – in cases within the jurisdiction of the Council of
Ministers under the Constitution of the Republic of Belarus, laws
of the Republic of Belarus, and instruments of the president of the
Republic of Belarus – to the prime minister of the Republic of
Belarus.
Chairman has deputies, one of which is a first deputy appointed
to the post and dismissed from the post by the president of the
Republic of Belarus. The number of deputy chairmen is determined
by the president of the Republic of Belarus. The State Boundary
Committee includes directorates general, directorates, depart.
ments, sectors (groups), and services (with the rights of sectors
(groups)).
Management:
Chairman of the State Boundary Committee of the Republic
of Belarus: Major General Igor Anatolyevich Rachkovsky
First Deputy Chairman, chief of the Main Operations
Directorate: Colonel Andrei Georgievich Gorulko
Deputy Chairman, chief of the Main Directorate for Ideology
and Staffing Support: Colonel Oleg Borisovich Abyzov
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Deputy Chairman, chief of the Main Directorate for Materiel
Control: Colonel Anatoly Petrovich Lappo
Deputy Chairman for Regime and Organizational Support:
Colonel Dmitry Grigoryevich Shugai
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MINISTRY OF THE INTERIOR
Internal affairs bodies are law.enforcement agencies engaged in
crime control, protection of public order, and ensuring of public
safety consistent with the tasks allotted by the law on of the Interior
agencies and other legislative acts of the Republic of Belarus.
Law.enforcement bodies are a component of the system of
maintenance of national security of the Republic of Belarus.
Law.enforcement bodies are guided by the Constitution of the
Republic of Belarus, law No.263.З of July 17, 2007 on law.
enforcement bodies of the Republic of Belarus, decrees and
ordinances of the president of the Republic of Belarus, other
legislative acts of the Republic of Belarus.
Composition of the Ministry of the Interior:
Minister: Major General of the Police Anatoly Nilovich
Kuleshov
Central organizational.analytical department
Monitoring and inspections directorate: department of
monitoring
Internal security directorate
Directorate for restricted and classified activity
Audit directorate
Military mobilization directorate
Special anti.terrorist unit Almaz
Department of corrections
Department of finance and logistics
Directorate of information and analysis
Belarusian Sports Association Dynamo
First deputy minister of the interior – chief of the directorate
general of the criminal police
Directorate general of the criminal police
Directorate general for criminal investigation
Directorate for drug enforcement and combating human
trafficking
Directorate general for combating corruption and economic
crime
Directorate general for operational.investigative activity
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Directorate general for combating organized crime and
corruption
Interpol National Central Bureau in Belarus
Directorate for hi.tech crime investigation
Deputy minister of the interior – chief of the public security
police
Public security police and special police
Department of protection
Department of citizenship and migration
Passportization bureau
Special road police unit Strela
Deputy minister of the interior – Interior Ministry troops
commander
Directorate general of the Interior Ministry troops commander,
forces and units of the interior troops
Department of the interior troops of the Military Academy of
the Republic of Belarus
Deputy minister of the interior – chief of preliminary
investigation
Preliminary investigation (of the headquarters and subordinate
divisions)
State Forensic Science Center
Deputy minister of the interior – chief of the main personnel
directorate (secretary of state)
Main personnel directorate
Directorate for international cooperation
Directorate for information and public relations
Educational institution of the Ministry of the Interior
Territorial and transport interior bodies and divisions
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MINISTRY OF DEFENSE
The armed forces of the Republic of Belarus are a structural element
of the state military establishment intended to ensure military
security and armed protection of the Republic of Belarus, its
sovereignty, independence, and territorial integrity.
The armed forces act in line with the Constitution of the
Republic of Belarus, international agreements of the Republic of
Belarus, law No.1904.XII of November 3, 1992 on the armed forces
of the Republic of Belarus, regulations on performance of active
duty, other regulatory enactments.
The military posture of the Republic of Belarus is determined
by law No.1902.XІІ of November 3, 1992 on defense; law No.74.З
of January 3, 2002 on the military doctrine.
The armed forces include the central management authority;
branches of the armed forces; service arms; special task forces; military
educational institutions, and organizations of the Ministry of Defense.
The central management authority includes the Ministry of
Defense and Joint Staff of the armed forces, which is an
organizational unit of the Ministry of Defense.
The branches of the armed forces are the land forces; air force
and air defense troops.
The overall direction of the armed forces is carried out by the
president of the Republic of Belarus, commander.in.chief of the
armed forces, and the Council of Ministers within the power
delegated by the President.
Management:
Minister of Defense of the Republic of Belarus: Lieutenant
General Yuri Viktorovich Zhadobin
Chief of the Joint Staff of the Armed Forces: First Deputy
Minister of Defense of the Republic of Belarus Major General Pyotr
Nikolayevich Tikhnovsky
Deputy Minister of Defense for Personnel and Military
Training: Chief of the Central Personnel Administration of the
Ministry of Defense Major General Mikhail Vasilyevich Puzikov
Deputy Minister of Defense of the Republic of Belarus for Arms
Materiel: Chief of Arms of the Armed Forces Major General Ivan
Vasilyevich Dyrman
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Deputy Minister of Defense for Logistics: Service Support
Commander of the Armed Forces Major General Alexander
Vasilyevich Boligatov
Commander of the Land Forces: Major General Alexander
Nikolaevich Nikitin
Commander of the Air Force and Air Defense of the Armed
Forces: Major General Igor Pavlovich Azaryonok
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PUBLIC HEALTH SERVICES
According to the National Statistics Committee of the Republic of
Belarus, as of early 2010, the population of Belarus was estimated
at 9,480,000, including 4,417,000 men and 5,063,000 women, with
a 192,000 year.on.year decline taking into account the preliminary
results of the population census of 2009 (see National Statistics
Committee of the Republic of Belarus – BELSTAT: http://
belstat.gov.by/homep/ru/indicators/population.php and http://
news.tut.by/133218.html).
The Life Expectancy Index as of 2007 (published in 2009)
Source: http://gtmarket.ru/ratings/life.expectancy.index/life.expectancy.
index.info
In January.August, the number of deaths increased 0.9% year.
on.year and exceeded 89,400 (see http://www.open.by/health/
10342)
The central department for employment and population policy
of the Ministry of Labor and Social Protection informs that the
number of deaths went up both in cities (101.1%) and villages
(100.7%). The highest increase is reported in the Grodno region
(102.6%), while in January.August 2009, there was a 1.9% decrease
in the number of deaths in the Mogilev region as against January.
August 2008, and a 0.2% decrease in the Gomel region.
Over eight months of 2009, the crude mortality rate went up
from 13.6 to 13.9 pro mille year.on.year. In the opinion of
experts, the leading causes of death are diseases of the
circulatory system (54.2%), cancer (13.4%), old age and external
causes (10.1%).
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In January.August 2009, the child mortality rate decreased 0.1
pro mille and reached 4.5 per 1,000 newborn infants. The level of
infantile death rate specified in the National Program of
Demographic Safety (below 6 pro mille) is achieved in almost all
regions and the city of Minsk. The rate of 6.5 pro mille is reported
in the Gomel region.
According to official sources, public expenditure on health
increased from US $59 per capita in 2001 up to US $160 in 2006. In
2009, the amount of financing of the public health sector stood at
BYR 5.127 trillion (see http://www.ej.by/news/2010.01.21/
v_belarusi_raschody_na_zdravoochranenie_sokraschay.html).
Social and economic safety index in the Republic of Belarus
1 National Safety of the Republic of Belarus. Ccurrent State and Perspecti.
ves / M.V. Myasnikovich [and others] – Мn.: IООО Law and Economy,
2003.
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SCIENCE
The scientific potential of Belarus is concentrated in the National
Academy of Sciences of Belarus (NAS), institutions of higher
education, scientific research institutes and centers, and design
bureaus. Fundamental and applied research is conducted by nearly
30,000 persons at 300 institutions.
Belarus is among the leading countries with respect to
fundamental research in the field of physics, mathematics,
advanced materials, and software. Techno.parks and technology
transfer centers promote scientific research findings on the
domestic and foreign markets. Research and development centers
hugely contribute to enhancement of the science.production
cooperation (see EXPORT.by portal).
According to the World Bank, Belarus is ranked 59th in the
world and 3rd in CIS regarding the economy index and leads with
respect to the level of educational and ICT development.
Belarus is ranked below Russia and Ukraine by the scientific
and technical potential being the third in the CIS. The innovation
infrastructure includes the High Technologies Park, 10 scientific
technological parks, 5 innovation centers, 24 technology transfer
centers, 9 business incubators, 10 information and marketing
centers. Most of them are state.controlled; their efficiency is rather
low, and impacts on private business advance are not enough, not
to speak of the national economy of Belarus as a whole.
It is customary to assume that for normal development of the
scientific and technical potential, the research intensity (the ratio
between the R&D expenses and Gross Domestic Product) should
be more than 1% of GDP. In industrialized countries this parameter
reaches 2.5% to 3.0% and over. If it accounts for 1% and below, the
research intensity is considered to be critical.
In 1990, the research intensity in Belarus made up 1.47% of
GDP (0.73% in 1997 and 0.72% in 2000).
The Socioeconomic Development Program envisaged the
research intensity at the rate of 1.2% to 1.4% in 2010. However, the
state failed to approach this target. In 2005, the research intensity
constituted 0.68%, 0.75% in 2008, and 0.7% in 2009.
According to the official statistics, in 2009, Belarusian scholars
worked out more than 260 advanced industrial technologies (up
313
70% compared to 2007). Among the recent achievements of
Belarusian scientists is creation of the first.ever optical semi.
conductor lasers radiating in the blue region of the spectrum, laser
TV, newest technologies enabling to create light.emitting diodes
and elements of optical data storage devices of the new generation
intended for satellite communication. Experts say the situation in
the field of science began to improve before the crisis and many
scholars were coming back from abroad.
In 2008, scientists of the National Center for Particle Physics
and High Energy of the Belarusian State University took part in
creation of the international linear collider, and in 2009, Russian
and Belarusian scientists set about development of super.
computers, unique on the world market. The new supercomputer
is able to perform up to 500 trillion operations per second, while
the capacity of first line SKIF.family computers was up to 0.5
trillion operations per second. Forth line SKIF.family
supercomputers are being developed under the SKIF.GRID Union
program.
In 2009, the Belarusian Scientific Research Institute of
Epidemiology and Microbiology generated a special.purpose
panel of reagents for diagnostics of influenza A(H1N1), the so.
called swine flu, and studying of its etiological factor. The panel
allows carrying out instant diagnosis in patients with clinical signs
of the flu in one or two days.
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EDUCATION
The Ministry of Education of the Republic of Belarus provides
regulation, management and governmental monitoring in the
education sector (http://www.minedu.by/).
The Education Index – a composite index of the United
Nations Development Program (UNDP) – is measured by the
adult literacy rate and the combined primary, secondary, and
tertiary gross enrollment ratio. In the list of countries by Education
Index published in 2009, Belarus is ranked 68th (the index being
0.961). For comparison: Norway is the first; Poland is 41st; Lithuania
is 46th; Latvia is 48th; the Russian Federation is 71st; Ukraine is
85th (see: http://gtmarket.ru/ratings/education.index/
education.index.info).
The adult literacy rate in Belarus makes up 99.7%. The ratio of
university students is 453 per 10,000 population. It is the highest
index over the entire history of independent Belarus and one of
the highest indices in the world. In 2009, vocational schools
admitted more than 59,000 persons, which is 24% more than in 2008;
90,000 became university students (the information was provided
by Deputy Prime Minister of Belarus V.N. Potupchik on October
28, 2009. See http://house.gov.by/index.php/,992,22811,1,,
0,0,0.html)
The following legislative and statutory acts constitute the legal
framework of the education system:
• Law No.1202.X ІІ on education of October 29, 1991;
• Law No.252.З on higher education of July 11, 2007;
• Law No.141.З on general secondary education of July 5, 2006;
• Law No.216.З on vocational technical training of June 29, 2003;
• The law on vocational technical training;
• The law on education of mentally and physically challenged
persons (special education);
• Resolution No.1255 of the Council of Ministers of the Republic
of Belarus on approval of regulations on reimbursement of costs
of training of a worker (employee), expert to the republican
and (or) local budgets of September 23, 2006;
• Decree of the President of the Republic of Belarus No.80 on
the procedure of admission to higher educational and
specialized secondary educational establishments of February
7, 2006.
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Source: Ministry of Education, http://www.minedu.unibel.by/
ru/main.aspx?guid=1061.
Basic quantitative indicator
of the education system
According to Tatiana Kovaleva, Deputy Minister of
Education, in 2009, four schools opened in Minsk, one school
opened in each of the Gomel and Brest regions; 97 schools closed.
Most of the closed schools are located in rural districts: low
attendance (some schools only totaled three to four students), in
want of repair or re.equipment (the information is provided by
Tatiana Kovaleva, Deputy Minister of Education, see: http://
pda.sb.by/post/90055/).
Comparative analysis of education development in the
regions of Belarus as of early 2009/2010 academic year (Source:
Main Information and Analysis Center of the Ministry of
Education of the Republic of Belarus: http://giac.unibel.by/ru/
main.aspx?guid=15941)
Preschool institutions
4,087 preschool institutions as of January 1, 2009 (managed
by the Ministry of Education: 3,872/94.7%); number of pupils:
367,739; the total number of seats: 365,131.
Compared with a year earlier, the total number of preschool
institutions was down 22 units (0.5%).
Out of the total number of pupils, 49,394 (13.4%) attend schools
where studies are conducted in the Belarusian language; 318,285
(86.6%) attend schools where studies are conducted in the Russian
language; 60 children (0.02%) use the Polish language.
Orphans and children deprived of parental care
Orphans and children deprived of parental care in foster
families as of January 1, 2009: 24,420 (431 children more than in
2008).
As many as 3,242 children and persons of full age were adopted
by foreign persons (3,237 as of January 1, 2008).
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Higher educational institutions
As of early 2009/2010 academic year: 53 higher educational
institutions in total, 43 of them are state managed ones, including
the Academy of Management under the President of the Republic
of Belarus:
• Universities – 31;
• Academies – 7;
• Institutes – 2;
• Higher education colleges – 3.
State universities employ 25,716 teachers including employees
holding second jobs, among them: doctors of sciences – 1,281
persons, doctoral candidates – 8,180 persons; professors – 1,205
persons; associate professors – 6,547 persons.
Basic quantitative characteristics of state universities base
In 2009, state universities of the republic admitted 85,440
persons, which is 6,309 more than last year.
Specialized secondary educational establishments: Belarus
totals 199 state.managed specialized secondary educational
establishments and 12 private educational institutions.
The total number of students of state.managed educational
institutions reaches 145,400 persons, which is 6,600 persons more
than last year.
Vocational technical training: 232 establishments in total,
including 225 state.managed and 7 private ones.
Establishments of out.of.school education: 387 establishments
in total, which is 3 establishments more than last year (as of
December 1, 2009).
Daytime general education schools and residential schools:
3,656 in total (93 schools less than last year (as of September 5,
2009/2010 academic year), including 3,651 establishments
subordinate to the Ministry of Education, one subordinate to the
Ministry of Social Protection, one subordinate to the Ministry of
317
Culture, one subordinate to the Ministry of Defense, one
subordinate to the National Bank, and one subordinate to the
Ministry of Emergency Situations.
Alongside with that, by the beginning of the academic year,
the country totaled 9 private educational establishments.
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NONGOVERNMENTAL
ORGANIZATIONS
As of January 1, 2010, The Ministry of Justice registered 15 political
parties and 994 party entities, 35 trade unions and 22,885 trade
union entities, 2,225 public associations (including 226
international, 667 republican, 1,332 local ones, and 31,636 of their
organizational entities), 22 unions of public associations, and 84
foundations (including 9 international, 4 republican and 71 local
ones). Source: Ministry of Justice of Belarus (http://minjust.by/).
In 2009, the Ministry of Justice of the Republic of Belarus
reported registration of 94 new public associations (including 3
international, 16 republican, and 75 local ones), and 8 new
foundations (including 1 international foundation).
Last year, the ministry registered and had files on 18 new
entities of political parties, 748 new entities of trade unions, and
5,228 new entities other public associations.
Basic regulatory documents:
• Law of the Republic of Belarus on public associations;
• Law of the Republic of Belarus on political parties;
• Law of the Republic of Belarus on trade unions;
• Decree No.302 of the President of the Republic of Belarus of
July 1, 2005 on particular measures aimed at regulation of
activities of foundations;
• Resolution No.48 of the Ministry of Justice of the Republic of
Belarus of August 30, 2005 on approval of regulatory legal acts
on registration and examination of documents connected with
state registration of political parties, trade unions, other public
associations, their unions (associations), and also state
registration and taking of state register, putting on and taking
off records of their organizational entities;
• Resolution No.43 of the Ministry of Justice of the Republic of
Belarus of August 3, 2005 on the procedure of publication and
content of information about use of property by a fund subject
to reporting.
The statistics shows that institutions of justice annually register
the number of nongovernmental organizations, which compen.
sates their reduction as a result of voluntary liquidation or
compulsory liquidation on the basis of court ruling.
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Source: Human Rights Center Viasna (http://www.spring96.
org/be/news/31774/); NGO Assembly (http://belngo.info/)
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PARTIES
Information about political parties registered in the Republic of
Belarus
As of March 7, 2010
Source: Ministry of Justice of the Republic of Belarus (http://
minjust.by/)
Head:
Address:
Head:
Phone:
Steering body:
Goals:
Date of formation:
Date of registration:
Date of re.registration:
Registration number
Name:
Address:
Head:
Phone:
Steering body:
Liberal Democratic Party
89а Sadovaya St., Minsk district,
Minsk region, 220000
Gaidukevich, Sergey Vasilyevich
503 11 61
Supreme Council
Construction of a law.governed state
with mixed economy by parliamentary
methods through advocacy of
liberalism and liberal democracy,
recognition of the multi.party system,
pluralism of opinions, securing of civic
rights and liberties, non.violent acts;
creation of favorable conditions for
dignified life for all citizens of the
Republic of Belarus, free development
of human personality in the economic,
political and cultural spheres.
05.02.1994
24.02.1994
15.06.1999
025
Belarusian Social Sports Party
77а/B Kalinovskogo St. No.3, Minsk,
220000
Aleksandrovich, Vladimir Aleksan.
drovich
283 07 50
Council
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Goals:
Date of formation:
Date of registration:
Date of re.registration:
Registration number:
Name:
Address:
Head:
Phone:
Steering body:
Goals:
Assistance in strengthening economi.
cally advanced, socially focused,
stable state by means of upgrading
public regulations; association of
progressive forces of the Republic of
Belarus for implementation of social
programs promoting enhancement of
spiritual, cultural and economic
potential of Belarusian people;
drawing of public attention to issues
of upbringing of the younger
generation, advocacy of ideas of
civilization, patriotism, healthy
lifestyle; involvement of citizens in
local self.government and fulfillment
of social tasks.
06.11.1994
09.12.1994
13.09.1999
024
Belarusian Green Party
11а Radialnaya St., 220070, Minsk
Novikov, Oleg Anatolyevich
+375 29 707 36 78
Central Council
Creation of healthy life environment for
a human, with its social and natural
parameters to provide maximum
possibilities for his development;
development of spirituality, high moral
attitude to everything alive, formation
and spreading of ecological style of
thinking, in all spheres of life of people,
including the political sphere; peace
between nations and states, prohibition
and perspective extermination of
nuclear, chemical and biological
weapons, as well as the most destructive
types of general weapons
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Date of formation:
Date of registration:
Date of re.registration:
Registration number:
Name:
Address:
Head:
Steering body:
Goals:
Date of formation:
Date of registration:
Date of re.registration:
Registration number:
Name:
Address:
Head:
Steering body:
Goals:
17.04.1994
03.06.1994
13.09.1999
032
Social Democratic Party of People’s
Concord
10 Marksa St., Minsk, 220050
Yermak, Sergey Vladimirovich
Council
Construction of civilized law.governed
state, promotion to democratic re.
forms.
15.03.1997
21.05.1997
30.09.1999
0014
Belarusian Agrarian Party
7A Fabritsiusa St., Minsk, 220007
Rusy, Mikhail Ivanovich
Central Council
Full.scale participation of party
members in activities of governmental
and local authorities by delegating
elected representatives of the party;
political education of citizens,
development of the sense of patriotism
and statehood; opinion research in the
field of public and political policies
and bringing it to notice of public,
governmental institutions and
agencies of local self.government;
participation in elections in line with
the legislation in force; participation in
adoption and implementation of
programs aimed at economic and
social development of rural areas;
preservation of spiritual and moral
values of the nation, development of
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Date of formation:
Date of registration:
Date of re.registration:
Registration number:
Name:
Address:
Head:
Phone:
Steering body:
Goals:
Date of formation:
Date of registration:
Date of re.registration:
Registration number:
Name:
Address:
Head:
Phone:
Steering body:
Goals:
Date of formation:
Date of registration:
Registration number:
the potential of material and spiritual
culture of Belarusian village
13.06.1992
13.07.1992
22.09.1999
034
Republican Party
34 Pritytskogo St., Minsk, 220082
Belozor, Vladimir Yakovlevich
203 97 83; 224 90 37
Central Board
Revival and strengthening of the
sovereign, humane, democratic state
of Belarus with fair alliance with the
republics of the former USSR and
countries of the West, maintenance of
high standards of living; construction
of economy on an essentially new basis
based on market mechanisms and
political sovereignty of the Republic of
Belarus and prosperity of its people;
strict securing of human rights in the
Republic of Belarus.
12.03.1994
25.05.1994
30.09.1999
030
Conservative Christian Party
Belarusian Popular Front
8 Masherova Ave., Minsk, 220005
Poznyak, Zenon Stanislavovich
285 34 70, 261 36 74
Sojm
Establishment of democratic society and
construction of strong Belarusian state.
26.09.1999
28.02.2000
0018
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Name:
Address:
Head:
Phone:
Steering body:
Goals:
Date of formation:
Date of registration:
Date of re.registration:
Registration number:
Name:
Address:
Head:
Phone:
Steering body:
Goals:
Date of formation:
Date of registration:
Date of re.registration:
Registration number:
Name:
Address:
Head:
Phone:
Steering body:
Goals:
Belarusian Popular Front
8 Masherova Ave., Minsk, 220005
Yanukevich, Alexey Antonovich
284 50 12
Sojm
Implementation of the Program of the
Public Association Belarusian Popular
Front Adradzhenne (“Revival”) by
means of participation and formation
of governmental authorities of the
Republic of Belarus.
30.05.1993
19.08.1993
30.09.1999
028
Republican Party of Labor and Justice
17 Kaliningradsky Lane, No.21, Minsk,
220012
Zadnepryany, Vasily Vasilyevich
280 48 07; 280 66 11; 290 96 44;
290 96 45
Political Council
Creation of society of economic
security and social justice.
26.06.1993
18.08.1993
18.06.1999
022
Belarusian United Left Party “Fair
World”
12 Kalinina Lane, No.312, Minsk,
220012
Kalyakin, Sergey Ivanovich
281 68 13, 292 25 73
Central Committee
Association and political development
of wage and salary workers for total
liberation from all kinds of exploitation
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of man by man and construction of
classless society of social justice
07.12.1991
26.05.1992
05.07.1999
036
United Civic Party
22 Khoruzhei St., office 38, Minsk,
220123
Lebedko, Anatoly Vladimirovich
289 50 09
National Committee
Assistance in constructing civil society
and lawful state on the basis of free
market relations, priority of human
rights, universal values and pluralism
of all development trends of society;
protection of rights, liberties and
legitimate interests of citizens of
Belarus within the framework of the
current Belarusian legislation;
assistance in creating conditions for
higher standards of living of citizens by
decisive reforming of economy and
integration into the global economical
community
01.10.1995
28.11.1995
30.07.1999
026
Belarusian Patriotic Party
7 Papanina St., No.107, Minsk, 220089
Ulakhovich, Nikolai Dmitrievich
226 32 60
Council
Promotion to construction of socially
just society; assistance in formation of
a renewed union of brotherly nations,
Date of formation:
Date of registration:
Date of re.registration:
Registration number:
Name:
Address:
Head:
Phone:
Steering body:
Goals:
Date of formation:
Date of registration:
Date of re.registration:
Registration number:
Name:
Address:
Head:
Phone:
Steering body:
Goals:
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first of all Russia, Belarus, and Ukraine;
support to the President in his efforts
to implement the election program and
immediate anti.crisis measures; pro.
tection of national interests, honor and
dignity of Motherland in all domains
08.10.1994
10.11.1994
25.08.1999
006
Belarusian Social Democratic
Gramada
4 Kulman St., Minsk, 220013
Shushkevich, Stanislav Stanislavovich
226 74 37
Central Council
Creation of humane democratic
society on a mixed economy basis and
multi.party system; legal and social
protection of workers; advocacy of the
fundamentals of freedom of person,
social justice, and solidarity
15.02.1998
27.05.1998
30.08.1999
033
Belarusian Social Democratic Party
(Gramada)
52/1 Rokossovskogo Ave., 241А,
Minsk, 220095
Levkovich, Anatoly Iosifovich
346 86 94
Central Committee
Construction of consolidated society
on the basis of freedom, equality, social
justice, democracy, and precedence of
law; construction of independent,
democratic, law.governed, and social
Date of formation:
Date of registration:
Date of re.registration:
Registration number:
Name:
Address:
Head:
Phone:
Steering body:
Goals:
Date of formation:
Date of registration:
Date of re.registration:
Registration number:
Name:
Address:
Head:
Phone:
Steering body:
Goals:
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Belarusian state, an equal member of
the European and world communities.
29.06.1996
29.01.1997
09.09.1999
035
Communist Party of Belarus
21 Chicherina St., No.412, Minsk,
220029
Golubeva, Tatiana Gennadievna
293 48 88; 293 43 11
Central Committee
Orientation of society to the socialist
way of development leading to
construction of society of social justice
based on the fundamentals of
collectivism, freedom and equality;
support to democracy, strengthening
of Belarusian statehood and
reconstitution of the state union of
Soviet peoples on a voluntary basis.
02.11.1996
21.11.1996
09.09.1999
029
Date of formation:
Date of registration:
Date of re.registration:
Registration number:
Name:
Address:
Head:
Phone:
Steering body:
Goals:
Date of formation:
Date of registration:
Date of re.registration:
Registration number:
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MASS MEDIA
Results of re.registration of media outlets and news agencies; as
of February 8, 2010
Source: Ministry of Information of the Republic of Belarus
(http://www.mininform.gov.by/).
ReEregistered print media, news agencies, eEmedia
Print media, news agencies, eEmedia,
which failed to pass reEregistration
As many as 1,075 print media outlets, 211 e.media outlets, and
6 news agencies were re.registered; 230 print media outlets, 17 e.
media outlets, and 3 news agencies failed to pass re.registration.
Situation with the mass media in Belarus in 2009 as rated by
international organizations:
• Reporters Without Borders, Freedom of the Press World
Ranking: Belarus is 151th among 175 countries. Despite a
certain “improvement” of the situation as compared with a year
earlier (154th rating), Belarus remains in the not.free.mass.
media zone. A relative improvement of the situation is
329
connected with statements made by the national authorities
concerning cautious liberalization in the mass media sector
within the framework of the dialogue with the European Union;
• Freedom House, World Press Freedom Review: 188th among
195 countries;
• Nations in Transit 2009: Belarus is put at 6.57 points on the 1
to 7 scale (7 being the lowest degree of independence);
according to this report, Belarus is among the countries with a
“consolidated authoritarian regime.”
Belarus is usually at the very bottom of the list as rated by seven
democratic development indices: election process (6.75 points);
civil society (6.25 points); independence of the mass media (6.75
points); democratic rule (6.75 points); local self.government (6.75
points); independence of judicial authorities (6.75 points); level of
corruption (6.0 points).
Source: http://www.freedomhouse.org/uploads/nit/2009/
Belarus.final.pdf
The following events are worth noting since they affected the
independent mass media the most in 2009: on November 11, 2009
the Belarusian authorities permitted the European Radio for
Belarus to open a news bureau and accredited 12 journalists and
staff members.
Activity of other trans.border media outlets is still banned in
Belarus. In early December, the Belarusian Foreign Ministry
allowed Belsat TV channel to open an office in Minsk. The
Prosecutor’s Office kept issuing official warnings to journalists for
cooperation with the foreign mass media without accreditation.
At the same time, the ministry denied accreditation of Belsat and
Radio Racyja journalists.
EEmedia
According to Akavita web service, the following resources lead
the field in the Belarusian segment of the Internet:
• TUT.by
• Charter’97 (charter97.org)
• Belorusski Partisan (belaruspartisan.org/bp.forte)
• BelTA News Agency (belta.by)
• Belorusskiye Novosti (Belarusian News, naviny.by)
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Print media on the Internet
• Komsomolskaya Pravda v Belarusi (Komsomol Truth in Belarus,
kp.by)
• PressBall (pressball.by)
• Belarus Segodnya (Belarus Today, sb.by)
• Nasha Niva (Our Field of Grain, nn.by)
• Narodnaya Gazeta (People’s Newspaper, ng.by)
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